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Abstract
Canada’s 1993 refugee policy Guidelines for Women Refugees Fearing Gender-Related 
Persecution reinterpret the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to 
radically expand state-responsibilities for women’s human rights. The evolution of this novel 
inter-state responsibility departed from established models of policy-making in some 
important respects. This study explores how asylum seekers challenged Canada to align 
domestic policies on violence against women with humanitarian responsibilities in refugee 
policy, shaping their own eligibility criteria and rights to state protection. These stateless 
persons and foreign nationals drew upon both human rights and Canadian citizenship rights 
in order to make claims upon the state and influence policy. Their influence has implications 
not only for women’s rights to inter-state protection, but for non-citizen participation in 
policy-making.
The participation of non-citizens in policy-making has been neglected in academic 
social policy. Here their role in policy-advocacy networks is explored through an analytic 
framework that draws on migration system theory and collective action theories. This 
illuminates the inter-state structural context, interactions between grassroots actors and 
government, and the interplay of national and supranational identity and rights issues. The 
study then identifies the structural context and key political opportunities that opened up for 
women seeking asylum and challenging refugee policy. Case studies are analysed to describe 
how emerging opportunities were used by the particular asylum seekers and their core 
network of supporters between 1991 and 1997, and to what effect.
Insight is provided into: how refugee policy-making involves asylum seekers whose 
roles are expanding in complicated and dynamic relationships with receiving-states; why anew 
international migration flow based on age-old structural persecution emerged in the late 
twentieth century and who these asylum seekers really are; the ways they influenced policy; and 
the extent and implications of their influence, for policy and policy-making.
The thesis suggests that academic social policy may need to rethink nationally bound 
policy and policy-change frameworks and their traditional basis in citizenship, which 
globalisation is calling into question. It suggests that citizenship and human rights discourses 
and state-responsibilities are merging through the influence of stateless persons and foreign- 
nationals who make expressly political use of new policy advocacy opportunities, both 
institutional and extra-institutional, and through transnational identity and rights issues of 
which feminism is a strong example. It indicates that Canada’s policy guidelines are not the 
end of the road -  refugee policy needs to move in a direction that recognises both ‘gender- 
related’ and ‘sex’ persecution at the heart of asylum seekers’ claims.
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It is worth noting that the argument against recognizinggender-based -persecution that proved the most 
powerful was the “flaodgpte” aigunwit: the thmti lies in wcmm dang something, getting up and 
walking, rather than sitting still and being awarded concessions.
(Janet Dench, CCR, speech to Boston College Law School, 23 March 1994)
I  ask you: if  we don't listen to women now, when are weeing to listen to them? When are 
they g)ing to be taken seriously? Women around the world are suffering, and governments use all their 
powers not to devdop, but to repress their people... This is the timefor Canada to take a standfor the 
humanrigfts andfundamentalfreedoms ofoppressed women.
(“Nada”, refugee claimant, The Ottawa Citizen 11-03-93)
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Pa r t I.
Seek ing  asylum  from  sex per sec u tio n : t h e  global challenge
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Chapter  1.
Seeking  asylum  from  sex per sec u tio n :
A  CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL POLICY
The immigration officer came inside. He said: 'Madame, whenwas the last letter you gotfromyour 
hudxtnd?... Your lawyer, she talks about a letter that was written to you about a hvedding dress*. What 
does it mean? I  said'--oh. This means that when I  come backfrom Canada... if I  don't stay here in 
Canada I  haw to go back with a wedding dress. But in our culture, when we die we dress in while. Iam  
already married to him,why do I  have to bringaweddingdressf This is it: for me to die in'. 
Therese (refugee claimant). Interview, Montreal July 1995
In a country o f65,000people, there is not a singfe shelterfor victims ofconjugal violence. Andthe 
courts there treat domestic violence asprivatefamily matters. So ted me, who will protect Therese? 
Marie-Louise Cote (Therese1 s lawyer), Montreal Gazette 17/11/94
I. Introduction
Therese’s experience, as she and her lawyer describe above, is both typical and atypical for an 
asylum seeker. All asylum seekers may experience life in the balance as their claims to 
refugee status are judged for legitimacy and eligibility for international protection. And all 
inland asylum seekers must bear the “burden of proof” in establishing the legitimacy of their 
claims to safeguard their formal status as “refugees” in the host country. A good lawyer will 
help to do so. The atypical nature of Therese’s experience, and asylum seekers like her, 
emerges in the explicit ways their claims and claim-making processes lay bare some 
important assumptions in refugee policy and policy-making generally.
These asylum seekers revealed culturally relativist and sexist eligibility criteria inherent 
to Canadian refugee policy and based on the standard setting 1951 UN Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred to as the 1951 Convention). They argued they 
are persecuted because they are female or in ways specific to females, and accordingly claimed 
they were seeking asylum from sex persecution despite its absence from the 1951 
Convention and standard state applications of it. Thus at the time, such claims were typically 
considered illegitimate even in Canada with its progressive humanitarian and women’s rights 
reputation. Yet these asylum seekers argued for the rights and benefits of membership in 
Canada, namely equivalent protection from violence against women that residents of Canada 
are entitled to receive. In so doing, as this study shows, they helped change policy.
Instated in March 1993 and revised in November 1996, Canada’s internationally
path-breaking policy Guidelines for Women Rffitgees Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (hereafter
referred to as the Guidelines) apply the 1951 Convention to female-specific forms of
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persecution. They do so by interpreting recognised structural causes through a ‘gender- 
related’ lens. As often remarked, they constitute a radical departure from established 
interpretations of international law on human rights, refugees and state responsibilities. And 
as this study shows, the role of asylum seekers and their means of influence in this policy 
development process constitute an important departure from traditional policy and policy­
making frameworks.
This study illustrates and explains the challenge which women seeking asylum from 
sex persecution faced and posed to refugee policy and policy-making through their claim- 
making and campaigning in Canada between 1991 and 1997. It reveals that non-citizens can 
profoundly challenge -  and help change -  national policy, and with it state responsibilities 
toward the welfare of noncitizens. More specifically, this unique case shows how noncitizens 
helped shape their own eligibility criteria for membership as laid out in refugee policy by 
elaborating the links between human rights based asylum seeking and social rights associated 
with citizenship. Thus their participation in and means of policy advocacy raises important 
questions for academic social policy regarding long-standing assumptions about the idea of 
‘citizenship’ underlying policy and policy-making frameworks, and subsequently about the 
scope and aims or justification of social policy in a world deeply affected by globalisation.
Several observable aspects of the campaigns were particularly striking and shaped this 
study, inspired as I witnessed the peak period of campaigning based primarily in Montreal 
where I resided, and secondarily in Toronto. Foremost, campaigns evolved around a series 
of asylum seekers like Therese who, individually and in groups, maJepiMc their claims for 
state protection and the negative decisions they had already received in institutional status- 
determination processes. These claimants made their life stories public through the mass 
media, and did so in an explicitly politicised way in order to argue for rights to protection in 
Canada. Second, they did this through a necessary structure of support that mobilised 
around them. A wide range of nongovernment organisations and specialists rallied around 
claimants, forming a dense network of support and suggesting important advocacy 
relationships were formed between established residents and noncitizens. Third, the 
campaigns brought into stark relief the pervasiveness and salience women’s rights supported 
in national and global level institutionalising structures as powerful legitimating and 
facilitating vehicles, and at the same time the dramatic unevenness in implementation of 
women’s rights across the world and subsequently the continuing pervasiveness of violence 
against women. Fourth, in what emerged as a strategy for addressing the aforesaid 
disjuncture, debates raised by asylum seekers and supporters explicitly invoked both
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citizenship and human rights norms and legal frameworks in an interesting and complex 
dynamic that served both to ground policy demands within these pre-existing institutions and 
to expand them to encompass and safeguard more ideal types of rights in a global world -  in 
this case pertaining to women’s rights.
Finally, and not insignificantly, the campaigns actually succeeded and in a dramatic 
fashion. They brought about a complete turn-around in government opposition to proposed 
policy changes. That is, their influence was obvious, as Canadian officials, academics and 
activists remarked. Many claimants who went public were granted immediate acceptance, 
others were granted stay of deportation until their claims could be reviewed under more 
appropriate policy. The Guidelines were instated a few months later and the government 
agreed to hold national consultations on Gender Issues and Refugees, and to present the 
Guidelines internationally. The Guidelines were first presented at the Vienna Conference on 
Human Rights (June 1993), and over the following years the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and a number of countries instated similar policy 
guidelines of their own. In 1996 an Update to the Canadian Guidelines was passed to better 
reflect the growing jurisprudence on gender-related refugee claims, Canada's Immigration 
and Refugee Board (ERB) Chairperson explained (Mawani,1997).
All of these aspects indicate that noncitizens can participate in policy-making, with 
profound impact on policy and state responsibilities, and that social rights linked to 
citizenship -  in this case policies and programs on violence against women -  are being 
transnationalised. New pressures are arising for the expansion of nationally-bound 
citizenship rights supported in social policies.
Academic discourse in social policy is unable to account for the above aspects of the 
policy campaigns or their implications, despite the discipline’s revived interest in the role and 
relevance of ‘citizenship’ since the 1980s as Section II of this chapter shows. That section 
illuminates the issues at stake for social policy in light of the consequences of mass 
transnational migration, drawing on migration studies and citizenship debates in other 
disciplines, and suggesting why asylum seeking trends in particular urge us to look further. As 
Section III demonstrates, in both popular and scholarly discourses dealing specifically with 
the policy process surrounding the Guidelines, the implications of asylum seekers’ influence 
were obscured from the onset and their participation was soon forgotten. Thus this 
qualitative study aimed to explore and explain these noncitizens’ challenge to policy and 
policy-making, and in so doing to illuminate possible implications for the study and 
application of social policy.
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To explore these asylum seekers' roles in policy change and how national and 
international levels were bridged, the study looks at asylum seekers' extra-institutional actions 
(going 'public'), their relationships with supporters and use of existing moral and legal 
resources to transnationalise their rights. These dimensions are further investigated within 
the broader structural context in an attempt to explain the generation and impact of asylum 
seekers’ challenge. Thus it sees asylum seeking and the campaign process as embedded within 
the wider structural environment of constraints and opportunities, which explain their 
influence as a factor of an environment both facilitating their actorhood and also vulnerable 
to their particular claims. It discloses the pre-existing and changing parameters of seeking 
asylum and challenging refugee policy in the particular case, and how asylum seekers 
negotiated these parameters. In this it highlights inter-relations between asylum seekers’ extra- 
institutional actions (i.e. ‘going public’ on a national level) and institutionalised access to claim- 
making, both as asylum seekers and as residents of Canada. At institutional and extra- 
institutional sites key political opportunities and national and international rights facilitating 
and legitimating their claims are illuminated, helping to explain more broadly why refugee 
policy actually expanded in a time of world-wide cutbacks and constraints on immigration.
The analytical framework developed thus explores asylum seekers* roles in policy 
development in light of broader changes occurring in the international and national structural 
contexts of constraints and opportunities for asylum seekers to challenge refugee policy. It 
explains why asylum seekers may develop decidedly political roles in traditional and newly 
emerging claim-making processes in the late twentieth century. These political roles relate 
both to policy-making and to policy; they question noncitizen rights and state responsibilities 
at the cross-roads between human rights beyond borders and cultural relativism within 
nationally-bound citizenship rights. Through symbolic and strategic means, they inherently 
invoke identity issues to develop links with both national and supranational rights. Section IV 
of this chapter sets out the study and the organisation of the thesis in detail.
Based on this study the thesis suggests that to account for the consequences of 
globalisation, assumptions about citizenship as an underlying justification for social policy 
may need to be revised and policy and policy-making frameworks correspondingly expanded. 
The study provides an important illustration of one way the ideas and institutions of 
citizenship and human rights interact, namely in a symbiotic rather than hierarchical 
relationship, highlighting asylum seekers’ particular role in this developing dynamic. It also 
offers, for the first time, a specific approach to the study of asylum seekers* participation in 
refugee policy-making, and presents a rich empirical description of the emergence of a ‘new’
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refugee flow, the particular policy process, and the unique asylum seekers as refugees and as 
policy actors. This example may be a useful consideration for social policy and citizenship 
debates more generally when questioning just what role citizenship plays, the nature of 
transformations currently occurring, and possible implications for the future.
II. C it iz e n s h ip  &  social  po lic y  in  t h e  a g e  o f  mass tr a n sn a t io n a l  m ig r a t io n
The central questions which asylum seekers’ influence upon refugee policy raises for social 
policy are two tier: In the broader context, how far has social policy taken on the 
consequences of globalisation? What are the consequences of an inter-state system deeply 
affected by transnational migration? More specifically, in what ways does asylum seeking 
inform the idea of citizenship and the dialogue of rights and duties between individuals and 
states underlying academic social policy, in an increasingly global system of nation-states with 
interstate responsibilities?
The social policy literature demonstrates a marked absence of theory and research 
regarding the effects of globalisation (Deacon,1997). More specifically, it neglects 
implications for state responsibilities toward citizens and non-citizens alike: their rights and 
participation in society. This is an important oversight considering the diverse and increasing 
impact of globalisation today, and given that citizenship has long been an underlying 
assumption and central justification for social policy. While the former is well recognised and 
subject to much investigation (see Held et al,1999) the latter remains highly taken for granted.
In Britain the idea of citizenship was largely introduced into academic social policy by 
TH. Marshall’s lectures on Citizenship and Social Class (1949). Marshall’s idea of citizenship is 
concerned less with national allegiance (Rees,1995) or formal legal status (Bottomorel992 in 
Marshall and Bottomore 1992) of the kind arising through birth, allegiance and/or residency, 
and more with a social and qualitative kind of status bestowing equality of rights to social 
integration as “full members of a community”(Marshall 1963:87). But it is also a means of 
achieving such social integration. Marshall calls citizenship a “developing institution” 
between state and society created by investing citizenship status with “rights and duties”. In 
so far as society creates “an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and 
towards which aspiration can be directed”, expressed through rights and duties which come 
to embody the institution of citizenship, citizenship is a “status bestowed” (1963:87,124). 
Ideally it confers equality among those who possess it.
Marshall went on to reveal successive stages in the progression of this developing
institution, each stage marked by the growth of a different type of citizenship right.
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According to his periodisation of history, civil and political rights developed in the 18th* and 
19th centuries respectively, culminating in social rights championed by 20th century welfare 
states. The idea, said Marshall, was that citizenship rights and the state-citizen dialogue 
accruing from those rights would equalise men of different social classes by enabling them to 
become full members of a community, i.e. enjoying full citizenship. The working classes 
could be integrated into what Marshall called ‘civilised’ society not by being lifted out of 
their class, but through equality of civil, political and social rights and the general quality of 
life these rights could foster. Thus Marshall argued the growth of social rights embodied in 
the welfare state need not conflict with the social class system and the rise of capitalism. He 
believed that the inherent tension between democratic and welfare rights on one hand, and 
the distribution of power and incomes by the market on the other, could be managed. 
Focusing particularly on social rights, Marshall treated citizenship as a central justification and 
aim of the welfare state.
Marshall’s conception of citizenship was much discussed and in many ways taken 
for granted in the decades following first publication in 1950. But as we shall see, while it 
remains a tumstone of social policy today it has more recently been criticised on several 
grounds: its inherent parameters of inclusion and exclusion, its Englishness, and the sweeping 
historical analysis underlying both. Subsequently, Marshall’s conceptualisation of the 
relationship between citizenship and social rights in particular has been expanded upon in 
some important respects both in theory and in practice. However, in this the consequences 
of globalisation upon citizenship as a justification for social policy, rights to it and 
participation in its development, remains for the most part unexplored.
Some distinctions are helpful to this analysis. Most importantly, the ideal and 
institution of citizenship involves both a formal membership element and a substantive rights 
element. The social policy literature tends to neglect this distinction and focus primarily on 
substantive rights as did Marshall. Bottomore (in Marshall and Bottomore 1992) underlined 
this observation, drawing upon studies of international migration by Brubaker (1989,1992) 
which illuminate changing relationships between formal and substantive elements. In 
Citizenship and hnmi^ ratim Brubaker explains:
The ‘sociologization’ of the concept of citizenship in the work of Marshall and Bendix 
and theorists of participation has indeed been fruitful [but] it has introduced an 
endogenous bias into the study of citizenship. Formal membership of the state has been 
taken for granted... But the massive immigration of the last quarter-centuiy to Western 
Europe and North America, leaving in its wake a large population whose formal 
citizenship is in question, has engendered a new politics of citizenship, centered 
precisely on the question of membership in the nation-state. (1992:38)
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The conflict and complexity that arises when formal status and substantive rights of 
citizenship are treated synonymously emerges in the case of massive immigration in the late 
twentieth century. Thus begins Brubaker’s comparison of immigration and citizenship in six 
industrial countries, demonstrating that citizenship status is derived differently in countries 
with different immigration traditions. The ‘politics of citizenship’ varies across countries 
because it bears various relations to conceptions of nationhood.
Immigration raises questions about criteria for access to civil, political and social 
citizenship rights, both formally and informally. Brubaker explains clearly two types of grey 
areas in the relation between formal and substantive citizenship, which are organisationally 
helpful. He states (1992:36-38): “That which constitutes citizenship -  the array of rights or 
the pattern of participation -  is not necessarily tied to formal state-membership. Formal 
citizenship is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for substantive citizenship... ” (emphasis 
added). Thus the first grey area arises when formal citizenship “is not a sufficient condition” 
for substantive rights and participation:
one can possess formal state-membership yet be excluded (in law or in fact) from 
certain political, civil, or social rights or from effective participation in the business of 
rule in a variety of settings... (Ibid,36-38)
The second grey area, which Brubaker notes is “less clear”, arises when formal 
citizenship “is not a necessary condition of substantive citizenship”:
...while formal citizenship may be required for certain components of substantive 
citizenship (e.g. voting in national elections), other components... are independent of 
formal state-membership. Social rights, for example, are accessible to citizens and 
legally resident non-citizens on virtually identical terms, as is participation in the self- 
governance of associations, political parties, unions, factory councils, and other 
institutions (Ibid,36-38).
Keeping these two grey areas in mind we may now further explore social policy, first 
regarding access to “the array of rights” and later regarding “patterns of participation” 
specifically in policy-making. Later we will delve even farther into these two grey areas, to 
consider questions raised by the access to rights and participation by status-seeking non-citizens^  
and subsequently the implications of their potential policy influence.
RIGHTS AND BENEFICIARIES
In the first grey area, where formal membership is not a sufficient condition for substantive 
citizenship rights (“in law or in fact”), academic social policy has been quite thorough. Not so 
the second grey area, although foreign bom populations have various types of access to both 
formal citizenship status and substantive rights in host countries.
The social policy literature now shows that citizenship rights unfold differently in 
different national contexts and for different segments of society, in relation to social class and 
market forces. Calls to extend Marshall's concept of citizenship have thus been voiced in 
many ways. In the 1970s it was recognised that socialisation comes to bear upon whether 
citizenship is fully enjoyed, enhanced, or even diminished. In Social Theory and Social Policy 
(1971) Pinker argued that contrary to what Marshall suggested, “citizenship” has not been on 
a one way track toward enhancement through social welfare or social rights. In some cases it 
may actually be diminished. For example, society often stigmatises people for receiving state 
welfare benefits, preventing some and socially penalising others for doing so. Pinker 
emphasised that underlying social structures profoundly affect the level of integration or 
enjoyment of citizenship rights across different segments of society. By posing barriers that 
include some citizens and exclude others from attaining substantive citizenship rights, 
socialisation and stigma undermine the universalism of the welfare state which Marshall 
envisioned through citizenship and the fruition of social rights. Yet, while Pinker referred to 
the concept of citizenship as an “intellectual conceit” as far as substantive rights go, 
citizenship remained the underlying justification for social rights, taking formal citizenship 
status for granted as a basis for substantive rights.
As Rees (1995) pointed out in The Other Marshall, Marshall's later works (1981) were 
increasingly pessimistic of the universalism of the welfare state as an equaliser of citizens of 
different social classes. Indeed, in the 1970s others argued that the welfare state merely 
reproduces class society (for example O’Connor,1973). Along the same lines as Pinker, some 
suggested that access to substantive social citizenship rights needs to be broadened by 
rethinking the social and intellectual assumptions underlying social policy, and reinvesting it 
with values that, in essence, broaden the concept of citizenship: “to adapt our social and 
political institutions to a new and more inclusive idea of citizenship that reflects the 
interconnected social world we live in... ” (Glennerster,1983:222). This revived interest in 
Marshall pursued the problematics of “citizenship” which inheres in underlying structures of 
social inequality. It built upon Marshall’s original use of the concept but identified both its 
Britishness and its unstated structural bias, or what Hill (1997) calls the “deep structures” of 
social policy, which in effect make some people ‘second-class’ citizens. Bulmer and Rees 
provide a forum in Citizenship Today (1996) for the ways social policy analysis has transcended 
the inherent parameters of citizenship set out by Marshall in both these respects.
In terms of ‘deep structures’ of citizenship and social policy, Marshall’s framework 
virtually ignored minorities and women whose civil, political and social rights have unfolded
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differently from that of white males, and in various ways in different countries. In so doing, 
it failed to recognise and indeed framed persisting social inequality based on sex and race as 
well as class. In response, feminist research has generally concentrated on the ways gender 
divisions between paid and unpaid labour underpin the structure of the welfare state and 
uphold women’s structural inequality and dependency. Much of Land’s work in writing about 
“the structure of dependency” in welfare systems (Land, 1989) uncovered ‘the myth of the 
male breadwinner’, in which assumptions about marriage and women’s financial dependency 
underpin the structure of British social security. Lewis (1992) and others have referred to the 
‘male-breadwinner model’ of welfare states, comparing and contrasting the evolution of 
‘gender welfare regimes’ in different states. Welfare regimes undervalue the informal caring 
work generally done by women in lieu of or alongside paid labour (Ungerson 1983).
Subsequently, the idea of citizenship underpinning welfare regimes may be 
inherently patriarchal and thus incompatible with a feminist agenda. On the other hand, 
building upon the citizenship analysis developed by political scientists such as Pateman 
(1988,1989) and Walby (1990) feminist social policy research suggests that by attending to the 
ways citizenship underwrites women’s economic independence, social policy could be 
strengthened to enhance women’s social citizenship rights (see Ungerson and Kembar,1997). 
As Vogel (1991), Lister (1997) and others have observed, in so far as gender divisions 
between public and private or domestic labour have been upheld in social policy, social rights 
have been predicated upon full and continuous labour market participation from which 
women have been excluded or devalued, thus undercutting women’s substantive citizenship 
rights. However, in this feminist scholarship fcrrmd citizenship status is generally not at issue.
Feminist research also became increasingly concerned with the multiplicity of 
women’s experiences and identities, drawing from research on race and ethnicity. Williams 
(1989) and others have shown how both gender and race bias underpin the welfare state. 
Analysis centres on inclusion and exclusion from substantive rights due to structural 
disadvantages and discrimination. Similar to gender bias, racism and nationalism underpins 
the welfare state, for example by barring restricting immigration to those able to prove they 
will be financially independent (Cohen,1985), relying on cheap immigrant labour to support 
the national economy, and prohibiting full minority and immigrants’ full access to rights -  
thus cementing an informal ‘second-class’ citizen status (see Williams, 1989; Gordon,1989a). 
An early use of the term 'denizen1, for example, to describe the experience of citizenship by 
black Americans. While the literature pertaining to the problems of citizenship in relation to 
colour and ethnicity, including international migrants with citizenship status, is less developed
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than feminist lenses in social policy, it has clearly indicated that formal citizenship status is 
not matched by the full range of substantive rights which are supposed to accompany it.
On the other hand, the too common experience of inequality of substantive rights 
among non-naturalised international migrants more closely matches the notion that access to 
rights comes with formal citizenship status, whether or not it should. For example guest 
workers were long used to meet labour shortages while being denied full social benefit rights, 
particularly in ‘old’ world countries of immigration. Compared to “settlement” countries of 
the ‘new* world, European countries have not historically been duly concerned with long 
term residence or the naturalisation of new arrivals, as international migration policy analysts 
have long observed (Papademetriou and Boutang,1994). Access to rights before attaining 
formal citizenship status was long in coming for all types of international migrants. It has 
even been argued that immigration policy has historically been affected by the strong tie 
between welfarism and nationality, for example the 1905 Alien Act in Britain prohibited 
established immigrants from receiving aid and deported those who became homeless or 
whose living situation deteriorated (see Cohen,1985).
Social policy has increasingly observed that international migrant labour market 
participation contributes to the welfare state (through taxation) and society (through 
economic and cultural contributions), and should be matched with access to substantive 
rights (Anderson and Marr,1987; Vogel and Moran, 1991). There has been concern about 
increasing competition for resources and inequality in substantive citizenship rights actually 
enjoyed by international migrants. But this important expansion in understanding how 
exclusion occurs still neglects corresponding conflicts that arise around lack of citizenship 
status and positive access to rights. Deacon (1997:220) rightly observes that alongside other 
international trends, the implications of international migration for citizenship laws and 
transnational social policy issues have been under-researched in social polity. Meanwhile 
sociologists and political scientists have observed that international migrants' substantive 
rights have gradually increased regardless of status (Layton-Hemy 1990), with direct 
implications for the citizenship question. Migrants are now ‘incorporated’ into host polities in 
a variety of ways (Soysal 1994). Global migration is changing access to substantive citizenship 
rights and perhaps the basis of nation-state membership -  or ‘rights to rights’ -  itself.
Types and levels of substantive rights enjoyed by different segments of the 
population at different times also indicate a fault in Marshall’s periodisation of rights, both in 
Britain and in other countries. The unfolding of civil, political and social rights again generally 
reflects the experience of white males in England, and was not always replicated in other
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countries, as Mann (1996) and others have pointed out. Women and ethnic minorities gained 
rights in various sequences and to different extents in different countries (see Vogal and 
Moran, 1991), while international migrants tended to attain social rights before other rights 
(Soysal,1994:131). Thus social policy’s traditionally ethnocentric and sexist focus on 
conflicting claims to social services among established citizens ignored ‘denizens’ or those 
groups in society whose progressive attainment of rights does not follow the same trajectory 
as that of ‘mainstream’ citizens. While inequalities of substantive citizenship rights enjoyed 
by different segments of the population have been considerably elaborated in an attempt to 
equalise them as members of the same citizenry, the consequences of globalisation have been 
considered only in terms of discrimination against established international migrants or the 
increased competition for resources they may create.
Globalisation has, however, influenced research method by encouraging comparative 
cross-national studies of the nature of welfare states and their development. This has given 
rise to the identification of global political economy as a factor of welfare state development 
and social citizenship rights. Esping-Anderson’s The Three worlds o f Welfare Capitalism (1990) 
revealed different welfare state types and their patterns of development. There we see that 
citizenship rights supported by welfare states are indeed historical in their dependence upon 
(for example) a particular state’s political economy and political party coalitions -  factors 
shaping welfare states themselves. However, the common characteristics of the three welfare 
regimes Esping-Anderson identifies still take formaL citizenship for granted. Esping-Anderson 
contends that social rights and social stratification are “part and parcel of welfare states”, 
which aim to decommodify citizen status. He explains (1990:3): “The outstanding criterion 
for social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to make their living 
standards independent of pure market forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish 
citizens’ status as ‘commodities.”
In Welfare States in Transition (1996) Esping-Anderson considers whether social 
citizenship is the inevitable outcome of democratisation, and what alternative post-industrial 
models of social citizenship the future might hold. He argues that the global economy deeply 
influences the different paths newly emerging industrial democracies are taking toward 
welfare state development.1 But Esping-Anderson is not concerned with who actually enjoys 
or is entitled to substantive citizenship rights, or whether individuals must be full-fledged
1 Esping-Anderson (1996) argues that the global economy influences governments’ freedom “to 
design discrete social policies”, wage competition and the loss of jobs to state economies with 
cheaper labour, different conceptions of equality that welfare states pursue, and different politics of 
welfare.
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citizens to influence policy. Rather the question is how the global political economy 
influences welfare states, and subsequently, the social rights established citizens may enjoy.
Comparative studies in social policy have also been encouraged by the formation of 
the European Union, with explicit implications for citizen rights. Citizens’ access to rights, 
the nature of their rights, the administration and financing of rights both in states undergoing 
reforms and across states, have been changing (Meehan,1993; Kleinman and Piachaud,1993). 
But European rights are discussed precisely in terms of formal citizenship status within 
contracting member states, for the most part excluding consideration of aliens and 
noncitizens (Sivanandan,1993; Gordon,1989b).
Broader implications for transnational rights and a more global social policy analysis 
arising from international trends such as the global political economy, regional and 
international institutions, and international migration, have been taken up by a only a few in 
social policy, most notably de Swaan (1994), Deacon (1997), Midgely (1997) and more 
recently Mishra (1999). They suggest social policy shift toward the global arena, with 
broadened state responsibilities, co-ordination with international institutions, and globalised 
conceptions of welfare needs. While they are less concerned with implications for 
‘citizenship’ or working out the details of conflicts that will arise around formal membership 
status, they tend toward advocating a reconceptualisation of citizenship at the supranational 
level; maintaining the idea of citizenship appears largely unproblematic, it is merely extended. 
As we shall see later, this view fails to address a number of questions, not least how such a 
system would work without global governance while states still feel compelled to regulate 
their borders. But more fundamentally, this view leaves untouched the underlying 
justification of social policy -  equality of membership associated with citizenship in the 
nation-state. Thus the second grey area where formal citizenship “is not a necessary condition of 
substantive citizenship”, remains unexplored.
The assumption that substantive rights require or may assume formal citizenship 
status in some state, or that rules of inclusion and exclusion will not remain fundamental 
determinants of access to rights in many respects, is clearly contradicted by the experience of 
temporary and permanent noncitizen residents, i.e. immigrants, refugees, students and 
visitors (see Layton-Hemy,1990). In most advanced democratic countries naturalisation rates 
have been falling. In some countries, particularly the United States, vast numbers of illegal 
migrants have secured basic benefits and rights, although not without controversy. At the 
same time, immigration regulations have been tightening all over the world. At present, social 
policy largely ignores the theoretical implications of the broken union between formal
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citizenship status and access to substantive rights. How has this affected non-citizen 
participation in policy-making processes, which both draw upon and define rights and access to 
them?
Policy-m a king  an d  policy  actors: patterns o f  participation  
In The Policy Process in the Modem Capitalist State (1984), Ham and Hill asserted that greater 
attention to the nature of the policy process, rather than policy content and ‘prescription’, 
was essential if the latter was to be grounded “in the real world where policy is made”, thus 
providing a firmer basis for building, analysing and changing policy. Subsequently, from a 
rather formulaic unidimensional textbook understanding of policy-making ‘stages’, a 
proliferation of approaches and a recognition of its complexity sprang up. By the third 
edition of their book Hill (1997) was remarking that the pursuit of policy-making processes 
had run into an atmosphere of “pessimistic realism”. The plea to take up a little studied 
process that once seemed relatively straightforward turned into an urging not to abandon its 
ever-unfolding complexity: “we must continue to try to understand the policy process -  
however irrational or uncontrollable it may seem to be -  as a crucial first step towards trying 
to bring it under control.” (1997:5).
The heuristic 'stages of policy-making1 approach, characterised by rational and 
prescriptive elite decision-making, has been surpassed ‘systems* models. Like others 
advocating a ‘systems’ approach, Hill emphasises that it is crucial to understand policy­
making as a political process within structures of power in society and between society and 
the state. In Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy (1975) Hall, Land, Parker and Webb 
brought out the crucial point that conflict is as important to policy-making as is consensus; 
political struggles occur in the policy-making and political environment where policy 
decisions are made. They built on Easton’s classic system model (1965) in which demands 
and supports feed into decision-making processes where authorities produce policy outputs, 
generating information that feeds back into future inputs in a policy cycle. This process 
occurs within a larger environment of different types of systems, including social and 
ecological systems. “Supports” were essentially made of the bargaining power or leverage 
points citizens can employ by giving or withdrawing their political support -  their vote -  for 
authorities making policy decisions, replacing authorities if need be with others who will 
uphold citizens’ values. Needless to say, conflict and consensus in policy-making takes place 
in a pluralist national environment, between citizens, politicians and state authorities.
Incremental approaches to policy-making have since elaborated the types of political 
leverage or “supports”, kinds of government and nongovernment interactions, and the range
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of actors within political and policy-making environments. Changing conceptions of power 
framed the new-found actors and their inter-actions with decision-makers. Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) had pointed out that the traditional pluralist framework of power, in which 
overt conflicts occur between actors and key issues in an accessible political system, failed to 
recognise the power of “ nondecision-making” by elites a political systems that are structurally 
informed and not equally accessible to all. Lukes (1974) criticised both pluralist and elitist 
conceptions of power (or “democratic elitism”) for neglecting the “latent conflict” inherent 
not only to overt nondecision-making (as in Bachrach and Baratz’ account), but also to 
covert nondecision-making by elites who shape the very awareness and interests of others.
Different policy-making models have subsequently explored the variety of ways 
complex relationships between groups and the state are played out, within different types of 
structural conflict in society and between competing groups (as Neo-Marxists pointed out). 
For example, Public Choice theory narrows in on the notion of groups competing for public 
support in a political market place. ‘State-centred’ theories emphasise the ways institutions of 
the state influence policy processes (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol,1993), or how the 
very design of political institutions influence policy processes (March and Olsen,1984). 
However policy-making remains a nationally bound project among actors whose formal 
citizenship is never in question. Citizenship is taken for granted, implicitly and often 
explicitly stated to identify actors as members of a specific polity, namely the state.
While many approaches evolve around state institutions and bureaucracy (see Hill 
1993,1997), others have increasingly sprung up which offer more detailed descriptions of 
both inter-governmental (i.e. federal, local) and nongovernment layers (citizens, NGOs), and 
their interaction. They increasingly blur the boundaries between traditional 'insider' (i.e. 
government) and 'outsider' (j.e. nongovernment) divisions in policy-making processes. Policy 
networks (Marsh and Rhodes,1992), policy communities (fordan and Richardson,1979) and 
policy coalitions (Smith and Sabatier,1994) are a few models that draw out the range of 
locations, actors, strategies and processes in policy-making. These models are not concerned 
with whether rights of participation correspond with citizenship status. Yet they tend to refer 
to non-state actors as citizens, and to overlook international influences.
One exception to state-defined boundaries of policy-making in the literature is the 
increasing concern with the global political economy as a kind of uncontrollable force or 
actor in its own right, predetermining the thrust of neo-conservative turns and cut-backs in 
social policy. While not everyone agrees that the global economy makes certain types of 
policy choices inevitable, it does describe how policy-making processes occur within an
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environment composed of ‘systems’ that may be international. Here the world economy is no 
longer seen as a threat to welfare states but as a centrifugal force (see Esping- 
Anderson, 1996).
Another significant exception is attention to the rise of regional and international 
institutions and laws that influence policy and provision, most notably in the European 
Union. This has filtered into Levin’s work (1997), who in describing components of the 
British policy-making environment adds a section on EU institutions, in particular the role of 
the 1989 Social Charter. Similarly, there have been empirical studies of the impact and 
influence of regulation, economic reforms, and redistribution upon policy and welfare 
systems among recent member states (for example Kleinman and Piachaud,1993; Feirera and 
Gualmini,1999). There is less of an attempt to conceptualise how such international elements 
figure into or change policy-making models and ideas about citizenship as an underlying 
justification.
Notably, Deacon (1997:2) contends that social policy needs to account for 
“supranational and global actors” in “explanations of changing social policy”, as do Midgely 
(1997) and Mishra (1999). They include institutions such as the IMF and World Bank to 
account for influences upon less developed countries and relations between more and less 
developed countries linked through the global economy. By “actors” they refer explicitly to 
organisations and institutions, not iridzuidmLs with transnational policy influence, i.e. foreign 
nationals, noncitizens or stateless persons. In the emerging citizenship literature within social 
policy, transnational issues such as the environment and subsequent pressures to conform 
with international standards justified on the basis of citizen rights in other countries, or even 
unborn or future citizens' rights within a country (see Van Steenbergen,1994). They assume 
formal citizenship or ignore the difficulties posed by the problematic union between formal 
status and substantive rights.
It is notable that despite considerable expansion since the 1980s, the literature on 
policy-making is as yet limited in its accounts of the consequences of globalisation. Diverse 
approaches have sprung up to describe inter-action between state and society, but in this the 
formal citizenship of policy actors has not been in question, nor the underlying ideal of 
citizenship itself. Citizenship remains an underlying assumption and central justification for 
social policy.
Social polity should consider the growing importance of supranational and foreign- 
national trends and forces that break the mould of nation-state defined boundaries of policy­
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making rooted in formal citizenship status, and states’ welfare responsibilities toward 
‘citizens’. In this the globalisation of migration is a contending force. Like the global political 
economy, global migration spans national and international policy ‘systems’. It involves 
national and international legislation regarding rights and limitations upon noncitizens’ entry 
and access to resources. And it involves individuals. We need to look more explicitly at 
individuals without formal citizenship status who engage in policy debates and policy- 
making, and consider the implications for social policy.
Refugee policy-making is particularly interesting for social policy despite the little 
attention it has received. It clearly straddles foreign and domestic affairs. It is geared toward 
the welfare of non-citizens (stateless persons and foreign nationals) rather than fulfilling 
domestic needs (such as labour migration), and sends important messages to other countries 
about human rights. It also helps shape current and future receiving-country constituencies 
and their access to membership benefits, subsequently shaping receiving-county 
responsibilities. It draws upon both national and international legislation and rights, 
increasingly including both human rights and substantive citizenship rights, as we shall see. It 
is particularly relevant given the tremendous increase of refugees making claims from within 
receiving-countries and making new types of claims upon states since the late twentieth 
century, which we shall now consider.
AGCESS TO RIGHTS AND PARTICIPATION BY STATUS-SEEKING MIGRANTS 
Questions raised by asylum seekers
Residency, as we now know, increasingly involves substantive citizenship rights (Layton 
Henry,1990) and incorporation into host polities (Soysal,1994) whether or not accompanied 
by formal citizenship status. Thus established migrants lacking formal citizenship, including 
illegal immigrants (see Jacobson,1996), have potential access to various rights and types of 
political organisation and participation in host countries, although our policy-making models 
have not been amended to account for them. This is true also of status-seeking individuals 
making claims for entry and membership in potential host countries. Status seekers, as 
opposed to established migrants, are particularly interesting but have been less remarked 
upon. This may be no surprise since many international migrants must apply for residence 
status from outside host countries, and the majority of international migrants are established 
(at least short-term). Moreover, in the past few decades most countries have implemented 
increasingly restrictive entry policies (i.e. increasing application fees, visa requirements, 
eligibility stringency, state rights to detain migrants) and complicated rules determining rights
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while awaiting determination (i.e. in some cases being refused work permits but given welfare 
benefits). These differ for different types of international migrants in different countries.
Asylum seekers are one type of status-seeking migrant whose inland damns have been 
dramatically increasing. Annual claims in the OECD countries rose from 25,000 in 1973 to 
550,000 applications in 1990 (the majority in Germany). In Canada annual inland claims rose 
from 600 in 1976 to 18,280 in 1986, and 36,000 in 1990 (Dirks,1995:77). While asylum 
seekers face many restrictions they have rights to make claims and have also gained access to 
a range of both formal and substantive citizenship rights, resources and participation avenues 
while making and awaiting decisions on their claims. Some of these have been accounted for in the 
literature on the incorporation of international migrants in particular countries, specifically 
regarding rights to welfare benefits (for example, Faist 1992:255-6).2 Other rights are similar 
to those of established migrants, including constitutional rights and more informal access to 
resources (such as information and community networks). Asylum seekers’ unique position 
also provides rights other migrants do not enjoy and leaves other rights open to question. 
The evolution of such rights in theory and practice may better enable asylum seekers to make 
claims, and challenge not only decisions on their claims but the content of refugee policy that 
excludes them.
In the past few decades, the growth of inland asylum seeking and receiving countries’ 
inability to manage their claims quickly and efficiently, often leading to long delays, has 
created a new class of international migrants. They have rights under international law to 
make asylum claims upon receiving countries. The 1951 Convention requires receiving- 
countries to establish refugee status determination processes, and forbids receiving-countries 
from deporting asylum seekers unless lack of well-founded fear of persecution in sending- 
countries can be ascertained (the principle of non-refoulement) through the established 
refugee status determination process.
Inland refugee status determination systems have evolved to an extent that refugee 
claims in many receiving countries are heard in judicial settings with a number of levels to 
which claimants may appeal decisions, drawing upon an elaborate framework of international 
and national law. Moreover, as far as possible claimants are required to provide testimonies 
and evidence of their inability to reside in the country of origin, and are provided (or may 
hire) lawyers to present their case. International politics and changing global migration trends 
influence the types of claims being made as well as the numbers of claims being made,
2 On the USA and Germany Faist (in Zolberg et al 1996:255-6) describes asylum seekers’ access to: 
social assistance, unemployment benefit, workers’ compensation, social security and old age pensions.
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neither of which receiving-countries can adequately control. And, while making refugee 
applications, undergoing the various stages of the status determination processes and 
awaiting decisions, claimants reside in the host country where they may access resources and 
rights typically available to citizens and other residents as well as resources developed 
specifically for immigrants and refugees. These resources and rights may help claimants in 
the claim-making process and in challenging it.
Claim-making is important for individual claimants, groups of claimants of similar 
types and claimants as a whole because court decisions may either support the status quo or 
contribute to the growth of jurisprudence which fundamentally alters it. Jurisprudence may 
increasingly change the application of the law, or suggest that the law itself should be 
changed. Or, the status determination process itself may be altered, paving the way for future 
claimants. An example of this occurred in the case of Singjo vs. M EI in 1985, in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada granted refugee claimants the right to a full oral hearing, leading to 
a complete overhaul of Canada’s system from an administrative to a judicial model. The 
decision also explicitly raised citizenship debates, as it was based on the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms -  intended for Canadian ‘citizens’ (See Knowles, 1992:174). However, 
as would be expected, the case studied confirms that generally more than jurisprudence may 
be necessary to alter refugee policy. For example, creating a public debate and raising 
domestic political support is important.
Asylum seekers’ access to both institutional and extra-institutional rights, resources 
and participation avenues challenges models of policy-making which exclude non-citizens. It 
is unlike that of other transnational actors, for instance in the fields of development and 
environmental policy which involve citizens making claims on foreign states (typically 
through international organisations). Refugee movement involves stateless persons and 
foreign nationals making claims upon host countries and willing to give up residency and 
citizenship of their country of origin. While their rights to resources in host countries are 
hotly contested, their actual use of all kinds enabling their participation in refugee policy 
development have not been explored, and subsequently neither have the implications for 
social policy.
While asylum seeking is not traditionally a subject of social policy, which typically 
deals with welfare rights and needs of people already inside 'the gates of admission1, 
globalisation is making increasingly insupportable the current blindness toward the challenges 
posed by noncitizens. Asylum seeking, in its institutionalised environment, is a site where
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international rights and national welfare systems meet on domestic terrain. Deacon 
(1997:220) explains:
Increased migration for economic and political reasons has generated a set of pressures 
on citizenship laws, and a set of problems concerning the rights to and social 
consequences of asylum seeking. Social policy analysts need to work with refugee 
studies experts to divine the emerging practices in this field. At the same time the 
impact on national social policy making of the diaspora is an under-researched topic.
What exactly might be the implications of status-seekers* access to and use of rights and 
corresponding policy participation avenues? Would it necessarily contradict the idea of 
citizenship as a central justification for rights upheld in social policy, access to them and 
participation in shaping them? Theories of current transformations of citizenship suggest two 
approaches to these questions..
Possible theoretical implications
Social policy analysts are increasingly considering the effects of international trends upon 
particular welfare states, particularly Europeanisation (see Kleinman and Piachaud,1993; 
Liebfried,1994) and global economic competition (for example Huber and Stevens,1993; 
Esping-Anderson,1996). A few have pointed toward a ‘global social policy* (Deacon, 1997; de 
Swaan,1994; Midgley,1997). The corresponding prescription for the ideals and institution of 
citizenship tends to be in favour of its expansion. But as Deacon (1997:1) observes,
The implications for national, supranational, and transnational social policy of this 
present phase of globalisation is an under-theorised and under-researched topic within 
the subject of social policy.
In sociology, political science, international migration studies and international 
relations, one theory of the transformation of citizenship under globalisation is that the 
concept of citizenship is indeed expanding. Citizenship is taking on or ought to take on 
enlarged rights and memberships, often by reaching toward human rights ideals or focusing 
on transnational identities, thus increasing state responsibilities or requiring more global 
forms of governance. Thus we see, for example, rights of cultural, ecological, European, 
corporate and global citizenship, to name just a few (for example Turner,1994; 
VanSteenbergen,1994; Meehan,1993; Falks,1994). These tend to be less concerned with 
formal citizenship status and admissions processes, and more with substantive rights. Some 
concentrate more on how substantive citizenship rights are to be enforced institutionally. In 
The Consequences o f Modernity Giddens (1990) argues that globalisation is a fundamental 
consequence of the institutional transformations of modernity marked by, in particular, the
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nation-state and systemic capitalist production. In turn, he argues, globalisation is likely to 
alter “polyarchy7’, or “government responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens 
considered as political equals”, thus making forms of democratic participation and political 
institutions increasingly global. Citizenship status and the parameters for inclusion or 
exclusion are not in question, but governing institutions and subsequently forms of citizen’s 
democratic participation are. In a detailed manner Held (1995) prescribes rights and both 
institutional and political participation expanding in new forms of global democracy 
encompassing global citizenship through increased and systematic interaction between states 
and supranational institutions. Increasingly significant, as generally agreed, are principles of 
universal personhood, or human rights.
In contrast, another theory is that citizenship is being replaced, by new postnational or 
transnational forms of membership. A strong body of evidence has emerged in favour of this 
view, particularly as demonstrated by international migrants without formal citizenship status 
(for example Soysal,1994; Baubock,1997; Jacobson,1996). In this some contend states' roles 
may increase as citizenship is replaced with human rights, while others maintain states’ roles 
will decrease as international bodies increasingly govern human rights encompassing 
citizenship. In both cases political participation by, for example, ‘postnational’ (Soysal,1994) 
or ‘transnational* (Baubock,1997) members draws increasingly on principles of universal 
personhood and upon increasing interaction between national and supranational governance.
It is evident that as ideas about citizenship are argued and contested, further 
exploration is warranted regarding the relationship between citizenship and more universal 
rights (both formal and substantive kinds) as the basis for state responsibilities toward 
individuals. For social policy the implications of the above debates lead us back to 
THMarshall’s conception of citizenship, in which social rights are fundamental to full 
citizenship, and full citizenship is an underlying aim or ideal, therefore, of social policy. As 
we saw earlier, citizenship was deemed by Marshall to be linked to right of membership in a 
community or to a shared social heritage. Citizenship, by Marshall’s time, was widely 
understood as involving formal membership in a nation-state. However, the above debates 
indicate that whether citizenship is (or should be) expanding, or is being replaced, new 
international rights, actors and influences on policy-making may disrupt the traditional 
citizenship assumption and alter the underlying justification of social policy.
The relationship between citizenship and human rights is particularly interesting 
when we consider the development of the very policies and laws governing rules of inclusion 
and exclusion to those rights -  in other words access to formal membership status. The
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relationship is even more interesting if influenced by people seeking formal membership in 
the first place -  status-seeking noncitizens, in this case asylum seekers. In advanced 
democratic countries a trend may be emerging in which the typical nature of status 
determination processes combined with changing opportunities for seeking asylum, are 
leading to more atypical types of claims being made that expand state responsibilities and 
bring citizenship and human rights principles increasingly into contact, creating new debates 
and negotiating new boundaries. This study illustrates a case of noncitizens explicitly drawing 
upon both social citizenship rights and human rights to influence national policy and gain 
membership. It thus affirms the need for social policy to self-consciously ground itself in a 
more global framework and theoretical justification, and illuminates the evolving dynamic 
between citizenship and human rights which social policy may need to better understand. It 
returns, in conclusion, to Marshall’s conception of citizenship to assess its compatibility with 
international trends and influences, and revisits citizenship debates in light of citizenship- 
human dynamics rights observed in the study, to suggest future directions for social policy.
We now need to consider what is involved in exploring the particular polity process 
at centre of this study. The following sketches the campaigns and the Canadian scene during 
instatement of the Guidelines, and reviews previous accounts of the particular policy process. 
This illuminates important dimensions of the process as well as significant oversights in the 
literature. The contributions of this study in its approach to the particular policy-process are 
then described.
I I I . T h e  CANADIAN CAMPAIGN AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY PROCESS
In the early 1990s a series of women facing deportation made their refugee claims public in 
Canada, with the support of a wide range of local, national and international organisations 
and prominent individuals. The media was filled with headlines such as "Is sexual equality a 
universal value?: debate rages over giving refugee status to abused women" (Montreal Gazette 
15-02-93), and “Canada not planning to widen refugee rules to cover sex bias: women fleeing 
abuse would strain system, Valcourt says” [Globe and Mail 15-01-93). It was asked whether 
women's rights to safety from violence typically considered ‘private’ in nature and 
perpetrated by non-state actors, such as family violence and traditional practices of female 
circumcision, are culturally-relevant rights or 'human rights' that transcend nations. The 
demands that were made and the public debate and negative government publicity that 
ensued forced Immigration Minister Valcourt to publicly announce whether or not he would
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personally intervene in the publicised cases and stop their deportation through special 
Ministerial powers, and initiate refugee policy change to recognise persecution based on sex.
The neo-conservative government was strongly in favour of protecting the security 
and interests of the state (economic, demographic, and in relations with other countries) 
before those of the particular asylum seekers. One way of achieving this was simply to adhere 
closely to the public/private demarcation as a guide to state responsibility -  the standard 
interpretation of international law. In this light, refugee policy change was painted as, 
somewhat paradoxically, either threatening or unnecessary. This confusion was perhaps best 
expressed when Randy Gordan, assistant to the Immigration Minister, stated that opening 
the door to one abused woman would be "opening a can of worms" which apparently the 
government would prefer to leave closed (NOW magazine 12-92).
State recognition of female-specific persecution is threatening firstly because it makes 
‘private violence’ into a public responsibility. This destroys the public/private demarcation 
traditionally defining state responsibility and state sovereignty (See Romany 1993; 
Charlesworth et al 1991; Cook 1994; Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion). Secondly, it 
questions the legitimacy of cultural relativism. Opening the doors to refugees for gender 
reasons could be culturally judgmental, imposing "Western" gender roles on "non-western" 
countries. The Federal government’s position remained unfailingly clear up to and including 
Valcourt’s statement to the press on 16 January 1993: "I don't think Canada should 
unilaterally try to impose its values on the rest of the world. Canada cannot go it alone, we 
just cannot (London i7U?/Vess,16-l-93, Montreal Gazette 16-1-93). He went on to emphasise the 
paradox of the situation, saying:
The laws of general application in countries of the world are not necessarily laws that we 
in this country would want to promote because of our values but will Canada act as an 
imperialist country and impose its values on other countries around the world? (The 
House, CBC Radio, 16-1-1993).
It also was posited that accepting violence against women as persecution might open the 
"floodgates" for vast numbers of women around the world who face chronic structural 
violence and who lack protection. Canada’s refugee system would not equipped to deal with 
such an influx, and tremendous pressures would be put on Canada’s welfare system.
At the same time Federal government maintained that existing refugee policy and 
determination frameworks were "gender neutral" and therefore capable of meeting females’ 
needs. The gender nature of the public/private distinction in international law was thus 
dismissed altogether.
30
Less than two weeks after his statement on cultural relativism, Valcourt made three 
announcements: a Saudi Arabian woman by the pseudonym “Nada” would be accepted in 
Canada for gender-related reasons, policy Guidelines to address the question of gender- 
related persecution would be forth-coming, and a national Consultation on Gender Issues 
and Refugees would be called to determine further administrative and legal solutions. Soon 
after, speaking for the Immigration Minister, Randy Gordan announced: “If there was a 
consensus on this gender issue in this country, and it was brought back to the government, 
the government could consider making representations on this issue to the United Nations” 
(Ottawa Citizen 25-01-93).
A year later a number of asylum seekers again went public, including two who had 
previously done so. Their continuing difficulty being accepted as refugees cast doubt on the 
adequacy of the Guidelines or their application, particularly in cases involving domestic 
violence. Media headlines included statements such as “Camaroon woman in hiding tests 
new immigration guidelines” (Montreal Gazette 11-01-95). This second phase of campaigning 
involved fewer asylum seekers and more sporadic publicity over a two-year period, and its 
effects were more mixed than the first phase. Not all the asylum seekers were accepted into 
Canada. However, in 1996 the Guidelines were revised, one important change being to 
address more specifically claims involving domestic violence.
These brief snapshots of government responses indicate how radical its change of 
position was between December 1992 and March 1993 when the Guidelines for Women Refugees 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution were instated. What were asylum seekers* roles in this radical 
change? What were their roles in the 1996 revision?
Looking to the post-instatement literature, we see that government and the 
Guidelines have been both applauded and criticised in the mass media, scholarly 
publications, and speeches given by advocates and activists. Information about female- 
specific persecution as cause for refugee status has proliferated rapidly from what was 
previously a sparse assortment of articles and reports. But interest in the Guidelines has been 
predominantly ‘static’, focusing on product (real or ideal policy content) rather than process. 
This is perhaps due to the continuing sense of ambiguity and need to legitimate just exactly 
who ‘gender-related’ refugees really are, usually in favour of the Guidelines or future 
expansions of the refugee definition. Law articles and government documents recognise or
31
lay out the framework for either "sex", or "gender", or "gender-related" persecution as a 
receiving-country responsibility through refugee status determination systems.3
Less attention has been paid to why and how the Guidelines were developed and 
instated. While no in-depth empirical studies have been undertaken, the few articles that have 
emerged -including two government documents - illuminate several important themes by 
attempting to describe and explain the instatement process. However, these accounts and 
analyses are problematic in a number of ways. First, they tend to separate government and 
nongovernment influences too much. This occurs in two ways. Foremost, there is little 
exploration of the interplay between government and non-government forces, just a 
statement of positions. Why and how did they actually influence one another? Failure to 
account for this dynamic leads to narrow visions. Some accounts explain the Guidelines as an 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) initiative, while failing to account for the fact that 
government was divided on whether to take responsibility for female-specific persecution at 
all, as indicated by Immigration Minister Valcourt’s clearly negative stance at the onset. 
Other accounts recognise overwhelming public pressure that was brought to bear without 
looking at how it was achieved, by whom and with what methods and implications.
Second, the existing accounts leave asylum seekers out of the analysis almost 
completely. This occurs in considerations of how IRB might have come to take certain 
initiatives, namely based on their experiences with asylum seekers making claims in the 
institutional realm. It also occurs in considerations of how nongovernment forces gained so 
much public support and influence, namely through extra-institutional actions in which 
asylum seekers were prominent. In both scenarios, asylum seekers are for the most part 
portrayed almost as victim by-standers or simply the beneficiaries of events. Important case- 
files are at times cited, either for their precedent-setting value or the publicity they achieved, 
but the active roles taken by people behind the cases are considered only in one account. In 
all accounts, the implications of their participation are overlooked or not of concern.
Enquiries into the policy change process, and the relation between process and 
product, have mainly been very recent and very cursory, usually within articles with other 
aims. Kuttner (1997:16) writes:
In the early 1990s, a series of controversial IRB decisions rejecting gender-related 
persecution claims brought the issue to the public eye. Refugee and women’s rights 
advocates managed to bring significant media attention to these decisions and to the
3 Particularly important are speeches by IRB Chairperson Mawani (1993a,c, 1994, 1995a,b); articles by 
Beasley and Thomas 1994, Pope and Stairs 1990, MacMillan 1993, TCMR 1993, Schenke 1996, Indra 
1987. Relevant Canadian government documents appear in Bibliography on National instruments.
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systemic gender-bias within the refugee determination process as it then operated. There 
was a significant public outcry which put politicians under the spotlight; their initial 
rejection of the need for change was badly received. Political pressure increased, and 
eventually a new official position was taken to change national criteria such that gender- 
related persecution claims became an accepted basis on which to grant refugee status 
within the Canadian system... Thus, the Guidelines can be said to have emerged from a 
complex process of interaction with domestic Canadian groups, an international 
institution (LJNHCR), international law (international human rights standards and 
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions) and transnational issue networks (academic 
articles and reports of international human rights NGOs).
Kuttner’s description is valuable as one of the few that exists. However, she does not 
examine the “complex process of interaction”, but is content to explain the strengths of 
advocates’ arguments based on formal legal norms of equality and non-discrimination 
strengthened by “preliminary developments on the issue of gender-related persecution at the 
international level” (Ibid, 16). The fact that these arguments were framed and presented to 
the public through the examples provided by asylum seekers willing to talk with the media, 
attend press conferences, have their life-stories discussed nationally, is absent.
In similar fashion, Macklin (1999:302) reports: “In the end, a constellation of forces 
within Canada precipitated the Canadian Guidelines, which was then instrumental in 
motivating similar action in the United States and eventually Australia.” What this 
“constellation” was and how it precipitated the Guidelines into being, is never explained. She 
does however provide an insightful comparative analysis of the Canadian, American and 
Australian Guidelines.
Gilad (1999) states explicitly that she endeavours to explain “how the protection of 
refugee women because they are women came about in Canada.” As both an anthropologist 
and a former IRB member, she draws an insightful analysis of particular cases, demonstrating 
their legal strengths and the need for status determination processes to rely more on 
ethnographic types of documentary evidence. However her explanation of developments is 
highly government-centred. The Guidelines are presented primarily as an initiative of the IRB 
Working Group on Refugee Women. As is well recognised, this group was indeed at the 
forefront, highly active and influential within the IRB for identifying refugee women’s needs 
and developing a framework for responding which could be fairly easily and quickly 
implemented. However, refugees from whose experiences the framework for the Guidelines 
was developed, are never treated as actors making claims upon the state, but as victims to 
whom the state should respond. Pressure brought to bear upon government by NGOs and 
asylum seekers, in the period leading up to, and during, the drafting of the Guidelines and 
culminating just before their instatement, is not indicated. Nor is the fact that NGOs were
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consulted on the draft version and made significant additions. Finally, whether the 
Guidelines would actually have been instated, or merely written up as a recommendation by a 
working group lacking decision-making power, if public pressure had not mounted and 
radicalised, is not at all clear.
Young (1994) from the Library of Parliament (Research Division) provides a more 
thorough descriptive account of the Guidelines’ instatement. Young explains that publicity 
and protest surrounding a refugee claimant taking the pseudonym Nada’, alongside other 
claimants, prompted widespread and diverse support for the issue in Canada. Government 
was criticised and embarrassed by women's groups, immigrant and refugee groups and 
international human rights organisations concerned by pending deportations of asylum 
seekers to countries where persecution was immanent. The role of advocacy groups and their 
interactions with state are revealed in snapshots of their dialogue through mass media, 
evolving as it did around particular asylum seekers who went public. The particulars of 
“Nada’s” case are discussed, pointing out legal and theoretical arguments that persuaded 
government to grant her acceptance despite the initial rejection of her refugee claim. Still, 
supporters and the arguments they used overshadow the role of asylum seekers like Nada. 
They are not actors themselves, and the implications of their challenge to policy and policy­
making are not at issue.
Government documents and NGO reports arising from the National Consultations on 
Gender Issues and Refugees, between 1993 and 1994, have also been candid about the profound 
influence upon government’s search for “consistent policy responses” by advocacy groups, 
media, and research on women refugees in Canada. These Consultations did not aim to 
explore how policy change came about, but involved many key participants in the preceding 
campaigns and debates. One of the steering committee’s aims was indeed to have each sector 
represented (Agenda setting meeting, July 1993). Thus the influences that brought 
government to the Consultation table were accredited in a more well-rounded manner. For 
example, the expansion of the interpretation of gender-persecution occurring in the private 
sphere, a turn-stone of the Guidelines’ radicalisation in addressing domestic violence, was 
accredited to NGO and Experts’ recommendations on the draft guidelines. What is not 
recognised is that when these NGO members and experts made recommendations they had 
been working with asylum seekers making claims public. However, the documents report 
that asylum seekers themselves participated in the Consultations process, providing ‘expert 
witness’ accounts of the hearing process and needs of women refugees.
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One exception to the above trend, and indeed among the earliest attempts to account 
for developments in Canada, is a speech to Boston College Law School (23 March 1994) by- 
Janet Dench from the Canadian Council for Refugees, who actively campaigned for changes 
in refugee policy and status determination processes. She rightly observed:
Nada was in fact courageous in the decisive actions she took -  in coming to Canada and 
making a refugee claim, in seeking ways to press her case once rejected and in agreeing 
to take on the media and talk publicly about her situation. The heart of her story would 
nevertheless be the bullying of a vulnerable young woman by the two Board Members, 
both male, who heard her refugee claim, and by the Minister who refused initially to 
intervene.
This statement describes the touchstone of the proposed study, addressing the active 
participation of asylum seekers in campaign, and through in-depth research expanding upon 
crucial dimensions of the particular policy process observed above: the formative conflict 
between government and nongovernment actors and international influences; the structure 
and force of the campaigns rooted in their organisation around individual asylum seekers 
going public; debates between Svomen’s rights’ and ‘human rights’ foundations of state 
responsibility. It also delves into the links between institutional and extra-institutional 
structural contexts and asylum seeking processes.
It is evident that the accounts reviewed offer important observations but also 
contains significant gaps, some of which correspond to the gaps in the social policy literature 
discussed earlier. However it fair to say that none of the above accounts aimed to reveal the 
implications of the campaigns and resultant policy for ideas of citizenship. Moreover they 
were not concerned with fitting into policy-change models in social policy -  where neither 
the international influences they observed nor asylum seekers would fit in. Finally, all but the 
last account correspond with theories of international migration and refugee policy 
development, which do not account for asylum seekers* policy roles (as Chapter 3 shows).
Several important dimensions of the policy process explored in this study thus
constitute original contributions to the literature on gender-related persecution specifically
and on refugee policy development more generally, but are aimed at illuminating implications
for social policy. First, as the literature on gender-related persecution is impoverished for
historical background and empirical analysis of the particular asylum flow, neither long-term
nor shorter-term policy development processes have been studied in relation to actual asylum
seeking trends and processes. The study addresses these empirical gaps and in so doing
raises questions about the relationship between asylum flows and changes in the structural
context for seeking asylum and challenging policy. Refugee flows must be approached in
global, inter-state and receiving-country contexts to understand their development and details
35
in relation to policy, including their abilities to influence the asylum seeking context -  namely 
policy. Migration systems theory (Fawcett and Arnold,1987) advocates a long-term structural 
approach to explaining the rise of refugee movements and refugee policy development; the 
same approach can be taken to study the rise of asylum seekers* abilities to seek and 
influence policy. This framework is essential to elaborate the details of the particular policy- 
process since refugee policy is not a typical focus of social policy. Chapter 3 analyses the 
evolution of refugee policy in relation to theories of international migration, and then 
develops the missing dimension -  asylum seekers’ roles -  creating a novel expansion and 
application of migration systems theory and an original analytical framework for studying 
refugee policy development.
Second, asylum seekers’ involvement in the policy process must be explored in both 
institutional and extra-institutional dimensions, neither of which are recognised in previous 
accounts of the Guidelines' instatement or in migration theories generally, and which social 
policy inherently excludes due to asylum seekers' noncitizen status. Claimants like Nada who 
went public (in extra-institutional tactics) represent a less visible majority of claimants whose 
presence in institutional claim-making processes makes immigration officials aware of 
female-specific persecution, and whose case-precedents can alter policy interpretation and 
occasionally lead to policy revision. Asylum seekers' abilities to use institutional and extra- 
institutional tactics can be understood arising from the context of national and international 
level rights and resources and their inter-relation, which the study illuminates.
Third, the basis for new inter-state responsibilities and rights of membership in the 
particular case has important implications that have not been explored. Asylum seekers' 
involvement in policy change needs to be explored in light o f their noncitizen status to 
explain international influences on membership eligibility and associated benefits, and 
subsequent implications for the scope and basis of social policy. In this the dynamic between 
citizenship and human rights, at national and international levels, is fundamental. This 
dynamic highlights the disjuncture between equality rights considered universal w ihn a host 
country population (i.e. women’s rights), versus host countries’ nonuniversal stance on those 
same rights when considering responsibilities for contrary practices in other countries. It also 
raises questions about the implementation of inter-state responsibilities, which a more global 
social policy would need to consider. For instance should receiving-countries be responsible 
for root causes of persecution or only the symptoms (i.e. should they provide humanitarian 
aid and expand social programs to noncitizens to prevent circumstances that could result in
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persecution, or simply accept refugees thereby protecting their well-being through already 
established welfare systems?).
By exploring how the particular claimants in Canada participated in policy- 
development, this study illuminates an unexplored process generally (how the policy process 
involves asylum seekers themselves, although noncitizens) and an unexplored refugee 
movement in particular. And it questions the broader implications of international migrants 
shaping policies describing their own eligibility for residency and citizenship rights, with 
particular implications for countries with advanced social welfare systems.
IV. THE CASE STUDY
Having set out the broad issues addressed in the thesis and some of its contributions to the 
literature, specific questions may now be posed for study, and the manner they will be 
approached set out. What is the role of asylum seekers in refugee policy development? What 
are the changing structural constraints and opportunities for asylum seekers’ roles, and how 
have they been used? To what extent have asylum seekers influenced refugee policy, and 
with what implications?
ASYLUM SEEKERS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNIQUE CASE STUDIED 
Convention refugees
Policy development in the case of the asylum seekers studied is somewhat unique compared 
to other ‘untraditional refugees’ such as those fleeing civil war, natural disaster and economic 
persecution. In Western countries policy recognition of the latter has been occurring without 
altering the definition provided in the 1951 Convention. Instead, distinct ‘‘humanitarian” 
categories have been created that provide asylum on an ad hoc basis for ‘extra-Convention 
refugees’ arriving from countries in a well-recognised state of crisis. These ‘refugee-like’ 
categories allow huge inlets of people fleeing persecution, but their ad hoc nature and lack of 
formalised rights or guidelines both contributes to the unmanageability of mass flows and 
fails to provide an equitable status determination system. In contrast, recognition of “gender- 
related” refugees developed in national interpretations of the Convention definition. Such 
asylum seekers may now actually receive Convention refugee status.
Canada: grassroots campaigns and policy pioneer
Canada’s precedent-setting experience with gender-related refugees was soon followed in 
other countries. In 1994 both the United Kingdom and the United States saw similar types of
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claims being made in similar ways (The Guardian,8-1-94; Associated Press, WashingtO2,20-'b-94t). 
In 1995 the US and Australia adopted policy Guidelines similar to those in Canada, and the 
UN adopted Guidelines of its own.4 Denmark and Switzerland followed in 1996 and France, 
Germany and Sweden began negotiating ways to handle cases coming to light. In March 
1999 the UK took a significant step in that direction when the House of Lords decided in 
favour of granting refugee status to two Pakistani women accused of adultery and facing 
persecution (Islam v. Secretary o f State for the Home Department, Reg. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
and Another, Ex Parte Shah (Conjoined Appeals). These developments signal major changes not 
only in the application of refugee law, but also in state responsibilities toward non-citizens 
and state vulnerability to the claims of non-citizens.
This study traces the asylum seeking and policy process in the Canadian case, which 
not only pioneered the particular policy change, making it a key country to study, but also 
involved the most intense and protracted public pressure tactics and debates. Although 
studies have not been conducted of the other countries, public campaigning appears to have 
been very slight (usually only around one or two cases); instead claimants have set judicial 
precedents through institutional means alone, and policy-makers have drawn on the success 
of Canada’s policy guidelines to deal with them. Thus the Canadian case demonstrated in a 
particularly explicit way the roles asylum seekers may play in shaping ideology and policy that 
defines their own membership eligibility criteria, despite the current climate of increasingly 
restrictive border controls. It subsequently illuminates the challenge noncitizens can pose to 
policy and policy-making.
Inland claimants in Canada
The asylum seekers studied were status-seeking international migrants making claims from wifan 
the receiuing-eountry. They were neither citizens nor permanent residents of Canada, nor were 
they temporary residents in the way of guestworkers, visitors or students although they 
sometimes fell into these categories at some point. They were not illegal migrants, though 
some became illegal by defying deportation orders. They were international migrants awaiting 
decisions, from within Canada, on whether they could remain legally and permanently in the
4 In its Conclusions on the Development of Appropriate Guidelines (1995), the UNHCR Executive Committee 
stated: "In accordance with the principle that women's rights are human rights, these guidelines 
should recognise as refugees women whose claim to refugee status is based upon well-founded fear 
of persecution for reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, including 
persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related persecution."
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host country. As such, they held particular rights and had access to others, and were under 
special constraints and pressures.
The study focuses on the processes surrounding ‘inland* refugee claimants as 
opposed to overseas selection, countries of resettlement or overseas humanitarian aid. By 
accepting inland claims Canada is known as a ‘first country of asylum’ (Dirks,1995); it accepts 
asylum seekers who proceed directly to Canada rather than be selected at Canada’s overseas 
immigration offices or who passing through other countries first. This illustrates processes 
and concerns typical to advanced democratic countries with advanced welfare systems, which 
are very different from countries such as Africa that experience mass regional flows. The 
study concentrates on receiving-country refugee policy development in relation to inland 
claim-making processes.
The receiving-country orientation is narrowed by the exclusive focus on a very 
particular group of untraditional refugees, as noted earlier, but on the other hand this group 
is considered broadly with no constraints according to their countries of origin. This makes 
the group studied more representative, and indeed is quite unlike most refugee studies which 
concentrate on particular groups who necessarily arrive from a particular country or set of 
countries due to specific events occurring there. In this study claimants who went public 
came from 12 different countries across 5 different regions of the world, and asylum seekers 
who used the Guidelines after their instatement arrived from over 100 countries. Therefore 
while more representative, the lack of sending-country constraints does exclude the 
possibility of accounting for the influence of particular sending and receiving-country relations 
(i.e. historical ties or political relations) upon the shape and influence of asylum flows and 
receiving-country policy responses. Instead I consider asylum seekers’ use of the broader 
transnational and national structural contexts of trends converging around the particular 
issue (female-specific persecution) and asylum seekers in order to influence Canada’s policy 
responses.
For the above reasons the particular case provides an opportunity to explore the 
evolution of the Convention refugee definition and asylum seekers’ roles in it, in a pioneering 
country under conditions specific to advanced democratic countries with advanced welfare 
systems. Perhaps most notably, it is an opportunity to study a successful case. Asylum seekers’ 
not only challenged the Convention refugee definition in explicit ways, they actually changed 
its use. The case is chosen because of its success, and because of the relative uniqueness of such 
success, in which asylum seekers were explicitly involved. In contrast, the merits and 
limitations of undertaking a comparative study with other countries that instated similar
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policy guidelines or with other untraditional claimants in Canada who failed to influence 
policy, are discussed in Chapter 2 on methodology. For reasons discussed there, a 
comparative approach could not be undertaken in this study. Moreover, this study had 
somewhat different aims than a comparative study might have. It does not attempt to 
definitively identify causal factors that would be crucial for the success of other cases (in 
Canada or elsewhere), as comparison with negative cases might, although it can indicate 
factors that may be crucial. Rather, it concentrates on a unique positive case in order to 
challenge existing theory that excludes noncitizen influence on policy and policy-making, and 
more specifically asylum seekers’ influence on refugee policy. It documents how policy was 
challenged in the particular case, including factors at national and international levels that 
were crucial in facilitating such a challenge and were actually used by asylum seekers (as the 
study shows), thus enabling their success. By examining the particular case within its 
structural context, the study helps illuminate why refugee policy actually expanded when 
international migration policies have been tightening all over the world. In this the effects of 
globalisation are paramount, in particular for asylum seekers’ changing abilities and legitimacy 
to claim ‘right’ to social rights in receiving-countries, bringing together citizenship-based 
social policy and human rights based refugee policy. Thus the study illuminates broader 
trends that may also come to bear in other cases, however it must be kept in mind that such 
cases invoke complex processes taking place under various conditions that can never be 
exactly duplicated and could therefore could alter the outcome.
O verview  o f  th e  study
The study explores the inter-state and national structural context to uncover inherent and 
emerging opportunities for the particular asylum seeking and policy advocacy process. It then 
examines how asylum seekers in Canada negotiated and made expressly political use of these 
opportunities to influence national refugee policy determining their inclusion or exclusion 
from membership. This illuminates the complicated and dynamic relationship between 
asylum seeking and national refugee policy development, and provides an important 
illustration of one way globalisation may be affecting policy-making and welfare state 
responsibilities, in particular by altering the ideal and institution of citizenship. The thesis 
does not attempt to resolve the problems thrown up by citizenship, but offers a clear 
directive for social policy to begin to engage more with citizenship debates in other fields, 
and considers various possibilities for the beginning of a more globally aware social policy.
The analytical framework developed to explain the relation between asylum seeking 
and policy development (Chapter 3) is comprised of three parts. First it identifies asylum
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seekers as part of broader processes of social change wherein they may be political actors in 
receiving-countries. It situates both refugee policy and asylum seeking within historical 
settings and identifies the dynamic tension between underlying ideals of refugee policy -  
rooted in human rights -  being static or universal, whilst asylum seeking causes and contexts 
change and subsequently call these ideals into question. It describes how citizenship and 
human rights may interact in the case of asylum seeking, and how asylum seeking may 
challenge this developing dynamic.
Second, it describes the implications of asylum seeking taking place in a structural 
context. Asylum seekers play a political role in which they claim a particular identity invoking 
particular rights in host countries. The process of linking identity with rights and further 
associating those rights with a particular state is a political one. It takes place in a particular 
structural environment that may increase or decrease conflict and political struggle over 
meaning, identity, rights and responsibilities. Claimants must seek support and prove the 
legitimacy of their claims, while historically specific circumstances allow some claimants 
greater opportunities than others, and favour some types of claims over others. 
Subsequently, what we think of as the ‘refugee* is a historically specific creation that may be 
successfully challenged under certain conditions, sometimes with policy implications.
Third, it broadly identifies the international and national structural context within 
which refugee policy is made and in which asylum seeking takes place, drawing out the main 
elements of their reciprocally shaping relationship and describing asylum seekers as political 
agents within it. It describes the increasing viability of asylum seekers* political agency within 
an institutionalist framework where national and transnational cultural and legal norms and 
values legitimate and facilitate their new claims and actions. It offers a basic axis for 
exploring how they negotiate the more tangible elements of the structural context (i.e. 
international refugee regimes, national refugee regimes and host country resources) in 
political ways, drawing upon collective action theory to illuminate both strategic and 
symbolic discursive dimensions. This approach reveals the long-term and inter-state 
structural context of interactions between grassroots actors and government, and emphasises 
cross-national identity-issues underlying policy goals and the ideologies and strategies used 
for their attainment in particular contexts.
Thus in this analytical framework the intertwining of identity politics, refugee policy 
and the politics of policy-making suggest that the challenge asylum seekers pose is both 
symbolic and strategic. It is symbolic in that it involves the creation of meaning and identity 
and how we think about power structures, social relations and responsibilities. It is strategic
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in that it involves seeking and using particular instruments for political persuasion to 
influence policy development around those identities and meanings.
The study then examines the structural context for both stable and more recently 
changing aspects as sites or opportunities for policy to be challenged by the particular asylum 
seekers, and explores how challenges were actually made and to what effect. In so doing, a 
previously unstudied refugee movement is also revealed and further policy recommendations 
are made based on cases examined.
The structural context comprises both international and national, and 
institutionalised claim-making procedures and extra-institutional public campaign tactics. 
Refugee policy challenges by asylum seekers typically occur incrementally through 
institutionalised status determination processes and the growth of jurisprudence. However 
they may be enhanced by extra-institutional tactics. The latter were used by Therese (quoted 
in introduction to this chapter) and eighteen others, who took the challenge out of private 
court rooms of refugee hearings. The study shows that this group in particular was politically 
conscious, made important decisions about taking certain actions, and took expressly political 
actions. Their engagement in Canadian politics thus does not conform to the traditional 
conception of refugees as simply ‘forced’ migrants and passive beneficiaries of receiving- 
country policies of protection, nor of participation in policy processes being confined to 
citizens. Their actual influence on policy through overarching campaign and claim-making 
processes, which the study illustrates, reinforces this finding. The means and outcomes of 
their influence reveal important aspects of policy-making under international influences.
Gaimants’ ability to draw on both human rights foundations of refugee policy and 
substantive citizenship rights in Canada as they made claims, awaited decisions and 
challenged them, was a crucial element of the policy process. Asylum seekers and supporters 
made use of and furthered the increasing overlap between citizenship and human rights 
discourses and state-responsibilities to argue the legitimacy of their claims and create public 
pressure. Two conflicting sets of ideologies and Canadian policies were brought face to face: 
Canada's domestic policies condemning violence against women and implementing social 
and legal interventions; and Canada’s foreign policy, treating violence against women as a 
"private" or non-state issue, remaining silent on the maltreatment of women in many 
countries and failing to provide refuge for women fleeing female-specific persecution. In an 
unusual twist, Canadian women’s rights were exposed as culturally relative rather than 
universally upheld by their own state. The Canadian government was called upon to rectify 
this situation. State responsibilities previously reserved for citizens were extended to
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noncitizens by enlarging human rights applications. By changing the application of refugee 
policy, Canada explicitly recognised that women’s rights are human rights, regardless of 
where women live. Women therefore can claim protection from female-specific human 
rights violations by seeking asylum.
Asylum seekers’ grassroots social change may be explained as occurring within 
institutionalised cultural contexts that lend legitimacy and opportunity to individual and 
collective actions (Meyer,1994; Powell and DiMaggio,1991), and which are marked by 
increasing interaction between national and global levels, or what is often described as a 
process of gttotalisation (Held,1999). It may also be described as furthering this interaction. 
Furthermore, while national and transnational institutional frameworks are mutually 
reinforcing in some respects, the conflicts and contradictions between them also make the 
political actorhood of noncitizens viable. This emerges particularly regarding the conflicts 
between the citizenship and human rights of particular groups. Women's rights are 
powerfully supported in many national and international legal codes and enjoy widespread 
and diverse support by many different publics, even compared to other social rights issues. 
However, it is evident that a driving force behind these asylum seekers’ claims was both the 
stronghold and pervasiveness of ideas about women’s rights, and their continuing 
unevenness in substance, implementation, dispersion and rate of development across the 
world, like many issues affected by globalisation today (see Held et al,1999). Thus these 
asylum seekers could bring nationally specific citizenship discourses and rights regarding 
females face to face with human rights, strategically drawing on the most helpful established 
elements within each and attracting substantial popular support that no doubt was 
fundamental to their success.
The combination of increasing global interdependency involving global level rights of 
persons, and concurrent unevenness in acceptance and enforcement of rights, poses a new 
challenge for national welfare systems. The irony is that while welfare states are under attack, 
they are also facing pressures to extend their responsibilities toward more transnational issues 
and beneficiaries and greater inter-state co-operation (Deacon 1997; on the EU, for example, 
see Meehan 1993). Similarly, while national refugee regimes are becoming increasingly 
restrictive in important respects, some are also broadening their coverage as new types of 
claims emerge and are legitimated and accepted, as the case of ‘gender-related refugees’ 
demonstrates. Asylum seekers’ leverage and unique access for making claims upon potential 
host countries for the rights and benefits associated with authorised entry and ‘citizenship’, 
by which they argued that national welfare rights should be international or human rights,
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bring these two arenas of ‘rights’ face to face. The outcome of campaigns depended on 
previous advances regarding women’s rights, but also further internationalised them.
The extent of asylum seekers’ influence on policy content is measured both by the 
aims and outcomes of publicised policy demands, and also by the quieter evolution of policy 
interpretation and administration through on-going institutional claim-making processes. 
Findings suggest that the implications of their policy influence were profound both 
ideologically and institutionally, but that strategy demanded some compromises be made. 
The Guidelines were not campaigners’ ideal policy solution but did serve to preserve high 
priority policy aims through a flexible framework open to future revision. Subsequently, since 
instatement the Guidelines have been incrementally expanded and in no small part due to 
challenging new twists in gender-related claims made through them, which the study also 
examines. However, analysis of claims also indicates that further policy change may be 
warranted, to recognise not only female-specific forms of ‘gender-related’ persecution but also 
structural sex-specific causes of ‘sex persecution’.
By illuminating the above processes, trends and outcomes, the thesis demonstrates 
that non-citizens, foreign nationals and stateless persons can indeed be instrumental in 
shaping their own eligibility criteria and rights to state protection and other benefits of 
membership laid out in national policy. It explains why this was possible in the particular 
case, and considers broader implications for citizenship as the underlying justification for 
social policy and states’ social welfare responsibilities. The thesis suggests that in the field of 
social policy academics may need to rethink nationally bound policy and policy-change 
frameworks rooted in traditional notions of citizenship rights, which globalisation is fast 
calling into question. It suggests possible directions for a more global social policy which 
explicitly incorporates noncitizens, re-reading Marshall’s theory of citizenship in light of 
findings of the study and building upon citizenship debates outside social policy.
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis is organised into two Parts reflecting the two-tier global/national aspect of the 
analytical framework but keeping a firm eye on their inter-relations. The remaining chapters 
in 'Part I  of the thesis elaborate the inter-state structural approach of the study and of the 
challenges faced and posed by the particular asylum seekers.
Chapter two presents a detailed account of the research strategy, data and methods of 
collection. A qualitative case study approach was used to describe and explain the particular 
asylum flow, the asylum seeking process in relation to policy development, the extent of its 
influence and its implications. The research method combines historical documentary
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techniques, interviews, analysis of mass media coverage, NGO and government documents, 
and analysis of gender-related claims and court decisions. By triangulating data sources I 
identify the asylum seekers, illuminate the structural context and changing political 
opportunities, and explore how they were used by asylum seekers and supporters.
Chapter three sets the international context of migration ‘systems* and theories of 
refugee policy-making, showing why and how asylum seekers’ policy roles in receiving- 
countries were previously neglected, and developing the analytical framework summarised 
earlier to explain the relationship between asylum seeking and national refugee policy 
development. Chapters four through nine reflea this framework. They explore the structural 
context and processes through which the particular asylum seekers negotiated the conflias 
between theory and opportunity that shape the refugee definition in law and policy, thus 
making the transition from ‘self-identified’ to ‘state-identified’ refugees, challenging 
prevailing political norms about rights and responsibilities, and influencing policy. They 
examine nature of asylum seekers’ roles and extent of influence in the case studied, and what 
the policy process and outcomes might tell us about the evolving inter-state system and idea 
of citizenship.
Chapter four reveals the embeddedness of asylum seekers’ symbolic and strategic 
challenges within international refugee law, refleaed in the Canadian policy and 
determination system, both generally and in the particular case of women fleeing female- 
specific persecution. It argues that claim-making is a linchpin of refugee policy development 
due to the structure of international migration systems and status determination processes. It 
reveals the roles refugee claimants are inherently required to play in evolving interpretations 
of ‘persecution’ and state responsibilities (which sit at the crux of the refugee definition) 
despite embedded structural constraints against them.
Chapter five explores the evolution of three inter-related international trends with 
important implications for the particular asylum seekers before 1992: the ‘feminisation of 
migration’, the corresponding evolution of refugee policy discourses from general to female- 
specific causes and needs, and the internationalisation of conceptions of state responsibility 
for female-specific violence through the human rights movement. A rapid evolution and 
underlying tension between progressive and static conceptions of women’s rights, and 
between continuing constraints and rising opportunities for migration by women is revealed 
in refugee policy discourses that just stopp short of women’s rights as human rights.
Against this background, Part II concentrates on the structural context and policy­
making process in which the particular asylum seekers engaged in Canada. Chapter six
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introduces the Canadian setting in the 1980s and reveals emerging rights, resources and 
opportunities for asylum seekers to engage in policy processes. The characteristics of the 
main actors in the core policy network are presented as they were influenced by this climate.
Chapters seven and ei$t explore campaigns involving asylum seekers who went public 
within the core policy advocacy network. Chapter seven shows why and how they and their 
supporters decided to campaign, revealing asylum seekers as political actors, and their 
relationships with and influence on the internal political culture of the advocacy network. 
Chapter eight analyses the processes, evolution and outcome of their campaigning, illuminating 
asylum seekers’ integral roles throughout. The incremental influence and implications of 
institutional claim-making processes under the Guidelines since instatement are explored in 
Chapter nine, which examines ‘gender-related’ claims and court decisions between 1993 and 
1997. It suggests further policy development may be in order.
In all the chapters, asylum seekers’ symbolic and strategic roles in policy change are 
illuminated and their actions and influence are explained in relation to the structural context. 
Integral to all the chapters is also the interplay between citizenship and human rights 
illuminated in asylum seekers’ challenge to refugee policy. This interplay is revealed as both 
an instrument and effect of asylum seekers’ participation in policy processes.
Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications of the particular case study 
for understanding the relationship between asylum seeking and refugee policy development 
in particular; the developing relationship between human rights and citizenship more 
generally regarding rights to the benefits of membership and access to policy-making that 
shapes those rights and benefits; and the implications for social policy. The study can only be 
a beginning in the necessary development of a more globally aware social policy. It indicates 
that relations between states and noncitizens are changing in ways social policy needs to 
account for. Implications for Marshall’s idea of citizenship as the underlying justification of 
social policy are suggested, and theories of transformations of citizenship are reconsidered in 
light of the case studied, which invoked a symbiotic relationship between human rights and 
citizenship rights.
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2 .  Research  strategy
The research strategy for this study seeks to address descriptive and theoretical aims: to 
describe the particular asylum flow and asylum seekers’ access to, participation in, and 
influence on the policy process through their institutional claim-making and extra- 
institutional campaigning; and to explain both this previously unexplored process as it 
involves asylum seeking noncitizens, and its implications for policy and policy-making. Thus 
the research evolved around four specific questions: (1) What are asylum seekers* roles in the 
policy process. (2) What comprises the stable and changing structural context of 
opportunities and constraints they negotiate. (3) How did asylum seekers negotiate this 
context. (4) To what effect.
Underlying these questions is the more fundamental question, and methodological 
concern, of who the particular asylum seekers are: are they defined by their policy demands 
(shaping policy to identity) or are they subjects defined by policy? This chapter begins by 
setting out a conceptual framework to address this question and describing the implications 
of choosing a successful case to study, both of which affect the methodology and data 
interpretation. The qualitative case study method and triangulation process in data 
interpretation are then presented. Section II describes the data collection method, including 
some of the difficulties encountered and the strengths and limitations of data obtained. 
Section III on data analysis relates the central questions explicitly to the data.
I. M e th o d o lo g y
A. T he  asylum seekers u n d er  co n sid era tio n : So m e conceptual distin ctio ns
A.1 Legitimate versus illegitimate refugees
A primary theme underlying both theory and methodology of the study is the false 
dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate refugees when we look at asylum seekers 
whose claims push out the boundaries of refugee policy and state responsibilities. When 
considering who the actors in question are, we run into the distinction between the formal 
status of ‘refugee’ which some attain and the reality of being a refugee (a person in flight 
from persecution) without state recognition. Because we are interested in how refugee policy 
is shaped by claimants, we must look at the dynamics between state-recognised and self­
recognised refugee identity. This underlies policy outcomes, whereby the needs and claims of
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self-recognised refugees may or may not fit eligibility criteria for state-recognition. And it also 
underlies the policy process, whereby lack of fit may indicate policy change is warranted, and 
may be pursued precisely by those who do not ‘fit’. It means also that the subjects of this 
study may include asylum seekers with, ultimately, either positive or negative outcomes on 
their individual refugee claims; various types of positive outcomes in terms of the formal 
status they receive; and different degrees to which their final policy status matches their 
policy claims. These are discussed below.
A.2 ‘Asylum seekers* versus ‘refugees*
The term ‘asylum seeker’ is used in this study for three main reasons which set the 
parameters for international migrants to be included in the study as well as how they are 
referred to in the study.
Firstly, the term “asylum seeker” describes formally unrecognised ‘refugees’ (i.e. 
lacking formal refugee status) attempting to establish their legitimacy; they are seeking asylum 
by making refugee claims. The outcome of their cases is pending, even for those challenging 
negative decisions already made on their claims. This study focuses on the processes asylum 
seekers engaged in while seeking status, and how their claims challenged the refugee 
definition that lays out their eligibility criteria.
Secondly, because this study is retrospective the outcome of cases is now known, and 
not all of the asylum seekers who went public ultimately attained formal Convention refugee 
status. Some received extra-Convention status, usually on Humanitarian grounds, while two 
were deported or remained illegally in Canada. In this study reasons for these various status 
types included both continuing misfit between asylum seekers’ claims and current 
interpretations of the refugee definition, and the fact that the Guidelines were instated after 
most of the asylum seekers who went public first made refugee claims -  thus raising 
administrative/claim-processing difficulties. As well, while it is not the researcher’s opinion, 
it is always possible that, like any refugee claim, evidence pertaining to particular claims was 
not credible even when viewed through a gender-lens. Each claimant who went public had 
to be assessed on the merits of her individual claim. In all cases the success or failure of 
individual claims is extremely important for the asylum seekers themselves, but is the 
challenge they posed (individually and collectively) and its effects upon refugee policy which 
we want to study.
Thirdly, the term asylum seeker emphasises the movement or action in ‘seeking’ 
refugee status; it emphasises their identity as actors. The study explores how asylum seekers
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can effect new interpretations of the law by making untraditional claims and challenging 
decisions on them, resulting in the growth of jurisprudence or catalysing substantial changes 
to the law. Their agency in this respect reveals that both asylum seeking and refugee law are 
historically and structurally located, the former having at times to challenge political 
boundaries to maintain a symbiotic relation with the latter (discussed further in Chapter 3).
For all these reasons, throughout the study I refer to ‘asylum seekers’ rather than 
‘refugees’ to account for all those who made claims and may have influenced policy 
development. This avoids the confusion that arises regarding someone with a legitimate claim 
to being a refugee but who is not traditionally recognised as such or is not ultimately accepted 
as a Conuention refuge, or who is even rejected.
A.3 What kind of ‘refugees’ in policy?
Having described conceptual distinctions within the asylum seeker category, how claimants 
are viewed in this study as potential policy actors regardless of the status they ultimately 
achieve, and which asylum seekers the study therefore considers, we must now identify those 
studied by their various policy identities: the types of refugee claims they make and 
corresponding demands upon policy, and their ultimate policy-defined status.
A .3.1 Female-specific persecution as an umbrella term
The above ‘status’ distinctions lead to the question of how to approach Canada’s Guidelines 
as the framework for identifying refugees of this type, and how this reflects on asylum 
seekers in the study whose cases push out the definitional boundaries. At the time the asylum 
seekers studied argued their claims, there were conflicting perspectives on how they ought to 
be defined in policy. These persist to a certain extent today. This fundamental ambiguity 
underlies their identity as actors influencing policy, as women who are persecuted, as 
refugees identified through particular frameworks in refugee policy, and as asylum seekers not 
yet recognised in policy.
“Female-specific persecution” is an umbrella term used in this thesis to describe the
various forms of persecution experienced primarily by females that thus are somehow
structurally rooted to gender discrimination. For such asylum seekers to be recognised as
refugees according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (to which most
states adhere), the nature of the persecution they experience must be identified by its
structural cause. The essential structural element is intended to lift identification of
persecution out of time and place specific forms, which would be too numerous to list in one
definition. It points instead toward universalisable and ahistorical root causes that may
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manifest themselves in various ways according to time and place. The 1951 Convention 
recognises five such grounds of persecution: race, religion, nationality, political opinion and 
social group. There are two ways of recognising female-specific forms of persecution within 
the Convention definition, to different extents and effects. Both were important in the case 
studied and are defined below.
A.3.2 ‘Gender-related persecutionJ versus 'sex persecution: policy outoomes and policy demands 
Canada’s Guidelines for WorrmRfugees Fearing Gender-Related Persecution interpret the Convention 
definition through a gender lens. They explain how gender-specific reasons and forms of 
persecution may cross-cut all five established grounds of persecution; i.e. persecution on any 
established ground may be “gender-related”. Adjudicators are instructed how to interpret 
violence against women as a public (versus ‘private3) and structural issue which therefore may 
amount to persecution, invoking rights to state protection.
The Guidelines may be viewed as a step in an evolutionary process of policy-making 
that is not yet complete. Asylum seekers and supporters in campaigns for policy change 
argued that female-specific forms persecution may occur on the universal or ahistorical basis 
of sex as a root cause, rather than being a gender-related form of persecution on other 
structural grounds. They argued for ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ to be recognised as a “sixth” category of 
persecution alongside race, religion, nationality, political opinion and social group. This view 
has been supported in the international law and human rights literature. It was this demand 
which propelled national debate and led to instatement of the Guidelines as an immediate 
measure whilst further legislative change could be considered.
Despite the apparent controversy over the Guidelines, the nascent literature does not 
include empirical studies of the newly recognised “gender-related” claimants in Canada to 
assess whether the Guidelines indeed go far enough, nor the has this new refugee movement 
been studied either in itself or in relation to the development of the Guidelines. Thus asylum 
seekers’ ‘invisibility’ in policy processes is matched by policy proposals and critiques that 
remain ‘static’, more focused on content rather than the dynamic relations between refugees 
and the policies that define them. The study returns to the asylum seekers in question. In 
exploring the policy change process it explores who these asylum seekers are, what their 
demands were and continued to be, and asks how far policy matches demands.
When referring to the structural basis of refugee claims by asylum seekers in this 
study I primarily use the term sex persecution, which formed the basis of their policy 
demands. I use the term ‘gender-related’ refugee only when referring specifically to the
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grounds for formal refugee status claimed by asylum seekers after the Guidelines were 
instated -  their actual policy identity.
B. STUDYING A SUCCESSFUL CASE
This study concentrates on a successful case -policy advocacy involving asylum seekers, 
which actually brought about a major policy development -  explaining the generation and 
impact of asylum seekers’ influence within a particular structural context that was both 
conducive and vulnerable to their claims and actions. It does not aim to prove definitively 
why policy campaigns succeeded, rather to identify and illustrate the role of asylum seekers in 
campaigns that succeeded, illuminating important factors that made their participation 
possible and describing the forms it took. It thus challenges existing theory about noncitizen 
and asylum seeker participation in policy-making, while illuminating many of the evident 
strengths of the particular claims and campaigns in a changing world context vulnerable to 
their particular characteristics and strategies.
The study identifies a bundle of opportunities asylum seekers actually made use of in 
the particular case, and offers a rich empirical description of their participation and influence 
on policy-making. Had any of the particularly significant opportunities these asylum seekers 
used been absent, or had they not converged at the same time, it is possible that these asylum 
seekers may not have succeeded. On the other hand, several factors of their influence were 
so important as to be called cmdaly to the extent that they could have brought significant 
pressure for policy change even without some of the other factors. A case can be made for 
the fact that these were women's rigftts claims, which have particular force both in Canada and 
internationally. Other factors which the study examines, such as the openness of Canada’s 
refugee regime, the new rights won by aliens in Canada, Canada’s multicultural and common 
law tradition, may have been fundamental but in themselves could not be called decisive 
since other types of untraditional refugees also make claims under these same circumstances 
and yet fail to change policy. However, significant factors of the particular case also can be 
related to a more overarching causal factor -  the broader processes of globalisation. The 
study illuminates the particular bundle of opportunities and relates them to broader structural 
trends and changes enhancing asylum seekers’ abilities to challenge refugee policy. However, 
whether other cases could be similarly successful remains dependent on claim-specific and 
other circumstance-specific variables that could alter the outcome.
Looking at this latter possibility, it is important to note several important 
characteristics of the case studied. First, the fact that Canada’s 1993 Guidelines were the first 
of their kind in the world makes their instatement process particularly interesting and unique;
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other countries built upon an already proven successful model without, therefore, as much 
controversy. Thus, second, the particularly explicit nature of the asylum seekers’ policy 
challenge (whose public campaigning even received international coverage) and its actual 
success (actually changing the use of the 1951 UN Convention rather than working outside 
it), are also unique. In this sense the case can be described as an ‘outlier’ (King, Keohane and 
Verba,1994:56) in that it occurred under particular circumstances suitable for very specific 
types of claims, and thus could not necessarily be replicated elsewhere or for different types 
of claims. However, it was also a forerunner, in using newly emerging opportunities for asylum 
seeking and further shaping other asylum seekers’ future opportunities.
Thus, as the introduction to this thesis described, these asylum seekers’ claim-making 
processes were both typcial and atypical. That is, they involved some processes that all refugee 
claimants engage in by the very act of making claims, and under conditions that broadly 
affect asylum seekers’ abilities to make claims and challenge decisions on them. All refugees 
make claims in typical institutionalised status determination process, and there is reason to 
believe that some among them are somehow ‘untraditional’ since many are rejected, accepted 
on extra-Convention grounds, or accepted as Convention refugees by setting precedents that 
alter the application of the 1951 Convention (either to a new fact situation or through a 
novel interpretative framework). This likelihood may increase with rising numbers of refugee 
claims each year, making it increasingly important for us to understand the politicised nature 
of refugee status determination processes and asylum seekers’ political roles in it.
The asylum seekers studied were also not completely atypical in ‘going public’ or 
using other extra-insitutional tactics. This strategy, while uncommon, is not unprecedented, 
nor is campaigning by supporters for (or against) refugee policy change with reference to 
individual asylum seekers ‘falling through the cracks’, so-to-speak. Several examples can be 
found although in campaigns with far less coverage or effect and altogether different policy 
demands or no policy demands (i.e. simply permission for claimants to reside in Canada). For 
example, around the same period that asylum seekers in this study campaigned in Quebec 
and Ontario, Iranian refugees in British Columbia announced a hunger strike and a public 
demonstration was held with over 600 supporters to stop their deportation, alter Canada’s 
political stance toward Iran and its low acceptance rate of political refugees from Iran (01-03- 
93, “Hunger strike day” Press release). Another example is the ‘sanctuary movement’ in the 
United States in the 1980s, in which thousands of rejected El Salvadorian and Guatemalan 
political refugee claimants were housed by US residents in churches where they were declared 
beyond the law under the Christian doctrine of ‘sanctuary’. Asylum seekers and advocates
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sought to change government’s refusal to see asylum seekers from those countries as 
legitimate political refugees, which they claimed was politically biased due US foreign policy 
(see MacEoin,1985).
Considering the institutional and extra-institutional possibilities for other 
untraditional asylum seekers to challenge policy, it is helpful to consider how studying a 
comparable asylum seeking and policy advocacy process that failed might change or 
contribute to the analysis in this study. Comparative analysis with a negative case could, by 
elaborating existing structural barriers to noncitizen participation and their effective 
exclusion in particular cases, contribute to a more thorough exploration and understanding 
of the various dimensions and nature of participation among successful cases. Highlighting 
dissimilar characteristics of negative and positive cases could illuminate those factors (of 
context or strategies used) that were crucial for success, while highlighting common 
characteristics could illuminate those that may not have been crucial or were not in 
themselves sufficient to explain success. For example, an interesting and fruitful comparison 
would be with other types of ‘gender-related’ claims that did not manage to change policy, 
for instance claims by individuals persecuted because of their homosexuality. It is likely that 
the failure of such cases could be related, for example, to the much lower salience and 
support for homosexual rights, compared to women’s rights.
Because the study is not comparative it did not seek to identify causal factors of 
asylum seekers’ success that would definitively explain either similar policy change in other 
countries, or why other untraditional’ refugees actually fail to change policy in Canada or 
elsewhere. Nor could it attempt a complete catalogue of the challenges and types of political 
participation those studied engaged in, or be completely representative of the kinds of access 
asylum seekers generally have. Such a comparison was beyond the scope of this study in 
terms of both time and space, since the group studied was in itself previously unexplored, as 
was the asylum seeking process in relation to policy development generally. Moreover, 
available information or access to it for other cases is scant, and indeed this study faced its 
own problems of data collection (described below). Without widespread campaigning for 
homosexual claimants for example (whose cases were instead argued thougjo the Guidelines 
after their instatement), it is incredibly difficult to identify and locate claimants who failed.
However, for the purposes of this study it is important to note that typical structural 
barriers preventing asylum seekers from participating in policy processes or more simply 
from making successful untraditional claims are, while also under-researched, far better known 
than are structural opportunities and how asylum seekers use them. Studying a negative case
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could reinforce or elaborate our knowledge of existing structural barriers against asylum 
seekers. But the historical and structural background this study provides (Chapters 4 and 5) 
on barriers to claim-making by the particular group studied helps the analysis be more 
exhaustive than would be possible by looking only at claims and policy advocacy from the 
campaigns onward. These barriers are further described alongside the ernergng/changng 
opportunities, and how they were actually used by the group studied. This helps explain why the 
particular type of claimants and policy process emerged when they did, and some important 
reasons why they succeeded.
Thus while the study can not identify with certitude crucial aspects that defined these 
asylum seekers’ success while others fail, it does describe a broad and significant range of 
types of access and circumstances enabling the particular asylum seekers to make the 
challenges they did, in the ways they did, and to the extent they did. It further reveals the 
nature and strategies of their participation in policy processes, providing strong evidence of 
why they were able to participate and have significant impact. And it theorises the relation 
between the particular ‘bundle of opportunities’ and how asylum seekers used them, and the 
broader structural trends brought on by globalisation -  namely the developing dynamic 
between national and international institutions, law, values and norms. The fact of asylum 
seekers’ participation and influence is thus illustrated and made comprehensible.
C. Q ualitative analysis and  th e  case study m ethod
A qualitative case study approach was used to describe and explain the particular asylum 
flow, the asylum seeking process in relation to policy development, the extent of its influence 
and its implications. The case study method is advantageous for generating rich data on 
topics for which research resources are limited (Yin,1994). It is also considered a fruitful 
approach for generating theoretical insights (Bryman,1989). Yin describes “the distinctive 
need for case studies” arising out of “the desire to understand complex social phenomena. In 
brief, the case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” (1994:3). Such an approach was appropriate for the 
complex social and political processes of asylum seeking and policy change illustrated in the 
particular campaigns and claim-making in Canada. In this sense the qualitative aspect was 
also an essential feature, as it is highly appropriate for descriptive studies (Burgess, 1984). The 
dearth of previous research and documentation on the particular policy process necessitated 
an approach that offers the means for “subjects to express and develop their own 
interpretations of the situation”, thus reducing researcher bias (Critcher et al, 1999:72). A 
qualitative approach further provides flexibility that enables unanticipated themes to emerge
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during the course of research (Pollit et al,1990). The analytical framework for the study was 
indeed generated through an iterative relationship with the empirical work. Yin (1994) 
describes this process of explanation building as one in which an initial proposition is 
compared to findings of case studies and revised.
The core advocacy network in campaigns that occurred in Canada between 1991 and 
1997 is the main focus of the case study. However, campaigns were comprised of a series of 
individual and groups of asylum seekers making their refugee claims (and negative court 
decisions) public. Individual claims thus also constituted individual case studies, or 
‘embedded units of analysis’, of the claim-making and campaigning processes, which could 
then be viewed as a whole. Claimants were linked through common supporters (Canadian 
residents) in a core advocacy network. Analysis of individual claimant ‘case histories’ (as 
described below) thus occurred on two levels: for the types of claims in themselves and their 
campaigning experiences, which could be compared individually (with the other claimants) 
and examined as a part of the campaign as a whole.
Additionally the research aimed to explore asylum seekers* influence through 
institutional means in and of themselves, in particular to examine the nature of the asylum 
flow and its use of the Guidelines after instatement. The study thus set out to be more 
comprehensive in exploring the structural context and its use by the particular asylum seekers 
in Canada. A second set of claims was examined, described below on data sources, again for 
both the nature of their claims (and court decisions on them) and their collective influence.
The case study as a whole also aimed to take into account how the structural 
environment affects claimant abilities to influence refugee policy, the structural environment 
being an intersection of international and national contexts, and historical and current trends 
and changes within them which asylum seekers traverse. Thus the study sought to explain 
not only how asylum seekers influenced policy but also to shed light on why they were able 
to do so in Canada in the late twentieth century.
D. TRIANGULATION METHOD OF DATA INTERPRETATION
A variety of data sources was needed to suit the above purposes and aims of the study and to 
compensate for the dearth of relevant previous research upon which to build the study and 
analysis. Thus a triangulation method was used. Yin (1994:92) explains: “the most important 
advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of corurghg 
lines o f inquiry, a process of triangulation... ”. By offering multiple sources of evidence with 
different perspectives, and diversifying the methods by which they were obtained,
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triangulation reduces the chances of researcher bias in the interpretation of data and 
increases the internal validity of the study.
Triangulation was particularly helpful for describing the complex process in the case 
studied. Many perspectives pertaining to factual details of the campaigns were gathered from 
a variety of types of sources and checked against each other to present a more holistic and 
reliable account of events, and to tease out significant recurring themes regarding asylum 
seekers’ roles and policy advocacy strategies. Converging lines of enquiry meant in this case 
that the conditions, nature and strategies of asylum seekers’ participation in policy processes 
were illuminated. Because a successful case was chosen in which asylum seekers had some 
role, evidenced in their claim-making and ‘going public’, the data was not searched for proof 
of their participation per se; rather data analysis sought to elaborate why, how and to what extent 
and effect isftum  seekers participated.
This included considering why and to what extent asylum seekers chose to participate, 
and to what extent they acted on their own behalf or were represented by advocates; i.e. to 
what extent were they actually more ‘voluntary’ than ‘forced’ actors. An important aspect of 
addressing this last point was looking at why some asylum seekers considered not 
participating. By looking at their considerations and options agrinst participating (particularly 
when deciding whether or not to go public), and at the obstacles to claim-making and policy 
advocacy which asylum seekers needed to overcome, findings support an interpretation of 
asylum seekers’ agency rather than forced actorhoocL
While the effect of asylum seekers’ participation can not be measured quantitatively 
divorced from overarching campaign processes and collective claim-making, multiple 
qualitative indicators relating to the success of policy influence strategies as they in fact invoked 
individual asylum seekers (indeed, showing asylum seekers* centrality in chosen strategies) 
provide some measure of asylum seekers’ influence. In this the case is not representative of 
asylum seekers generally; rather it describes why and how particular asylum seekers helped 
shape policy, despite their traditional ‘forced’ image and noncitizen status, as an illustration 
of global influences on policy processes and the transformation of state responsibilities.
The combined research methods included historical documentary techniques, 
interviews with campaign participants (primarily core supporters of asylum seekers who went 
public), examination of NGO and government documents, analysis of mass media coverage, 
analysis of gender-related claims and court decisions, and direct observation. Through this 
variety of data sources I identify and describe the asylum seekers, illuminate their structural
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context and changing political opportunities, and explore the ways asylum seekers and 
supporters used them.
(5. D ata  sources
The number and combination of data sources and methods used reflects complexity of the 
process studied, and an attempt to be comprehensive given scarce analytical resources on the 
topic. It perhaps most resembles studies of collective action, which aim at a number of levels 
of analysis linking individual/group identity and aims, structure and agency within a specific 
historical or current process, as discussed in Chapter 3.
(1) Case histories of twenty-five asylum seekers, including all those (twenty-two) who 
engaged in public pressure tactics and three who made private appeals to the Immigration 
Minister through supporters between 1991 and 1997. In total nineteen of the asylum seekers 
who went public are the main focus of attention due to the substantial amounts of data with 
multiple sources of corroborating evidence on each of their cases; they are therefore referred 
to as ‘major’ case histories. The remaining six cases form ‘minor’ case histories to which the 
study occasionally refers as supporting evidence.
Individual case histories were compiled from the variety of data sources listed below. 
The process of identifying and compiling evidence on particular claimants from the range of 
sources constituted the most lengthy dimension of the fieldwork, as it involved so many 
sources and stages of research as described in the section on Data Collection -  for example 
searching newspaper archives, identifying asylum seekers* advocates, and tracking down 
multiple sources of information based on leads gained during interviews.
Once compiled, case histories served several purposes. They provided: data on 
characteristics of claimants and types or ‘scenarios’ of female-specific persecution and 
corresponding claim types; descriptions of asylum seekers’ institutional and extra-institutional 
actions and their relationships with supporters, primarily those in what I refer to as the ‘core 
advocacy network’ (see below); chronology and details campaigns in individual case histories 
and as a group of case histories; and direct quotes and political commentaiy from asylum 
seekers regarding their situation, beliefs, aims or demands. The case histories themselves are 
described in detail in Chapters 6-8, presenting their characteristics in relation to why and 
how they made claims and campaigned.
(2) Twenty in-depth ‘expert’ interviews at on-site locations (Toronto, Ottawa and 
(primarily) Montreal where campaigns took place) and four in phone interviews. These 
included all but one of the organisations in a core advocacy network and several of the main 
participating lawyers. They also included several secondaiy campaign participants and
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government sympathisers. Asylum seekers who campaigned were central to the advocacy 
networks, as the study demonstrates. However interviews concentrated on their supporters 
due to lack of access (described in the Section on Data Collection) and relying instead on the 
presence of alternative sources for case histories as described above.
Interviews were semi-structured or “loosely-structured” whereby interviews:
follow a sequence which allows respondents plenty of room to develop their own 
perspectives and agendas at the beginning, even if the researcher later needs to inject a 
minimum number of ‘standard’ questions. This reduces the chances that the researchers 
will impose their own prior pattern on the evidence. (Politt et al 1990:184).
The specialists interviewed provided an alternative to the paucity of published 
information on gender-persecution generally, and provided ‘elite’ insider accounts of what 
when on between supporters, asylum seekers and government before, during and after the 
campaigns. Interviews had five main themes or aims: to identify policy actors (both asylum 
seekers and Canadian residents); describe trends witnessed regarding the particular asylum 
flow; describe types of the particular claims and their movement through the Canadian 
refugee system; describe the campaign process in various dimensions (participants, aims, 
strategies, chronology of campaign generation, height and decline), interviewee’s roles in it 
(including their personal background) and their relationships with asylum seekers and 
supporters; and provide personal opinions on the Guidelines as an outcome of the campaigns.
Campaign participants were diverse in profession. Interviews were undertaken with 
the lawyers representing claimants who went public, and the main actors from participating 
organisations including international, national and local level refugee, human rights and 
women’s organisations. They also included one refugee, IRB official, and researcher at the 
Library of Parliament. Due to this diversity interview schedules were to a certain extent 
individually tailored to suit professional background and thus best elicit the kinds of 
information interviewees would be able to offer. However interviews all followed the same 
basic themes and structure based on research questions. The great diversity of interviewees 
contributed a wide range of perspectives and holistic view of campaigns, asylum seekers and 
asylum seeking process, raising a variety of themes and generating rich descriptive data which 
could be analysed for common and different interpretations of events.
(3) Questionnaires answered by seven women’s shelters, in Montreal, Toronto and 
Ottawa. The majority of respondents were ‘secondary campaign participants’, i.e. not 
participants in the core advocacy network. The aims of the questionnaire were three-tier: to 
illuminate/describe trends in the shelters’ experience with international migrant women, 
specifically asylum seekers; the different dimensions of the ‘scenarios’ of asylum seekers’
situations, of those who resided at the shelter; the shelters* participation in and views on the 
campaigns and 1993 Guidelines.
(4) Mass media coverage of the campaigns from 12 newspapers, and press packages, 
press releases, letters to the Immigration Minister and other NGO documents pertaining to 
the campaign. These were used primarily to identify campaign participants, add to case 
histories of individual asylum seekers, provide a chronology of campaigns and the discourses 
and strategies between state and nonstate actors. The 12 newspapers were chosen simply for 
having covered the campaigns, but were those located primarily in the Provinces of Quebec 
and Ontario. They include the main newspapers as well as some smaller and local papers. 
Use of media sources was intended neither to compare coverage by different sources or 
media, nor as a complete index of all coverage on the campaigns. However the coverage used 
for this study includes the majority of articles on the campaigns appearing in major papers 
during the time period of the campaigns.
(5) Institutional documents including Consultations and Conference reports, and 
relevant press releases and speeches by government officials pertaining to campaigns and 
gender-related claims. This was a relatively abundant source, providing details and 
chronology of the government’s stance on female-specific persecution and state 
responsibility, its approaches to demands by activists, and its approach to solutions.
(6) Case synopses and court decisions on 147 “gender-related” claims and court 
decisions between 1993 and 1997, drawn from RefLex, a legal database of notable cases 
across the country. Notable cases are those that break legal ground, either expanding or 
challenging previous decisions on similar cases. Claims and court decisions are examined for 
characteristics and trends, and application of the Guidelines. The characteristics and 
representativeness of cases included in RefLex are described in Section II.
(7) Historical literature on international migration and Canada’s refugee regime, and 
the nascent literature on female-specific persecution. Historical documents were consulted 
relating to various aspects shaping the ‘refugee’ in policy and the asylum seeking process. It 
includes historical descriptions and analysis of the international refugee regime and migration 
system, Canada’s refugee regime, and trends for women in particular. Although information 
on gender-related persecution is limited, a nascent body of literature has quickly developed 
since 1993 primarily in international human rights and refugee law but also including policy 
literature and institutional documents (government and NGO). Institutional documents 
include, in particular, relevant IRB special papers and reports, speeches and documents, with 
special assistance from the Working Group on Women and Children Refugees, and the
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editorial board of RefLex. Among this information was an evolving set of statistics on 
gender-related claims in Canada which are used to put the RefLex cases into context.5
(8) Direct observation of the campaigns during my residence in Montreal before, 
during, and immediately after the campaigns, in both first and second phases.
II. DATA SELECTION AND COLLECTION
The method for collecting data on all but historical aspects is described below within the 
broader aims of uncovering who the particular asylum seekers are; how they made use of the 
structural context to challenge policy; and to what effect. Selecting and collecting information 
pertaining to these questions was divided across two main areas with a combination of data 
sources and methods within each: A. extra-institutional (campaign) actors and activities; B. 
institutional actors and activities. These are in reality inter-related actors and areas of activity 
in that all asylum seekers undergo institutional procedures; however, not all asylum seekers 
undertake extra-institutional actions, thus they are treated separately here. Within both areas 
are the issues of mapping aaoess, representation and confidentiality^  each affecting the nature and 
reliability of data obtained for specific purposes.
A. Extra-institutional (campaign) actors a n d  A cnvm ES
A.1 Identifying policy advocates and policy processes
Campaigns were organised around a series of individual and groups of asylum seekers 
making their claims public. The core policy advocacy network studied was therefore 
comprised of both asylum seekers who went public and their supporters. The empirical 
research started with highly publicised cases as a way into the network of advocates and 
asylum seekers. Media coverage (newspapers, television, newsletters and journal articles) 
following the course of events, both before and after the Guidelines’ instatement, was used to 
begin identifying claimants and supporters.
A main difficulty in the research was access, arising from the fact that studying a 
particular campaign involved locating and getting access to particular individuals. These ‘key 
informants’ were the only sources of information on campaigns from the perspective of core 
campaigners; they were irreplaceable. As the research was conducted several years after the 
most intense period of campaigning, in some cases individuals could not be located. Despite
5 I am particularly grateful to Nancy Doraiy from the IRB Montreal Division; the Montreal IRB 
Documentation Centre archivists; Valerie Woods, a Regional co-ordinator of RefLex; and Sarah 
Morgan who responded to my queries through the Access to Information Act.
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intense efforts, the target of interviews in fact shifted early on in the fieldwork, from asylum 
seekers to their supporters in the core advocacy network.
Asylum seekers who had gone public were often identified in press coverage only by 
their first names or by alias. Once their supporters were interviewed, the majority of asylum 
seekers still could not be located either because they had re-located in an attempt to begin 
more settled lives in Canada and/or had explicitly stated they wanted to return to normal life 
without public attention after the campaigns and resolution of their claims. Supporters either 
did not know where they were or could not put me in contact with them. However, as 
described below case histories of participating claimants were compiled through a variety of 
other data sources including (most importantly) the people they worked with.
These experts respected the confidentiality of claimant names and whereabouts but 
talked openly about the campaign process and particular claimants. Access was in this sense 
particularly good, no doubt influenced by my own interests and affinity toward human rights, 
refugee and women’s issues, alongside the nature of the study which was supportive of 
campaign aims. These aspects put me in good standing with interviewees, who tended to be 
quite candid and provided detailed accounts and opinions of events. Despite the fact that 
these experts were also ‘irreplaceable’ they comprised the bulk of the interviews, as most 
were indeed available and interested in the study. All publicised claims and campaigns 
occurred in Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa, the stronghold being Montreal where the 
majority of interviews were conducted.
Interviews were first conducted with supporters who according to press coverage 
appeared most frequently involved with cases and public pressure tactics. At each interview 
other core supporters were identified, and follow-on interviews were arranged. The 
‘network’ structure best described the nature and organisation of their coalition, which was 
non-hierarchical, diffuse, and diverse in constituency and types of action or strategies used.
A “nominalist” sketch of overarching and sub-networks of asylum seekers and 
supporters was thus mapped. Laumann and colleagues (1992:23) describe a nominalist 
delineation of network boundaries as a process by which “an analyst self-consciously 
imposes a conceptual framework constructed to serve [her] own analytic purposes”. In this 
approach “network closure has no ontologically independent status. There is no assumption 
that itself will naturally conform to the analyst’s distinction; the perception of reality is 
assumed to be mediated by the conceptual apparatus of the analyst, be he (or she) an active 
participant in the social scene under study or an outside observer.” (Ibid,22).
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The chain of contacts was mapped until information obtained about participants and 
events was saturated -  no new names of individuals or organisations continued to emerge, 
and those identified overlapped extensively among the chain of contacts who were 
interviewed. At this point, the network could be mapped through a “realist” approach in 
which “the investigator adopts the presumed vantage point of the actors themselves in 
defining the boundaries of social entities. That is, the network is treated as a social fact only 
in that it is consciously experienced as such by the actors composing it” (Ibid,20-21).
This produced a map of the larger metanetwork of support, nationally and regionally, 
and of the “core” network of activists including asylum seekers. By ‘core’ I mean the network 
of supporters most involved with, and indeed leading, campaigns around those asylum 
seekers who received the greatest media attention. The core network was a small cluster of 
individuals from a surprisingly broad cross section of fields with varying mandates and 
expertise, across non-government, semi-government organisations, international, national, 
regional, and local levels. They included human rights organisations; refugee and immigrant 
groups; women's organisations including women's shelters, national organisations and 
educational/research groups; church groups regularly involved with refugee advocacy and 
community work; immigration and refugee specialists in academia; and lawyers, both in 
private practice and Legal Aid (state provided legal counsel).
The main participant from each of the organisations spear-heading the campaigns 
was interviewed, with the exception of the Canadian division of Amnesty International which 
appeared to have taken a more marginal role in orchestrating campaigns, although providing 
a very important source of support and legitimacy for the campaigns as a whole. Several 
lawyers were unavailable or could not be located, however the majority were interviewed (six 
lawyers handling a total of thirteen of the nineteen cases that went public).
At times there were very strong supporters involved with a particular claimant but 
not closely involved with the core advocacy network orchestrating the bulk of the campaigns. 
These are referred to as secondary supporters, with whom several interviews were conducted 
for information on the extent of their involvement, additional campaign descriptions 
including other actors, and information about the claimants they were involved with.
Of women’s shelters, often integrally involved with the campaigns, four were 
interviewed. Of these, two were part of the core network in early campaigns, one was more 
secondary, and the fourth was a main leader in campaigns during the second phase. To 
complement the data on secondary actors a questionnaire was sent to women’s shelters in 
Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto because compared to other types of organisations they were
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involved in the campaigns in higher numbers. The aim was to discover the extent of their 
involvement, and what they knew about the particular asylum seekers and campaign process. 
Questionnaire responses were low: seven out of thirty. All but one was more peripherally 
involved in the campaigns, as expected, thus providing information more on secondary 
actors’ experiences. An interview was arranged with the one shelter more integrally involved.
The overarching metanetwork of policy advocates could be said to include 
sympathetic government authorities, primarily members of the IRB Working Group on 
Refugee Women and Children. They did not work together with core advocates and did not 
get involved in campaigning for individual asylum seekers. They were not regarded by core 
participants as necessarily “on their side” and were viewed with some scepticism. However, 
surprise was voiced at the positive nature of certain IRB members’ involvement and co­
operation particularly in public Consultations and Conferences afier the Guidelines’ 
instatement.
Interviews generated other data of two kinds: access to unpublished and institutional 
documents relating to campaigns and gender-related refugees; and case synopses, case files, 
and media coverage on particular claimants. The latter were essential for compiling case 
histories of asylum seekers who went public.
A.2 Compiling case histories on asylum seekers who went public
Through the combination of mass media coverage and interviews, a total of 25 asylum 
seekers were identified, 22 who Vent public’ and three who did net make their claims public 
but were supported by core advocates in private appeals to immigration authorities.
Information for their case histories comprised their official case files and other 
institutional documents (i.e. sensitised Personal Information Forms provided by the IRB, 
lawyers or organisations); case synopses provided by NAC in press packages, interviews with 
core polity advocates, and media coverage. However, access to the various elements of 
claimant case histories was uneven across different cases. For instance, claimants who 
received the greatest media coverage were most accessible, and among these some also had 
the greatest contact with core supporters who therefore were able to provide more 
information on particular claimants. They subsequently form particularly strong case studies 
drawn upon heavily in Chapters 7 and 8. Of asylum seekers who went public there were 
three for whom minimal case history information was found. These cases are referred to 
more peripherally, as are the three who did not go public.
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Case histories of asylum seekers who went public are representative of asylum 
seekers in the campaigns; according to accounts of supporters and the media, they constitute 
all claimants who received substantial media attention at some time during the campaigns as 
part of the campaigns. Thus they share many characteristics. In particular their special 
circumstances, timing and experiences of persecution started all off as ineligible for refugee 
status. All were rejected, all resorted to public activities and subsequently formed a collective 
body with specific policy demands.
These asylum seekers are representative of the broader population of claimants in 
Canada in the sense that they set precedents concerning a variety of state-recognised 
categories or forms of violence against women and the conditions under which such violence 
amounts to persecution. Indeed, case scenarios of these claimants were helpful for drawing a 
more realistic typology than currently exists in the Guidelines or in publications. Their stories 
reflected a range of forms of female-specific persecution, from traditionally ‘public’ to 
‘private’ and involving a diverse set of scenarios and claim-making processes. However, these 
claimants were different from the population of claimants emerging afier the Guidelines were 
instated, not only in the public pressure tactics they took but also because of administrative 
complications they faced because they initiated claim processes before the Guidelines were 
instated. For example under Canadian law an individual can only make one refugee claim and 
can not introduce new evidence at a later time. Thus some asylum seekers could not 
introduce new claims after the Guidelines were instated, although immigration officials 
recognised that had they been made later they would have received Convention refugee 
status. Consequently some attained entry through other status types (characteristics of claims 
and status types are explored in the empirical chapters).
A.3 Handling interviews and case histories: Confidentiality
Handling of information about claimants was varied according to the wishes of the claimant 
based on their previous decision to use their own names or an alias when they went public, 
and based on instructions they sometimes left with supporters. A high degree of 
confidentially was ensured in the case of those using alias names. At times real names, or 
whether names were real or fictitious, were not made known to me. On the other hand some 
claimants were completely candid in interviews with the press, and one in interview with me, 
insisting on using their real names. Both types (using alias or real names) spoke with the 
press. One wrote an editorial and at least one other gave a speech at a conference. Of my 
own interviews, the most in-depth ran over five hours with one of the refugee women; she
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was adamant that her real name be used, as discussed in the empirical study. Quotations and 
viewpoints of asylum seekers are referred to by first names or alias first names.
Supporters, on the other hand, were activists from a range of professions who had 
taken public roles in the campaigns and were not typically concerned with their own 
confidentiality. Exceptions were several lawyers who agreed to be quoted and were extremely 
generous with their time and knowledge, but stipulated that while still in progress cases 
should not be commented upon to the media or using lawyers’ names (none are in progress 
at this point). They were extremely respectful of confidentiality agreements with claimants 
they worked with. Their quotations referenced by surname and organisational affiliation.
B. Institutional  actors and  activities
Turning to a broader sample of gender-related claimants representing those in institutional 
claim-making processes, statistics on gender-related claims in Canada generally were 
identified, and within these a sample of claimants between 1993 and 1997 was selected. Like 
asylum seekers who went public these are assessed in a more qualitatively than quantitatively.
B.l Assessing the prevalence of gender-related claims in Canada
Because of the newness of the ‘gender-related’ refugee category in Canada, information on 
and analysis of these claimants is more manageable than for refugees of racial, religious, 
nationality based, political or social group persecution generally (which gender-related claims 
intersect). There are simply fewer of them, making very particular types of claims. However, 
the newness of the gender-related category also poses particular difficulties in terms of 
availability and access to data. Data on gender-related claims was not made available to the 
public until 1995, and minimal at that. Moreover, over the next four years different statistics 
were provided of the total number of gender-related claims, in fact showing gradually lowr 
numbers of claims actually identified as being ‘gender-related’. Information obtained through 
the Access to Information Act in 1995 indicated some 2500 gender-related claims had been 
identified since 1993, breaking down claims by countries of origin and status of claims 
(positive/negative/pending). In 1997 the IRB reported that a total of 1200 gender-related 
claims had been identified since 1993. This shrinkage most likely occurred as methods of 
tracking and identifying the particular claims have been developed and improved. This thesis 
uses the most recent statistics on the campaign period covered, as shown in Figure 2.1, 
drawn from reports delivered by the IRB Chairperson.
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Table 2.1 IRB identified ‘gender-related* claims and outcomes, March 1993 - January 1997
Total number of gender-related claims identified 1200
Accepted gender-related claims 664
Rejected gender-related claims 363
Pending, withdrawn, abandoned or discontinued gender-related claims 173
Gender-related claims as a % of all refugee claims in Canada in 1996 1.4%
(source: Mawani 1997).
B.2. Accessing case synopses and court decisions: the REFLEX cases
Using the above statistics the 147 cases gender-related cases drawn from the RefLex database 
represent approximately 7% of all positive and negative decisions in the same time period, 
from cases across Canada. The selected cases from RefLex, one of Canada’s most prestigious 
legal databases, include 100% of ‘gender-related’ cases in the database from 1993 to 1997.
Refugee claims (all types) are identified for inclusion into RefLex journals using the 
criteria presented in Table 2.2, as stated in RefLex Policy, Memorandum(l).
Table 2.2 Characteristics of refugee cases chosen for inclusion in RefLex journals.
• Cases in which court decisions depict a ‘novel approach to law’, with an emphasis on cases 
where reasons for the decision are set out in a clear and concise manner
• Cases reflecting the application of established legal principle to a novel fact situation
• Cases where reasons for decisions are representative of a number of decisions decided on 
specific issue from a particular country, or decided in a particular IRB region
RefLex further aims to achieve, in the selection and representation of cases in a widely used lega 
database:
• A balance of positive and negative cases
• A selection from each of the IRB Provincial offices
• The furthering of consistency in substantive law, evidential and procedural matters, rather tha 
a reflection of all claims
From the above criteria on RefLex cases, the selected pool of gender-related claims represent 
a range of case scenarios and novel applications of the Guidelines since instatement 
according to evolving jurisprudence. In-depth qualitative analysis of the 147 cases presented 
in chapter 9 is the first on any substantial group of ‘gender-related’ claims in Canada.
III. D a t a  a n a ly s is  a n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Drawing on the above sources, as the following describes, the following research themes 
were analysed through the conceptual guidelines and qualitative methods outlined earlier.
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A. Who are asylum seekers fleeing female-specific persecution, as “refugees” in 
accordance with policy and as actors influencing policy content?
Keeping in mind the basic complications and distinctions regarding the identity of asylum
seekers generally and those under consideration, illuminated earlier, a combination of data
sources were used to analyse both asylum seekers and asylum seeking processing, in both
extra-institutional and institutional realms.
Case histories and campaign participation of asylum seekers who engaged in public
pressure tactics were studied. Statistical information on “gender-persecution” claimants
provide a backdrop on the prevalence and acceptance rates of gender-related claims in
Canada. RefLex cases offer more detailed accounts of claims and court decisions, analysed to
create a detailed typology of claims made under the Guidelines, and trends in court decisions.
Substantial use was made of the nascent literature on female-specific persecution,
which provides legal and discursive frameworks for typologising claims. These are
significantly elaborated through analysis of the claims studied. In light of the lack of relevant
empirical studies, this study presents one of the most extensive uses of the literature to date
and present empirical evidence on the nature of the claims and claim-making process which
the literature lacks.
Established Canadian residents in the advocacy network provided a good alternative 
source of information on gender-related asylum seekers generally and particularly those who 
went public, with whom they worked. They were specialists and practitioners with insight 
into both the nature and complications of the particular claims and claim-making processes, 
as well as on the campaign process and role of asylum seekers in it. Depth interviews with 
core supporters and several secondary actors (including women’s shelters that responded to 
the survey) helped identify and explain the nature and types of claims being made. They also 
provided extensive unpublished information (i.e. reports, leaflets, speech transcripts), access 
to difficult to obtain institutional documents as well as press packages, case histories, 
correspondences and action-plans pertaining to the campaigns. Mass media coverage of 
campaigns and campaign issues between 1991 and 1997 in 12 newspapers and journals 
served to identify actors for the first round of interviewing, and provide descriptive 
information on the particular asylum seekers, campaigns and evolving political discourse.
These sources were inter-related and complementary to analysis of daim-types and 
asylum seekers* identity as actors and refugees, which appear throughout the chapters, but 
particularly Chapters 7-10. Aside from developing a detailed descriptive account and 
chronology of the asylum seeking process and campaigns from ‘insiders’ point of view, many
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recurring themes emerged regarding strategy and the role of identity (individual and 
collective), including how resources and supporters were mobilised, how they framed their 
demands, and the ‘symbolic’ and strategic nature of actions they took. The role of asylum 
seekers as actors was accounted for and analysed in all dimensions that emerged. As actors 
they were also agents of policy change who could be defined by their policy demands. Their 
demands were compared and contrasted to actual policy outcomes in the institutional 
analysis of case synopses and court decisions after the Guidelines’ instatement.
B. What is the stable and changing structural context of opportunities and 
constraints for the asylum seekers?
Asylum seekers’ roles as policy actors are uncovered in light of the context in which they 
operated, both to explain why they were able to become actors, and how they influenced 
their environment. The inter-state system of legal and institutional structures for claim- 
making (the relationship between international law and national policies and status 
determination systems) is analysed to reveal various types and layers of constraints and 
opportunities upon asylum seekers generally and those fleeing female-specific persecution in 
particular. Historical trends in asylum seeking flows, the salience of relevant ideas, and the 
kinds of resources and opportunities available to the particular asylum seekers, are similarly 
identified and analysed, particularly in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8 which set relatively stable (long­
term) features against changing features that offer ckangng opportunities for asylum seekers 
to push out claim-making processes in both institutional and extra-institutional realms. This 
brings us from the supranational level of international refugee and human rights law to their 
national applications, and how asylum seekers political roles in normative claim-making 
processes at state level are both obstructed and legitimated.
A dual emphasis is maintained on discursive symbolic and strategic opportunity 
structures and the relationship between them, showing how identity, structure and agency 
interact. The research draws on historical and legal documents in a variety of fields, analysing 
the evolution and emergence of different kinds of opportunities and constraints in changing 
contemporary trends. This is supplemented by interviews with core advocates and by trends 
in refugee case scenarios. Emerging opportunities of particular importance for the political 
viability of the asylum seekers studied are identified and examined: migration and policy 
trends, institutional and substantive rights and resources, vulnerability and openness of the 
institutional and political establishment, and salient ideas and collective interests.
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C. How were changing opportunity structures used?
To document and explore the generation and process of campaigns I rely on the claimant 
case histories, personal accounts of core advocacy network members, NGO documents on 
campaigns and advocate-government interaction (i.e. advocacy letters, consultation reports, 
speeches), mass media coverage in itself, and direct observation of the campaigns. The 
question of how asylum seekers negotiated the structural context is explored in both extra- 
institutional and institutional realms, not only before but after the Guidelines were instated, 
as campaigns continued in various forms for some time and as the Guidelines were revised in 
November 1996 to reflect emerging jurisprudence. Within these realms I investigated asylum 
seekers’ abilities to migrate, their wtEingness to make use of opportunities in the receiving- 
country, and their resultant or actual use of changing opportunity structures.
C.1 Abilities to migrate
Abilities to migrate are influenced by laws and practices in sending-countries and by relations 
between sending and receiving countries, but these aspects could not realistically be studied 
due to time and space constraints. Claimants who went public arrived from sixteen different 
countries; those in the databases studied arrived from over 100 different countries. Another 
indicator of abilities to migrate is financial and social status. As now recognised, international 
migration most often occurs among people of intermediate social status, particularly in 
movements from less to more advanced capitalist and democratic countries (Hammar,1997), 
in contrast to the view proposed by Push-pull theories of migration that it is the poorest who 
migrate into richer countries. While this may not apply to all asylum seekers, it probable for 
those migrating to distant countries (like Canada) rather than countries bordering their own.
Information on financial and social status of asylum seekers who went public was 
difficult to obtain and does not constitute a main dimension of the study. However 
Hammar’s observation could be supported in the case histories studied, which showed that 
persecution sometimes involved family members of high social status with substantial 
political influence which prevented them from being able to attain protection in their home 
country. In two cases, family wealth enabled women to migrate initially for international 
education, which then became a means to break away from the family. More commonly, 
ability to migrate was linked to the financial capacities of either families with whan they arrived, 
in Canada, or having friends and contacts who helped them out in Canada, sometimes even 
getting into relationships with Canadian residents who became their sponsors. These details 
emerge in chapters where case histories are discussed (6, 7, 8). For more general structural
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trends influencing or indicating abilities to migrate, Chapters 5 and 6 paint in depth the 
international and national contexts for migration by the particular type of asylum seeker.
C.2 Willingness and actual actions: Using new resources, rights and interests to 
effect policy change
In Part II of the thesis analysis concentrates particularly on the use of opportunities by 
asylum seekers once in Canada, for example how increasingly salient ideas and frameworks 
for expressing and legitimising claims and rights were applied, expanded and translated into 
meaningful actions and applications. It situates the analysis within the Canadian political 
climate at the time, describing the timeliness and strategic nature of pressure tactics, and the 
ways asylum seekers were integral to campaigns as a whole and crucial to its outcome.
The formation and mobilisation of advocacy networks in Canada is described with 
particular emphasis on the role of asylum seekers, drawing from case histories and 
interviews. The ways ideology and grievances were translated into demands and actions is 
analysed both in the internal political culture of the advocacy network (in relations between 
asylum seekers and supporters) and in relations between the advocacy network and the 
external political culture they wished to influence. The latter includes current political climate 
in Canada at the time, and strategies for expressing demands (types of goals and tactics or 
actions), legitimising the cause, mobilising public support, negotiating with and pressuring 
government (drawing additionally on mass media, and on NGO and government documents 
and correspondence). Actions include the use and transformation of institutionalised claim- 
making processes, as well as the mobilisation and influence of extra-institutional claim- 
making processes. Actions also include the transformation of ideas about rights and 
responsibilities from nationally-bound to human rights levels. Asylum seekers’ roles are 
explored in all these processes.
C.3 Using institutionalised claim-making processes before and after the 
Guidelines
The use of institutional procedures for claim-making was an inherent part of the 
campaigning process. The structure and range of institutional options b^bre the Guidelines is 
described in Chapters 4 and 6, highlighting claimants’ embedded rights and responsibilities as 
potential opportunities to challenge decisions on claims, and also as inherent obstacles and 
barriers to making such a challenge. Chapters 7 and 8 describe how asylum seekers exhausted 
institutional options before campaigning. Their policy impact -  the Guidelines -  was then 
used by later claimants. To evaluate the nature and implications of claims and court decisions
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after instatement of the Guidelines, the broader RefLex database is analysed in Chapter 9, 
presenting a detailed typology of gender-related persecution claimants. Claims were coded 
along a number of dimensions: types and locales of violence against women; relation 
between the persecuted and persecutors; degree of claimant activism and state role in 
persecution; types of refugee claims made at various stages of the status determination 
process; and categories of “persecution” into which the causes of the violence falls.
Having explored each of the research themes, the broader implications of the 
particular nature, process and extent of asylum seekers’ participation and influence may then 
be discussed in terms of changing policy-making processes and the emerging citizenship- 
human rights debate in social policy.
Sum m ary
The chapter has presented the methodology, data sources and data collection, and linked 
analysis to the questions posed for study. It also illuminated some of the difficulties of the 
research, its main limitations and strengths. The following chapter explores why asylum 
seekers’ roles (as ‘asylum seekers’ and as noncitizens) in receiving-country policy 
development have not previously been explored in migration studies or theories, and then 
develops an analytical framework to tackle problematic conceptualisations and to explain and 
explore asylum seekers’ roles as political actors in receiving-countries.
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3. A s y l u m  s e e k e r s  a n d  t h e  p o l ic y  p r o c e s s : a n  a n a l y t ic a l
FRAMEWORK
“Refugee”:
Anypersonishoyosaresukof... arid owingto wed-joundedfear ofbeingpersecutedjbr reasons of race, rdvgan, 
nationality, membership in a paniadar social group or political opinion, is outside the aMitryofhti nationality and is 
unable or, owingto such fear, isunuMingtoauailhimselfof the piotecticn of that country; or who not having a 
nationality and being outside the comtry of his former habitual residence as a result ofsuch events, is unable or, owmgto
such fear, is unmllingto return to it
_______________r 1951 UN Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees!______________
What creates a refugee? As Zolberg and others have noted, when it comes to issues of 
refugee-recognition, “the definitional problem... is not mere academic exercise but has 
bearing on matters of life and death” (1989:3). The standard-setting refugee definition 
provided in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (above) identifies a 
number of the characteristics of “refugees” and the conditions characterising the refugee’s 
situation. Most states have developed refugee policy around this definition. Asylum seekers 
falling outside the formal refugee definition may not only remain invisible to our conception 
of just what a refugee is or what “makes” refugees, but may have their chances of survival 
seriously threatened. Policies themselves ‘make’ some asylum seekers into formal refugees 
eligible for protection, while excluding others. The issue of refugee policy development is 
thus a serious matter, but the political processes and agendas behind it have only recently 
been conceptualised.
Section I of this chapter describes how the nation-state system necessitated the 
explicit categorisation of ‘refugees’ by creating rules of inclusion and exclusion from 
membership. It then reviews the merits and limitations of ‘migration systems’ theories for 
understanding refugee policy development today. This describes the international context 
and nature of migration systems, and currently accepted ideas about the inter-relations 
between receiving-country policy and the emergence and shape of asylum flows. It points 
toward the subjective and political nature of the evolving refugee definition. It also reveals 
significant theoretical gaps: current conceptualisations neglect the political roles asylum 
seekers may play in receiving-countries, namely in policy development. Sections II and III 
develop an original analytical framework to explain asylum seekers’ roles in policy 
development within migration systems.
Section II begins by enlarging upon conceptualisations of refugees’ “social change 
function” (Zolberg et al,1989), pointing out that social change occurs not only in sending-
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countries, but in receiving-countries where asylum seekers may be political actors. It then 
situates both refugee policy and asylum seeking within historical settings and identifies the 
dynamic tension between underlying ideals of refugee policy being static or universal, whilst 
asylum seeking causes and contexts change and subsequently question these ideals. This 
describes the relationships and contests between theory, rights, opportunities, and identity.
In Section III the structural context and institutional logic framing asylum seekers’ 
political action and policy influence are described, presenting the international and national 
refugee regimes which asylum seekers must traverse and offering several premises about 
asylum seeking as a central component of the migration system. Three basic dimensions of 
the asylum seeking processes are then laid out, expanding upon migration system theory. A 
basic axis for exploring asylum seekers’ use of the structural context in political ways is 
offered, drawing upon collective action theory.
I. T h e  n a t io n -state  system  a n d  ‘m ig r a t io n  system s’
A. T he  n a tio n -state system
There have always been ‘refugees’ -  people who flee their homeland due to persecution. 
However, the creation of refugees moved from the societal to the state level with the 
formation of the nation-state system, in which states began to define the people to whom 
they would grant rights and extend protection. This effected both the creation of persecuted 
groups within nation-states on one hand, and the necessity for nation-states to determine 
whether or not to grant rights and protection to persecuted groups arriving from other 
countries on the other (Zolberg et al,1989).
Hannah Arendt explained the former in this way: the formation and proliferation of 
states in the nation-state system, in bringing about the nationalisation of rights, also brought 
about the emergence of two “victim” groups, or targets for persecution: minorities and the 
stateless (Arendt,1973:268). The very nature of the nation-state system implies that only 
nationals can be citizens and only citizens can benefit from “the full protection of legal 
institutions... [while] people of a different nationality needed some law of exception until or 
unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin.” (Ibid,275). Thus 
nation-states give pre-eminence to nationally guaranteed rights over "human rights" of 
traditional Western doctrine (see Zolberg et al,1989:13). Arendt called this the paradox of 
human rights. Although human rights were meant to be universal and independent of 
citizenship, nationality or territorial residence, they “proved to be unenforceable - even in
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countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who were 
no longer citizens of any sovereign state.” They were in effect based on citizenship as “the 
right to have rights” (Arendt 1973:105).
As Zolberg explains, this became increasingly apparent after "the nation-state 
formula was adopted to organise political life in states containing ethnically mixed 
populations, often so inextricably interspersed that it proved impossible to form viable 
ethnically homogeneous political entities" (Zolberg et al, 1989:12). Persecuted minorities 
includes persons claiming a different nationality than that of the state in which they live, who 
thus are disqualified from citizenship rights associated with nationality. Persecuted stateless 
persons describes those who "would always remain residual groups who did not belong to 
any established nation-state or recognised national minority" regardless of how territorial 
boundaries might be drawn (Arendt,1973; see Zolberg et al,1989:22).
Zolberg notes that the newness of "victim groups" in Arendt's analysis is misleading 
because it addresses the rise of "victim groups" in the years after World War I without 
considering that state-formation also gave rise to persecution of minorities in the 16th and 
17th centuries. However, the "nationalisation of rights" can indeed be seen as corresponding 
to the emergence of target minorities, described as part of a more general process:
whereby the state's choice of an integration formula determines positive and negative 
categories of persons and its ensuing relationships with these groups. The formula is 
the construction of a collective identity encompassing the rulers and the majority of the 
population; its foundations may be religious, racial, or even ideological, as well as 
national, but each has distinct implications. (Zolberg et al, 1989:23)
The “collective identity” of rulers and the majority population contrasts with persons 
and groups who do not fit that identity. These “political misfits” (Ibid,23) may constitute 
their own collective identity, upon which their acceptance or rejection by receiving-countries 
is based. Thus the formation of nation-states not only identified or reified, as the case may 
be, targets of persecution, but also made their flight dependent upon acceptance into the 
territories of other nation-states according to international law and national refugee policy.
We should also add to Zolberg’s analysis that not only minorities lacking full 
citizenship status are persecuted, but status citizens (not necessarily minorities) who lack full 
substantive rights of citizenship. In this females form an exemplary category, as international 
law and human rights scholars have observed (for example Cook,1994; Rominay,1993). 
Persecution in such cases may be linked to cultural traditions, or simply lack of protection or 
rights to protection, or adequate means or willingness of enforcement by the state.
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B. THEORIES OF MIGRATION: TOWARD A ‘MIGRATION SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 
Theories of international migration have not generally been developed, applied or analysed 
with the intention of understanding the evolution of the refugee definition, and certainly not 
to understand the complex role of the refugee therein. They have been developed to 
understand why movements of people arise, possibly to predict them, and increasingly to 
enable receiving-countries and international bodies to manage or respond to them.
The first theories of migration were developed in the 19th century and more or less 
held sway until the 1980s. These Tush-Pull’ theories offer ahistorical and internalist 
(sending-country) visions of migrations occurring on an individual cost-benefit calculus. The 
“causes” of migration are considered a combination of ‘push’ factors impelling people to 
leave the areas of origin (i.e. demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic 
opportunities and political repression), and ‘pull’ factors attracting them to certain receiving- 
countries (i.e. demand for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and 
political freedoms) (see Castles and Miller,1993:19). Push-pull theories may therefore be 
summarised as positing a direct causal relationship between the conditions or grievances 
motivating international migration, and the acceptance of international migrants by receiving- 
countries. Receiving-country migration policy was thus considered primarily reactive -  a 
response to the international migration of individuals themselves. But while push-pull 
theories understood immigrants as ‘voluntary migrants’ calculating their best course of 
action, they saw refugees as ‘forced migrants’ influenced by factors beyond individual 
control. Accordingly, refugees were seen as direct symptoms of political turmoil in sending- 
countries (causes), and refugee policy a direct response or reaction to refugee flows. This gave 
refugees symbolic political power but could neither explain nor predict root causes of refugee 
movement, thus supporting the belief that refugee movements are by nature unpredictable 
and unstructured events (Zolberg et al,1989).
It was not until relatively recently that international migration theory began seriously 
considering the role of receiving-countries in actually creating root causes of refugee flows, 
rather than simply responding to them, and the influence of refugee policy upon the shape 
and constituency of refugee flows. The combined political and strategic factors that both 
cause refugee problems and help determine the policy responses of states to refugee crises 
have received even less systematic research until more recently (Loescher,1989j.
Dramatically changing patterns of international migration, particularly since the 
1960’s, brought the serious criticism that push-pull theories were not supported by empirical 
evidence. In fact, people of intermediate social status during periods and from regions
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undergoing economic and social change are the most common migrants, and rarely the 
poorest people moving from developing to richer countries. Neither do movements arise out 
of all equally underdeveloped countries or regions within countries. Moreover, some of the 
most densely populated countries receive large influxes of migrants, for example the 
Netherlands and Germany (see Castles and Miller,1993:21). Subsequently push-pull models 
failed to explain or predict migratory movements (Sassen,1988; Boyd,1989; Portes and 
Rumbaut,1990).
The new literature has given rise to migration theories that are essentially 
“collectivist and institutional” approaches to migrations as historical phenomena deeply 
influenced by globalisation, particularly the emerging global economy, and relations between 
sending and receiving-countries (see Castles and Miller 1993:19). This major theoretical shift 
can be described as moving away from a causal model to one that incorporated mediating 
factors. This fostered much more complex, realistic, explanatory and predictive models of 
international migration, based on the idea that migration is structurally determined.
Structural theories argue that international migrations are “embedded in larger 
geopolitical and transnational economic dynamics” (Sassen 1998:8; 1988). They identify “the 
dynamics of the transnational capitalist economy, which simultaneously brings both the 
‘push’ and the ‘pull’” to migration (Zolberg,1989:407), economic and political relations and 
power asymmetries between countries (Portes and Borocz,1989), and prior links between 
sending and receiving-countries, for example colonisation, political influence, trade, 
investment or cultural ties. They also describe international pressures of state conformity to 
international human rights conventions and agreements (Sassen, 1996).
What Fawcett and Arnold have conceptualised as a ‘migration systems’ approach 
(1987) is particularly useful because it binds together many of the features of different 
structural approaches. It is premised on the concept of global interdependence in which all 
the linkages between the sending and receiving-countries play significant roles: “state to state 
relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks”, 
exchanges of information, goods, services and ideas (Fawcett and Arnold 1987:456-7). The 
sets of relations comprising international migration take place “not so much...between 
compartmentalised national units as within an overarching system, itself a product of past 
historical development” (Portes and Borocz,1989:626). Castles and Miller (1993:22summarise 
the migratory process or system as “the result of interacting macro- and micro- structures”).
Macrostructural determinants generally include economic and political historical 
relations and trends between sending and receiving-countries. They include large-scale
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institutional factors such as the political economy of the world market and inter-state 
relationships (for example Bohning,1984; Sassen,1988; Mitchell,1989; Fawcett and Arnold 
1989). The regulatory laws and structures of both sending and receiving-countries also shape 
migration flows, while overarching international agreements and conventions help shape 
both flows and state responses. Human rights instruments and organisations are exerting 
increasing influence in international and national refugee law (Hathaway, 199la). The 
international human rights regime not only influences states and inter-state relations, but 
gives rights to individuals and potentially undermines or transforms state sovereignty (see 
Sassen,1996,1998; Jacobson,1994; Soysal,1994).
Microstructural determinants generally refer to “the networks, practices and beliefs of 
the migrants themselves” (Price,1963), or the internal dynamics of ethnic community 
formation in receiving-countries. These aspects are influenced by “cultural capital” 
(information and capability enabling migration and adaptation) and personal relationships 
(family, community, and even relations with non-migrants) linking immigrants to the ethnic 
populations in receiving-countries and also to receiving-populations (Boyd, 1989). They help 
explain why individual motivations to migrate may supersede weakening ‘puli’ factors.
Under Migration Systems theory, “...refugee movements, like other international 
population movements, are patterned by identifiable social forces and hence can be viewed 
as structured events that result from broad historical processes” (Zolberg et al,1989:vi). The 
migration system shapes refugee-creating situations, structural determinants of individuals’ 
decisions and abilities to migrate, receiving-country responses and the shapes flows take. It 
may be summarised as explaining refugee movement through four contiguous elements. (1) 
Supranational trends and institutions affecting sending countries and involving receiving- 
countries in relations between states. (2) Particular circumstances and events causing refugee- 
creating situations and how sending countries address them. (3) Particular responses of 
receiving-countries in either addressing root causes or dealing with migratory flows through 
policy. (4) Micro-structural determinants of international migrants’ motivations, needs and 
opportunities for migration. These mediating dimensions shape or create “refugees”, both in 
real terms and in discursive or policy terms. Receiving-countries’ chosen policies and 
attitudes toward migration, and the fluctuations and trends they exhibit, further affect 
migratory trends.
However the last of the four dimensions typically attracts the least attention in 
explanations of policy development; rather it tends to be used to explain motivations to 
migrate and patterns of integration in host countries. In contrast, the first three dimensions
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have been brought together more rigorously. International Relations theories of receiving- 
country responses recognise the importance of foreign policy and political agendas, 
particularly for refugee policy. Teitelbaum (1984:433) demonstrated that fcm gi policy affects 
international migration, international migrations may also be used (stimulated, restrained, 
facilitated or regulated) as a tool o f fomgi policy, and foreign policy may reflect the changing 
constituency of countries due to past migrations.
As now well recognised, ad hoc refugee definitions as well as the 1951 UN definition 
were formulated around the prevailing Cold War political climate. Refugee policy was 
primarily intended “to protea persons from countries under communist domination” 
(Melander,1988:9). International relations and the political agenda of Western states were 
crucial influences on the refugee definition drafted by Western states and initially applied 
primarily to European countries, the USSR and the far East (Ibid,9).
The formation of receiving-country responses has also been conceptualised in terms 
of degrees of “conflia situations” (Matthews,1972) arising from the particular combination 
of politically active or politically passive refugees on one hand, and political or humanitarian 
receiving-country stances toward particular events in countries of origin on the other (i.e. 
politically active refugees and political stances of receiving-countries produce high-conflia 
policy decisions; politically passive refugees and humanitarian stances produce low conflia 
policy decisions). Vasquex and Mansbach (1981) add to this a “co-operation” dimension 
between states, which can influence refugee policy development. Hastedt and Knickrehm 
(1984) further add that receiving-state response patterns typically correspond with various 
their stances toward particular “issue-areas”, observing that refugee flows raise central issues 
within the context of pre-existing interstate relations.
As we can see, all sorts of variables, rules and response patterns shape why and how 
receiving-countries formulate refugee policy, but they are embedded in international issues as 
well as domestic. International migration policies and practices address “unwittingly or not, 
both domestic and international issues that have to be dealt with in the domestic arena” 
(Sassen,1988:7). Dacyl (1992) observes that theories of receiving-country responses generally 
tend to combine humanitarian concerns with foreign policy considerations; or “compassion” 
with “realpolitik”. The latter includes domestic climate, needs and security measures, such as 
protecting cultural, ethnic and economic stability or continuity. The former entails pressures 
from domestic spheres, including pro-immigration lobbies and increasingly immigrant and 
ethic communities (Baubock,1998), and global pressures to conform with international 
human rights standards and regional agreements. However, regarding the fourth dimension
78
of the migration system it is evident that the possibility of asylum seekers (as opposed to 
established migrants) as anything but passive beneficiaries of policy is not considered. When 
refugees are referred to as ‘political’, this implies politicism only in the sending-country.
C. INROADS TO RECOGNITION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT:
REFUGEE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE
As migration systems theory gained sway in the 1980s and international migration continued 
to rise, receiving-countries increasingly shifted their focus toward mediating factors with the 
aim of preventing refugee-creating situations from arising, and limiting refugee influxes. This 
preventative approach has been marked by, for example, increasing overseas humanitarian 
aid, conflict-mediation in foreign policy, imposition of visa requirements on people from 
high refugee-producing countries, aircraft carrier sanctions (to prevent airlines from 
accepting persons without valid identity papers), and general tightening of entry rules and 
regulations throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
While humanitarian aid and conflia mediation have developed with increasing 
support, their increasing restriaions on asylum seeking have inspired criticism that among 
other things has drawn out the political nature of refugee movements. Leading scholars on 
refugee movement Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo accused preventative approaches of stifling 
the political and social change function which refugee movements serve in sending countries. 
They emphasised the “essential political and normative nature” of the root causes of refugee 
movement (Zolberg et al,1989), and the faa that refugee outflows in response to root causes 
are integrally linked to social change. The preventative approach, they argued, seeks to avert 
refugee flows but takes into account neither the role of refugee movement nor that of 
receiving-countries in creating and shaping refugee movement. It “ignores the historical 
connection between social change and refugees. To avert flows would be the equivalent of 
trying to oppose social change... To stifle change may freeze a repressive social order or 
contribute to systemic social inequalities. In the longer run, both conditions are likely to 
produce their own refugees...” (Ibid,262).
Zolberg and his colleagues therefore proposed that to address refugee problems 
greater emphasis be put on the role of external parties and regional peace systems in addition 
to conflia-reducing institutional reforms. They further observed that change in the refugee 
definition is a natural and desirable outcome of broader processes of social change. Social 
conditions change or are newly recognised as producing new types of “refugees”, thus a 
good refugee determination framework is one which is can respond to the changing times.
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Preventative policy approaches also discourage another type of political and social 
change by removing some of refugees’ symbolic political force upon receiving-countries. 
Concerned as such approaches have been with the rising volume and possible ‘illegitimacy’ of 
refugees, asylum seekers are no longer assumed to be direct symptoms of root/political 
causes. Rather, in popular discourses even legitimate refugees, while still typically considered 
‘forced* migrants, are increasingly blamed for contributing to contemporary social problems 
in receiving-countries -  from increasing racial tension and unemployment to straining 
welfare states. They are causes of social discontent rather than symptoms of root causes of 
persecution; the causes of refugee flight escape popular discontent with government’s inability 
or unwillingness to curb refugee flows. But as Hathaway (1991a) has observed in his 
influential work on refugee law, it is important to remember that by ‘voting with one’s feet’ 
refugees alert the international community to human rights abuses occurring in their home 
countries. And with the increasing global interdependency of states and growing salience of 
human rights codes, violations of human rights in foreign countries are gaining increasing 
concern and attention by receiving states.
Clearly refugees have the potential motivation and beginnings of a framework to be 
political actors from a receiving-country perspective, when the very events they flee are not 
recognised in policy as meriting asylum. However this potential political role wiixn receiving- 
countries, and the structural determinants of the nature, process and extent of this political role 
as a factor of policy development, remains unexplored. It has been excluded from migration 
system theory, theories of receiving-country responses, and policy critiques through them. 
There has been insufficient attention to the complexity of refugees’ roles in receiving- 
countries, as asylum seekers navigate the system and push out its boundaries. Instead, asylum 
seekers are still predominantly considered either the recipients of goodwill which states may 
chose to extend toward them by granting Convention or extra-Convention refugee status (Le. 
Humanitarian status), or as perhaps the greatest mass of con-artists in history: ‘illegitimate 
refugees*. How might we overcome this duality, account for asylum seekers’ political roles in 
receiving-countries and explain their potential influence upon policy?
II . E n l a r g in g  u p o n  r e fu g e e s’ po lit ic a l  r o l e s : T h e  c o n t e s t  b e t w e e n
THEORY, RIGHTS, IDENTITY AND OPPORTUNITIES
Policy-making models in social policy inherently exclude consideration of asylum seekers as 
policy actors because of their noncitizen status and their embeddedness in international 
trends, as Chapter 1 discussed. We can now see this exclusion occurring also as a factor of
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conceptions of refugees and their roles according to migration theories, where asylum 
seekers are primarily the pawns of history caught up in broader structural events, or are 
actually illegitimate refugees. However migration systems theory does paint the essential 
picture of the various layers of the international migration system and some of their inter­
relations. These are important for understanding asylum seekers’ roles in receiving-countries, 
because we need to understand the ‘system’ which asylum seekers traverse -  that which links 
national refugee policy with the broader migration system.
There are indeed formidable barriers and constraints upon seeking and receiving 
refugee status, and in many dimensions. Notably, Tuitt (1996) and others have pointed out 
many of the legal constraints upon asylum seeking, where identity and law or its 
interpretation conflict. Not only inter-state relations (between sending and receiving 
countries), but also group-state relations (collective identity of particular types of claimants, 
and receiving-countries) are politicised in ways that constrain many refugees. We now need 
to look how these politicised refugee systems may be negotiated by asylum seekers in 
necessarily political ways. We need to consider how asylum seekers actually involve receiving 
countries in the political debates and moral issues surrounding their flight, and often must 
challenge prevailing norms even there, and gain domestic support for their entry. The 
following considers the nature of their political challenge.
A. T h e  contest over  identity : ‘Universal righ ts’ versus historically
SPECIFIC OPPORTUNITIES TO CLAIM OR CHANGE THEM 
Much of the over-simplification of refugees’ roles (as simply beneficiaries of refugee policy), 
as well as the very strength of their rights in policy, may stem from the basis of the 
international refugee definition in basic human qualities that may be considered inherent to 
one’s being: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, membership in a social group. These 
characteristics begin to define what it means to be a member of the human community. To 
be denied these fundamental qualities is to be denied self and self in relation to the world in 
which one lives. In some instances it may be tantamount to inhumane treatment, or 
persecution.6 These qualities thus are equated with human rights, to be safeguarded, for they 
enable humans to pursue enjoyment of life as a whole.
6 “Persecution” is understood as human rights violations committed directly or indirectly by the state 
in a country lacking internal protection mechanisms. A ‘human rights’ approach to the interpretation 
of persecution (see Hathaway, 199 lb: 104-5) is commonly recognised by scholars, legal practitioners 
and adjudicators in Canada (Schenke,1996). In the case of Canada v. Ward (1993) the Supreme Court 
endorsed a definition of persecution as “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of state protection”(S.CJR..1993at734). On the Ward case see Tranter,1993; 
on the application of the human rights approach to gender-related persecution see OLAP,1994.
81
These inherent human qualities and rights are the tremendous strength of the refugee 
definition, but also its capstone if their identification in policy is not acknowledged within 
historically specific recognition processes. The ‘universal’ nature of human rights is ideally 
relevant to all peoples in all places as well as universal in the range and nature of rights 
protected. However in practice we know that many people, particularly within certain groups, 
do not enjoy basic human rights, far from a full range of ‘universal’ human rights, and that the 
composition of the latter itself is not uncontested.
So-called ‘illegitimate’ refugees who have challenged the parameters of the above 
categories of persecution or their interpretation draw attention to the fact that universal 
categories of human rights violations identified thus far in refugee policy and through our 
interpretation of human rights principles may be incomplete or interpreted through biased 
lenses. A disjuncture exists between the universality of human rights defining ahistorical 
structural causes of persecution on one hand (and subsequently the characteristics of 
persecuted groups), verses the historically specific and more transparent structure of 
opportunities for particular rights and forms of persecution (and subsequently particular 
persecuted groups) to be recognised by a receiving-country. This can be better understood by 
considering the nature of both human rights and citizenship rights in relation to the doctrine 
of cultural relativism. We can then better see how asylum seeking may bridge these worlds, 
posing significant political challenges.
B. H uman rights, citizenship rights a n d  cultural relativism
A curious paradox of refugee policy is its basis in universal notions of human rights to call 
upon state responsibility, and its application in culturally specific contexts with various 
traditions of citizenship rights and state responsibilities. This actually creates a two-way 
dilemma for receiving-countries. First, human rights may be broader than nationally 
protected rights, whether in law or in practice. A state unwilling or unable to protect some 
basic rights of its own citizens may be unlikely to extend those rights and protections to 
aliens, and moreover, competition over scarce resources might suggest that claims of 
established citizens or residents should come first. Second, rights upheld nationally may be 
broader than those actually protected through refugee policy according to traditional 
interpretations of human rights in status determinations. Thus the use of human rights in 
refugee policy does not always match citizenship rights in a particular receiving-country.
Human rights exist in principles codified at the supranational level in international 
documents, which states may then choose to ratify. Like citizenship rights they also cover 
the gamut from political and civil rights and to social and economic rights. But unlike
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citizenship rights, human rights are intended to be universal -  relevant to all people regardless 
of territorially or otherwise defined membership. Moreover, they are typically conceived as 
being of a higher order than citizenship rights perhaps because of the inconsistency in the 
very nature of citizenship rights across states. Not all states recognise, uphold or enforce the 
same citizenship rights, whereas in theory human rights should be applied and upheld the 
same way everywhere.
Also unlike citizenship rights, human rights instruments did not initially develop with 
monitoring and enforcing mechanisms. Rather, sovereign states were left to decide whether 
or not, or how, to enforce them. Monitoring and enforcing mechanisms within and across 
states are more recent and still largely underdeveloped dimensions of human rights 
institutions. Under international refugee law, states are only required to establish a refugee 
status determination system, and through it to ensure (according to the specific framework 
created) that persecuted individuals are not returned to the countries from which they have fled 
(see Plender,1989:82,88). This is known as the principle of non-refoulement. To determine 
eligibility for refugee status, states increasingly rely on human rights principles, which they 
further hierarchise.
Individual rights within nation-states came to be embodied in the idea of citizenship. 
But as we know, and accept, citizenship rights of both formal and substantive kinds vary across 
countries and cultures. That is, citizenship rights are intended to be universal only within a 
limited domain. Variation in citizenship rights across countries occurs both in the 
interpretation and application of the broad categories of which they are said to consist 
(political, civil and social rights), and their historical development (their order of evolution), 
as we saw in chapter one. Citizenship rights may thus be more readily identified along the 
lines of culturally relative rights. Although nation-states may house more than one ‘culture’ or 
ethnicity, they are typically considered to constitute national communities based on shared 
political space, cultural ties, and belief systems.7
The doctrine of cultural relativism interprets any universalist claim, such as the 
universality of human rights, in the context of a particular time and place. Vincent (1986) 
identifies the three elements of the doctrine: first, cultural relativism "asserts that rules about 
morality vaiy from place to place"; second, it claims that variety in such rules must therefore 
be understood within corresponding cultural contexts; third, "moral claims derive from, and 
are enmeshed in, a cultural context which is itself the source of their validity". In its extreme
7 see for example Andersen, 1983; Smith,1986; Seton-Watson,1977.
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form, cultural relativism asserts:
there is no universal morality, because the history of the world is the story of the 
plurality of cultures, and the attempt to assert universality... as a criterion of all morality, 
is a more or less well-disguised version of the imperial routine of trying to make the 
values of a particular culture general. (Vincent,1986:37-38).
Cultural relativists believe moral and ethical choices are but value judgements shaped by 
historical and cultural variables, having different meaning and taking different forms and 
applications in different societies, and that therefore there are no 'universal' values, only 
those which are culturally relative. Universalists, on the other hand, believe that certain 
moral and ethical principles and rights can be not only identified but universally applicable to 
all peoples across time, such as universal human rights.
The greatest strengths of cultural relativism are, as Vincent aptly summarises, “the 
protest it utters against imperialism, and the buttress it seems to provide against it* (Vincent, 
1986:38). Its greatest weakness is that “it might reduce the ethnocentrism of the erstwhile 
imperialist, but multiply it everywhere else by reinforcing in any culture its adherence to its 
own tradition.” (Vincent, 1986:39. See Donally,1982). Other cultures’ moral claims are thus 
deprived of validity within different societies, the effect of which is “to withdraw a society 
from the moral scrutiny of others.” In a perfect society this may be acceptable, but no 
society can make that claim.
The strength of universalism is in offering protection against the drawbacks of 
cultural relativism, rejecting the idea that moral argument in world politics can simply be 
withdrawn. However its main dangers lay in the fact that there is no common culture of 
modernity, it is subject to the particular moralities of “the primary cultural groups” in each 
society, and most importantly, it may be set against “the measure of westernization and not 
modernization”, thus imposing what are actually ethnocentric imperialistic moralities 
(Vincent,1986: 50-53).
A third perspective may be argued which recognises that predominant frameworks 
or paradigms that we use to understand the world and ourselves, whether considered 
universal or culturally relative, may be and will be challenged from time to time, and 
revisioned. Frameworks that are taken to be universal either to all of humanity or to all of a 
particular culture or society (universally particularist) are formed out of social and political 
discourse and interaction, and can be changed. This idea was well expressed by Kuhn who 
spoke of “scientific revolutions” in a controversial thesis that challenged the notion that 
scientific progress is orderly, incremental movement toward empirical truth. Kuhn 
maintained that rather than being ‘evolutionary’, scientific ‘revolutions’ occur when one
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predominant paradigm is displaced with another through mechanisms involving “techniques 
of persuasion...argument and counter-argument in a situation in which there can be no 
proof” (Kuhn,1962). Likewise, we can not simply select from the pool of existing cultural 
moralities and expect these to remain incontestable either in a universalist or culturally 
particularist sense.
Asylum seekers must base their claims on human rights violations, or persecution 
(see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion). If we consider Arendt’s (1967) analysis of human 
rights as in fact premised on citizenship rights, as we saw earlier in the chapter, and the 
possible dialectic between human rights and citizenship rights discussed above, the question 
arises as to what rights asylum seekers can lay claim to. These two considerations could easily 
amount to situations in which asylum seekers are excluded from rights to protection, having 
neither protected citizenship rights in their country of origin nor protection in receiving- 
countries when corresponding human rights abuses are not recognised.
Yet this possible outcome does not remove the political nature of claiming 
protection, in which rights are claimed and judgement must be rendered. In this process 
different institutionalised norms of rights protections at national and international levels are 
considered. As Soysal (1994:7) describes, “combined in complex ways, these discourses and 
modalities sanction different forms of activity and organising”. They may also come into 
conflict, as they are not always in agreement, “but this does not necessarily create irresolvable 
tensions or 'role conflicts' for actors” (Ibid,7).
In fact, asylum seeking may exemplify forces blurring the boundaries between 
exclusion and inclusion from citizenship rights, through processes of policy formation that 
link national and international state responsibilities. Asylum seekers may have to negotiate 
and challenge both universalist and particularist rights and moralities, and in both sending 
and receiving countries. Important here are the dynamics between national level refugee 
policy-making and the standard-setting nature and processes of international law, declarations 
and policy. Both may be mutually shaping over time, but the former offers possibilities for 
‘bottom-up’ involvement due to nation-states actually recaring refugees in their territories. The 
latter, being a representative rather than territorial body, responds from the 'top-down' or 
through representative organisations (government and nongovernment) to delegate and 
standardise responsibilities among states.
In the case studied, the particular citizenship rights desired in countries of origin were 
not initially recognised by Canada or any country for that matter, as being on par with human 
rights. Cases could be argued only by laying claim to the same rights Canadian citizens enjoy,
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and convincing the Federal government to correspondingly elaborate its interpretation of 
human rights in refugee policy. Human rights and corresponding state responsibilities for 
refugees were expanded through a feminist lens reinforced by women’s citizenship rights in 
Canada. A feminist human rights framework is predicated upon the recognition that 
women’s citizenship rights are often not substantively or adequately met; it then brings 
accountability for this failure into the inter-state system. Human rights frames provide a 
means for making states (at least theoretically) accountable for failure to uphold and nurture 
women’s rights as equal members of humanity residing within the state and inter-state 
system; human rights frames subsequently also provide the justification for inter-state 
responsibility when states fail to uphold human rights. But human rights (in principle, 
interpretation or application) may also be expanded upon througjo culturally relevant examples. At the time 
of the campaigns a fast growing literature on women’s human rights was emerging in 
disciplines such as international law, development and international relations (see chapter five 
in particular). However it took comparison to Canadian women’s rights to actually get state 
responsibility for women's human rights institutionalised through refugee policy.
From the preceding description, it is clear that the process of transforming refugee 
policy is a political one. It involves the politics of identity, structure and agency, played out 
within a shifting terrain of citizen-state defined rights operating in the context of growing 
globalisation. An analytic framework for asylum seekers roles’ in policy development must 
account for both institutional politics of policy-making and symbolic or identity politics, 
which the following elaborates. It considers the structural context as a field of changing 
opportunities and constraints for asylum seeking, the role of asylum seekers within it, and 
some basic parameters and processes of asylum seeking and political action.
I I I . T h e  structura l  c o n t e x t  f o r  po lit ic a l  a c t io n  a n d  po l ic y  in f l u e n c e :
STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND IDENTITY
The structural context for political contests over identity and rights as intersected by asylum 
seeking consists of the migration system which asylum seekers physically traverse and its 
institutional rules and norms which they negotiate. This ‘terrain’ of asylum seeking meets that 
of policy development in receiving-countries, which similarly takes place between two broad 
institutional and political layers -  the overarching international refugee regime and migration 
system, and particular national refugee regimes discussed below. Both may be described as 
contributing to “the institutional structure of society” which as Meyer, Boli and Thomas 
(1994:9) explain:
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creates and legitimates the social entities that are seen as “actors”. That is, 
institutionalized cultural rules define the meaning and identity of the individual and 
the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by 
those individuals. They similarly constitute the purposes and legitimacy of 
organizations, professions, interest groups, and states, while delineating lines of 
activity appropriate to these entities. All of this material has general cultural meaning 
in modem systems and tends to be universal across them, so that all aspects of 
individual identity, choice, and action... are depicted in the institutional system as 
related to the collective purposes of progress and justice.
Institutional logics of the structural context for asylum seeking describe the framework of 
legitimating and enabling asylum seekers' political action (DiMaggio and Powell,1991; Meyer, 
Boli and Thomas, 1987).
A. Internatio nal  a n d  n a tio n a l  refugee regim es in  th e  m ig ration  system  
Zolberg et al (1989) refer to the "international refugee regime" as the institutional and policy 
structures and the ways they were developed in response to changes in the migration system 
-  flows of people, relations between countries, sending-country causes and receiving-country 
responses -  internationally since World War II. It consists of refugee and humanitarian 
concerned international bodies at global and regional levels, such as the UNHCR and the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and the human rights principles they support, 
these offer individuals legitimacy as ‘persons’ rather than as ‘subjects’ of states, thus enabling 
their claim-making.
Like the international refugee regime, national refugee regimes may be described 
through relations between the migration system and the institutional and policy sub-system 
that evolve and change over time. This respects Boutang and Papademetriou (1994) 
description of national ‘migration regimes’, showing how particular types of countries have 
worked within the migration system. As international migration policy analysts, they are 
concerned with typologising different types of migration regimes in different countries. 
Coining from this angle, they emphasise the integral role of receiving-country responses to 
their definition of the Migration System:
...the particular combination of types of population flows between countries of 
departure and arrival, perhaps extending over several generations, along with the rules 
regulating these flows, and their administration. (1994:20).
They suggest this definition "allows the interplay of institutional variables to be given an 
important role” while recognising that migration policy is highly dependent upon the system 
in which it operates. They therefore suggest a working definition of "migration policy" as "a 
subsystem of the migration system" (Ibid,20). As a sub-system, migration policy "refleas the
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content of the system, and at the same time is an essential component of its dynamics." 
(1994:20). The ways receiving-country responses are formulated must therefore also be 
understood within the overarching migration system.
They explain that migration policy is concerned with controlling “the effects of the 
migration system and, to some extent...the magnitude of international migration 
movements”. But it faces constraints arising “from the nature of the system” and from “the 
policy’s being only a subsystem, which limits what it can achieve” (Ibid,20). They describe 
migration policy as comprising all actions taken by central and local government on the basis 
of regulations under “the rule of law”: treaties, agreements, laws, regulations and 
administrative instructions, as well as measures concerning the foreign immigrant population 
and its descendants (abroad or in the host country). Such regulations may be clear-cut, but 
the variables of the system itself are not, and can not be controlled. In this latter dimension 
Boutang and Papademetriou include the attitudes of the countries of origin, all types of 
refugee flows in time of war, and the influence of interest groups and political parties. Other 
macro structural factors include inter-state relations affecting modernisation and anti­
colonialism, and the globalisation of technology and communication (Fawcett and 
Amold,1987; Zolberg,1989; Castles and Miller,1993).
These influences are reflected in national migration policy and regime types. At this 
level the international logics of both human rights and citizenship norms come into play. 
Canada is divided between the citizenship based needs and demands of residents, and the 
humanitarian needs of nonresidents. These two levels are sometimes supportive and 
sometimes conflictual. Both can legitimate actors making claims and provide access to 
resources needed to challenge policy.
In Boutang and Papademetriou’s typology Canada’s migration regime is classified as 
reflecting a ‘hybrid’ of labour and permanent settlement priorities, the latter including its 
strong family reunion and humanitarian policies. Elaborating upon domestic refugee policy 
influences such as interest groups and political parties, which Boutang and Papademetriou 
mention, empirical studies of refugee policy making identify a range of formal and informal 
organisations and groups comprised of national citizens and including established ethnic 
minority communities (for example Hardcastle et al,1994). However, as Baubock has 
observed, the role of ethnic communities in shaping migration policies generally has tended 
to be underplayed or overlooked in migration theories (Baubock,1998), despite the profound 
nation-building function played by immigrants in countries such as the US and Canada.
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As in theories of receiving-country responses and policy-making models, asylum 
seekers are not conceived as part of the policy process within refugee regimes and studies of 
refugee policy development. What is the political nature of inland asylum seekers’ actual 
movement across this terrain? We need to look more closely at the asylum seeking process 
itself as it confronts politicised legal, institutional and extra-institutional structures, at sites 
where identity and rights are defined and developed.
B. Intersecting  the m igration  system: three premises a bo u t  asylum  seekers
AS AGENTS
As described above, refugee regimes and migration systems may be defined largely by the 
interdependency of their parts. Interdependent agents are both instrument and effect of a 
specific but changable context. To put asylum seekers more explicitly into this equation, 
three premises are offered to explain their inclusion as agents and to expose and overturn 
previous assumptions that led to their exclusion.
Asylum seekers face a conflict between theory and opportunity in refugee status 
determination systems
The first premise is that asylum seekers face a conflia between theory and opportunity in 
institutionalised status determination processes. Theoretically, all persecuted individuals have 
the rigjrt “to seek and enjoy asylum” in other countries, according to Article 14(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). However, not all persecuted individuals 
enjoy the same opportunities to seek asylum in the first place, and once asylum is sought, 
receiving countries maintain the authority to determine whether asylum seekers actually have 
the right to receive asylum in order to “enjoy” it. That is, asylum seekers must be considered 
eligible for “refugee” status as interpreted by sovereign states in national refugee policy8 and 
along lines delineated in international refugee law.9 The problem arises as, first, both 
international law and states’ interpretations of it favour refugees of some types of “refugee- 
creating” situations (the charaaeristics of which define ‘genuine’ refugees) more than others. 
Second, in the face of this, the “burden of proof” in determinations of status falls primarily
8 Plender (1989) extensive examines the ‘right of asylum’ in different countries and the views of 
eminent refugee law scholars who tend to conclude that states determine ‘the right of asylum*.
9 The term “International refugee law” applies to refugee-related Conventions and Treaties, but also 
the human rights standards to which they conform. The standard for Treaties and state policy is 
primarily the United Nations 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1961 New York Protocol.
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upon refugee claimants.10 However, not all claimants enjoy the same availability of 
information and support necessary to prove their cases, or the equal opportunity to present 
information in an environment suitable to their needs.11
In fact, all of the above conditions which pit theory against opportunity may 
seriously obstruct the ability of persecuted individuals to act effectively in order to be 
recognised as genuine refugees, a status that essentially transfers state responsibility for an 
individual’s welfare from one country to another. Yet at the same time, as this thesis argues, 
the structural context makes the act of seeking asylum an important linchpin for expanding 
the refugee definition in policy such that less traditional asylum seekers may be recognised as 
legitimate’ refugees therein, and receive international protection. In this study, women who 
seek asylum from female-specific persecution, as radically untraditional “refugees” who have 
clearly been considered illegitimate or invisible throughout the greater part of institutionalised 
asylum-giving history, sit at the centre of just such a quandary. They engage in a contest over 
identity concerning rights and state responsibilities.
This contest is influenced by the structural context asylum seekers must negotiate, 
and various resources (including legal, ideological, and material) they can draw upon to 
negotiate the system more effectively. Resources include particular legal rights as refugees 
through refugee policy and determination systems, and as residents in the host country; 
greater empirical evidence on conditions in their country of origin; ideological support for 
political activists or against particular forms of persecution; financial aid to reside in the host 
country while making claims, potentially to hire better lawyers; and support by NGOs in a 
variety of dimensions during the claim-making process, and networks between host country 
communities (for example ethnic communities) and recent arrivals. We will see in this study 
what kind of rights and resources asylum seekers had access to, which were important for the 
policy process and policy influence.
10 According to the 1951 Convention refugee definition, claimants must show “well-founded fear of 
persecution”. Shenke (1996:8) explains that “proof” of persecution contains objective and subjective 
elements, and applicants are responsible for both. The former refers to “objective circumstances that 
give rise to the fear”, and the latter refers to the claimant’s genuine suffering from fear of persecution.
11 On lack of documentary evidence for women refugees, see Martin-Forbes (1992), OLAP (1994). 
Canada’s Guidelines for Women Refuge Claimants Fearing Gender-related Persecution note problematic 
evidentiary matters including the “particularised evidence rule”, lack of “’statistical data on the 
incidence of sexual violence in her country of origin”, indirect state involvement in persecution by 
failing to protect, and special problems facing women at status determinations, i.e. cultural barriers 
preventing communication with male officers or disclosure of sexual violence, and the trauma of 
sexual violence (1993: 8-9). See Chapter 5 for detailed account.
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Asylum seekers themselves are instrument and effect of the migration system
A defining features of the migration system is the interdependency of its parts. Thus the 
second premise is that asylum seekers, as central components of migration systems and refugee 
regimes, are both instrument and fee t of these relations, not merely shaped by but shaping 
interdependency. This is recognised in migration systems theory insofar as refugee policy is 
often said to ‘respond’ to refugee flows and also to shape them. It differs from migration 
theory which still tends to describe refugees as ‘forced’ migrants, focusing often on mass 
flows and implying asylum seekers do not make decisions on actions that may influence their 
migration prospects. However, we do not have evidence pertaining to asylum seekers’ roles, 
particularly in receiving-countries, to draw this conclusion.
The assumptions of migration systems theories are based on the macro structural 
causes of persecution or human rights violations over which asylum seekers have no control. 
The many barriers to access that asylum seekers face, the dangers and risks they take in flight 
and in refugee camps, have been documented. But without investigation, the influence of 
asylum seeking upon the broader structural context is considered almost inevitable -  not a 
factor of individual asylum seekers’ actions in a political context but of their forced collective 
roles as pawns of history. Hathaway (1991a) and Zolberg et al (1989), discussed earlier, made 
substantial contributions by identifying the political role of refugee movements in drawing 
attention to the occurrence of human rights abuses and forming a necessary part of broader 
processes of social change. However even here asylum seekers are considered not as 
individual agents but as forced groups.
Thus, clarifying the second premise, asylum seekers are considered here as 
autonomous agents just as much as they operate and are embedded within an interdependent 
system that patterns their actions. In as far as individual claims are part of a structural type or 
group of claims, they are part of a collectivity, and may at times act politically as conscious 
members of that collective identity (defined by their experience of persecution or type of 
claim) or make claims that affect future decisions on claims by members of that collective 
group (i.e. setting legal precedents), whether consciously or not. This capacity does not 
suggest that asylum seekers do not face forces beyond their control that impel them to flee 
their home countries, and grave obstacles to actually fleeing or receiving asylum once in the 
host country. But it impels us to question the ways they are autonomous agents, and the 
implications. This leads directly to the third premise.
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Asylum seekers are actors working with changing political opportunities
If asylum seekers are not solely forced actors by virtue of being compelled to seek asylum, we 
can explain their movement as in part that of actors waking with favourable political opportunities 
that may arise in changing structural contexts. Several striking dimensions of the contemporary 
world constitute changing political opportunities for asylum seeking on a broad level.
First is the growth of regional and international conventions and agreements and the 
increasing salience of the human rights principles they support. Human rights codes prioritise 
the individual or person and provide legal and moral tools to challenge state sovereignty to 
violate human rights and to exclude aliens from their territories. In this context “the 
individual emerges as a site for contesting the authority (sovereignty) of the state because she 
is the site for human rights” (Sassen 1998:8). Asylum seekers’ claims to the legitimating 
discourses of institutionalised human rights norms and notions of personhood lend them 
options and the means for agency.
Second, both an outcome of the first point but moreover fundamental to its fruitful 
employment, is the increasing application of citizenship rights to noncitizens, and 
noncitizens’ increasing ability to access and claim citizenship rights (Soysal,1994; 
Jacobson,1996). Like other migrants, inland asylum seekers are exposed to the political, 
social, organisational, and resource environment of the host-country as they make claims and 
await decisions on them. This provides asylum seekers a range of institutional and extra- 
institutional resources and opportunities, for instance to make full use of judicial institutions 
and be represented by lawyers paid for by the state.
The two dimensions described necessarily intersect within the context of 
globalisation, marked by increasing interaction between national and international level 
systems (see Held et al,1999), and subsequently between national and world level institutional 
norms and logics that legitimate individual actors (see Meyers, 1994:30). Both dimensions and 
their intersection can be fleshed out empirically as used by asylum seekers in this study. Thus, 
we can explore how asylum seekers acquired the means and legitimacy to challenge their 
exclusion from host countries despite increasing restrictions on refugees in policy and 
administration in recent years.
Seeing asylum seekers as actors further removes them from the limited ‘forced 
refugee’ image in which the individual actor disappears and refugee movements are ‘irrational 
and unstructured events’, yet without making the illogical assumption that individuals who 
challenge the refugee system are calculating voluntary migrants and thus ‘illegitimate 
refugees’. Just as the old ‘voluntary migrant’ category is now seen, in a migration systems
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context, as subject to historically structured processes that qualify individualistic explanation 
of migration, so are refugees distanced from the old ‘forced migrant’ category and can be 
seen also as individual actors as new frameworks for action and legitimacy emerge.
As eminent refugee scholars Zolberg et al (1989:31) have noted, the forced/voluntary 
distinction is problematic for political dissidents who ‘choose’ to be political activists in their 
home country and thus do not quite fit the ‘forced’ definition (events leading to their 
persecution were not entirely out of their control). It is also problematic for untraditional 
asylum seekers; for instance, refugees of economic persecution are not recognised under the 
1951 Convention and thus are often considered ‘voluntary’ migrants and illegitimate refugees. 
Moreover, due to barriers against their acceptance, untraditional asylum seekers may need to 
strengthen claims to state protection by taking extra, voluntary, political action in the 
receiving-country. Paradoxically, the more they challenge the system the more they may 
appear as calculating individuals who are not really forced migrants at all. This study 
dispenses with the artificial distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migrants and explores 
how asylum seekers use political opportunities, rather than assuming that as refugees they 
must be ‘forced actors’ as well. They may have legitimate claims that push out existing 
refugee eligibility frameworks. The rationale of seeking asylum is based not on how well they 
‘fit’ existing refugee law, but on membership in a collective group with shared identity and 
grievances as well as structural opportunities, resources and potential strategies for redress -  
all important factors mediating the migration system. Of course, potential actorhood does 
not guarantee success in seeking asylum; rather it implies wearing known options and 
opportunities, making what are perceived to be strategic and rational decisions within the 
universe of known possibilities, at times even taking risks to act on certain decisions. And, it 
does not preclude individuals who have not faced persecution but who are attempting to ‘use 
the system’ to gain authorised entrance.
C. ADAPTING MIGRATION SYSTEMS THEORY: THREE BASIC DIMENSIONS OF SUCCESSFUL
ASYLUM SEEKING
Using the above premises international and national refugee regimes may be explored as 
terrain for women seeking asylum from female-specific persecution. Now we need to look at 
some of the basic dimensions of sucoessful asylum seeking, from the asylum seeking 
perspective, which opens up potential policy influence. Three such dimensions can be 
delineated. Asylum seekers must have opportunities to seek asylum, that is, both to leave their 
country and to request refugee status from a host country in the first place. They must have 
opportunities in the receiving-country to challenge negative decisions on their claims and the existing
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refugee determination system, if necessary. And asylum seekers must have the wihngness to 
make use o f these opportunities, which may involve certain risks.
The first dimension, opportunities to seek asylum, is most commonly identified in 
migration studies of various kinds, although not as ‘opportunities’ per se. Rather, migration 
studies following the migration systems theory framework identify a combination of macro 
and micro level factors shaping both particular sending and receiving-country conditions for 
emigration and immigration (see Fawcett and Arnold 1987; Castles and Miller 1993). These 
are often discussed in terms of the structural circumstances shaping international migration 
flows, such as global economic trends, decolonisation, modernisation and other inter-state or 
international level trends. They also include factors such as: laws permitting free movement 
in the sending-country, potential asylum seekers’ financial and/or human resources (i.e. 
contacts) which enable immigration (particularly in the case of movement to distant 
counties), international refugee law and receiving-country refugee laws and determination 
systems, and political relations between sending and receiving countries. These create the 
particular structural contexts of constraints and opportunities for certain migrants in particular 
times and places. Factors also include the resources international migrants can access once 
inside receiving-countries, described earlier as including access to legal counsel, evidence 
regarding widespread persecution in sending-countries, welfare benefits such as housing and 
community organisations that offer information and advocacy, and the particular rights 
associated with residence in the receiving-country, such as constitutional and civil rights.
The second dimension, opportunities in the rwehmg-country to challenge negative decisions, is 
rarely discussed in migration studies or even in the literature more specifically on refugee 
policy development. However, in the international and national refugee law literature where 
status determination systems are described and analysed, it is evident that law, its 
administration, and various resources available to claimants (i.e. a judicial setting, legal 
representation, etc.) are fundamental not only to the outcome of claims of different types 
(See Tuitt,1996; Paul,1992) but also to claimants’ abilities to challenge outcomes. These are 
not often discussed as opportunities, rather the more closed an immigration system is, the more 
it is considered to constrain asylum seekers’ chances of being accepted. The opposite logic is 
that the more open a particular system is, the greater opportunities asylum seekers will have 
to challenge it. The same is true for less tangible aspects of international migration systems 
that affect particular types of claimants and claims, for example systemic bias toward 
refugees arriving from particular countries due to political relations between sending and 
receiving countries (see Fawcett and Arnold 1987), receiving countries’ use of immigration as
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a tool of foreign policy (Teitelbaum, 1984) 5 general attitudes toward international migration in 
receiving-coimtries, and the salience of human rights and citizenship norms in receiving- 
countries or as forces undermining state sovereignty (see Sassen,1996).
We may also add factors less commonly associated with status determination 
processes because we are considering asylum seeking (including status determination) in 
relation to policy development. The latter, in any kind of policy-making, requires opportunities 
such as: access to substantive rights and means (resources and opportunities) of participation 
in the host country; salient ideas and interests in the receiving-country which are relevant to 
the ideology underlying particular types of claims and demands upon states (i.e. ideas and 
interests embodied by the women’s movement, or particular ethnic communities and/or 
public opinion concerned with international politics giving rise to refugee flows); and 
vulnerability of the establishment at a given time or on relevant political issues (i.e. domestic 
discontent toward a particular government, factions within political parties, and inherent or 
rising institutional weaknesses). Some of these were mentioned earlier as creating leverage 
points for asylum seekers facing the conflict between theory and opportunity. All the above 
types of factors can be viewed as structural opportunities, and elaborated upon appropriately 
in relation to particular kinds of claims and claimants.
The third dimension, willingness to make use o f these opportunities, is neglected in the 
literature on refugees. Refugees are traditionally described as ‘forced’ migrants, although 
disagreement with this definition is increasing (see Zolberg et al 1989:30). As forced migrants 
refugees’ capacity to weigh risks of various kinds and make choices even under difficult 
circumstances is overlooked. Moreover, despite the shift from push-pull to ‘systems’ theories 
there is still a marked tendency to concentrate on factors in sending-countries ‘pushing’ 
asylum seekers out, to the neglect of opportunities and constraints in receiving-countries.12 If 
asylum seekers are presented with opportunities and constraints upon seeking and receiving 
asylum as described along the two dimensions developed above, they may be confronted 
with decisions about various kinds of risks they must be willing to take in the receiving- 
country to achieve their goal. For instance, would they be willing to make untraditional types 
of claims that are less likely to be accepted, or would they rather attempt to fit their claims 
within more readily accepted eligibility parameters by distorting the evidence? Would they be
12 Incentives and abilities to migrate have been explored among immigrants on the micro level 
through social networks linking them to established migrants and migrant communities in receiving- 
countries (see Price, 1963; Boyd,1989). 'Migration cycles' across generations of families are said to link 
international migrants of various types -  migration beginning with refugees may be followed by 
extended family members as immigrants.
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willing to challenge negative decisions on their claims (a surprising number of claims are 
‘abandoned’ or ‘withdrawn’ at some stage of the determination process)? Would they be 
willing to take extra-institutional measures, such as going public, to challenge decisions?
These considerations may often depend upon whether asylum seekers have the 
resources necessary to become aware of various possibilities in the first place or ultimately to 
be able to go act on them (i.e. knowing one’s legal rights; having a good lawyer; having the 
support of NGOs to help gather hard to find evidence on countries of origin, or write 
advocacy letters to immigration officials who may be able to intervene in negative decisions). 
In this sense, bringing the third dimension to fruition is integrally linked to the first two.
To consider how asylum seekers actually achieve their goal -  asylum -  we must also 
understand the asylum seeking process and the policy development process together: how 
the structural context frames identity and process, and how asylum seekers may negotiate it. 
Having an idea of the political contests that take place as refugees lay claim to rights, and as 
links between identity and rights evolve in policy; the layers of the migration system, asylum 
seekers as central components of it, and the dimensions of asylum seeking, we may now 
elaborate how asylum seekers become political actors in receiving-countries. This can be 
described by drawing on theories of collective action to draw a thread through the diverse 
dimensions of the relationship between asylum seeking and the policy development process.
D . A sylum  seek ing  a n d  collective a c tio n : dynam ics of  structure, collective
IDENTITY AND AGENCY IN REFUGEE POLICY CHANGE 
The dynamics between identity, the asylum seeking process, and policy, are crucial for 
understanding asylum seekers’ roles. Collective action theories are useful for further 
explaining this dynamic as it occurs in the particular policy process. They help explain how 
the structural context is used and resources and ideologies mobilised around particular 
collective identities and aims, including policy aims. Compared to models of policy-making in 
social policy, theories of collective action are particularly useful for studying a policy process 
by identifying the structural context but focusing on the agncy of policy actors in it, i.e. their 
use of the structural context. Policy-making models in a social policy, reviewed in Chapter 1, 
tend to offer highly structural and institutional accounts of the policy-change process without 
looking in-depth into the actual dynamics of the conflict that takes place between actors. 
Further, they tend to neglect important factors in the generative stage of policy conflicts, such 
as the identification of grievances as structural (rather than individual) by potential actors, the 
formation of collective identities around grievances, the development and use of appropriate
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ideologies, and the actual mobilisation of actors into a collectivity.13
The structural context can be broadly categorised into three distinct but contiguous 
dimensions that explain why political action may arise and how it becomes political 
influential. Drawn from a comprehensive theory of collective action offered by McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald (1996), these are described as political opportunity structures, mohlising 
structures, and framingprocesses. This approach is useful here because as a synthesis of the two 
main theories of social movement, New Social Movement and Resource Mobilisation 
theories, it combines a number of elements applicable to the approach to the study described 
thus far: a structural historical and identity oriented approach (as in NSM theory), which is 
attentive to institutional and noninstitutional resources and their strategic use (RM theory).14
Taking a snap-shot of each of the three dimensions as related to a particular issue or 
collective interest, we see: (1) The structure of political opportunities, or the variety of 
institutional structures and informal power relations in a given area, which shapes the 
interaction of collective interests and institutionalised politics. (2) The particular formal and 
informal structures or “vehicles... through which people mobilise and engage in collective 
actions” (Ibid,3), such as NGOs or legal structures and institutionalised claim-making 
processes. And (3) the structure of salient ideas and ideologies, or the ways culture, identity 
and politics are ‘framed’ for a particular political purpose.
These three dimensions each provide various kinds of opportunities and constraints 
for individuals and groups to engage in successful political actions and thus shape vehicles 
for action, ideas and identity, institutional structures and power relations. The aims and 
outcomes of their endeavours may be broad social change, and/or particular vehicles 
encouraging social change, such as legislation and policy.
13 This is an under-recognised and under-researched area in policy-making, which has long neglected 
to sufficiently draw upon the more extensive literature and theory on social movements.
14 A complete review of the literature can not be undertaken here, but a brief synopsis can be offered. 
NSM theory focuses on the long-term - vhy movements develop - postulating this question is best 
understood at the macro level as new political identities coagulate around changing social grievances 
corresponding to broad socio-political and technological changes of post-industrial societies. 
Movements are essentially cultural struggles for control over the production of meaning and the 
constitution of collective identities. Main proponents of NSM theory include Melucci (1989), 
Touraine (1981), Habermas (1987). RM theory concentrates on short and intermediate term variables 
and the processes through which pre-existing grievances are translated and mobilised into goals and 
action. It explores, for example, the necessary pre-existing and developed resources, how resources 
and political opportunities are operationalised, participant recruitment, strategic political- 
entrepreneurial interaction between movements and existing political processes and structures. Main 
proponents of this approach include Tilly (1978), Gamson (1978), Oberschall (1973), McAdam 
(1982), McCarthy and Zald (1979).
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The three dimensions also operate in a context where national and international 
discourses, norms, and institutions interact. The effects of globalisation are pertinent to 
nationally rooted collective action and policy processes because globalisation helps shape 
“institutions as cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities and 
activities, integrating them into the larger schemes... [The] patterns of activity and the units 
involved in them (individuals and other social entities) [are] constructed by such wider rules.” 
(Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994:10). Meyer (1994:30) describes such wider rules or 
environments as those of (1) world society and its dominant rules and ideologies, as well as 
the organisations and professions that structure these, i.e. those emphasising world level 
human rights ideologies; (2) universalistic ideologies and scientific doctrines that may also be 
world-wide and involve general or universal claims to authority; and (3) arrangements that in 
fact aggregate to the world level because of common clauses or diffusion processes, i.e. 
because interrelations among nation-states make changes widespread, such as ideas, politics 
and practices regarding women's rights.
The fact that political opportunity structures, mobilising vehicles, and framing 
processes are changing structures (i.e. under the influence of globalisation which creates 
standardising human rights law, international and ethnic organisations, and ideologies of 
multiculturalism linked to citizenship and women's rights) explains the emergence, 
development and subsequent nature and extent of influence by particular political actors in a 
specific time and place. As structures change they provide different opportunities and 
constraints for political action. Changes occur both over the long-term as the result of broad 
historical change and the development of new meanings and identities (NSM theory), and in 
the intermediate-term mobilisation of resources and political opportunities to address 
grievances (RM theory), affecting national and international levels and their interrelations.
The above parameters and may be applied to the more specific contexts of asylum 
seeking and the political action and policy process under consideration. The staMe and changing 
nature of the structural context where asylum seeking takes place can be explored, and 
asylum seekers’ use of it analysed. They need to use potential opportunities to take their 
claims from the individual to the collective level. This occurs in at least four basic processes:
(a) Identifying experiences of persecution within a broader structural experience of 
persecution by similarly structurally situated people. This aspect of refugee claim-making is 
often taken for granted in studies involving aspects of migration or status determination 
processes -  asylum seekers are assumed to have fled structural persecution which forms the 
obvious basis for refugee claims. However, we can not assume that asylum seekers will frame
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their experiences in political ways -  i.e. identifying its structural causes. More likely, they 
present their individual experience, which hopefully is self-evidently structural in cause. 
However, presenting a claim with evidence or persuasive arguments as to its structural 
element is an important aspect of the claim-making process, particularly when claimant 
experiences do not ‘fit’ refugee eligibility frameworks. Claimants need to explain why theirs is 
a chronic, not individually experienced, problem. Lawyers are the most obvious candidate for 
helping claimants frame their experiences appropriately, however other influences may also 
be important (for instance refugee advocacy organisations).
(b) Using available ideologies and ideas as moral and legal resources to argue for 
collective rights. This dimension is interesting and significant as it brings different cultures 
and layers of legal and ideological arguments into contact. As indicated earlier, asylum 
seekers draw on a complex system of international and national law. They further raise 
debates about culture and the rights of particular groups (i.e. women), in both sending and 
host countries, the latter often overlooked. This process underlines that refugee policy is 
framed by historically and culturally specific ideas about rights and theOir justification 
through affiliation to identity or particular membership.
(c) Making use of or helping to mobilise necessary resources and support. This 
dimension is interesting as it involves mobilising host country resources and residents. The 
former may include resources often thought to be reserved for established residents or 
citizens. Residents may not be personally affected by the same grievances or seem to have a 
personal stake in taking political action around particular issues except insofar as their 
employment may involve dealing with refugees or issues related to particular types of asylum 
seekers’ claims (for example in this study, individuals working in women’s organisations). 
On a broader political level individuals and organisations may benefit indirectly from 
politically supporting a common ideology that benefits them as members of a broad group.15
(d) Finally, strategically using emerging political opportunities to draw on appropriate 
ideology and resources and pressure for policy change. That is, the timeliness of certain types 
of claims is very important, not only for political access but also for seizing moments when 
opponents may be more vulnerable to certain types of claims and pressure tactics.
15 These are known as 'selective' and 'solidary' incentives which partially account for what is often 
referred to as the free-rider problem in explanations of social movement participation (Olsen, 1965).
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IV. C o n c l u sio n
Asylum seekers’ role in and use of the structural context may be both symbolic and 
institutional/strategic. Their importance for symbolic politics involves the interpretation and 
creation of meaning and understanding of identity. Their strategic institutional influence 
involves bringing political situations to light and convincing states to adopt appropriate 
policy.
Identity for asylum seekers is both self-dimmed and state-d fried Both are important, and 
together they highlight the distinction between informal and formal status and the 
significance of their inter-action for policy-making. Refugee policy identifies potential 
beneficiaries of state protection and their rights according to basic state responsibilities 
explicit and implicit to the policy. Feeding into refugee policy development are policy actors’ 
abilities and opportunities, arising from informal and formal rights inherent to contracts and 
relations between states and individuals in the global system, and between the state and 
citizens or residents, through which asylum seekers may mobilise and legitimate their claims.
Taking this into consideration, we can better understand that opportunities to seek 
asylum and challenge the refugee determination system, alongside willingness to successfully 
make use of these opportunities, contain both tangible and intangible, symbolic and strategic 
aspects. For example, asylum seekers have both symbolic self-defined identities as refugees, 
and institutional or state-defined identities as legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ refugees. 
Opportunities and constraints include both institutional structures and resources (or lack of) 
and other tangibles, and salient ideas, trends and other intangibles. And asylum seekers and 
supporters use both ideas and ideology in ‘symbolic politics’ (Edelman 1971), as well as 
strategic tactics of influence through use of law, media and other instruments for public and 
government persuasion. McAdam (1996) describes the combination of symbolic and 
strategic actions as types of ‘signifying acts’ used by collective actors to influence social 
change. Looking specifically at policy-change processes, Smith and Sabatier (1994) explain 
that policies can be mapped on the same canvass as ‘belief systems’. Policy actors cohere in 
coalitions for policy change through a ‘hierarchy of policy values’ from deep level beliefs to 
preferred policy instruments and aims, and secondary aims. Policy actors can even shift 
policy aims from preferred (or ‘core policy values’) to secondary as a matter of strategic 
consideration or new information coming to light (Smith and Sabatier,1994).
Conditions for effective policy advocacy are an effect of changing political 
opportunities, and their use by asylum seekers whose identity and roles in relation to 
receiving states have also been changing. Transformations occur both symbolically and
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strategically. For example, significant to this study were changing relationships between 
noncitizens and states, noncitizens and residents, and citizenship and human rights. The 
dynamic between asylum seeking and policy development is political, involving struggle and 
conflict and describing an important over-looked dimension of refugee policy development.
Furthermore, refugee policy is not only a vehicle for protecting states and preventing 
flows or providing aid to passive beneficiaries. It may also be a also vehicle for making use of 
or even expanding state responsibilities in human rights protection. Asylum seekers may 
actually use the existing structural context as a vehicle to overcome constraints and 
restrictions in receiving-countries. Both scholarly and popular discourse tends to be either 
panicked at this likelihood, saying that the system is prone to abuses by illegitimate refugees, 
or protective of legitimate refugees’ structural vulnerability and ‘forced’ image. Migration 
Systems theory generally and theories of receiving-country responses in particular do not 
look at the international migration system as one of developing opportunities or constraints 
which asylum seekers must negotiate and may successfully challenge. They neglect the political 
process involved in actual asylum seeking and claim-making processes. This is essential to 
understanding how policy influence may occur. Its implications involve more explicit 
recognition of international pressures on, and applications of, social policy. This involves 
recognising noncitizen access to rights and policy-making processes, and considering the 
dialectic between international and national rights that may be mutually informative, 
extending state responsibilities for a range of substantive rights and for the formal 
beneficiaries of those rights. These transformations could fundamentally alter the use of 
‘citizenship’ as a justification for social policy.
The analytical framework presented in this chapter suggests why and how asylum 
seekers (particularly persecuted individuals who do not fit traditional refugee status 
frameworks) may make the transition from being “self-recognised” refugees to state- 
recognised “refugees”. While policy influence is not often a direct result of asylum seeking by 
individual claimants, and certainly can not be conceived as an easy process, we must still 
consider some of the structural layers asylum seekers negotiate and the means by which 
asylum seekers negotiate them, their impact and its implications. Such is the aim of following 
chapters, which examine the particular asylum seeking process in the unique case of refugees 
of female-specific persecution. Chapter 4 begins by examining in detail the context and 
interface between international law, its national applications and the claim-making process 
itself, drawing out the symbolic and strategic challenges both faced and posed by women 
fleeing female-specific persecution.
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4. I n t e r p r e t i n g  " p e r s e c u t io n ” i n  t h e  i n t e r - s t a t e  sy s te m :
FEMALE ASYLUM SEEKERS’ SYMBOLIC AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGE
"Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."
[Article 14(1) International Declaration of Human Rights, 1948]
the question is whose criteria defines legitimate fear for refuge recognition purposes? Why is it 
decided that persecution on the grounds of race or religion may lead to ‘well-founded fear’ followed by 
international assistance, while women who are burnt to death have no rights of protection? Why is a girl 
who is threatened by violence and who attempts to escape by fleeing from her country, not part of the 
UNHCR’s responsibility? Since neither national governments nor international bodies offer the right to 
protection and right to life [for these women], this is their under-development and their shame.”
[Bonnerjea,1985:6]
Both the constraints against asylum seekers being recognised as “refugees” and the 
opportunities for overcoming them must be considered within the structural context of 
international law relating to refugees and to state responsibilities, and their national 
interpretations and applications in policy and status determination processes. This chapter 
looks at relations between women asylum seekers, states and the international legal context, 
as they interact in defining and redefining the lens used to determine state responsibility for 
protecting foreign-nationals and stateless persons, in this case those seeking asylum from 
female-specific forms and/or causes of persecution. This achieves three things. It provides a 
general background on the basic legal and administrative framework as a structural context 
for seeking and receiving refugee status, highlighting gaps between theory at the level of 
international law, and practice at the national level. It illuminates, as a basic element of that 
structure, the quite active and essential role of asylum seekers in interpretative processes that 
occur in refugee status determinations within receiving-countries. And it provides a more 
specialised analysis of how, through status determination processes, asylum seekers fleeing 
female-specific persecution in particular face and also pose structural challenges to the legal 
discourse on persecution and subsequently to the structure of interstate responsibility.
Such challenges occur as the gendered lens traditionally used to interpret refugee law 
and state responsibility for determinations of refugee status, is reframed. This lens 
differentiates between legitimate and illegitimate refugees along a public/private political axis. 
Asylum seekers’ challenges are thus both symbolic and strategic, oscillating between 
discourses and norms framing identity and rights at national and international levels, and 
their institutional applications.
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Legal discourse, writes Klare (1982:1358), mirrors "systematised symbolic 
interaction", it "informs our beliefs about how people learn about and treat themselves and 
others". The manner in which legal discourse informs "ways of thinking about public and 
private" (ibid.1361), which subsequently may fluctuate and be revised, is only one such 
example. There is now a vast literature on the structure of the public-private divide and 
implications for women in society, ranging from issues such as women’s caring and unpaid 
labour, to violence against women, to gender in international relations.
At the national level, violence against females has become a social policy concern in 
many countries, including Canada, where domestic responsibility ideally consists of 
prevention, protection, and prosecution measures. These policy aims are built upon state 
obligations to promote the well-being and full-integration of all members of society; and the 
idea that violence against females is a public rather than private issue due to its structural 
origins. It is both product and promoter of the structural inequality of females in society 
based on their sex (Status of Women Canada, 1991).
Statist discourse underpinning the inter-state system has remained premised on a 
masculinist demarcation between conceptions of what constitutes 'public' and 'private', 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’, and subsequently between the 'inner' life of sovereign states 
(their political and civil society) from their 'outer' life, or what Walker (1994) has called the 
“public faces in the global system”. Thus internationally, female-specific violence has 
traditionally been interpreted as occurring in the ‘private’ sphere, beyond the responsibility of 
states for their citizenry, and undoubtedly beyond inter-state responsibility. The fundamental 
challenge both faced and posed by female asylum seekers is to this public/private 
demarcation underlying state and inter-state systems. This demarcation has traditionally 
informed the meaning of “persecution” for which states are responsible and from which 
individuals may “seek and enjoy” asylum, according to Article 14(1) of the International 
Declaration of Human Rights, thus determining asylum seekers’ eligibility for refugee status.
The chapter draws from the literature on refugees and the international refugee 
system and on feminist scholarship on the public/private divide framing women’s human 
rights, in such a way as to show how persecuted women’s structural opportunities to seek 
and receive asylum and state responsibility are framed, and with what kinds of implications 
for asylum seekers’ role in interpretative processes. Tensions between opportunities and 
barriers to recognition of female-specific violence as "persecution" in international law versus 
national policy and administration are drawn out, moving from the international scene to the 
Canadian context in particular, and highlighting how the need for asylum seekers to take an
103
active interpretative role is actually built into the system. Thus I argue that asylum seekers 
may be agents within the legal and administrative structural context; their agency is shaped 
(constrained, guided or promoted) by the inter-state and national legal systems, are their 
inter-relations, but may also influence the legal system within which they act.
Section I asks "Who defines persecution" and by what criteria or framework 
according to the standard refugee definition. It explains how in theory international 
documents and basic principles in international law counter-balance the rights and roles of 
asylum seekers and sovereign states in the definitional process. Section II goes on to explore 
the implications, for women, of international human rights law being based on the principle 
of state responsibility among sovereign nation-states. As the public/private demarcation 
inherent to statist discourse, which prevents structural violence against women from being 
treated as a public issue within states, has come to inform the structure of international law, 
inter-state responsibility for female-specific persecution has been left to what is known as the 
"goodwill" doctrine of states. Distinguishing between inherent or potential meanings of 
“persecution” in international refugee law, and states’ interpretations of "persecution", I discuss 
how the latter have traditionally excluded female experiences by using the public/private 
demarcation which informs the principle of state responsibility, and how the former has the 
potential to overcome it. New interpretations of persecution need to operate through a 
human rights framework (rather than a male model and interpretation of citizenship rights 
drawn along gendered public/private lines) which dissolves the barriers between states and 
non-citizens in receiving-countries, and between states and individuals not granted the full 
rights and protections of citizens in their own country. In section III, returning to the role of 
asylum seekers, the barriers they face in interpretative processes at the level of claim-making 
and jurisprudence creation is assessed through the public/private lens, and the question of 
why and how opportunities may arise for them to challenge these barriers is highlighted.
I. WHO DEFINES "PERSECUTION?
In ter na tio n al  law , asylum  seekers a n d  so vereig n  states
According to Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
determining factor of the theoretical "right to seek and to enjoy... asylum" is the experience 
or threat of "persecution" in the country of origin. However, the Declaration does not 
explicitly define "persecution" which gives individuals the right to seek asylum in the first 
place, nor do subsequently instated international documents which reinforce this right, in
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particular the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 New 
York Protocol. Neither is "persecution" explicitly defined by most receiving-countries, 
which usually reproduce the Convention or Protocol in their national legislation.16
Typically, persecution is equated with serious human rights violations (Hathaway, 
1994:108; IRB Preferred Position Paper,1992; OLAP, REF6-1, 1994:4). However not all 
violations of human rights will be recognised as amounting to persecution. To determine 
whether violence actually amounts to persecution for which states are responsible, 
international documents provide a loose framework for interpretative processes which 
theoretically balance the rights and roles of asylum seekers against those of states. Asylum 
seekers' forum for exercising this right is in the claim-making process, and subsequently the 
growth of jurisprudence. Flora Liebich (1993), IRB member and Chairperson of the 
Working Group on Women Refugee Claimants explains that in Canada, “When we look for 
guidance in deciding key issues in a refugee claim, such as what constitutes persecution... we 
look both to Canadian case law and to the international human rights instruments.”
A sylum seekers a n d  the  ‘bur den  o f pro of’
Case law arising from refugee claims forms an important element of interpretations of 
persecution (its forms, types and structural nature), as well as recognition of the occurrence 
of persecution in particular countries at particular times. Persecuted individuals are 
therefore an important part of the definitional process, although the influence of their 
movement and claims tend to be objectified and divorced from them as individuals and 
actors. Seeking asylum entails both self-identification as individuals who are persecuted or 
seriously threatened by persecution, and the attainment of external or state recognition of the 
experience of persecution and right to receive refuge. These necessary actions are translated 
into what is often referred to as "the burden of proof", or the requirement that claimants 
provide evidence of both a general and a particular nature regarding their persecution.
Schenke (1996) explains that the burden of proof consists of both subjective and 
objective elements, and that the applicant is responsible for both. Objective elements 
consist of “objective circumstances that give rise to the fear”. Subjective elements refer to 
the claimant’s genuine suffering from fear of persecution. Persecuted individuals may present 
themselves at immigration posts within their country of origin to make refugee claims, or at 
the borders of or from within receiving-countries. Whether or not external parties are aware
16 See Hathaway (1991), on Canada; Schenke (1996) on the US.
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of countiy-of-origin conditions, claimants must recognise and show “well-founded fear of 
persecution”. Hathaway (1991a) describes asylum seeking as a process that allows “people to 
become directly and immediately involved in the process of calling attention to affronts to 
human dignity in their home state”.
However, not all persecuted individuals are recognised as "refugees" by states, and as 
we shall see not all have enjoyed the same opportunity to shape interpretations of 
persecution in receiving-countries. Access to claim-making and case law creation processes 
is stratified among asylum seekers, despite what should be an inherent recognition that 
"Persecution is, in fact, a violation of one’s human rights, whether the claimant is a woman, 
man or child" (Liebich,1993:2). The principle of state sovereignty allows states to interpret 
and apply UN Conventions to which they are signatory. This enables states to determine in 
tndwidml cases whether a claimant's experience actually amounted to persecution from which 
asylum is the only viable source of protection, rather than be obliged to accept all self­
identified refugees. Determinations take place in settings more amenable to some claimants 
that others. Subsequently, eligibility frameworks are created through which some self­
identified refugees will be regarded as legitimate’, and others as ‘illegitimate’. The challenges 
posed by these two aspects are discussed below.
STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: DELIMITING OR EXPANDING THE 
REFUGEE ELIGIBILITY FRAMEWORK
The principle of state sovereignty was upheld when Article 14(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was being drafted, so that states' interpretations of 
responsibility for persecuted individuals are shaped but not precisely defined. The instated 
article, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution", in addition to being only theoretically gender neutral, emphasises the right of 
individuals to seek asylum but does not bind states which are signatory to grant asylum. In 
contrast, the original draft of that article proposed to emphasise the responsibility rather than 
rights of states: "Everyone has the right to seek and be granted in other countries asylum from 
persecution." (UN Doc. A/C 3/285 Rev. 1 (1948), emphasis added). Opposition was 
upheld by the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, whose delegates argued that "recognition of a right to be granted asylum would 
violate State sovereignty" (in Plender, 1988:397, UN Doc A/C3/SR 121 pp4,6). Plender, 
Professor of international law, concludes that the traditional view concerning the Article 
actually instated is that:
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the right of asylum is no more than the right of each State to grant asylum to a fugitive 
alien. In part, this view is based on the premise that international law gives rise to rights 
and duties only between States; and in part on the premise that States are free to exclude 
aliens from their territories. (Plender,1988:394)
According to Migration Systems theory, exclusion of aliens, whether in South-South, 
South-North or East-West movements, occurs both on the basis of international relations 
and foreign policy between sending and receiving states, and to preserve the inward looking 
protectionary interests of receiving-countries, usually to maintain or strengthen economic 
and ethnic/national integrity, and often fuelled by xenophobic sentiment (See Fawcett and 
Arnold 1987; Castles and Miller 1993). Humanitarian protection thus respects the right of 
states to protect self interests by having apparatus of the state determine whether asylum 
seekers are "legitimate" or "illegitimate" refugees. Since the upsurge in refugee movement 
from the 1970s and corresponding rise in costs of national refugee systems, ‘legitimacy’ has 
become an increasing preoccupation both to contain unmanageable flows and prevent 
‘illegitimate’ asylum seekers from taking advantage of the system. Essentially the only 
obligations of regional and national refugee determination systems, as signatories or 
"contracting states" to the 1951 Convention and 1967 New York Protocol, are: (1) to 
establish determination procedures that identify the beneficiaries, and (2) to undertake the 
status determination task, in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement which states 
that no persecuted individual may be returned to her or his country of origin (see 
Plender,1989:82,88 and 1988:425-428). Controlling the framework for how persecution is to 
be interpreted clearly gives states the tools to justify rejecting asylum seekers.
The suggested framework for refugee determination which forms the basis for the 
majority of national immigration and refugee policies, is the refugee definition offered in the 
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 New York 
Protocol. These Conventions identify five structural causes or grounds of persecution rather 
than defining "persecution" or the many forms persecution takes. The reasons identified 
indicate that the persecution must be of a kind based on the inherent characteristics which an 
individual possesses or comes to possess in life and which are central to one's being: the 
universal qualities or "categories" of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and 
membership in a particular social group. Denial of the right to possess any of these basic 
characteristics would be tantamount to denial of basic human rights. These universal 
categories were identified in lieu of enumerating particular persecuted groups (i.e. all the 
particular races, religions, nationalities, political opinions or social groups which may be 
persecuted in a certain place and time) which would be both impossible and limiting, as new
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categories would constantly have to be added or else excluded as particular situations arise, 
subside, or are recognised over time (Zolberg et al 1989:25. Also see Chapter 3).
Universal causes of persecution thus constitute a determining factor of refugee 
eligibility which makes states responsible for human rights violations (the forms of persecution). 
These two factors qualify one another. The Convention does not entitle all members of a 
particular race, for example, to seek and receive asylum; only those who have suffered or 
have well-founded fear of human rights violations related to one’s race, may do so under the 
claim of persecution. This is referred to as the individualised basis of persecution. Similarly, 
not all individuals whose human rights are violated are entitled to asylum according to the 
Convention; only those persecuted on any of the five universal grounds of persecution may 
do so. This excludes, for example, victims of civil war and economic or class persecution, 
which are also structurally based human rights violations, but are not enumerated in the 
Conventions.
The third crucial factor determining when an individual persecuted on universal 
grounds may receive asylum in another country is that the country of origin must be unable 
or unwilling to provide protection or “internal flight alternatives”. The essential combination 
of these three mutually qualifying features form the basic framework for defining who the 
persecuted are, and who of those are entitled to asylum, which states then institutionalise in 
various ways. This is intended to preclude large masses of persecuted individuals such as 
victims of random violence, while (ideally) accepting those individuals persecuted on 
Convention grounds who are most in need.
Some scholars have argued that the basis for refugee status and refugee law is 
essentially exclusionary -  its primary purpose is to limit, rather than to recognise, real 
refugees (Tuitt,1996). However, some arguments for limiting broader acceptance (or "open- 
door" policy) of persecuted individuals as refugees have been made in the name of 
persecuted peoples’ interests. Too general acceptance of refugees might encourage countries 
to get rid of unwanted people, while encouraging many groups to emigrate who would 
otherwise remain to challenge serious discrimination (see Zolberg et al,1989:21). As well, a 
refugee definition that does not regularly deny status to very large numbers could both 
jeopardise the possibility of their obtaining special consideration from the international 
community in times of crisis, and could undermine state authority (Zolberg et al,1989:22).
Thus refugee status has evolved along the fine line between universal and 
particularistic categories and concerns. Universalism won out through the Geneva 
Convention’s universal categories of persecution (race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
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social group), while the specification that the refugee's departure must be accompanied by 
individualised persecution or threat of persecution (at least against a section of the 
population with which the refugee identifies) individualises or particularises the refugee 
definition. The concepts and applications of state sovereignty and state responsibility may 
then be so combined to reinforce either humanitarian assistance or the right of states not to 
grant asylum. States were advised to balance their sovereignty and responsibility for 
persecuted individuals when, following instatement of the 1951 Convention, the UN 
recommended that “governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that 
they act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these refugees 
may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement” (Recommendation IV.D).
Thus while the majority of states recognise Conventions and Declarations of the 
UNHCR and face strong international pressures to act in good faith toward the Convention, 
the refugee definition leaves "ambiguities to be fleshed out in National law and state 
practice" (Plender,1989:63). There remains a lack of international consensus on the definition 
of "refugee" (Ibid,64). Most Western European and North American countries apply the 
UNHCR refugee definition as a basis for determination of eligibility, and then "subject the 
definition to qualifications to address regional problems" (Ibid,64), either limiting or 
expanding it. Furthermore the ambiguous meaning of "persecution" in international 
documents leaves states to interpret what amounts to persecution on the basis of any of the 
five Convention grounds or otherwise, on a case by case basis (except in mass intra-regional 
exoduses of people, for example in Africa), relying both on former case precedents and 
international Conventions and Declarations. Interpretations may broaden or tighten the 
application of the refugee definition.
It is important to note that in the process of delimiting the definition, various 
attitudes toward asylum seekers develop or are reflected. Rejected applicants may be 
considered either "illegitimate" refugees, or less worthy of need than other applicants. 
Conservative and neo-conservative approaches consider those asylum seekers who are 
refused entry to either (a) actually have available to them "internal flight alternatives" or 
mechanisms for redress from within the country of origin, (b) not be fleeing from 
persecution occurring on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social 
group, or (c) not be fleeing from violence or abuses actually amounting to human rights 
violations, or persecution. On the other hand, libertarians at the extreme end consider all 
refugees to be essentially “legitimate”, and thus advocate a more or less open-door policy, or 
only minimum requirements (such as no previous criminal activity) for immigrant and
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refugee eligibility. Taking a moderate approach, pragmatic liberalists interpret the 
determination process by explaining that modem nation-states are confronted with the 
difficulty of having to limit the number of in-coming refugees due to economic and 
geographic constraints, having therefore to set about the distasteful task of establishing 
selection criteria and attempting to prioritise in an equitable way some groups of people over 
others, according to perceived needs and alternatives. While seeing all refugees as 
"legitimate" and our understanding of refugee creating conditions forever incomplete as the 
terrain and nature of such problems shifts throughout history, this perspective accounts for 
the need for conceptual adaptability and for nation-states to develop distinctions between 
"more" and "less" legitimate refugees at any period in time.17
Recognition that individuals are often persecuted for reasons not identified in the 
Convention has led many states to grant asylum to individuals and groups in "refugee-like" 
situations. Sweden first introduced the category of "B status" or "de facto" refugees in the 
1960s, creating temporary ad hoc measures to cover refugees of social-political crisi without 
precedent in the Convention. "De facto" refugees are those who, although they fail to meet 
Convention criteria, do not wish to return to their country of origin because "of the political 
conditions there" (Plender,1989:67). Many countries and regional systems have followed 
Sweden’s example and created extra-convention categories.18 Canada, for example, allows 
entry to "non-statutory" refugees (verses "statutory" or Convention refugees) as "designated 
classes" of refugees, or on "Humanitarian and Compassionate" grounds (Immigration Act 
1976, 1993). The UNHCR also regularly recognises persons in "refugee-like" situations, 
extending aid to large masses of refugees in camps for reasons such as civil war and famine, 
which are not covered by the Convention but amount to serious human rights violations. 
The Organisation for African Unity is an exception, explicitly naming refugees of civil war 
and strife in its definition (OAU. Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, Article 1. 
1969). These extensions of the refugee definition share the recognition that persecution may 
occur for reasons not explicitly stated in the Convention, in countries unable or unwilling to 
provide protection from human rights violations.
Leeway to grant or with-hold asylum to women, as for all refugees, is guided 
generally by the inter-relation between asylum seekers’ and states’ rights, mediated by 
international law. Persecuted individuals’ rights to seek and reoewe asylum when their own
17 Parekh (1994) describes the three theories of immigration as “liberal”, “communitarian”, and 
“ethnic or nationalist”, on a scale from least to most conservative.
18 See Plender (1989) for documentation and comparison of national and regional systems regarding 
extra-convention categories.
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country fails to protea, is upheld in the International Declaration of Human Rights when 
claimants meet the refugee definition provided in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
The sovereignty of signatory states is upheld as states may interpret the concept of 
'persecution' to either widen or delimit eligibility for refugee status. For women these inter­
relations are further framed by the public/private lens of state interpretations, as we shall 
now see.
II. T h e  pu b l ic / priv ate  ba rrier  t o  state r e spo n sib il it y  f o r  w o m e n ’s
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERPRETATIONS OF PERSECUTION
According to Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all "rights and 
freedoms " contained therein apply equally or "without distinaion" to all people, including 
distinaions based on " sex":
Every one is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinaion of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Thus in theory, Article 14 (1) on the right of persecuted individuals "to seek and 
enjoy asylum", like all articles under that declaration, is inherently gender-equal. However, 
structural barriers against women seeking and enjoying asylum occurs at each of the three 
dimensions of the framework for refugee eligibility provided in the Convention refugee 
definition and as generally interpreted by states. These were discussed above as: well-founded 
fear of persecution, which is increasingly equated with forms of human rights violations 
generally; the structural basis for persecution; and lack of internal flight alternatives. At each 
of these dimensions, barriers to recognition of female-specific persecution arise.
E x c lu s io n  o f  fe m a le  f o r m s  o f  hum an r ig h ts  v io la t io n s
The requirement that claimants be fleeing persecution is left for states and asylum seekers to 
determine in ways that has traditionally excluded female-specific experiences or foams of 
human rights violations. Failure to apply equally the laws of asylum to women and men in 
accordance with Articles 2 and 14(1) stems from what international law specialists have 
observed as the gendered basis of international law and relations, which has its roots in the 
public/private divide (See Beasley and Thomas,1994; Cook,1994; Schenke 1996; Peterson 
and Runyan,1993; Sylvester,1994; Charlesworth 1991). Charlesworth (1991:614) observes:
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both the structures of international lawmaking and the content of the rules of 
international law privilege men; if women's interests are acknowledged at all, they are 
marginalized. International law is a thoroughly gendered system... [which] privileges the 
male world view and supports male dominance in the international legal order.
Despite Article 2, the Declaration of Human Rights has traditionally viewed human rights 
violations through a gender-male lens. This may originate in the fact that before the United 
Nations Charter, human rights violations were a matter of domestic jurisdiction (Riggs and 
Plano, 1988:240). The UN Charter represents the intent to "assert an international interest" 
in the human rights of individuals by formulating standards of conduct, encouraging 
compliance with standards, and condemning egregious examples of non-compliance” 
(Ibid,241). It includes the creation of international co-operation in "promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Ibid,241). But the state, as the basic cell or 
unit of the international system, is the underlying structure for interpretation of international 
human rights.
Human rights violations were later identified in the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights but the guidelines indicating when human rights violations amount to persecution are 
based loosely on the principle of state responsibility with its origin in "the demarcation of 
spheres between the state and the individual" in a "social contract" relationship, and within 
which nation-states are considered sovereign (Romany,1993:90). Subsequently, state 
responsibility for human rights protection has typically referred to the "public" realm of 
state governance. This is reflected in the UN Draft Code of State Responsibility which 
asserts that acts by individuals or a group not acting on behalf of the state are not considered 
acts of the state (see Romany 1993:111). Thus human rights are traditionally defined along 
underlying public/private demarcations inherent to statist discourse, which have long 
symbolised the separation between male and female experiences in society (Romany,1994).
It is in this context that interpretations of female-specific persecution must be 
understood. Human rights violations were traditionally considered violations perpetrated by 
the state or by actors of the state, as a necessary precondition for other states to take on the 
humanitarian responsibilities of accepting asylum seekers (see Rominay,1994:90). Cook 
(1994:21) explains that state responsibility in international law:
makes a state legally accountable for the breaches of international obligations that are 
attributable or imputable to the state. In other words, only a state and its agents can 
commit a human rights violation. Nonstate actors are not generally accountable under 
international human rights law, but the state may sometimes be held responsible for 
human rights violations.
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Human rights violations that are "attributable or imputable to the state" are 
considered "public", within the realm of state responsibility. This framework does not 
recognise the private sphere of citizens in their everyday life because it does not recognise 
linkages between the personal and the political which occur in the Tife world” of individuals. 
Many forms of violence against women have traditionally been considered "private" in 
nature, that is, committed by "non-state-actors" in the private sector and as such beyond the 
realm of state responsibility.
"Private" violence may be described as that which occurs either through or in the 
name of the traditional family structure where it supports and perpetuates the gender 
hierarchy at its most basic level. This hierarchy is reflected in gender-role relations of the 
'public' sphere of state and society. However the separation between public and private 
sectors is manifested "to different effects" in different societies, particularly when one 
compares Western to Eastern and Southern societies (Cook,1994:6). Charlesworth (1994) 
explains that "what is public in one society may be private in another", but that which is the 
women's domain is the one consistently devalued. This combination of public/private 
demarcation and differentiation in cultural manifestation of public/private creates special 
problems for the protection of women's human rights, both within and between states.
Within some states, condemnation of violence against women (public and private) has 
grown since the 19th Century, but particularly in the past three decades (see Dobash and 
Dobash,1992). Between states, female-specific violence has only recently become an issue of 
government attention.19 Ashworth (1986:3) describes the public/private demarcation as 
fostering a "false separation of ethics" between foreign and domestic policy, apparent in the 
historical fact that "no state has ever proposed sanctions, economic boycotts or war against 
another for its treatment of its female citizens". The demarcation still underlying the state 
and international relations has produced a tremendous gap between domestic policy and 
ideology regarding state responsibility for violence against women, versus state responsibility 
in foreign policy and international relations. States that have developed an infrastructure to 
act as intervening third parties to prevent or hand down punitive consequences, in their own 
countries, for violence against women formerly considered "private", have continued to treat 
violence as "private" and non-interferable when refugees have sought protection from 
female-specific forms of violence occurring abroad. Such violence was not considered 
persecution, or subsequently an inter-state responsibility. Refugee movement based on
19 The first international Convention to explicitly address public andprivate violence against women is 
the UN Declaration on the Eradication of All Forms of Violence Against Women, instated in 1995.
113
female-specific persecution brings domestic and foreign policy face to face, and must be 
battled out in refugee determination processes, jurisprudence creation, and refugee policy 
development.
Professor of Law Celina Romany (1993:87) explains women’s position in foreign and 
domestic policy, and the interface between them, as “alien”:
Women are the paradigmatic alien subjects of international law. To be an alien is to be 
an other, and outsider. Women are aliens within their states and aliens within an exclusive 
international club of states which constitutes international society.
Violence against women is demonstrative of "how human rights law has excluded 
women" (Friedman,1994:20). Bunch explains that violence against women is "the issue which 
most parallels a human rights paradigm and yet is excluded":
...it involves slavery, it involves situations of torture, it involves terrorism, it involves a 
whole series of things that the human rights community is already committed to 
[fighting, but which] have never been defined in terms of women's lives, (in 
Friedman,1994:20)
Until recently, non-governmental human rights organisations have also demonstrated 
a lack of attention to violence against women. Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights 
Watch (New York), attributes this gap largely to the origins of the movement in concerns 
with politically motivated abuse, in particular the classic "prisoner of conscience" who 
experiences abuse considered public or directly related to a state. Roth (1994) traces the 
evolution of the traditional human rights movement, demonstrating why domestic violence 
women experience has been neglected therein. He concludes that "although organisations 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have gradually expanded their 
mandates beyond the classic prisoner of conscience, the paradigm of a government seeking 
to still dissent remains powerful" while recognition of individuals persecuted because of 
social status, or of individuals whose human rights are violated by non-state actors, remains 
relatively neglected (Ibid,328). However, Roth also notes that "the broad language of the 
Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] clearly encompasses these governmental abuses [by 
non-state actors], and it has become increasingly accepted that they should be part of the 
international human rights mandate." (Ibid,328).
E x c lu s io n  o f  s tr u c tu r a l c a  u s e s  o f  fe m a le -sp e c ific  p e r se c u tio n
The public/ private framework has also underpinned female experiences of the structural 
basis of persecution. This occurs in two ways. (1) Interpretations of whether the persecution
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claimants flee occurs on one of the five Convention grounds typically exclude forms of 
human rights violations experienced by females in each of the five categories. (2) Sex itself as 
a structural basis of persecution is not included in the Convention grounds. For instance, the 
rape of women as a tactic of war (to destroy the ‘purity’ of a racial or ethnic group) could in 
theory be conceived as persecution on the grounds of nationality or social group, but 
traditionally has not. The view that rape (the form of persecution) is a ‘private’ rather than 
public or state matter has precluded consideration of the structural basis of the persecution. 
Similarly, persecution occurring due to structural status as females is precluded from 
consideration because relevant forms of human rights violations are not recognised as state 
responsibility and do not occur for the same reasons that men experience. Sex specific 
elements have generally been considered irrelevant to refugee claims. The Australia Law 
Reform Commission recommending guidelines which mimic those developed in Canada, 
quoted one example of a DORS officer dismissing gender dimensions of claims:
Now, you make two claims: one is on your rape and one is on your religion. The rape 
question is not a Convention-related issue, therefore we will not discuss that question. 
We will go straight into the religion question.20
In other cases, Hearing Officers have not merely dismissed elements of claims, but 
made statements judging female claimants’ cultural roles and responsibilities rather than look 
at political or other elements of persecution. In one widely publicised Canadian case, Hearing 
Officers concluded that the claimant should not have opposed the wishes of her father and 
authorities regarding appropriate dress for Saudi Arabian women. It did not consider the 
punishment that would be inflicted upon her for disrespecting the dress code (public lashing, 
stoning) because it was appropriate to her gender in the society in which she lived, and it did 
not consider her actions political (see Young,1994).
Female experiences of persecution are fleshed out in Chapter 9 in an analysis of 
claims. For present purposes, the public/private division underlying frameworks and status 
determination systems can be identified as a primary reason female experiences are excluded 
from state responsibilities.
Exclusion  o f  female experiences o f  pro tectio n :
As Canada’s Guidelines for Women Refugees Fearing Gender-Related Persecution now recognise, 
determination of whether ‘Internal Flight Alternatives’ are aualable are largely contingent 
upon the existence of appropriate documentation which has typically been lacking for
20 In OLAP,1994: Case study cited by Australia Law Reform Commission, NSW Submission 588. (69)
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women. However, documentation is irrelevant if determinations of whether IFA’s are 
necessary are considered culturally relative. States are free to interpret whether the right of a 
sending-country to withhold adequate protection from human rights violations is culturally 
relative. These elements can be described in greater detail as they affect female refugee 
claimants’ opportunities to make and prove the validity of their claims, taking as example the 
Canadian experience.
III . Ba rriers a n d  o p p o r t u n it ie s  f o r  claim -m a k in g  a n d  t h e  g r o w t h  o f
FEMALE JURISPRUDENCE IN CANADA
In Canada, "persecution" is not defined in the national Immigration Act but derives its 
meaning through case law and interpretations of former precedents (OLAP 1994). National 
case law, its development and application may be a vehicle through which new 
interpretations of persecution develop, setting precedents for other cases to draw upon. 
However, the growth of case law is shaped by the ideological and sociological background of 
national refugee determination processes. These are built upon the public/private 
demarcation and thus steeped in bias toward male claimants.
Barriers to recognition of female experiences of persecution occur not only in legal 
discourse and interpretations, but in how refugees are treated in refugee determination 
hearings, which have tended not to be suitable to women refugees’ needs. The latter gained 
recognition in Canada in the late 1980s. It became increasingly evident that women asylum 
seekers face various socio-economic and status determination disadvantages which policy 
and status determination processes were not designed to take into consideration. These 
disadvantages involve both claimants’ status as women in their home countries and the ways 
receiving-countries hear and judge claims. Three consequences have been identified: (1) 
women are prevented from emigrating independently and having their claims evaluated fairly; 
(2) a system that frames women’s dependency leads to abuses of sponsorship power and (3) 
prevents women from telling their own stories in receiving-countries and being heard 
through an appropriate gender-lens.
Regarding the first, the structural disadvantages women face occur in all entry 
categories. Boyd (1987, 1993, 1994) and others have shown that Canada's immigration and 
refugee system favours those who are or have been financially independent or have particular 
skills considered marketable, usually excluding the ‘unpaid’ labour and value of women’s 
traditional skills and contributions to society, while attempting to balance this through a high 
rate of admissions for family class/ sponsored relatives. Boyd showed how women refugees
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who are accepted into Canada overwhelmingly tend not to be allowed entry due to 
humanitarian reasons (referring to Convention refugees, Designated Classes, as well as those 
accepted on humanitarian grounds), but through landed immigrant classes, in particular the 
"family class" where they outnumber men by 50%. Women entering in this class are allowed 
entry primarily as "dependants" or sponsored family members, meaning that they do not in 
fact make claims of their own but rely on the claims of their spouses/ family members.
Regarding the second consequence of economic and status determination 
disadvantages, the sponsorship system can lead to abuses of power. This became a matter of 
increasing concern in the late 1980s. The National Clearinghouse on Family Violence 
produced a report in 1990 concerning women refugees who are battered based on a study of 
women’s shelters (MacLeod and Shin,1990). It identified abusive situations that may be 
created when women enter Canada as dependants whose sponsors have been or become 
abusive. Battered refugee women, as dependants, may feel locked into the abusive situation, 
without information as to their rights, and with fears of being deported if they leave the 
abusive relationship and abandon the sponsorship contract. As dependent refugees, they may 
be prohibited from making a new refugee claim because they are not allowed to enter new 
evidence in support of their claim, and because evidence not presented at the initial hearing 
may weigh against claimant credibility (see MacLeod and Shin, 1990; also Pope and 
Stairs,1990).
The third consequence is women’s silence and the lack o f hearing given to their 
experiences during determination processes. In the face of economic and status 
disadvantages, women refugee claimants still face “the burden of proof’. They must show 
“well-founded fear of persecution” according to the UN refugee definition. But more often 
than male claimants, females generally face a paucity of documentation upon which to find 
evidence regarding the occurrence of persecution, the well-foundedness of fear of such 
persecution (such as evidence of conditions for women and statistical data on the incidence 
of certain forms of violence in the country of origin), and the lack of state protection or 
internal flight alternatives. Problematic evidentiary matters also include the “particularised 
evidence rule”, for which claimants much show that persecution which is general in nature, 
i.e. affecting all women in a particular place and time, has affected them in particular (IRB 
Guidelines,1993).
The difficulties women face are also related to stress producing factors generally 
affecting both claimants and Hearings Officers. Karola Paul, Chief of Promotion of Refugee 
Law Unit of the UNHCR Division of International Protection, produced an influential
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report in 1992 observing the general and female-specific barriers in refugee hearings. 
Refugees may be in a psychological "state of emergency" in the first days after arrival in a 
foreign country, resulting in communication difficulties during the claim-making procedures. 
The claimant may be euphoric, "almost incoherent in communicating her joy at having 
escaped humiliation and persecution". Following initial euphoria, the claimant may be so 
depressed by uprooting from the country of origin and the traumatic events experienced that 
she becomes reserved and withdrawn and has difficulty producing information. These 
situations are particularly difficult when the persecution experienced is not commonly 
recognised and adjudicators do know not what type of information to look for (Paul 
1992:11).
Claimants also commonly lack understanding of the status determination hearing, in 
particular the condition "that they have to substantiate in the first hearing all measures of 
persecution that they mdkiduatty have been subjected to in order to avoid the credibility issues 
which can arise when new information is presented after the hearing" (Ibid, 12 emphasis 
added). Paul explains that "for refugees who come from cultures where the individual does 
not count as such but only as part of a collective, the individualised notion of persecution is 
hardly understandable" (Ibid,12). Claimants often describe in general terms the situation in 
the country of origin and "in terms of what has happened to her family, clan or tribe" rather 
than the persecution she herself experienced or is in danger of experiencing.
Claimants may not understand the questioning of refugee hearing officers, who seem 
to doubt well-known generalised persecution in the country of origin. Claimants may even 
consider the questioning to indicate that hearing officers are 'against' them, and may decide 
to be careful of what they say, becoming fearful and defensive or nervous and aggressive. 
Some refugees have experience that authorities do not accept dissonance, that their own 
opinions are not wanted by officers of rank. Attempts to retrieve precise and "to the point" 
information from claimants may be interpreted as an order not to speak or explain 
background further (Ibid, 13).
Females face particular difficulties presenting their claims because they often come 
from societies in which it is "uncommon that women speak in public i.e. outside the confines 
of their family collective. If a woman wishes to state something, a man from her family will 
represent her interests." (Ibid, 14). When represented by another individual, particularly a 
male, she will not have an opportunity to voice her experience of persecution and make an 
independent refugee claim. Unless adjudicators encourage female claimants to tell their own
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stoiy, women often remain silent. Former refugee hearing officers describe the presence of 
female claimants as being “in the background”, or as if they are not really there at all.21
When female claimants do have the opportunity to tell their stories, the hearing room 
environment has not traditionally been gender sensitive. For example, difficulty arises when 
female claimants come from societies that highly value a woman's sexual 'honour' as 
representative of the honour of her family. In such cases, as Paul explains, a woman:
...who admits during the hearing that she has been sexually mistreated or even raped 
during detention would normally have to take her own life in accordance with the 
traditions of her home country in order to restore the honour of her family... For a 
woman, the hearing itself therefore puts into question the norms and values to which 
she was accustomed in her country of origin. This fact will be aggravated if the hearing 
officer is a man. For Tamil women, for example, it is forbidden to be alone with a man 
in a closed room. (Paul,1992:14)
Loyalty to family and cultural values of honour may also inhibit a woman from 
divulging information about persecution perpetrated by kin (for example as punishment for 
transgressing social mores and sullying family honour, or in gender-specific traditions such as 
domestic violence, or ‘female circumcision’, also known as female genital mutilation).
Due to cultural inhibitions and lack of understanding of the hearing process, a 
woman may introduce vital information only as a last resort to avoid deportation. At that 
point, "added information" has low credibility and often still results in a negative decision:
...the tragic consequence is that many women who have suffered severe persecution do 
not obtain refugee status... What embitters these women most is that the shame is now 
out in the open but their 'sacrifice' was superfluous because it did not protect them from 
deportation or amtmuedpersecution. (Ibid, 15 emphasis added)
If rejected, persecution may in fact be heightened by the divulgence of information, 
considered as further betrayal of family honour, whether by family, extended family, or 
community members in the country of origin to which the claimant must return.
Stress producing factors also influence Hearings Officers’ abilities to make sound 
judgements. Paul (1992) sites factors such as emotional/psychological exhaustion from day 
to day hearing of traumatic events, which may increase the difficulty Hearings Officers 
experience in hearing claims equitably:
Research has established that members are thus at an increased risk of favouring 
undemanding asylum-seekers... The refugee hearing officer/member is engaged in a 
cultural confrontation where her own values might be silently questioned. This constant 
stress can lead to disgust and indifference (Ibid, 16).
21 Interview with refugee lawyer Cote.
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Other factors that may inhibit Hearing Officers’ gender-inclusiveness and recognition 
of experiences and circumstances particular to female refugees, are described by Liebich 
(1993) from the IRB Working Group on Refugee Women. These include the likelihood that 
Refugee hearing officers/members may lack understanding of the cultural background of 
claimants, and of how cultural values may inhibit the manner and type of information given 
by claimants. Traditional lack of gender sensitivity or awareness is only compounded by 
unfamiliar gender roles and practices of other cultures, and different forms of persecution 
women may experience therein.
All these barriers inhibit female claimants from making claims or verifying their 
merits (Turley, 1994). In Canada, until recently the body of jurisprudence accounting for 
women's experiences was small, and the meaning of persecution was derived from the 
experience of male claimants. The 1993 Guidelines on Women Refugees Fearing Gender-related 
Persecution explain:
The circumstances which give rise to women's fear of persecution are often unique to 
women. The existing bank of jurisprudence on the meaning of persecution is based on, 
for the most part, the experiences of male claimants. Aside from a few cases of rape, the 
definition has not been widely applied to female-specific experiences, such as 
infanticide, genital mutilation, bride-burning, forced marriage, domestic violence, forced 
abortion, or compulsory sterilisation (1993,para.7).
Instruments necessary to overcome these barriers have either not been well established or 
not readily available or accessible. However, the growing interest and research on violence 
against women across cultures and the increasing salience of the human rights movement 
challenges these obstacles, as the following chapter shows, offering more appropriate 
frameworks and necessary resources for women to make and prove their refugee claims.
C o n c l u s io n : A sylum  seekers Sym bolic  a n d  str a teg ic  c h a l l e n g e
We have reviewed the legal and administrative framework of asylum seeking, drawing on 
feminist readings of international law and of refugee determination processes, and revealing 
the role of asylum seekers themselves in interpretative processes that shape refugee eligibility. 
In theory, international documents counter-balance the rights and roles of asylum seekers 
and states in interpretative processes surrounding the meaning of persecution, which 
determine whether individuals will in fact be eligible to “enjoy” asylum once they have 
sought it.
The public/private demarcation in statist discourse informs international law, which 
in turn reinforces state interpretations of persecution and the extent of state sovereignty or
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responsibility for human rights violations giving rise to refugee flows. It thus also informs 
the rights of asylum seekers to seek asylum and the rights of states to grant or withhold 
asylum. We saw how interpretations of “persecution” may negatively affect female-specific 
claims that challenge the political symbolic demarcation between "public" and "private", 
foreign and domestic, as defining features of state responsibility.
Appropriate theoretical frameworks may help adjudicators hear claims involving 
female-specific persecution more equitably. But until such frameworks are established or 
institutionalised they may be fostered through claim-making and the ongoing growth of 
jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is a vehicle through which new interpretations of "hard law", or 
international instruments, can be developed and implemented. However, lack of relevant 
documentation alongside the public/private demarcation and inherent to status 
determination processes leads to predominantly male-based jurisprudence.
This vicious cycle exaggerates the ‘burden of proof’ placed upon claimants. On one 
hand it perpetuates the fundamental contradictions between externally imposed identities and 
actual experiences of asylum seekers by obstructing their credibility, and on the other hand 
may necessitate their greater action. These claimants must work harder to find alternative 
ways of proving the merits of their claims, including, as later chapters will show, using both 
institutional and extra-institutional recourses.
Considering the relatively wide berth states enjoy to either delimit or extend the 
Convention refugee definition, the significance of interpretations of "persecution" (essential 
in all refugee status determinations) which make states responsible for asylum seekers looms 
large. The dearth of well established theoretical and administrative frameworks and 
documentary evidence applicable to refugees of female-specific persecution in particular 
necessitates both theoretical revisioning ‘from above’ and practical developments ‘from 
below’, which the following chapters describe. On one hand, states must establish a 
framework for determining whether the experience of individuals seeking asylum -- whether 
falling within or outside the traditional five Convention grounds -  actually amounts to 
persecution invoking state responsibility which the sending-country has been unable or 
unwilling to assume. Equally important, asylum seekers must prove that their fears of 
persecution are well-founded, on both subjective and objective grounds. Both interpretative 
forces are essential, as well as mutually shaping and reinforcing. Development from below 
occurs through claim-making that confronts the political boundaries of state responsibility, as 
untraditional women refugees overcome symbolic and strategic disadvantages to foster the 
growth of case law. Such claimants face formidable structural barriers to “seeking and
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enjoying” asylum, thus becoming more than ever political actors who must seek strategic 
means to overcome constraints in receiving-countries.
It is suggested therefore that asylum seekers face and pose both symbolic and 
strategic challenges in interpretative processes within actual status determination processes. 
Despite structural barriers we can see a potential forum in which asylum seekers can bring to 
light the occurrence, forms and nature of female experiences of persecution. Interpretative 
processes involved in claim-making and the development of jurisprudence constitute a 
driving force behind the institutionalisation of untraditional definitions of persecution. In 
this the state is a vehicle for expanding interpretations of human rights, while interaction 
between national and international legal and moral norms facilitates claim-making that fuels 
the need for new interpretations.
The following chapters will consider how barriers were challenged such that female 
experiences were translated into existing structures and created new structures. We begin 
with the emergence of necessary political opportunities for asylum seekers in the inter-state 
system, illuminating the progressive evolution of three important trends up to 1992: changing 
world migration by females, the international evolution of policy recognition for those 
fleeing female-specific persecution, and the birth of the women’s human rights movement.
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5 . T h e  f e m in is a t io n  o f  m ig r a t io n , r e fu g e e  po lic y  a n d  h u m a n
RIGHTS DISCOURSES: STABLE AND CHANGING OPPORTUNITIES AND  
IDENTITIES, 1970-1992
As the preceding chapter has shown, reinterpreting “persecution” to include the female 
experience in ‘hard law’ (i.e. international and national law, conventions, treaties) refugee 
definitions involves interpretative processes at both theoretical and at practical levels. This is 
promoted in part through asylum seeking itself which draws international attention to the 
occurrence of human rights violations, and at times leads to the growth of case-law within 
nation-states. This chapter explores three international trends with significance for women’s 
opportunities to seek asylum from female-specific persecution and be recognised.
Section I describes dramatic changes in international migration trends by women 
globally, in the late twentieth century. This is no doubt linked to new needs to migrate, but it is 
also an indicator of their growing opportunities to migrate. And it creates opportunities for 
issues concerning women to come to light and be addressed in policy.
Section II analyses the evolution of recognition of female-specific persecution in ‘soft 
law’ discourses (policy recommendations, resolutions, guidelines and jurisprudence, 
government conferences) up to 1992, internationally and in Canada. I draw on primary 
documents in an original and comprehensive historical analysis, complemented by secondary 
sources. The discussion moves from discourses on women refugees’ situations generally to 
sex-specific persecution, showing how they reflect both progressive and stereotypical 
attitudes toward women in society. It discloses both increasing opportunities for the 
particular type of asylum seeker to be ‘state-recognised’ refugees, and the persistence of 
traditional stereotypes of women as primarily passive and vulnerable, being ‘symbols of the 
nation’ (Yuval-Davis and Anthias,1989) but also deprived basic citizenship rights. The 
Canadian jurisprudence and prevalence of refugee claims involving female-specific 
persecution up to 1992 are described as an example of these trends, drawing on IRB 
documentation and supplemented by interviews with lawyers.
Section III considers a final international trend with the potential to move policy 
discourses from cultural relativism and citizenship rights toward more universal rights 
discourses: the global human rights movement as adopted by women’s rights advocates.
The crux of the tension drawn out in this chapter, and also its fundamental force, is 
the absence of a commonly agreed and implemented framework of women’s citizenship 
rights both in sending and receiving countries. Faced with this condition, women have been 
what Rominay (1994) describes as “aliens” in their own states and aliens in international
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relations and receiving countries. Women have been seen as cultural symbols of nations and 
nationalities (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis,1997), while their lack of formal or 
substantive citizenship rights have been considered culturally relevant and used to deny them 
international protection. The evolution of refugee discourses in ‘soft law’ up to 1992 stops 
short of recognising underlying structural causes of persecution which emerging human 
rights discourses offered the potential to overcome. The rising potential for women to 
migrate and be recognised for female-specific forms of violence stopped at the rift that 
remained between these two bodies of discourse and theoiy, which campaigns leading to the 
instatement of the Guidelines would have to overcome.
The significance of ‘soft law’ discourses analysed in the second section can be read in 
a number of ways and a few comments are warranted here. Because of it’s non-binding 
nature, in contrast to legally binding ‘hard law’ of international declarations, conventions, 
treaties and law, the influence and significance of ‘soft law’ has been widely debated. Bimie 
and Boyle (1992) explain soft law as, “by its nature the articulation of a ‘norm’ in written 
form, which can include both legal and non-legal instruments; the necessary abstract norms 
in issues which have been agreed by states or in international organisations are thus reamkd in 
it, and this is its essential characteristic” (Ibid,27).
While potentially a disadvantage, the non-binding nature of soft law may be part of 
its fundamental strength. It enables “the incorporation of conflicting standards and goals” as 
new or innovative legal developments emerge, by providing “States with the room to 
manoeuvre in the making of claims and counterclaims” (Chinken, 1989:866). Although states 
may disregard it, soft law may reflect and strengthen international law-making trends and 
create expectations for state behaviour (Reisman, 1988:374). Ultimately soft law may indeed 
provide a foundation for the development of ‘hard law’. Thus the development and ways 
soft law discourses are framed, which this chapter traces regarding women refugees and 
female-specific persecution, is an important aspect of a larger developmental process, indeed 
an innovative or evolutionary process linking states and the inter-state system.
I. T h e  f e m in is a t io n  o f  m ig r a t io n
The “feminisation of migration” refers to “the increasing role in all regions and all types of
migration” which women have played in the late twentieth century (Castles and Miller,
1993:8). Castles and Miller observe this trend as one of four major international migration
trends characterising the modem world, including globalisation of migration, acceleration of
migration, and diversification of migration. They explain the dramatic nature of the
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feminisation of migration arising from the fact that women have been particularly affected by 
rapid changes arising from decolonisation, modernisation and uneven development. 
Subsequently, where men traditionally dominated numerically, women have been increasingly 
represented in labour migration as principle applicants rather than family class or dependants. 
The majority of the world’s refugees are women and children (approximately 80%), while 
some refugee movements have been predominately female, for instance refugees of the 
former Yugoslavia (UNHCR,1995). Looking specifically at refugees we see that moreover, 
the volume of refugees world-wide has increased dramatically. The UNHCR reported in 
1993 that the number of people seeking asylum continued to escalate in the 1990s, all over 
the world, including asylum applicants in industrialised countries. Asylum applications in 
Europe, North America, Australia and Japan rose from some 100,00 in 1983 to over 800,000, 
in 1992. The total number of applicants recorded between 1983 and 1992 was approximately 
3.7 million in these countries alone (UNHCR,1993). Today there are an estimated 22 million 
refugees or displaced people world-wide.
Increasing volume and dispersion of women, across entry categories “...raises new 
issues both for policy-makers and for those who study the migratory process" (Castles and 
Miller 1993:8). Castles and Miller do not look at what these issues may be, but briefly 
describe the significance of links between ethnicity, class and gender for the migration 
process and for ethnic community formation in host countries as it feeds into the migratory 
cycle, which migration studies have tended to overlook (Ibid,32). It is generally accepted that 
the feminisation trend in migration is integrally related to factors influencing the 
globalisation, acceleration, and differentiation of migration, and that the specific ways 
females are affected, their mobility and opportunities to be accepted in receiving- countries, 
are different from men in many respects. Most case studies of female migrants continue to 
focus either on settlement and adaptive processes, or the experiences and needs of refugee 
women in camps (see Fincher, Foster Giles and Preston,1994). Across these there is still a 
predominant focus on the role of female migrants in the family (see Morokvasic,1984). This 
reflects what indeed continues to be their highest category of concentration, the family class, 
and also as the majority of dependants in refugee classes in receiving-countries, in Canada 
(Boyd,1989) and most countries (UNHCR,1995). Immigration policy has played a large role 
in this concentration, as Boyd (1989,1993) and others have recognised, by not valuing 
women’s particular labour skills and not creating conditions suitable for hearing women’s 
refugee claims (UNHCR,1995; also see Chapter 4).
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But female migrants might not only strengthen migratory cycles already underway 
(through family and community roles). New policy considerations may be whether they may 
lead new cycles or migrate for reasons different from males. These possible aspects of the 
"feminisation of migration” have received little attention, particularly regarding refugees as 
we shall see below. The "feminisation of migration" is a loaded phrase requiring greater 
inquiry. It indicates not only a gender specific constituency, including the 75% of refugees 
who are women and children, but raises questions about traditional conceptions of 'root 
causes' of migratory movement and the responsibilities of both sending and receiving states.
Root causes of refugee flight have generally been assumed to be the same for women 
as for men: gross human rights violations, war and "natural" disaster. According to Migration 
Systems theory, receiving-countries play significant roles in precipitating refugee crises and all 
types of migration, as an effect of colonisation, military involvement, political links, the Cold 
War, and trade and investment. They are also integral in aiding refugees in camps in an 
equitable manner, as well as enabling or preventing refugees or other immigrants from 
receiving asylum in host countries (see Castles and Miller 1993). All of these may have 
particular implications for female refugees.
The feminisation of migration may also be considered, in part, an effect of 
practitioners’ and academics’ increasing recognition or discovery of female migrants and their 
needs. Thus we shall now examine the ‘feminisation’ of rejugee policy and ‘soft law’ 
discourses, tracing the issues and narrowing in on those that identify ra t causes of flight which 
are scmdoow differentjircm thoseaffedmgmen. Within these discourses we shall see both increasing 
opportunities for female migrants’ recognition, and the nature of continuing constraints.
II. G en ea lo g y  o f  discourses spec ify in g  fem a le  p e r s e c u t io n  in  ‘so ft  law ’
A. International  evolution : ‘invisibility’, ‘vulnerability an d  dev ia n ce’, a n d
‘sexual status’
Recognition of issues and root causes of persecution affecting female refugees occurred in 
roughly three contiguous and incomplete stages up to 1992 -  gender neutrality, gender 
difference and increasing gender inclusivity.
Under refugee policy and programs considered gender neutral, the concerns and needs 
of women refugees were largely overlooked and ‘invisible’ (Camus-Jacques 1989). In 1989 
refugee practitioner and academic Camus-Jacques explained:
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Refugee women encounter specific problems regarding protection, assistance, and 
participation in decision-making. The following remarks are unfortunately not based on 
statistical data, for the simple reason that such data on refugee women do not exist. In 
spite of the recognition that women and girls constitute most of the world’s refugee 
population, policy-makers and field-workers still do not have the proper information 
which would enable them to implement adequate protection and assistance for refugee 
women or to allow them a greater voice in decisions regarding their fives. (Camus- 
Jacques 1989:142).
Women refugees had been systematically overlooked in data collection and in policy 
and research on refugees, both those in camps and in receiving-countries (see Camus- 
Jacques,1989; Martin-Forbes 1992, Moser,1991; Newland,1991). They have also been 
overlooked in inland status determination systems and settlement programs (Boyd 1994). 
Finsher et al (1994) comprehensively review the literature on gender and immigration, 
concluding that women’s invisibility was an effect of “a taken-for-granted view that women 
are the appendages of either protective males or the patriarchal state” (Fincher et al 
1994:150).
Recognition of the concerns and needs of women refugees was precipitated by the 
illumination of the gender variable in the field of development, revealing that economic and 
welfare failure in development was in large part due to gender-bfindness in policies and 
programs. Concern subsequently also emerged regarding development needs of women and 
children in refugee camp situations, where the majority of refugees are located. With this 
virtually new attention to gender in refugee studies in the early 1980s (Buijs,1993), women 
refugees became known as ‘the forgotten majority’ (Camus-Jacques,1989). Like ‘gender- 
neutral’ third world development programs, refugee-related policies and programs had 
previously treated all refugees as male.
It was observed that alongside the same needs for physical protection, assistance and 
participation in decision-making and status determination as men, women also face particular 
risks. However as a continuing legacy of their “invisibility”, problems facing women refugees 
continued to be treated re-actively rather than pro-actively, their needs most often regarded 
as the gendered consequence of their ‘special vulnerability’ as females. Those women who 
were already refugees in transit, located in refugee camps, or facing cultural assimilation and 
role change difficulties in countries of asylum, were recognised as experiencing difficulties 
different from those faced by male refugees.22 Their sex was considered an indicator of the 
difficulties they faced, however these difficulties were not generally considered a result of 
relations between men and women in society.
22 These have been particularly well documented by Martin-Forbes (1992).
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Most ground-breaking was recognition of sexual violation as a factor of persecution, 
which first appeared in the work of Swedish researcher Connie DeNeef. Her study, carried 
out between 1978 and 1984, was the first of sexual violence against refugee women and its 
effect on status seeking, eligibility and determination processes. DeNeef identified four 
categories of persecution particular to refugee women, in which sexual violence "may have 
played a role in the flight from the country of origin in any variety of ways" (DeNeef, 1984:6- 
7). These lay the groundwork for international documents that later developed.
(1) Persecution based on a woman's political convictions, where the persecution is expressed 
through sexual violence. DeNeef notes: "Both for men and women in a number of countries 
sexual violence is an integral part of the methods of torture". This category recognises such 
torture in a gender inclusive, rather than "gender neutral" (traditionally male-based) manner. 
(2) Persecution o f a woman for "not carjbrrrmg to the cultural traditions in the country of origin which 
prescribe a certain behaviour for women". DeNeef describes an example of this type of 
violence to be the "decapitating or stoning women who have committed adultery in some 
Islamic countries". (3) Persecution o f women as both a strategic and symbolic act o f war, where 
persecution is manifested through "the threat of, or through actual sexual violence against 
women" as an expression of conflict (or way of deciding conflicts) between different political 
or religious groups. Sexual violence against women here can be a means to hurt an entire 
group and to reinforce the superiority of the one group over the other". (4) Persecution of 
impmtected women, for instance women "who have fled [their country] because of conditions of 
war or of a reign of terror", where the persecution is expressed through sexual violence 
because such women may be "exceptionally vulnerable" due to having been "deprived of the 
men's traditional protection and hav[ing] lost their status of wife."
These categories were ground breaking in that relations between refugees and 
violence particular to women had never before been identified explicitly. While the study did 
not explore women's motivations for seeking refugee status, it revealed the necessity for 
status determination systems to be aware of female-specific forms of persecution affecting 
asylum seekers, and of deterrents to women speaking about their experiences (particularly to 
male immigration officers), such as trauma and cultural taboos against speaking about sexual 
crime or punishment.
Several formulations of the type of persecution specific to women were subsequently 
proposed at regional and international levels in the early 1980's. These can be grouped into 
two categories: those specifying persecution on the grounds of “sex" or "sexual status" 
alongside the five traditional categories of persecution in the Convention; and those
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specifying persecution against women as a "particular social group", thus making use of an 
existing category rather than reopening the Convention.
Sex persecution
In 1980 the UN held a round-table discussion which was the first to introduce sexual 
violence and refugee women at the international level, discussing the special needs and risks 
facing refugee women due to their "special vulnerability as women". Two years later the 
European Parliament submitted a motion for a Resolution based on a report of DeNeef s 
research, requesting that the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees be 
re-opened for the first time since its instatement, "for the purpose of including the word 'sex' 
therein on the same basis as the words 'race, religion...'.” This motion was rejected, 
substantially revised, and passed a year later.
The original motion was significant not only for explicit recognition of ‘sex’ as a 
category, but because the detailed recognition of the nature of the violence against women 
calls attention to the inter-personal dimension, as opposed to the individual-state relation in 
which human rights abuses are traditionally said to occur. It identifies ‘extortion’, in which 
perpetrators may be state authorities or non-state actors, and ‘inhumane treatment’ resulting 
when women infringe the moral or ethical code (rather than legal) imposed on the social 
group to which they belong on the basis of cultural or religious traditions (Provision A). The 
motion also explicitly recognises that women’s cultural infringements “do not constitute 
offences or crimes under provisions of international criminal law or United Nations 
agreements” (Provision B). This removes blame from women who are persecuted and 
redirects attention to the persecutors. The recommendation suggests subordination and 
persecution or “inhuman treatment” of women occurs because of their status as women 
mthin society, and because those who subject them to such treatment “belong to the same 
social group” and are thus “[immune] from criminal proceedings” (Provision C). It finally 
notes the 1951 Convention “disregards persecution on the grounds of sex” (Provision D).
The European Parliament motion for a resolution was rejected, raising important 
debates which did not disappear, as controversy over subsequent recommendations shows.
Female-specific persecution within the 'social group' category
Recommendations that developed in lieu of the 1982 Motion emphasise the symptoms of 
sexual divisions in society, rather than their structural causes. A new motion was passed by 
the European Parliament on 13 April 1984, focusing on "sexual violence against refugee
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women" within camps or by soldiers, border officials, or other state-related authorities (as 
DeNeef s categories 1,3, and 4).23 This version abandoned the notion of re-opening the 1951 
Convention to introduce sex persecution. States were advised that they may recognise 
women as members of “a particular social group’ under the five existing Convention 
categories of persecution if they fear cruel or inhuman treatment for having transgressed the 
social customs of the society in which they live. This strategy was adopted by the Dutch 
Refugee Council (DRC) in policy recommendations that same year, and by the UNHCR 
Executive Committee in 1985, each with slightly different definitions.
The Dutch Refugee Council's 1984 policy directive on refugee women was the most 
far-reaching, stating:
...persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group, may also be taken 
to include persecution because of social position on the basis o f sex. This may be 
especially true in situations where discrimination against women in society, contrary to 
the rulings o f international law, has been institutionalised and where women who 
oppose this discrimination, or distance themselves from it, are faced with drastic 
sanctions, either from the authorities themselves, or from their social environment, 
where the authorities are unwilling or unable to offer protection. (Advisory Committee on 
Human Rights and Foreign Policy 1987).
Here the social group to which women may belong is defined by "social position on 
the basis of sex". The persecution they face may be a consequence simply of sex, particularly 
when institutionalised discrimination against women is opposed or when women seek to 
"distance themselves from it". The Dutch Refugee Council remained at the forefront of 
related policy discourses throughout the 1980’s, with the Dutch delegation acting as a prime 
mover as a member of the UN Executive Committee.24
Policy recommendations with the widest influence are those issued by the UNHCR, 
whose audience includes all states signatory to conventions and treaties relating to refugees. 
In April 1985, following the publication of DeNeef s research, the UN Sub-committee of the 
Whole on International Protection issued a report recognising that “there are situations in 
which refuge women face particular hazards due to the mere fact that they are women” 
(para.l). Its Note on Refugee Women and International Protection (EC/SCP/39, 8 July 
1985, 36th Session) recognised the danger of “violation of their physical integrity and safety” 
in camps or in transit, particularly the threat of sexual abuse, including sexual exploitation,
23 European Parliament, Resolution on the application of the 1951 Commtion Relating to the Status of Refuses, 
Report by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 1984, see p64-64.
24 See Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy (1987) for opinions of Dutch 
members supporting a social group interpretation, and objections of dissenting states.
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rape and prostitution, through extortion, brutality, and abduction (para.2and3). It recognised 
refugee women’s “right to equal treatment”, noting that neither the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol, nor the Statue of the Office of the UNHCR,
makes a distinction between male and female refugees, the basic assumption being that 
all refugees, irrespective of their sex, face the same problems and will be treated equally. 
In practice, however, the effects of the international refugee instruments and of 
humanitarian principles may be vitiated for some refugee women because the social 
conditions of women in a particular society may not permit their full impact to be felt. 
(para.4)
These limitations were observed to persist because of “prevailing attitudes” in bolh “countries 
of asylum and/or origin” (para. 5). Finally, it recommended that the UN follow the 
European Parliament resolution advocating use of the ‘social group’ category:
As regards women who face harsh and inhuman treatment because they are considered 
as having transgressed the social mores of their society, consideration should be given 
by States to interpreting the term ‘membership in a particular social group’, as 
mentioned in article 1 (A) (2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, to 
include women belonging to this category.
The Executive Committee did not accept this interpretation. States objected on two 
counts. First, the interpretation of social group was too broad and, they argued, could “lead 
to a wider interpretation of refugee status for others. This interpretation is, after all, based 
on ‘persecution’ due to the transgression of the certain social customs and not due to the 
status of the individual who does so”. Second, the interpretation represented a 
“condemnation of certain social customs” in certain states.25
These state responses demonstrate a clear demarcation between the position of 
women in society and the gender roles which they are expected to embody. Recognition of 
women’s greater protection needs due to a presumed inherent Vulnerability’, both as 
refugees and as women, had won out relatively easily because it corresponded with 
stereotypes of women as passive and requiring male protection, not necessarily because of 
their position in society as females but because of their nature as females and their 
heightened vulnerability as refugees. Negotiation over “transgressions of social mores”, on 
the other hand, was more protracted because it raised the question of whether the social 
mores themselves were persecutory toward women and based on their status in society.
The UNHCR Executive Committee resolved the problem of implicating states and 
cultures by passing a directive on Refugee Women and International Protection (36th session,
25 See Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, (Appendix 1): 1987.
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A/AC.96/671, 1985) recognising “that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to 
adopt the interpretation that women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment 
due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be 
considered as a ‘particular social group’... ”
Thus from the onset to the final form which the directive took, the UN’s position 
has been criticised both for going too far and for not going far enough. States’ objections of 
‘floodgate fear’ and cultural relativism remained while the directives fell short precisely 
because they reinforced state sovereignty to make use of them only if they wish. The 
provision appears in a sub-committee report which only advises, is not binding upon states, 
and is difficult to monitor.
It is also limiting in its categorisation of violence against women which may amount 
to persecution. First, the suggested interpretation of social group identifies deviance as the 
defining criteria of the cause of the persecution -  women who have “transgressed the social 
mores of the society in which they live” -  rather than seeing how social mores may reinforce 
the subordination of women in society, and indeed deviate from human rights standards. 
Social customs were not perceived as related to the ‘status of the individual’, but persecution 
could result from an individual deviating from social custom. The implication of this 
definition is that the transgressions are not inherently political (as defiance of social and 
political status), rather they betray apolitical custom, yet at the same time the persecuted 
individual is cast in a criminal light (transgressing codes rather than potentially fighting for 
their rights). Second, the Conclusion identifies only ‘public’ forms of female-specific 
persecution, meaning that a state must be directly implicated either through individuals acting 
in official capacity or representative of political or religious factions in a state, or individuals 
acting according to established law. The Conclusion failed to recognise private violence 
against women as inextricably linked to the public sphere, by reason of women’s social status.
However, like other UN documents the 1985 Conclusion is discursively significant at 
the international level. The UN Executive Committee reiterated its commitment to the 
Conclusion at its 39th session in 1988, issuing Conclusion No. 54, “Refugee Women” 
recognising both the “particular hazards, especially threats to [refugee womens’] physical 
safety and sexual exploitation”. A 1990 sub-committee Note On Refugee Women And 
International Protection (EC/CSP/59, 1990) called upon international documents for the 
civil, political, social and cultural rights of refugee women, embodied not only in refugee 
related documents, but in human rights instruments. It notes (para.8 and 9)in particular the 
1966 Human Rights Covenants, the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies on the Status of
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Women (1985), and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (1979). Article 1 of CEDAW states:
No distinction, exclusion or restriction must be made ‘on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil 
or any other field.’ (Article 1, CEDAW,1979)
These were important advancements for refugee women. Most importantly, the 
report recognises that “international protection of refugees also requires a human rights 
approach based upon equity, and refugee women should be informed about their rights as 
refugees and as women” (para.65,conclusion).
Moreover, reference is made to causes of persecution as “severe gender-based 
discrimination”, while no reference is made to transgression of social mores as prerequisite. 
“Severe discrimination”, the document goes on to say, “may justify the granting of refugee 
status” (para. 18), explicitly naming for the first time persecution based on gender, in a 
comment on the need for proper documentation:
... it is important that decision-makers involved in the refugee-status determination 
procedures have at their disposal background material and documentation describing 
the situation of women in countries of origin, particularly regarding gender-based 
persecution and its consequences.
However, gender-based persecution is not defined. Moreover, physical violence and 
discrimination are said to arise from circumstances common to refugees (male and female), 
and “not [from the] fact that they are subject to such violations of their rights” (1990 
para. 14). Human rights violations against women refugees are not associated with sexual 
status, rather their increased vulnerability as refugees and females. Paragraph 17 explicitly 
states international protection will not be readily extendible to all persecuted or at risk refugee 
women because “the universal refugee definition contained in the 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees does not include gender as one of the 
grounds for persecution which will lead to refugee status being granted.” The document goes 
on to stress forms of female-specific persecution resulting from increased vulnerability, 
reiterating Conclusion No. 39 (1985) on the social group category for persecuted women.
The 1991 UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, toward which
the above report had been geared, addressed issues of concern to refugee women generally,
including female violence or persecution as a symptom of the need for economic and
democratic development in the countries of origin. It reiterates the 1985 UN Resolution by
stating that women “fearing persecution or severe discrimination on the basis of their gender
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should be considered a- member of a social group for the purposes of determining refugee 
status. Others may be seen as having made a religious or political statement in transgressing 
the social norms of their society.” The “gender-based persecution” aspect is not noted but a 
move is made toward a more political interpretation.
These international developments had both their limitations and possibilities, as we 
have seen. Their influence upon states began to emerge by the late 1980s, as national 
jurisprudence began to develop. Leiss and Boesjes (1994) uncovered and compared policy 
and jurisprudence in the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK, describing the 
development of female-specific refugee jurisprudence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
list of jurisprudence is small (typically ten to twenty cases in each country) but not intended 
to be comprehensive. Nevertheless they uncover six common themes: persecution arising 
from or involving sexual violence, grave discrimination, guilt by association, women breaking 
norms and values of society, women carrying out odd jobs (i.e. for political causes), and 
political activism. These reflect well the international frameworks described above. Leiss and 
Boesjes deal only ‘summarily with Canada’ (as with Belgium), thus the following considers 
the nature and growth of jurisprudence or refugee claims involving female-specific 
persecution in Canada in the same time period.
B. CANADA: REFUGEE CLAIMS INVOLVING FEMALE-SPECIFIC PERSECUTION UP TO 1992 
Refugee cases involving female-specific persecution before 1993 are for obvious reasons 
difficult to trace. Previously there was no such category to be monitored, while cases 
involving female-specific persecution would most likely emphasise the aspect of their claims 
likely to be accepted, such as race or nationality. Moreover, aspects of claims that are 
considered irrelevant to the final decision are not usually recorded if a decision is positive.26 
However, women could in theory receive asylum through membership in a particular social 
group in accordance with the UNHCR’s 1985 Conclusion.
In 1987, the same year Canada adopted the UN resolution, precedent setting cases 
arose in which women were accorded Convention refugee status on the basis of “political 
opinion” in opposing Iranian laws governing dress [Shahabaldin, Modjgan v. M .E.I. (1987)]; and 
on the basis of belonging to a “particular social group” comprised of “single women living in 
a Moslem country without the protection of a male relative (father, brother, husband, son)” 
[Incirriyan, Zeyiyev. M .E.I. (1987)]. These cases reflect growing international recognition of
26 Adjudicators deciding cases maintain discretion as to how detailed their report will be, but 
generally negative decision receive lengthy reports, and positive decisions do not.
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the special vulnerability of women refugees and the harsh punishments they face for 
deviating from accepted gender roles in society.27 However cases decided primarily on 
gender-related grounds remained difficult to monitor and appear highly uncommon, possibly 
due to inconsistent or scarce use of the 1985 UN recommendation by adjudicators.
On the other hand, there is evidence concerning the prevalence of female-specific 
persecution as a reason for flight before 1993, even if not the primary reason or the formal 
reason recognised by adjudicators. This appears in the IRB 1992 survey of Women Refugee 
Claimants in Canada, which considers the top five sending countries between January 1990 
and September 1991. One of the "causes of flight" (as opposed to "types of persecution", i.e. 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, social group) identified was "female violence", 
which unfortunately remained largely undefined. However, female violence did seems to 
have included both public and private forms of violence against women since the survey was 
not concerned with fitting the forms of violence into convention categories but simply 
establishing if female violence had occurred as an important element of flight.
According to the findings, four percent of all female refugee claimants from the top 
five sending countries at that time stated 'female violence' as a reason for flight. This was at 
a time when claimants could not reasonably hope to be accepted on those grounds, and 
would therefore find it in their best interests to demonstrate other more conventional 
reasons for flight, namely the five persecution categories identified in the 1951 Convention. 
Notably, the report further comments on the difficulties of documenting such cases:
It should be noted that the incidence of female violence (including sexual assault, rape 
and forced abortion) is probably much greater than has been recognised here. 
According to a recent study, most women refugee claimants feel highly uncomfortable 
discussing such issues with officials involved in the refugee process. Many experience 
great shame and, due to family or cultural expectations, often choose to avoid the 
repercussions of disclosure (Saint Pierre 1990). Although only four percent of the 
women in this study admitted to female violence, this form of persecution ranked sixth 
out of a total of fourteen potential forms of persecution. (IRB,1992:7)
Thus refugees of female-specific persecution for the most part remained ‘hidden’ within the 
existing five categories of persecution, or sought alternative routes of entry into Canada.
It is evident that while international developments were important for female asylum 
seekers’ emerging national opportunities, other changes were necessary to encourage 
sensitisation, documentation and acceptance of claims involving female-specific persecution. 
To this purpose, a crucial global trend was the growing salience of ideas and legal norms
27 They also might reflect anti-Islamic sentiments in the 1980s, which could fuel greater acceptances 
from Islamic countries as a political statement from receiving to sending countries.
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concerning women’s human rights, and the internationalisation of conceptions of violence 
against women, which culminated in the early 1990s.
III. T h e  in t e r n a t io n a l is a t io n  o f  v io l e n c e  a g ainst  w o m e n : to w a rd  a
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
As we have seen, recognition of women refugees by the international community grew 
suddenly and rapidly in the 1980s and did encompass particular types of persecution women 
experience, although the debate was never quite settled as to the structural causes of these 
experiences. By the early 1990’s the stage was set for refugee women to be able to draw from 
the language of “women’s human rights”, which as Nahid Toubia, associate at the 
Population Council and the first female surgeon in Sudan observed, had been moving quickly 
into national and regional levels “at a pace that far exceeded that of any previous movement 
on behalf of women internationally” (in Friedman,1995:31). Ground-breaking work in 
several fields had broadened the definition of violence against women and ‘internationalised’ 
it, and a new literature was produced.
Conceptualisations of violence against women have been internationalised in two 
ways: both in practice or forms it takes, and in global causes of it. Emphasising the latter, the 
first recognition grew out of the negative female-specific effects of gender-blind development 
programs and policies (for example Beneria,1982; Sen and Grown, 1988). Soon to follow was 
research on gendered means and effects of other inter-state relations in the wake of 
globalisation: militarism and war (Enloe,1989); the rise of nationalism and fundamentalism 
(Yuval-Davis and Anthias,1989; Jayawardena,1986); and humanitarian aid and refugee policy 
(Moser,1991; Camus-Jacques, 1989; Martin-Forbes, 1991). Violence against women was in 
itself recognised as an obstacle to development mainly in the early 1990s (Carrillo,1992). 
These researchers were among the first to show how gender hierarchies pervade not only 
state but inter-state relations, perpetuating or promoting the violent subordination of women 
that occurs through gender inequality and gender-blind politics inherent to state, societal, and 
family structures. These currents underpin the patriarchal nature of international relations, as 
specialists in that field have subsequently pointed out (Grant, 1991; Peterson and 
Runyan,1993; Sylvester 1994; Grant and Newland, 1991).
This interdisciplinary literature describes structural processes and foundations 
shaping how states have long inter-related in ways that reinforce and often exacerbate their 
inherent gender-biases, while virtually ignoring these gendered processes and consequences 
and state responsibilities for them. Violence against women must be understood as having
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root causes not only within specific cultures and contexts, but within the superstructure of 
interstate relations (Peterson and Runyan,1993). The internationalisation of violence against 
women thus can be seen linked to the growth of a global market and international 
community, the globalisation of information and other technologies, development, 
colonialism and the subsequent rise of anti-colonialism, nationalism and militarism, as many 
specialists have noted (See Giles,1996; Grant and Newland,1991; Sylvester,1994; Peterson 
and Sisson-Runyan,1993), manifested for example in the international sex trade, child 
prostitution and ‘mail-order’ brides, rape in war, and severe gender discrimination in 
fundamentalist regimes. This has been explained in various ways, but Kandiyoti (1990) 
observes in a review of the discourses that different perspectives on women and nationhood 
in post-colonialism share “a recognition that the integration of women into modem 
‘nationhood’, epitomised by citizenship in a sovereign nation-state, somehow follows a 
different trajectory from that of men.” This trajectory is one which, alongside other effects, 
may create or amplify forms of violent subordination of females. However, it also may bring 
new sense of state and indeed inter-state responsibilities for gender inequality.
A crucial dimension of the growing literature on violence against women was the 
novel international perspective arising from local grassroots women’s endeavours in 
developing countries, and multicultural projects by ethnic minorities in advanced 
industrialised countries (Schuler,1992). In 1990 Isis International produced a survey of 
documentation on violence against women during the 1980’s, identifying over 650 entries 
from around the world, 350 coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. In countries like 
Canada, the United States and Britain, women’s movements became increasingly 
multicultural in all sorts of ways (see Schuler,1992). They described different experiences of 
violence women of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds experience, exacerbated by 
discrimination in accessing resources, protection and rights within majority cultures. Schuler 
(1992:5) explains:
the discovery of gender violence... took different paths in different parts of the world”, 
but “In general, it emerged in the context of activism and research on issues related to 
the social status of women and their right to participation... [I]n Europe and North 
America [it] coincided with the early stages of feminist theory development. In other 
parts of the world the convergence of development, human rights, and feminist praxis 
produced the framework for discovering the nature, forms, extent and pernicious effects 
of violence against women.
Increasingly, women in different countries also began working together, broadening 
conceptualisations of violence against women, and types of redress: “coalitions and networks 
based in Europe and North America tended to be more specialised -  concentrating on one
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form of violence such as rape -  than those in the Third World where groups often coalesced 
to work on a variety of issues simultaneously” (Schuler,1992:5). Merging definitions, the Asia 
Pacific forum on Women, Law and Development describes “gender violence” in a way that 
can be applied to the divergence between male and female experiences of globalisation: “any 
act involving the use of force or coercion with an intent of perpetuating/ promoting 
hierarchical gender relations” (APFWLD in Schuler, 1992). The Canadian Advisory Council 
on the Status of Women provides an equally broad definition: “Violence against women is a 
multifaceted problem which encompasses physical, sexual, psychological, and economic 
violations of women and which is integrally linked to the social/economic/political 
structures, values, and policies that silence women in our society, support gender based 
discrimination, and maintain women’s inequality” (CACSW,1991).
Violence against women made it onto the agenda of the 1985 Nairobi Conference 
largely at the prodding of non-governmental organisations, “although not yet on the same 
scale as other development issues” (Schuler,1992:4). That year the UN General Assembly 
passed its first resolution recognising the significance of violence in the home and the need 
for “concerted and multi-disciplinary action” (Res. 40/36 of 29 Nov. 1985).
In 1991 an Expert Group Meeting on Violence Against Women reported to the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women and the Economic and Social Council, proposing a 
Draft Declaration on Violence Against Women. In it they affirmed “that violence against women is 
a violation of human rights”, and recognised “that violence against women is also a 
manifestation of historically unequal power relations, which have led to the domination over 
and discrimination against women and the prevention of their full advancement”. Violence 
against women was recognised as an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development 
and peace. The report called for a more expansive definition of violence against women and 
women’s rights by the UN, and a clear commitment in the international community to the 
eradication of violence against women (EGM/VAW/1991/1). This was one of the earliest 
reports to use a “women’s human rights” argument over non-discrimination.
The newest dimension of the literature is that on “Women’s Human Rights” based 
primarily in international law. It can be described as an outgrowth of the above 
developments. It goes beyond recognition of violence against women in all its forms in 
different countries and propagated through various means at the inter-state level, to look at 
explicitly how and why it is maintained through the underlying legal structure of states in an 
inter-state system. Romany (1993) explains that by relegating state responsibility to spheres 
of social life considered “public”, the legal structure succeeded in casting “women as aliens”
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within their own countries, lacking basic citizenship rights and protections in social spheres 
considered “private”. Thus state interpretations and applications of international human 
rights law have generally been part of the system that supports underlying causes of violence 
against women. Women’s human rights certainly would not be protected nationally if women 
did not enjoy basic citizenship rights, nor would they receive international protection for 
violence considered ‘private’ and beyond state responsibility. We saw in the previous chapter 
how this was manifested in refugee law. If amended, receiving-countries should not simply 
‘respond’ to female-specific human rights violations causing refugee flight, but address the 
overarching system that supports causes and prevents redress of such violence.
In North America, a body of literature in International Law and human rights began 
to emerge alongside several international migration studies in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, 
relating specifically to violence against women and refugee status (Bonnerjea,1985; Heise 
1989; Pope and Stairs,1990; Greatbatch,1989; Indra,1987). Like intergovernmental 
documents described in Section II, these articles based their arguments primarily on equality 
and non-discrimination doctrines, considering in particular sexual violence against refugee 
women in camps, and sometimes women in their home countries. However in North 
America important articles focused on abuses occurring at the intersection between domestic 
violence and the refugee sponsorship system (Pope and Stairs,1990; see also Chapter 4). This 
opened the question of whether human rights abuses of immigrant women are also fostered 
within receiving-countries through gender-biased refugee systems.
On the other hand, early intergovernmental documents reviewed earlier lacked a solid 
human rights theoretical framework, and concentrated on stereotypical images of women as 
passive and vulnerable rather than situating their persecution within a political social 
structural context. They also lacked concentrated “grassroots” political action. These were 
aspects that the women’s human rights movement had access to, creating the potential for 
further expansion in refugee policy discourses.
Co n c l u s io n : A sylums se e k in g  a n d  t h e  o p p o r t u n it y -id e n t it y  c o n f l ic t
We have seen the progression and persisting stereotypes of women in policy discourses on 
female refugees in relation to changing migration trends by women, and considered the 
emerging potential of the women’s human rights literature.
From the onset, invisibility and depoliticisation of women refugees’ experiences was
eminent. Not surprisingly, the most readily accepted image of persecuted refugee women
was ‘vulnerability’. This went hand in hand with recognition of sexual violence, particularly
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against women who had lost their traditional status as wife’. A shift also occurred toward 
viewing female-specific persecution as the result of women's "deviance", suggesting that their 
actions were not political but criminal, in their societies. It implied that a woman had to act 
out in order to be persecuted (not be persecuted for following expected roles), while 
transforming the political nature of flight into voluntary, irrational or indeed criminal actions 
from the point of view of the persecutors. Finally, with the exception of the European 
Parliament’s 1982 Motion for a Resolution, policy recommendations up to 1992 tended to 
focus on forms of violence against women considered 'public', thus excluding violence by 
non-state actors. Conclusions and Recommendations concentrated on images of women as 
vulnerable, passive, and deviant. These themes have their rightful place in categorisations of 
female-specific persecution. But when elaborating upon the particular scenarios in which 
such persecution occurs, they fail to get to the root of the persecution.
The overarching conflict which emerges is between: (a) The non-political nature of 
women, both as females and as refugees; for example, violence as a factor of women’s 
vulnerability as females or due to the loss of traditional male protection, (b) The political 
nature of women's flight as refugees as the result of “deviance” or “transgression” of cultural 
mores of society. This conflict is one endemic to women’s position in modern 
transformations of society. Feminist writers on race and ethnicity and on international 
relations have remarked that as the cornerstone of many ideologies of national identity, 
women often find their rights as citizens defined by their female-specific role as cultural 
markers, such that their needs and identities are equated with those of the nation and culture 
in which they live (Yuval-Davis and Anthias,1989). Often highly praised as "mothers of the 
nation", their guarded rights become a catch-22 hinging on both national and gender 
stereotypes, which may fragment the basic principles of universal human rights. This is no 
less true for women seeking asylum in a foreign country, where they have long been 
perceived as symbols of cultural continuity, bringing with them categorical belief systems, 
values and culture specific traditions and social structures.
Refugee creating factors in the global system have increasingly thrown women into 
positions where they increasingly seek asylum, have increasing opportunities for their needs 
to be recognised, but still face stereotypes both in sending and receiving countries. The latter 
prevents recognition of causes of refugee movement different for females because of their 
sex or sexual status. Human rights discourses provide a logical vehicle for such recognition, 
to evoke state responsibility beyond the immediate citizemy and beyond culturally relativist 
conceptions of women’s rights as citizens of other countries.
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The refugee policy discourses and the human rights literature discussed here were 
important stepping stones for Canada’s Guidelines for Women Refugees Fearing Gender-related 
Persecution, instated in March 1993, and also for other important developments in state 
responsibilities for women's human rights the same year. In June 1993 the fourth World 
Conference on Human Rights took place which was the first ever to address women's human 
rights. That year the United Nations accepted the draft Declaration on the Eradication of All 
Forms of Violence Against Women (December 1993; ratified in 1995), and for the first time 
appointed a special UN Rapporteur on Violence against Women.
Canada’s Guidelines must be understood, like each of these developments, as part 
and parcel of a global Women’s Human Rights Movement gathering strength since the late 
1980’s. But the Guidelines and their advocates also directly contributed to the movement. At 
these and other international gatherings IRB Chairperson Mawani promoted the Guidelines 
as a strong example of a women’s human rights protection mechanism. In fact, the 
Guidelines may be described as an early attempt “to move beyond mere visibility for 
women’s human rights to actual accountability for abuse”, a challenge women’s human rights 
advocates observe must still be faced by the movement generally (Friedman, 1995:31). They 
build upon, transcend and institutionalise earlier frameworks and typologies of female- 
specific persecution, bringing together the strands of feminist theorising and research 
described above and making them actionable. They reinterpret international human rights 
and refugee law and apply it to national refugee policy with direct effects for persecuted 
women. They also incited a surge of work on women’s human rights, state responsibility, and 
more specifically, female-specific persecution between 1992 and 1996 (for example Beasley & 
Thomas,1994; Romany,1993,1994; Cook,1994; Peters and Wolper,1995).
Concluding Part I of the thesis, we have seen the international structural context and 
some of its links specifically to Canada, which were important for the growth of the 
particular asylum seeking trend and its recognition in policy. The asylum seeking system and 
trends illustrated were also described as essential for stimulating and enabling activism ‘from 
below’ on the part of asylum seekers themselves. Part II of the thesis will now look closely at 
just how policy developments in Canada came about, in particular the dynamics of 
govemment-nongovemment interaction and the role of asylum seekers therein.
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Part  II.
CHALLENGING REFUGEE POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING IN CANADA: 
EVOLUTION, PROCESS AND IMPACT OF CLAIM-MAKING AND 
CAMPAIGNING
6 . T h e  C a n a d ia n  c o n t e x t : e m e r g in g  r e s o u r c e s , r ig h t s  a n d  
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN  THE 1980S
We have seen the inter-state structural context of law, asylum seeking, policy development, 
ideas and political discourses. We now need a picture of the Canadian structural context and 
emerging opportunities for asylum seekers, which this chapter provides. This sets the 
context, reveals the emergence of number of avenues for institutional and extra-institutional 
actions by asylum seekers, and introduces the main participants in a core advocacy network.
Section I provides a brief historical background on Canadian refugee policy and 
policy-making, followed by an examination of significant changes in the 1980s. Emerging 
opportunities with both direct and indirect effects upon asylum seekers are described. The 
former included the growth of new institutional rights, resources and political access 
specifically for refugees and refugee women. The latter included increasing structural 
vulnerability of Canada’s political climate and refugee regime, and rising organisational 
strength and interest of nongovernment advocates. Together these trends helped shape 
imperatives, opportunities and perceived potential for successful influence in refugee policy, 
a typically a ‘high risk’ area (Dirks,1995).1 We see that despite increasingly restrictive 
immigration practices in the 1980s, a number of key political and organisational 
opportunities emerged that framed asylum seekers’ and supporters’ abilities to challenge 
refugee policy, both separately and together in new working relationships. Section II presents 
consequences for asylum seekers in the study who went public, describing important 
characteristics they shared. The ways these opportunities were used by asylum seekers and 
supporters is explored in chapters 7 through 9.
I. G r o w t h  o f  a sy lu m  seek ers*  r e s o u r c e s ,  a c c e s s  a n d  r i g h t s
A. POLICY-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION: GROWTH OF CORE NGOS IN THE
ADVOCACY NETWORK IN THE 1980S
Jurisdiction over migration is one policy area beside agriculture in which federal-provincial
authority has been shared since Confederation in 1867.2 Unlike the United States and
Australia, Canada has never had a Federal organisational base devoted exclusively to
immigration and refugee matters. Immigration has been combined with other policy and
1 Edelman (1971) refers to signs and signals that the establishment may be vulnerable to influence, 
and the timely convergence of ideas and opportunities for their transformation into strategies, as 
‘social cueings’. Similarly, McAdam (1982) descirbes social cueings in relation to ‘expanding political 
opportunities’ for potential actors’ mobilisation.
2 Section 95, British North America Act, now the Constitution Act, 1867
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administration areas, primarily expressing security or labour priorities (Hardcastle,1994:106). 
The Federal government has also been hesitant to raise debates, make legislative changes, 
and commit itself to a long-term vision. It avoided contentious issues in parliamentary 
debates over proposed legislation by using ‘orders in council’ to modify immigration 
regulations and procedures (Dirks, 1995).
Provincial interest in migration authority grew markedly in the 1970s 
(Simeon,1987:265-267) as immigration became a tool for protecting regional and language 
rights. Provinces began contributing to immigrant selection and target levels and shaping and 
managing settlement programs (Dirks,1995:98). Section 7 of the 1976 Immigration Act 
finally formalised inter-govemmental authority by requiring the Immigration Minister to 
actively consult with provinces as well as nongovernment organisations to determine annual 
immigration levels (see Boyd and Taylor 1990:37). Settlement services were to be provided 
“by promoting co-operation between the Government of Canada and other levels of 
government and non-governmental agencies in Canada.” (3(d) Immigration Act 1976).
Although the real extent of voluntary sector influence upon refugee policy-making 
has not been ascertained,3 it is well recognised that voluntary sector humanitarian interest in 
immigrant and refugee matters has long been a significant dimension of Canada’s refugee 
regime, and has become fundamental in the provision of services (Hawkins, 1971; 
Ruddick,1994). NGOs’ formal involvement in immigration consultations, representing the 
interests and needs of immigrants and refugees regarding entry levels, composition and social 
services during and after status determination, reflects this history. It also indicates the 
increasing number, types of involvement, and issue interests of ethnic organisations, 
immigrant and refugee advocacy groups, and other humanitarian groups (Hawkins, 1971; 
Chapman,1994; Ruddick,1994).
Unlike federal and provincial governments, NGOs have always struggled for greater 
involvement, legitimacy and authority in international migration matters. In the immediate 
post-war years church involvement was institutionalised in overseas activities including 
screening and selecting refugees (Hawkins,1972:303). Federal government financed their 
activities until the early 1950s, but support tapered off as government began institutionalising 
its own professional system of management (Dirks,1995:101). In particular, government no 
longer wanted nongovernment agencies to handle the selection of immigrants and refugees 
abroad. By 1960 voluntary organisations were strongly redirected toward family reunion and 
inland resettlement operations. A labyrinth of inland services for immigrants and refugees
3 NGO participation in Immigration Consultations is regarded both as significant to democratic 
processes of policy-making, and an effective mechanism for government to manage opposition, 
providing a forum for NGO cooperation without actual decision-making power.
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developed, but with little guidance in relation to the federal government's immigration 
program and with little inter-organisational structure. This contrasts markedly with the 
experience of the United States and Australia which early on boasted large associations as co­
ordinating bodies and forums for exchanging ideas and information for voluntary activity, 
with good working relationships with government (Hawkins 1972:304).
Against this background we can see that remarkable changes occurred in the 1980s 
which fostered both greater advocacy power and inclusion in consultative style policy- 
making for NGOs. The 1980s brought increasing co-ordination between NGOs and 
government in service provision (entry, advocacy and settlement services). This was in part 
an effect of dramatic changes in international migration coinciding with economic downturn 
and restructuring of economies. Government downloaded more service provision to private 
and voluntary sectors in order to cope with these tremendous changes. A proliferation of 
NGO activity occurred in the international migration sector like other voluntary sector areas 
(see Chapman 1994; Ruddick 1994), however under incredibly sharp increases in demand 
arising from skyrocketing international migration levels. Thus both government departments 
and services, and NGO services grew, bringing new relations with government, in policy­
making and implementation, status determination and settlement issues (Dirks,1995:102). By 
the 1990’s government was boasting NGOs as an integral part of its immigration and refugee 
regime. Government services and investments continued to expand, including the 
development of ‘arms-length’ government or semi-government organisations. Some 
organisations, primarily nonsecular, were created or remained independent of government 
funding. To co-ordinate this growth, secular and non-secular umbrella groups emerged.
With the growth of international migration NGOs that occurred in this period, the 
sector as a whole became increasingly fertile, involving professionals and highly articulate 
activists sceptical of government but able to move government funding to their advantage 
and have a strong voice in politics and policy. They have been increasingly regarded with a 
high degree of legitimacy. As Hardcastle et al (1994:117) observes, Canada’s humanitarian 
NGOs “have played a role disproportionate to their size”. This is in no small part due to the 
energy and capabilities their membership.
It contributed to what Adelman et al (1994) have described as a refugee policy­
making situation in Canada characterised by “the tension between two embedded dynamics: 
a ‘nation-building statism’, involving the management of policy by governmental elites 
according to an agenda which legitimates state action and promotes national goals, and a 
‘pluralistic’ social and political structure which enables particular social pressures to bear on 
the process” (Adelman et al,1994:121). On the side of “interests” they observe the influence 
of political parties, organised labour, business, ethnic minorities, humanitarian interests,
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environmental interests, ethnocentric anti-immigration groups, and public opinion. Refugee 
policy-making has become increasingly vulnerable to pluralist intrusions since the late 1970s.
These changes affected core constituents of the advocacy network studied, made up 
of traditional refugee/humanitarian groups and women’s organisations. The former included 
the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development (ICHRDD), Refugee Action Montreal (RAM), and Table de 
Concertation des Organismes de Montreal au service des Refugies (TCMR). Women’s 
groups included the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), National 
Organisation of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada (NOIVMW), three 
women’s shelters catering to immigrant and multi-cultural women -  Flora Tristan, Women’s 
Aid and Multi-Femmes, as well as one mainstream women’s shelter, Auberge Transition.
All of these organisations experienced three important trends in the 1980s: (1) 
growth and institutionalisation; (2) the bridging or integration of international migration and 
women’s issues in their organisational mandate; and (3) the development and diversification 
of their political status and advocacy strategies in the increasingly ‘mixed’ economy of 
welfare. The group of organisations also represent a wide range of types of service 
organisations, from front-line service, to umbrella groups for advocacy, education and 
research. They operate at a number of levels, from local/community, to provincial, national, 
international. They have a wide range of funding relationships to government -  complete, 
partial, none -  as well as political access to government (high, medium, low). They include 
the most prominent, largest and most influential national and/or umbrella groups on human 
rights, refugee issues, women’s issues and immigrant women’s issues. These basic 
characteristics of core organisations are presented in Appendix C, which also describes NGO 
characteristics discussed in following chapter.4
The characteristics and capacities these organisations developed in the 1980s set 
important organisational foundations, interests, and strategic frameworks for future 
advocacy. They developed the resources, interests and abilities to successfully mobilise and 
organise, while also contributing to the growth of a new issue-niche combining refugee with 
women’s issues and organisations. They also developed and expanded specific skills and 
forms of influence in advocacy situations.5
4 With the exception of Amnesty International whose development followed international trends
5 Characteristics and development of these organisations described in annual reports (ICHRDD 
93/94; TCMR 94/95), special reports and unpublished organisational documents (RAM, CCR, Flora 
Tristan), and interviews with representatives of all the organisations (Appendix A). Detailed historical 
and organisational overviews of NAC are provided by Vickers and Appelle (1993), for other 
organisations by Schreader (1990) and Agnew (1996).
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B. REFUGEE POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION: INCREASING EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
PRESSURES ON THE STATE
B.l Historical background
Although Canada ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, it was 
not until 1976 that refugees began enjoying statutory recognition. Refugees and those in 
"refugee-like" situations were previously admitted into Canada through ad hoc provisions or 
Orders in Council which "suspended normal immigration regulations and routines and 
permitted relaxed criteria for screening and processing to be substituted" (Dirks,1995:61).
By the 1970s, a changing immigrant and refugee constituency and volume brought 
mounting pressures and a radical reassessment of policy. International migrants increasingly 
arrived from less developed countries, and illegal migration with which the government was 
ill-prepared to deal steadily rose. The 1976 Immigration Act stressed educational and 
employment preference over racial determinants as the major criterion for status 
determination in order to address Canada's need for economic growth (Hawkins,1971:52). 
Three classes of migrants were identified: independent immigrants, family class, and refugees. 
Most controversial was perhaps the statutory recognition of refugees, both Convention and 
extra-Convention (Designated Classes) refugees, and the establishment of status 
determination procedures for inland refugee claimants -  asylum seekers.
Like other countries adhering to UN conventions on refugees, previously Canada 
was not greatly concerned with asylum seekers claiming refugee status from within Canada or 
at its borders. Unlike refugees resettled from overseas, asylum seekers do not first undergo 
screening and selection processes by overseas officials, and thus often lack travel documents 
and generally raise very different management issues, needs and rights. Regularising 
acceptance of such refugees changed Canada’s refugee regime from a ‘resettlement from 
abroad’ oriented system to a “country of first asylum”, subsequently opening Canada to a 
much larger pool of potential refugees (Dirks,1995).
However the Act was weak in defining long-term objectives for Canada, and by the 
early 1980’s its operational structures were already proving cumbersome, particularly in the 
area of refugee determinations. Canada was experiencing a tremendous increase in refugee 
claims, for which it was ill prepared to deal.
B.2 Canada’s refugee crisis
Since the 1970s, the annual number of inland refugee claims had grown at a remarkable rate. 
In 1976 approximately 600 inland refugee claims were made. Of these, 25% were found to 
be invalid, 15% were allowed entry on Humanitarian & Compassionate grounds, and the 
remainder entered as Convention refugees (see Dirks: 1995:77). In 1986 there were 18,280
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inland claims made, and in the next three months alone more than 10,000. These thousands 
of inland claimants were further confronted with “a cumbersome, multi-step process” 
including appeals that could provoke long delays (Knowles,1992:173). By May 1986 there 
were 23,000 backlogged claims awaiting determination (see,Malarek 1987:104). Just three 
years later that number reached nearly 50,000.
While Canada’s refugee crisis did not reach the proportions European countries 
faced, it became hugely unmanageable and ushered in a period of public panic, controversy 
and conflict between government and NGOs. The Conservative government was unable to 
find adequate long-term solutions, issuing instead a confusing blend of responses with both 
disadvantages and advantages for asylum seekers, as we shall see later. First, it is important 
that this weakness coincided with a turbulent domestic political climate generally, setting the 
stage for the emergence of important new rights, resources, and collective interests for 
asylum seekers.
B.3 Canada’s identity-crisis and structural vulnerability
The domestic socio-political climate of the 1980s and early 1990s has been described as one 
of turmoil unlike others in Canada. During this period Canadians exhibited what has been 
described as a dramatic “decline of deference” (Nevitte,1996), a reallocation of authority 
(Roseneau,1992) or shift from “a devotion to authority to cynicism and self-assertiveness” 
(Flanagan,1987:403-43), quite unlike the high degree of trust and co-operation traditionally
Individual and group rights, and Canadian identity itself, were hotly contested. 
Conflict over French/English citizenship rights within Canada became complicated by 
increasingly organised non-regional and non-language interests, such as First Nations, 
Women, and Ethnic Minorities. This co-existed with increasing conflict over Canada’s place 
in the world and the identity of its population as Canadians. Dominant national issues were 
the Constitution, Free Trade, welfare state devolution, and international migration. The 
following concentrates on implications of Constitutional debates and the general climate, for 
international migrants.
Constitutional debates raised fragile Canadian identity issues internally, the most 
extreme being the spectre of Quebec separation from Canada. Controversy evolved around 
how the Constitution was to set out the division of powers between federal and provincial 
governments, and subsequently how status and powers should be divided among the 
provinces. Quebec’s insistence on special status as one of the two founding cultures of 
Canada pitted French Canada, or French Quebecers, against “the Rest of Canada”. Canadian
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nationalists and Quebec sovereigntists became increasingly polarised and unable to reach 
agreement on government proposals in 1982, 1987 and 1992.
Constitutional debates also evoked demands by non-regional and non-language 
interests whose needs were being overshadowed by the French/English question. Two 
fundamental vehicles for such demands were the government’s policy on Multiculturalism 
and the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Multiculturalism was brought to the 
fore in the 1970s by Prime Minister Trudeau to recognise the racial and ethnic diversity of 
Canada within a ‘bilingual framework’. Knowles (1992:169) comments: “In a sense it was 
both the logical child of official biculturalism and a polite gesture to non-English and non- 
French Canadians, who now made up a significant source of potential support for the Liberal 
Party.” In 1972 a minister of Multiculturalism was appointed and a Multiculturalism Council 
and Multiculturalism Directorate were established within the Department of the Secretary of 
State. In 1988 Prime Minister Mulrooney established a separate ministry for multiculturalism 
and in July of that year Bill C-93, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act, was passed.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arose out of the Constitution Act of 
1982, which provided for a domestic amending process that as Simeon (1987:268) explains, 
“bypasses federal-provincial relations and makes salient identities and interests that are 
nonregional -  that are, indeed, hostile to regionally defined interests.” The Charter, and 
more specifically the equality rights section fought for by NGOs, was both instrument and 
effect of changes in Canadian attitudes toward government described above. Together the 
Constitution and Charter “not only define the relationship between the individual and the 
state, and between various parts of the state, it also includes principles defining the 
relationships between various collectivities or groups of people” (CACSW,1992:57).
Processes of establishing the Charter also “demystified the federal-provincial process 
for many groups” (Simeon,1987:268). Mechanisms were set into place giving greater 
attention and legitimacy to NGOs and nonregional issues in intergovernmental relations, in 
particular the use of the legal system and court rulings (Ibid. p268). Greater NGO pressure 
could be, and was, brought to bear on federal government and federal-provincial relations. 
The Charter and the ideology of multiculturalism were important for citizens generally and 
for specific groups, as Cairns (1988:121) describes:
The Charter brought new groups into the constitutional order or, as in the case of 
aboriginals, enhanced a pre-existing constitutional status. It bypassed governments and 
spoke directly to Canadians by defining them as bearers of rights, as well as by 
according specific constitutional recognition to women, aboriginals, official language 
minority populations, ethnic groups through the vehicle of multiculturalism, and to 
those social categories explicitly listed in the equality rights section of the Charter. The 
Charter thus reduced the relative status of governments and strengthened that of the
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citizens who received constitutional encouragement to think of themselves as 
constitutional actors.
According to Section 27, the Charter must be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the aims of multiculturalism, described as “reaffirming two fundamental human rights in 
Canadian society - the right to be different (preserving culture) and the right to remain the 
same (receiving equal treatment)” (Agnew,1996:145; see Elliot and Fleras,1990:65).
Nationalism and sovereignty encouraged public panic over rising international 
migration levels, but multiculturalism as a defining feature of Canadian identity gained 
increasingly organised support. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed in 1988, 
recognising and promoting multiculturalism as “an invaluable resource in the shaping of 
Canada’s future” (section 3(2)). It drew upon the Canadian Human Rights Act, (1977, 
amended 1983) which provides that “every individual should have an equal opportunity with 
other individuals to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have, consistent 
with the duties and obligations of that individual as a member of society” (preamble). In 
recent years multiculturalism has increasingly been accepted as encompassing non-ethnic 
identity groups in a broad ‘politics of identity’ (Kymlicka,1998:9)
At the same time, international migration matters were becoming a real priority for 
government and publics for the first time. Support grew for multiculturalism and recognition 
of the importance of international migration in founding and building Canada (settlement, 
agriculture and industrialisation) and its constituency, past and future. By the mid 1990s, 16% 
of Canada’s population was foreign bom, more than twice that of US (see Kymlicka,1989). 
Government support for marginalised racial, ethnic and immigrant populations had increased 
substantially. International migration remained high on government agenda, and indeed is 
now considered crucial if to stablise Canada’s ageing population and declining birth rate.
International migrants saw their status and legitimacy rise in many respects, including 
rights as Canadians or potential Canadians with citizenship rights.6 The Charter was 
fundamental for the latter, gradually being applied to most people within Canadian territory: 
citizens, denizens, and non-citizen residents and visitors.
B.4 The new rights of refugees and the mobilisation of mediating groups
In the 1980s the state instituted a patchwork of responses to the refugee crisis which actually 
increased asylum seekers political leverage in some important ways, and increased anti-state 
mobilisations. Alongside the growth of resources and support described earlier, asylum 
seekers experienced: (1) Increasing opportunities to make use of emerging resources and to
6 In Canada, three years residency are required before an international migrant may apply for 
citizenship.
149
gain political leverage vis-a-vis the state. (2) The mediation of the judiciary and of an 
increasingly co-ordinated NGO sector. The following analysis, depicting these emerging 
opportunities, also provides a picture of how the Canadian refugee system works, how 
asylum seekers must navigate it, and what kinds of rights, opportunities and support they 
have to challenge it. It draws upon examples and implications for claimants fleeing female- 
specific persecution.
The Administrative response: increasingprocessing delays and asylum seekers’ stay in Canada 
Canada has generally been more successful coming up with short-term administrative 
solutions to international migration (see Cox and Glenn,1994:290-291) than long term 
legislative solutions. In the early 1980s these involved imposing non-universal visa system 
requiring visas for visitors from countries likely to produce illegal migrants, and carrier 
sanctions for airlines carrying passengers without proper documentation. But as processing 
delays continued to grow, government fell back on adjustment of status tactics, initiating a 
mass clearing of backlogged claims through two Administrative Review programs without 
simultaneously taking steps to prevent future build-ups. In order to address a backlog of 
23,000 claims the first program essentially granted amnesty to all claimants entering Canada 
before 21 May 1986. The backlog took several years to process while new claims 
accumulated under the still inadequate system, prompting a second backlog clearance 
program in 1989 to deal with some 50,000 claims (see Dirks,1995).
Administrative alternatives such as applications for Minister's Permits and 
Humanitarian and Compassionate (H&C) grounds became increasingly popular. Minister’s 
Permits offer residence on H&C grounds through the Immigration Minister’s personal 
review and authorisation in individual cases. H&C applications can also be made any time 
through what was then the Employment and Immigration Commission, an administrative 
body. In a rarer procedure for change of status, known in Quebec as the "Buffalo Shuffle", 
applicants cross the border to the US where they remain for a proscribed period of time, 
apply for immigrant status with an informal guarantee of acceptance and re-enter Canada as 
landed immigrants.7
These administrative solutions added to processing times of claims. Backlogs took 
years to clear, and last resort Minister’s permits and H&C class applications add another layer 
to determination processes. However they provided both alternatives and time for rejected 
claimants to seek support and information. All lawyers interviewed described processing 
delays and its effects upon claimants. One commented:
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Sometimes cases were postponed, even three years... This affects people. Living in a 
country for four or five years, waiting for your case, you meet someone and start 
another life, you have children, and then you are refused! Those people then go in 
appeal and wait another year. (Piriou, Interview,1995)
Others noted that case could run between four and eight years (Jackson, interview 1994). 
While typically a cause of great instability and anxiety, such delays may provide claimants 
opportunities to establish themselves in Canada, make contacts with Canadians, attain 
support, learn about how the ‘system’ works and how to challenge it. This capacity was 
enhanced by other changes to the refugee system implemented around the same time.
The Judicial response: New rights and increasing mediation in status determmatim processes 
A  new judicial approach was developed which granted individual rights to refugees such that 
they could not be turned away without full oral hearing. This profound change had been 
advocated by voluntary sector organisations since the early 1980s. But the greatest influence 
and determining factor was a landmark decision handed down by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the case of Singh vs. ME! Canada in 1985, the same year that the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. Dirks observes that with this decision “the long 
and rancorous debate over oral hearings came to an abrupt close... As a result of this 
judgement, the government introduced amendments to the immigration Act in Parliament in 
June 1985” (Dirks,1995:82). In the Smgfo case, failure to grant refugee claimants the right of 
full oral hearing, even at Appeals stages, was found to be a constitutional violation according 
to Charter (Knowles,1992). This had a number of profound implications.
First, recognising right to oral hearing through the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in effect equated asylum seekers’ rights to those of Canadian citizens 
(Knowles,1992:174). Institutional recognition of the Charter as a basis for refugee and 
immigrant rights expanded and solidified in subsequent years. In 1995 IRB Chairperson 
Mawani declared in a speech to an International Judicial Conference in the UK: “All 
claimants have the protection of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, concerned as 
it is with life, liberty and security of the person” (Mawani,1995a).
Second, between 1985 and 1989 Canada's determination system changed radically to 
meet new requirements raised by the Singh decision. Bill C-55 (Refugee Reform Bill), 
proposed in May 1987, altered the entire structure of the refugee department from an 
administrative to a quasi-judicial branch with autonomous decision-making power. In 1986 
the Immigration and Appeal Board was expanded and by 1988 refugees came to enjoy the
7 For example, Dulerie (an asylum seeker in the study who made her case public) was accepted in this 
manner in September 1992.
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benefits of an adjudicative status determination model involving full oral hearing, review and 
appeals processes. In 1989 when the Bill came into effect, the new system was renamed the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). Operating independent of the EIC, adjudicators and 
lawyers became mediators between the state and refugee claimants.
The application of the Charter to non-citizens and the resulting status determination 
process both distanced claimants from the administrative arm of the state, and provided 
rights and opportunities to debate the legitimacy of claims. The fact that a refugee claim 
setting a judicial precedent actually drove through the above changes indicates the potentially 
profound impact non-citizen claimants can have upon policy and policy-making, and 
consequently upon noncitizen rights and state responsibilities.
The individualised aspect of the asylum seeking process also fostered the growth of 
rights for particular groups of asylum seekers, as refugee jurisprudence grew. Women seeking 
asylum from female-specific persecution benefited from the new access to rights and 
opportunities. Under the new system the first precedent setting decisions on female-specific 
persecution emerged in 1987.8 Later, the growth of such jurisprudence was no doubt aided 
by the development of special Working Groups within the IRB, in particular the Working 
Group on Refugee Women (Gilad,1999). However the new system still suffered certain 
disadvantages, particularly for untraditional types of claims. Its decentralised structure could 
foster inconsistency in decision-making (see Young,1994). More widely recognised, the 
adjudicative model made expeditious hearings virtually impossible and added considerably to 
the costs of processing refugee claims (Knowles,1992:174). The status determination process 
proposed in Bill C-55 involved three claim-making stages. Later a ‘fast-track’ class was 
added, enabling applicants from designated countries or suffering obvious persecution to be 
granted refugee status at the first stage.
Figure 6.1 depicts the full range of “possible pathways” in refugee status 
determination processes in effect to 1995. It indicates the complexity and extent of 
procedural options, including access to appeals with full oral hearing at Federal and Supreme 
Court levels. As critics later pointed out, in effect the proposed system was not three-tier, but 
potentially involved a lengthy seven stages (see Knowles,1992:174; Young,1997:9-10) which 
would increase the backlog of claims. It made essential the second special administrative 
review for backlogged claims, but vast numbers of new claimants entitled to review 
continued adding to the backlog. Like previous backlogs, this may have increased the
8 Described in the previous chapter, these were Shahabcddin, Madjgan u M.E.I. (1987) Inanjyan, Zeyiye 
v. M.E.I. (1987) .
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F ig u r e  6.1
Refugee Determination Process: possible pathways for Inland Asylum Seekers
YES: Accepted as 
Convention refugee. 
Apply for perm anent 
residence status
NO: Apply to  appeal decision
^  Fast track: IRB member makes a decision based on a report by a
Refugee Hearing Officer (RHO) who has recommended 
a full refugee hearing is not necessary
/ ANY TIME: \
Apply on  
Hum anitarian &  
Com passionate  
grounds (fee:
$450). If 
accepted, apply 
fo r perm anent 
residence status
V_______)
claim made:
Renoval order:
Refugee Determ ination Hearing
before two IRB members and an RHO
Backlog in processing: 
At times large backlogs are 
cleared through temporary 
adminstrative reviews
Appeal decision
(PDRC)
OR
Deportation
Perm ission denied:
15 days to request review by PDRC unit 
(Post-determination Refugee Claim review unit) 
This unit does not review the decision may by 
the IRB or Federal Court. Successful claims 
must show "objectively identifiable individual risk". 
Few cases succeed.
YES: NO:
\ t
DEPORTATION
Perm ission granted:
Federal Court for judicial review
—  NO: \ l /
YES:
Case returned to IRB.
In rare instances, Convention 
Refugee status is granted
NO: YES:
A  
v
apply to appeal decision 
at Supreme Court
Apply for perm anent residence status
Source: Adapted from Community Legal Education Ontario. Irmigratim Fact Sheet, 1994. 
Schema depicts the process in effect to 1995.
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likelihood of claimant contact with nongovernment services and support, including 
appropriate lawyers. Thus the triple effects of this cumbersome system were to increase the 
both ways asylum seekers could gain entrance (possible pathways) and their rights to make 
claims; increase delays and add to time spent living in Canada awaiting decisions and getting 
into contact with Canadian residents as sources of support; and fuel anti-government 
responses which increased refugees’ support base. We turn now to the last of these, followed 
by a description of the consequences of all three in the cases studied.
The New Right response: restricting refugee flows, mobilising dissent
Canada’s system was still acclaimed for being strong on refugee rights, but was increasingly 
criticised for catering to illegal immigrants and "illegitimate" refugees who might take 
advantage of a time and money consuming process. The pervasive NewRight political 
atmosphere undoubtedly fuelled these criticisms. More pointedly, as Knowles notes, “it 
raised the question of whether it was possible to manage an immigration program when 
aliens were given the same rights as Canadian citizens.” (1992:174). Thus Canada’s 
immigration system also became increasingly restrictive in a number of ways, in turn 
triggering a backlash as anti-govemment sentiment increased among NGOs and other 
refugee supporters. Given Canada’s international migration NGOs heritage of fragmentation, 
the development of stronger links between organisations themselves is important. The 
restrictive aspects of Bills C-55, C-84 and C-86 were pivotal in this respect, intending to 
crack down on ‘illegitimate’ refugees at the same time that amnesty for thousands of others, 
and individual rights to oral hearing and judicial review, were being granted.9
In contrast to governments’ mixed responses, NGOs became more directed and 
organised. They were increasingly concerned with refugee legitimacy being compromised by 
management problems, saying that these Bills endangered legitimate refugees’ ability to be 
accepted. The Bills met considerable sustained opposition by NGOs, the immigration bar, 
church groups, immigrant associations and unions (Young 1997:8).
The legislation was passed in 1989 but the consequences of NGO dissent were long- 
lasting. Voluntary sector dissent as an outcome of government’s constraint tactics has been 
noted (see Young 1997), but its implications not explored. It was highly organised. In fact 
from the mid to late 1980s this historically fragmented sector was mobilised and organised to 
an extent unprecedented in Canada, involving a range of advocates opposed to the proposed 
legislation. Major vehicles for this were no doubt umbrella groups such as CCR and TCMR 
(both members of the core advocacy network studied) which were either created or
9 For details of restrictive aspects of Bill C-84 and G86, see Dirks (1995); on Bill C-55, Young, 1997.
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formalised in that period, as discussed earlier. TCMR president Rivca Augenfeld described 
the legislation as a mobilising force for the TCMR, refugee groups generally, and for the 
network that later formed around women seeking asylum from female-specific persecution:
It was in opposition to the legislation all those years ago that we really got organised, 
when we had Bills C-55 and C-84. The legislation, as far as we were concerned, was not 
what we had hoped, so we mobilised, we worked very hard to present our... 
parliamentary briefs and our senate briefs. We worked very hard and the network 
developed out of that, (interview 1995).
Augenfeld remarks that for the CCR, in which TCMR is a member, "it was the same thing, it 
was around the legislation, Bills C-55 and C-84. The CCR had a sort of quantum leap in this 
time, when the office became an office” (Ibid). The network Augenfeld mentions linked 
Montreal based refugee organisations as well as organisations across provinces, through 
national umbrella groups. In co-ordinated opposition, the network brought into contact a 
variety of people and groups working with different international migration issues through 
various approaches: those “more interested in the settlement part”, and those “more 
interested in the protection part of it... those who do visits” (Augenfeld, interview 1995). It 
also involved new organisations whose membership not only spoke for refugees, but was 
comprised of refugees, such as the Montreal Refugee Coalition.
The implications of this mobilisation and co-ordination are manifold. It increased the 
international migration voluntaiy sector's strength and legitimacy, and thus that of refugees 
themselves. Like the judiciary system, increasingly co-ordinated NGOs took on more of a 
mediating role between refugees and the state, both in policy advocacy and case-work with 
particular claimants. This was undoubtedly both instrument and effect of the growth 
experienced throughout the decade, with increasing support of other voluntary sector 
groups. Augenfeld (TCMR) describes:
I think the big thing that we accomplished here over the years, something that people 
don’t even realise now because it seems so obvious, was to bring people together from 
different political stripes, different opinions, right across the spectrum from left to right, 
and establish the idea that a refugee is a refugee no matter what kind of a regime you 
come from. (Augenfeld,interview 1995).
II. EMERGING RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO WENT PUBLIC
Asylum seekers’ increasing opportunities to get into contact with and make use of evolving 
resources and support networks is suggested in the cases of asylum seekers who went public 
with female-specific persecution claims in the campaigns studied. Here we see claimants use 
of services and participation in NGOs with long-term Canadian residents, their growing use
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of the evolving judicial system for refugees, and subsequently their emerging ability to 
challenge the refugee system through both institutional and extra-institutional means.
As indicated in Table 6.1 these claimants arrived in Canada between 1984 and 1991 
while refugee backlogs were building up and being cleared. As we can see, many experienced 
a significant time lapse between year of arrival and first independent refugee claim. This was 
influenced by the types of first claims that were made, which included claims both as 
Dependents (sponsored) and Principal Applicants (independent).
Seven of the nineteen claimants were sponsored by spouses or boyfriends (whether 
immigrants, refugees or Canadian citizens) upon arrival. They made independent refugee 
claims only upon breaking the sponsorship contract. These cases usually involved domestic 
violence, and sponsorship was broken for various reasons: the woman left and divorced the 
husband; or if not divorcing, husbands/boyfriends withdrew their sponsorship as 
’punishment' for her leaving the relationship; or the sponsor eventually left the country, 
either deported for rejection of his claim (which often had been caught in a processing 
backlog for several years while they awaited decision), or having chosen to leave, in several 
instances to evade criminal charges of domestic assault.
In the case of deportation, sponsors* claims were sometimes caught in backlog, 
creating a delay between arrival and rejection. In either of the cases of women leaving 
relationships, the time allowed for growing awareness of rights and resources for protection 
in Canada was likely to have been important. This is common among Canadian citizens who 
experience domestic violence. The 1993 Violence Against Women Survey reports that only 
24% of women abused by a marital partner used social services, and only 26% reported 
violence to police. Reasons for not seeking help included shame or embarrassment, being too 
afraid of their spouse or not having anyone to turn to (Statistics Canada, 1994). As MacLeod 
and Shin (1990) reported in a study of immigrant women’s use of shelters for women who 
are battered, these factors are even more important for women from other cultures where 
violence may be accepted and state protection is not offered, and who may not be aware of 
their rights or resources in a host country. They are also relevant for other types of claimants 
who either do not apply for refugee status upon arrival, or apply on grounds other than 
female-specific persecution because they are unaware that gendered violence may be grounds 
for refugee status. Delays in claim processing may provide opportunities to gain the 
resources necessary (knowledge and support) to decide to leave abusive partners, make such 
claims or potentially challenge negative decisions.
Change of status applications arising from the above scenarios occurred a further two 
to three years after sponsorship breakdown, probably because of the time required for the 
immigration office to review their sponsorship status, determine that they were no longer
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eligible to live in Canada, and issue deportation notices. During this time, women had 
opportunities to make contacts and gain support and resources that became necessary to 
challenge decisions on their claims. Upon making independent refugee claims, they entered 
into another waiting process, involving reviews, hearings, decisions and appeals.
But for one exception, a claimant who arrived as a student and two years later applied 
for refugee status when her countiy of origin circumstances changed, the remaining eleven 
claimants made their first refugee claim as Principal Applicant. Of these the majority (seven) 
applied for refugee status immediately. This is important because the longer claimants wait, 
the more the credibility of their claims is in question. Only three claimants applied between 
two to three years after arrival.
Table 6.1 presents the distribution of both sponsored and first principal applicants 
by three characteristics: year of arrival; time lapse between arrival and first claim as principle 
applicant; and years of residency before going public. Thus, for example in the second column, 
five of the women made claims between 2-3 years after arrival; two of these were in change 
of status claims, and three as the first claims ever made by the applicants.
Table 6.1 Asylum seekers who went public: year of arrival in Canada, time lapse before 
first independent claim, total years residency before going public.
Claimants by 
year of arrival in 
Canada
Claimants by time lapse 
between entry and first claim as 
Principal applicant
Claimants by total years of 
residency before going 
public
1991 8 0-1 years: 7 0-1 years: 1
1990 2 2-3 years: 5 2-3 years: 6
1989 2 3-4 years: 3 3-4 years: 4
1988 3 4-5 years: 1 4-5 years: 3
1986 1 5-6 years: 1 5-6 years: 1
1985 2 6-7 years: 0 6-7 years: 1
1984 1 8-9 years: 2 8-9 years: 2
9-10 years: 1
Source: Case histories of claimants who went public, 1991-1997
Claimants who applied immediately and were rejected, as well as those who applied 
later, experienced various forms of female-specific persecution, from domestic violence to 
gender-related political persecution. They entered the same processes of hearings, rejections 
and appeals which previously sponsored claimants faced, and tended to face delays of 
between one and five years. Like claimants who were initially sponsored, their length of stay 
in Canada provided opportunities to find and use resources necessary for challenging 
negative decisions and going public. Before going public, thirteen (68.4%) of all claimants had 
lived in Canada between 2 and 5 years, five (26.3%) had lived in Canada between 5 and 10 
years, and only one (5.3%) for less than a year. Thus alongside their need, a determining 
factor and significance of time lapses between making refugee claims and going public, may 
well have been the discovery of necessary resources and opportunities.
157
Refugee resources and rights, and particularly those for women refugees, were 
developing during the period of these asylum seekers’ residency. They had by then gained 
rights to full oral hearing, recourse to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a 
host society with declared multiculturalism and human rights commitments. They could 
access a broad range of organisations and memberships whose capabilities and particular 
interests later provided a crucial framework for specialised networks concerned with female- 
specific persecution to emerge. The majority of claimants who went public got into contact 
with both NAC and one of six different women's shelters. Many were in direct contact with 
the CCR, the ICHRDD, RAM and NOIVMW. Many went through a number of lawyers 
until arriving at one attuned to female-specific issues. Shelters were particularly important 
sources of information about asylum seekers' rights and resources, providing referrals and 
offering sanctuary and emotional support. These contacts were among the most important 
for the women when going public, rather than an exhaustive list of organisations with which 
the women were involved, which were often quite numerous. Some women received direct 
support from community organisations, church groups, and even schools they or their 
children had attended.
Some claimants came to Canada expressly to escape female-specific violence in their 
countries, and made claims to this effect well before the Guidelines were instated. Others, 
primarily those in sponsorship situations, had no initial intention of making such a claim. On 
the contrary, some hoped that moving to another country would bring a fresh start to their 
troubled relationships, only to see problems intensify. Others were neither sponsored nor 
explicit about the female violence upon entry, although they later claimed they had 
purposefully fled it. They may have been initially unaware of the potential to make such a 
claim, or were afraid to discuss their abuse. These were most likely influenced by their long­
term residence and contact with organisations and individuals.
Some in this situation may well have realised they could make gender-related claims 
by seeing other cases going public with the support of powerful organisations in late 1992 
and early 1993. This coincided with the end of the last administrative review program, 
announced in 1991, and the introduction of another restrictive immigration Bill (C-86). The 
combined effect was a deportation panic and a rush of claims among those in dire situations 
who needed to formalise their status in Canada. This brought to NAC’s doors a mass of 
asylum seekers, among them those facing female-specific forms of persecution resembling 
the experiences of asylum seekers whom NAC helped go public (Fernandez, NAC Executive 
committee, Women’s Aid Director, interview 1995). Chapter 7 discusses in detail advocates’ 
and asylum seekers’ interactions and motivations to campaign.
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CONCLUSION
In Canada the 1980s are typically described as years of political turmoil and identity crisis, 
increasing restraint in government spending, rising ‘refugee panic’ and restrictive immigration 
practices. This domestic political climate deeply affected attitudes toward government, 
multiculturalism and international migration, with important consequences. Yet refugee 
rights and opportunities actually expanded in some important ways during this period of cut­
backs and constraints on immigration. The chapter highlighted the changing nature of 
relationships between government and refugees as an outcome of increasing internal and 
external or national and international pressures upon the state, in so doing describing the 
Canadian context immediately before the asylum seekers and supporters in the study began 
campaigning.
Canada’s crisis culminated in a panic over “illegitimate” refugees in the 1980s and 
1990s, a continuously flip-flopping government approach, the growth of important refugee 
rights and opportunities for entry, and an increasingly fertile and organised voluntary sector 
with increasingly overlapping interests in women’s and refugee issues. Government’s 
patchwork responses provided incentives and opportunities for both asylum seekers and 
advocates to exploit the increasing structural vulnerability of the establishment, thus 
producing new refugee rights and opportunities during a time of rising constraints and 
cutbacks. Both an effect of the refugee crisis and a crucial vehicle for refugees to exploit 
emerging political opportunities, was increasing mediation between refugees and the state in 
status determination processes, by a new semi-judicial system with an active Working Group 
on Refugee Women, and by increasingly co-ordinated international migration NGOs. This 
combination of forces created political opportunities and organisational or resource basis for 
advocacy networks concerned with Canadian responsibility for female-specific persecution.
Implications of the changes for the asylum seekers studied were manifold. Increased 
resources, both ideological and material support; increasingly co-ordinated support by a very 
wide range of organisations; increasing opportunities (such as processing delays and legal 
rights) to make use of resources and emerging interests. These trends pre-conditioned the 
mobilisation of a final emerging resource and opportunity: new working relationships 
between asylum seekers and Canadian residents in policy advocacy situations. The following 
two chapters explore how the core advocacy network was actually mobilised, how it operated 
internally and in relation to the external environment and to what effect, and the role of 
asylum seekers in all these aspects.
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7 . D e c id in g  t o  c a m p a ig n : a s y l u m  s e e k e r s  a n d  t h e  in t e r n a l
POLITICAL CULTURE OF THEIR ADVOCACY NETWORK
The importance of ideas, or ideology, and their formal and strategic expression by actors 
attempting to influence the external environment, can not be understated. McAdam explains 
(1982:48): “Mediating between opportunity and action are the people and the... meanings 
they attach to their situations”. This chapter explores why and how asylum seekers and 
supporters got involved in campaigning for refugee policy change, in particular through 
extra-institutional actions. It describes key factors in the generation and nature of the 
networks and challenges traditional ideas about asylum seekers and participants of national 
policy-making processes. It shows that far from being simply 'forced migrants' without 
options, dependent on the goodwill of the state or desperate to challenge it, asylum seekers 
made rational political decisions and acted on them. They also both symbolised and 
profoundly influenced the translation of ideology into aims and participatory action among 
supporters. They subsequently played an important role in shaping the structure and political 
culture of the core advocacy network that developed. This emerges in analysis of their own 
decision-making processes and actions, that of their supporters, and the dynamics of their 
interaction and participation. I draw on case histories of the asylum seekers, including the 
intense media coverage they received and interviews primarily with supporters.
The term political culture describes both internal movement or advocacy culture, and 
relations with external environments, including how the latter is approached in order to 
achieve policy goals. The following chapter explores how the advocacy network challenged 
the external environment to achieve their aims. This chapter concentrates on asylum seekers 
in relation to the former, internal life of advocacy networks.
By exploring why and how actors got involved in public pressure tactics for policy 
change, their belief systems and corresponding aims are illuminated. Smith and Sabatier 
(1994:180) explain:
... public policies/programs incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their 
objectives (Pressman and Wildavsky,1973; Majone,1980), and thus can be 
conceptualised in much the same way as belief systems. They involve value priorities, 
perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of the state of the world 
(including the magnitude of the problem), perceptions of the efficacy of policy 
instruments, etc.
This chapter draws out actors “deep core policy values”, which as Smith and Sabatier 
(1993, 1994) describe, link identity and ideology with underlying policy aims and strategies 
for achieving them. It shows why and how asylum seekers were integral to this link being 
made. The following chapter illuminates ‘near core’ and ‘secondary’ policy aims as evolving
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strategies for achieving deep core goals, in what Smith and Sabatier describe as a ‘hierarchy 
of policy values’. In both chapters we see asylum seekers roles and the significance of their 
participation.
Section I below at how asylum seekers conceptualised and approached extra- 
institutional actions -  ‘going public’. It explores the personal and political considerations that 
informed asylum seekers’ decisions. These crucial factors mediated between the need for 
safety as driving force behind both their flight and subsequent willingness to engage in 
radical tactics to secure asylum, and also between these factors and supporters’ influence 
upon asylum seekers’ decisions and opportunities for action.
Section II looks at how core supporters conceptualised the relation between asylum 
seekers and their own belief systems in ways that influenced their participation, policy values 
and approaches to achieving them. It reveals factors predisposing supporters toward 
participation, how contact with asylum seekers served as a linchpin between their ‘deep core’ 
ideology and participatoiy action. Implications of asylum seekers’ involvement are discussed 
in Section III, with a schematic presentation of the advocacy network.
I. A sylum seekers ‘g o in g  pu blic*: t h e  p o t e n t ia l  f o r  extra-in s t it u t io n a l
ACTION
To understand asylum seekers’ role in shaping the nature and structure of support, we must 
begin with an enquiry into why asylum seekers themselves choose to ‘go public’. First, an 
obvious point is that failing institutional means to securing safe asylum, the life and death 
situations that refugees may face if deported provide the predominant motivating force for 
extra-institutional action. Second, among a typically resourceless and politically powerless 
population, actually pursuing extra-institutional action requires opportunities and support. I 
shall return to these two crucial factors later. First we must question both of these 
explanations as sufficient in themselves. This is important because over-reliance on the 
former may support the idea that real refugees must be primarily ‘forced’ actors to whom 
receiving-countries simply respond, or else illegitimate refugees, rather than political actors in 
their own right within receiving-countries. Over-reliance on the latter may similarly exclude 
the political role of asylum seekers, instead explaining policy change primarily as result of 
activism by Canadian residents advocating ‘for’ asylum seekers.
Empirically, problems with both explanations emerge when we consider that 
generally, asylum seekers receive support and advocacy from a variety of sources (e.g. 
refugee, ethnic and community organisations offering entry and settlement services) and for 
a number of reasons before, during and after claim-making. Yet the actions typically taken
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with such support are a long way away from ‘going public’ to campaign for individual and 
collective claims to be accepted. Similarly, the traditional ‘forced’ image of refugees, 
desperate to attain entry, does not explain what is in fact an extremely small number of 
rejected refugee claimants who do or will ‘go public’.
As McAdam and others have observed, neither grievances (such as persecution) nor 
opportunities and support structures are sufficient to explain the generation and influence of 
collective action. Grievances, opportunities and ‘organisational readiness’ may have little 
influence at a particular time if potential actors are unable or unwilling to make use of or 
exploit them (see McAdam,1982,1996). In this case going public was a central pressure tactic, 
and constituted a driving force behind policy demands, so we need to understand why 
asylum seekers would make their intimate life stories public knowledge, and what would be 
involved in making such a decision. Their wllingiess to go public must be explored. Thus I 
shall first concentrate on important decision making processes that mediate between 
grievances and opportunities on one hand, and actions that asylum seekers may or may not 
take because of or through them on the other.
A. D ecid in g  t o  g o  public
Looking at the asylum seekers in this study who did choose to share intimate life details with 
the public through mass media in campaigns reveals important personal and political 
considerations behind their decisions and actions. These claimants went public from a range 
of female-specific experiences raising a variety of case-specific complications that would 
shape why and how public action was chosen and at particular times, sometimes with 
different outcomes.10 But all contributed directly to the public debate and pressure brought 
to bear upon government, and most were allowed to remain in Canada.
Strong commonalities can be seen in the ways and extent that claimants went public, 
within which we can look for important elements informing their decisions to go public in 
the first place. All provided personal testimony of their experiences as persecuted women 
and as claimants discriminated in Canada’s refugee system. Going public raised contentious 
debates about persecution and rights to protection in Canada as refugees. The grounds for their 
acceptance under any category subsequently set important precedents. Seven claimants who 
individually sought and received particularly extensive media attention spoke at press 
conferences, gave interviews and/or wrote articles. Three of these cases (Dulerie, Nada and 
Basdaye) were concluded before the Guidelines’ instatement and four began before but were
10 Inconsistency of outcomes was due in part, at the time, to (1) technical and administrative difficulties due to 
cases having begun before the Guidelines were instated, (2) these cases being forerunners of certain 
interpretations on certain types of cases, both before and after instatement of the Guidelines. See chapter 2, on 
methodology.
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concluded after (Ferdousi, Tamarati, Therese, Ginette). Two claimants attracting major press 
coverage after March 1993 were also among a group of fourteen claimants who collectively 
went public between January and February 1993. The remainder of the fourteen had less 
individual press coverage but a collective force for their demands. These fourteen were from 
a group of what NAC initially announced were about 50 claimants in similar situations 
(Montreal Gazette 30-11-92) who had gone to NAC for help (Fernandez, interview 1995).
All the women worked directly with and through supporters in order to voice their 
stories. Some chose pseudonyms to protect their identity, but others did not.11 Several were 
particularly open about their experiences, accepting to be photographed and generally 
making extra efforts to be accessible to the media and other interested individuals and 
potential supporters. At least one was emphatic about revealing her identity along with her 
experiences, in a sense claiming due credit and strength for the difficulty of the choices she 
made and actions she took. Others were interviewed by the press, under alias or not, several 
only after being accepted. Of up to 50 known to NAC (Montreal Gazette 30-11-92), 36 chose 
never to go public at all.
Considering those with the greatest media attention, it is evident that decisions to go 
public, and to do so in particular ways, were made both for personal and political reasons 
deeply intertwined in what we might call identity politics. This describes ways of thinking 
about self within the world. It involves recognising self within social and political contexts 
and power structures, and from that recognition and the understanding gained from it, either 
reconstructing (on one’s own terms) or reifying self identity.
Choosing to use real or invented names was one way of expressing social political 
identity which claimants made use of in different ways and based on various considerations. 
When asked if she would prefer to use another name in the interview for this study, Therese 
stated without hesitation: “You are using my name.” She explained that she was “not 
talking lies”, people would hear her story in any case and there should be no 
misunderstanding that what she was telling was the truth; why hide behind another name?
Some people don’t want to use their name. I don’t care... You can use “Therese”... I 
remember when my lawyer in 1992 wrote an article and she told me she is not going to 
use my name. I said *No. I want you to use my name.’ And she said most of the 
women use another name. That they come to this country and they use another name, 
they don’t use their own name. And I said: You use my name.’ And whenever my 
lawyer tells people, she calls and she says: ‘I told them to use your name!’(Therese, 
interview,1995).
Revealing the truth or reality of life experiences, and standing behind her words by revealing 
her full identity, appears as not only self-affirming process, but also a cathartic process as the
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reality of abuse and persecution is publicly recognised. Identity as a persecuted individual 
invokes the intimate details of the persecution. Therese explains:
Back home we don’t talk about that: our rape, our abuse, everything. We just close 
our mouths. So I don’t know, I changed a lot since I’ve been here in Montreal. Like, 
I never keep secrets now. Everything that comes, I just say it. [I talk to] anybody 
who calls me and says, ‘I am doing this and I want your help... ’ It’s hard when I am 
talking about it still, but after that I get over it. I used to have headaches when I used 
to finish telling everything, but now I don’t get it anymore. And I used to cry a lot, 
but now I am just a little bit. It doesn’t hurt as much. (Therese, interview 1995)
The need to constantly reassert and prove one’s identity by revealing personal 
experiences is basic to the refugee determination process. To be recognised as a “refugee”, 
identity must be proven through the experience of structural persecution and lack of 
protection. But for claimants like Therese, structural invisibility of the persecution as such, 
and subsequently their identity as persecuted individuals, initially prevented protection both 
in their home countries and in Canada. For Therese, revealing her identity went hand in hand 
with the structural nature of the abuse she experienced, and as she describes above, the ways 
it had been enshrouded in a culture of secrecy which was self-perpetuating and isolating for 
victims. Voicing the truth was both a personally liberating process and an act keeping 
strongly in mind the similar experiences of other women, the “we” who “don’t talk about... 
our rape, our abuse... ” in the Seychelles Islands.
The lengths to which such claimants went to prove their identity also went far 
beyond the confidential closed hearing room status determination processes that all refugee 
claimants must undergo. Expressing her truth about self and society became increasingly 
important for Therese after being rejected by immigration authorities. It was not only about 
conditions in home countries, but conditions in Canada. Therese’s adamance emerges not 
only as a strategy to influence and reverse the decision on her claim, but also as crucial part 
of reclaiming a sense of integrity after being disbelieved in Canada. Describing the dismissive 
treatment she received by Canadian immigration authorities, Therese again emphasised the 
truth of her story against disbelief in its reality or validity.
On the immigration side there is nothing that you can say that they were really there for 
you... They are very rude, they don’t think that they are like us, like you. They just take 
pity on you. I don’t want them to take pity for me, but just to think: if it were you> or 
your family! And I have a lot: everything that is written, everything that is in my file, it 
is true. It’s not something that was made up. It was true. But they didn’t look at it. 
Their idea was just that Ve have to deport her, and that is it’. (Therese, interview 1995).
Taking the opposite approach with regard to revealing her identity, but no less 
emphasising the structural nature of the violence experienced, was perhaps the most well
11 See Chapter 2 on confidentiality of claimants and by supporters.
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known claimant of all. Despite the most widespread, even international, coverage this 
claimant never revealed her name or showed her face to the public while arguing her case. 
The pseudonym she chose was “Nada”, signifying ‘nothing’ or ‘zero’ in her country of origin. 
Concealing her identity while going public was intended both to protect her privacy and 
safety as well as that of her family in Saudi Arabia. But Nada’s portrayal of herself as a 
woman without an identity, and without a face, was also a powerful image of the treatment 
of females in Saudi Arabia. She claimed persecution on political grounds for opposing the 
formal and informal laws of her society on roles and behaviours appropriate to females, such 
as the dress code. Nada described the required chador, or veil, as literally rendering women 
faceless and identityless. Refusal to comply would result in public flogging and stone 
throwing as well as the private punishments inflicted by family. She explained:
Wearing the veil made me feel dirty. It made me feel faceless and bodiless, like some 
sexual object in the street. I felt like I was nothing. I was not a human being. So I 
decided I would not do it anymore. I would rather stay home all day. I preferred to be 
stoned rather than to be without an identity. (“Nada”. The Ottawa Citizen, 11-03-93).
In Canada, in the only photograph Nada allowed to be taken for use in the media, 
she appeared modelling the traditional “abaaya”, which conceals the body and face. After her 
claim was accepted Nada participated ‘as herself’ in Consultations between NGO’s and 
government concerning gender-persecution, the Canadian refugee system and the 
Guidelines.
Nada’s nameless and faceless identity as she portrayed herself to the Canadian public 
also suggested the invisibility of persecuted women in the Canadian refugee system. Her 
appeals to the public were moral and political, highly intelligent, eloquent and educational. 
Like Therese she brought both foreign and domestic blindness to her person, as an 
individual and as a woman, clearly to light.
When I was in Saudi Arabia, I thought that women in other countries were more 
respected and more powerful. I was naive. I first realised my naivete when they 
laughed at me at the airport when I said I have problems because I am a woman. 
(Ibid,11-3-93).
The dismissive treatment Nada received upon arrival in Canada was mirrored during the oral 
hearing of her refugee claim. Nada was refused refugee status based on the assertion that she 
should not disobey the laws of her society and family. The adjudicator in her case stated:
The Claimant would do well, like all her compatriots, to abide by the laws of general 
application she opposes, and to do this under all circumstances, and not only, as she has 
done, in order to study, work or to show consideration for the feelings of her father, 
who, like everyone else in her large family, was opposed to the liberalism of his 
daughter. (Informal translation; see M.Young, 1994)
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As later recognised when this decision was reversed, it disregarded the discriminatory 
nature of laws that target females, and the persecutory nature of punishments inflicted for 
transgressing discriminatory moral and legal codes. It took a typically patriarchal stance in 
stating that Nada, a grown woman, should “show consideration for the feelings of her 
father.”
Nada was particularly emphatic about the hypocrisy inherent in a culturally relative 
approach to determining refugee status eligibility. She describes:
...Throughout the agony of waiting for my case to be determined, many issues were 
raised in the media. The minister of Employment and Immigration, Bernard Valcourt, 
argued that Canada should not intervene and impose its cultural values. He was missing 
the point. (“Nada”. The Ottawa Citizen, 11-03-93).
At the same time, Nada was concerned with the likelihood that going public, while 
challenging cultural relativism in women’s human rights, would provide ammunition for 
racist public responses toward the treatment of women in Arab countries. Diana Bronson 
from the ICHRDD, one of Nada’s primaiy supporters, explained how the campaign was 
prepared before Nada decided to use a pseudonym. Nada had gone into hiding (remaining 
illegally) after receiving a deportation order, letters and documents had been prepared and 
the campaigning was set to go public.
I asked her again: ‘are you sure you are ready to go through with this? The media is 
going to use every anti-Arab stereotype you ever heard, they are going to be talking 
about veiled women in the Arab world, they are going to want to know all your personal 
stories, they will not stop at anything to know everything that is personal about you, 
they will ask you insulting questions, and there may be repercussions back home, for 
you or your family. Are you sure?” And she said No. (Bronson, interview 1995).
Ultimately, Nada’s decision to go public became a political one wrapping up personal 
need for safety, with her rights as a woman in her country and with what Nada felt were 
Canada’s political responsibilities for the persecution she faced. It also prompted her to 
choose a pseudonym in order to protect her family. The incident that triggered her final 
decision involved a Bulgarian musician who had been granted refugee status because of a fan 
who happened to be the daughter of an influential federal bureaucrat. Journalist Andre 
Picard concluded his column on the story saying: “We turn back women who are being 
beaten by their husbands but a white guy got in for a song.” Working closely with Nada, 
Bronson described: “I don’t know if I showed this article to Nada or if someone else did, 
but she got wind of it. She got so mad at the federal government that she decided to go 
public, for sure. So we went public” (Bronson, interview 1995).
The political nature of Nada’s decision was made clear in her criticism of the 
Canadian government’s attempt to shirk responsibility for violence that it claimed was
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cultural rather than political. This she counter-poised against the extreme realities of life for 
women in Saudi Arabia:
The discrimination and repression I lived with in Saudi Arabia had political and not 
cultural roots. When governments impose a certain set of beliefs on individuals, 
through propaganda, violence or torture, we are dealing not with culture but rather with 
political expediency. To claim that such practices are cultural is dangerous, if not racist.
When a woman walks down the street in Saudi Arabia without a veil and the 
Mutamsriym (religious police) flog her, this is not cultural, it’s political. Who gave 
permission to the mutaimi’m} The government. They fear that women will try to 
change things, and they’ll lose their power.
I’m suspicious when I hear the Canadian government expressing concern for cultural 
integrity.... When women are publicly flogged for wearing perfumes or cosmetics 
imported from the West, do westerners protest about cultural imperialism? (TheOttaim 
Citizen, 11-3-93).
Here Nada points out again that the treatment and recognition women receive both 
in Saudi Arabia and in Canada is a structural issue, the instability of women’s human rights a 
form of “political expediency”. Thus pressure was put on Canadian Immigration to recognise 
human rights violations against women, not as an act of compassion and pity but as the act 
of a socially responsible and accountable state within a global system, where states already 
influence one another and state politics and cultures are intertwined.
Like Nada, other claimants also expressed concerns that going pubic could further 
jeopardise their safety and that of their family. This could occur in three ways, each of which 
might be affected by choosing either to use real names or pseudonyms. First, going public 
could notify violent family members of the claimant’s location. For this reason, one woman’s 
case was publicised after her claim was accepted and even then her identity was not revealed 
(Montreal Gazette, November 1992).
Second, going public could endanger the lives of claimants’ children, either through 
violent family members tracking them down, or in the case of custody battles in Canada or 
between claimants in Canada and family members in the country of origin. In cases of 
domestic violence, the extent to which violent men may go to track down their partners is 
well recognised. Despite the geographical distance, this is sometimes true for asylum seekers. 
For example, when Dulerie fled to Canada claiming refugee status with her three children 
after 17 years of violent abuse by her husband, he followed and was subsequently convicted 
in Canada eleven times for assault and death threats. During that time, her eldest child 
returned to Trinidad to escape beating by her father.
Another case involved a Bangladeshi woman married at age 11 to a man 20 years her 
senior who beat her for 18 years. They arrived together in Canada with three children.
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Ferduousi’s husband threatened to many off their two daughters, age 11 and 13, and to kill 
Ferdousi or drive her to suicide, if she complained to police and he was deported. Men in 
many countries have custodial rights over children, making his threat very plausible. When 
charged with assault and uttering death threats in Canada he failed to appear at trial. The 
family remained in hiding, both from Canadian authorities and from Ferdousi’s husband 
whose location remained unknown, while fighting to overturn their deportation order.
This ties into a third type of risk raised by going public and using real names: 
amplifying dangers faced back home if the claimant is still rejected and deported. For 
example, having divorced her husband and failing to return with him to Bangladesh, 
Ferdousi’s family would no longer accept her. Moreover, the fact that cases had been 
publicised could get back to family members, community, and the government. In some 
countries, social ostracisation for having defied social norms might also be accompanied by 
physical forms of punishment, and both could be enhanced by the ‘shame’ the woman brings 
to her people.12 In countries where women have little means to support themselves, 
ostrasisation by family and community could be indeed dire.
These examples suggest asylum seekers (particularly mothers) must have great 
impetus to attempt every possible means to secure safety; they were willing to take the above 
named risks, and those receiving the greatest publicity did tend to use their real names. Being 
mothers may also have served a strategic purpose; mothers often provoke greater public 
sympathy and support than childless women, particularly when they allow photos to be 
taken, a consideration in favour of trying the strategy. Of the seven most publicised cases, all 
using real names, five involved children.
But public pressure tactics always remained a last resort strategy after careful 
consideration, and as indicated earlier, others did not go public at all. They tended to be 
used after all institutional options had been exhausted and deportation orders had been 
issued, in attempt to overturn negative decisions. Of the fourteen women who went public 
collectively, all had been rejected or were in the final stages of Appeal and were or would 
soon be facing deportation. Three were in hiding, the date of deportation having passed. The 
last resort aspect was a strong indicator of the needs of these asylum seekers (discussed later) 
outweighing the risks and unpleasantness of going public. But it also served the strategic 
purpose of highlighting failures of the Canadian refugee system.
The fact that some claimants went public after receiving deportation notice but 
before exhausting all Appeals processes (in one case), or that some claimants waned to go 
public earlier on (in at least one case), while others ultimately chose not to go public at all,
12 These scenarios are elaborated in the typology presented in Chapter 9. See also Paul,1992:15.
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indicates the influence of other considerations mediating between need and public actions. 
In at least one case a rejected claimant went public while still in Appeals processes to 
overturn the negative decision on her claim. Under a pseudonym (so as not to interfere with 
the Appeal) this claimant went public with the fourteen claimants, asking NAC to publicise 
that she made the decision in order “to make her story known in order to help the Minister 
reconsider the Guidelines regarding gender-related problems in some countries, including her 
own.” (NAC press packet, February 1993).
The fact that others chose not to go public at all indicates many mediating 
considerations, often raising competing priorities that won out. It also shows that pursing 
refugee status on untraditional grounds, an expressly political act challenging the refugee 
system, was not always the only recourse or was not always considered most desirable. Entry 
could sometimes be sought through other types of status that, while perhaps not adequately 
reflecting reasons for international migration, and not challenging the status quo in that 
regard, nevertheless achieved individual aims to secure safe asylum in Canada. At least 
another thirty-six claimants who sought NAC’s assistance considered going public but 
ultimately did not do for various practical and technical reasons, together with personal and 
political considerations and risks discussed above. Handling the cases, Flora Fernandez 
(Executive Committee, Violence Against Women Unit, NAC; and director of Women’s Aid) 
explained that some women chose alternative solutions where possible, including marriage to 
Canadians, thus securing immigrant status while avoiding the media or risk of rejection in 
this uncertain area of refugee policy. Others still in determination processes (Appeals) 
decided “not to push more at that time” out of fear that publicity could result in negative 
decisions on their claims, even though the likelihood of receiving positive decisions was 
extremely low to begin with (Fernandez, interview 1995).
Another last resort strategy was going ‘into hiding’ from Canadian authorities after 
receiving deportation notice. It was primarily due to lack of alternatives. While not 
necessarily uncommon among asylum seekers generally (the real number of illegals residing 
in Canada is unknown), what uas unusual was the choice to ptMidse the fact of being in 
hiding, speaking to the media just before going into hiding (announcing the intention) or whie 
in hiding, thus blatantly defying and challenging Canadian law. This may be regarded as a 
form of civil disobedience. Their claims had already been rejected. These ‘illegals’ were 
seeking institutional recognition of their right as part of a collective identity to remain in 
Canada, even if it meant jeopardising actually staying hidden. Announcing the fact of being 
in hiding was also a powerful way of conveying to the public the depth of desperation and 
realities of persecution faced. Therese explained:
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... otherwise, I had three choices: Go in hiding; leave the country; or go in hospital 
because I was suicidal - -1 was telling my sister ‘if you don’t send the letter, the journal 
showing there is no protection for women in our country, I will throw myself under the 
metro’. And always [my lawyer] was saying ‘no no you must be brave, you have been so 
brave always, you can keep on -  braving’. (Therese, interview 1995)
As many asylum seekers and supporters have commented, ‘going underground’ is a 
last resort because it creates a life of insecurity and risk, without legal rights to work or to 
health and welfare benefits, in constant fear of being discovered and deported. Ginette went 
into hiding after both her refugee and Humanitarian and Compassionate appeals refused, she 
had gone public and the Immigration Minister refused to intervene. In hiding she told 
reporters: “I’m realty in a state of despair. I realty don’t know what to do. Living in hiding is 
no life at all.” (Ginette, Montreal Gazette,7-12-94)
Going into hiding did have strategic advantages which some claimants made use of. 
For the better part of her 21 months in hiding, Nada attempted to find people both 
sympathetic and in a position to help her remain in Canada legally. It gave her the time to go 
public, and allowed her a time of reflection and planning not available to others facing the 
urgency of upcoming deportation who would not consider going underground, like Therese. 
Nada’s campaign was well thought out and prepared. Having received the greatest media 
attention of all those who went public, Nada in many ways lay a road-map which other 
claimants and supporters later used to put pressure on the Immigration Minister and 
Immigration Canada. During and after Nada’s campaign, the ICHRDD offered campaigning 
advice to other groups based on its experience with Nada (Bronson, interview 1994).
As indicated, the desperation inherent to last resort’ strategies provided forceful 
images of Canada’s refusal to provide protection, while highlighting structural considerations 
linking personal identity to collective grievances and potentially collective rights. Although at 
the time the fourteen claimants who publicised their claims together received less individual 
press attention, the collective nature of their claims provided a strong example of the macro- 
structural and cross-cultural nature of female-specific persecution. They arrived from twelve 
different countries: St. Vincent, Bulgaria (2 claimants), Guatemala, Zaire, Seychelles, 
Dominica, Trinidad & Tobago (2 claimants), Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey, Peru and Russia.
Therese’s depiction of her final press conference -  after fighting for status one year 
before the Guidelines and one year after, being deported to a third country with her children, 
detained, rejected and sent back to Canada for deportation to the Seychelles Islands -  is 
more than ever an emphasis on structural persecution and rights. She went public both 
collectively, and again individually. While in detention she decided to hold more press 
conferences a few days before final deportation. She describes the experience of telling her 
story to the media, and how she approached the topic when confronting the public:
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So we had the press conference. Twelve o’clock I arrived with Father Robert, Glynis 
[Refugee Action Montreal] was there, we stepped out of the car and I saw a big white 
van and Father Robert said: ‘You know what it is, it is for you, the CBC.’ The room 
was all packed, people all around, so many journalists and my friends. And when I 
started to tell my story, I just said, 1 don’t know the meaning of ‘abuse’. Abuse is a 
culture.’ (Therese, interview 1994)
Like Nada, Therese’s depiction of how she went public was a story of defiance and 
desperation, but also careful reflection on the conditions and structural reasons for the abuse 
suffered and rights to asylum from it. Therese emphasises the cultural rootedness of 
domestic violence, which prevented protection in her country of origin.
From the testimonies of all the women, it is evident that going public was not simply 
a ‘forced’ outcome of their needs. It was a conscious decision involving many considerations 
that tied together personal experiences, identity as a persecuted woman and as part of a 
broader persecuted group and ethnic minority in Canada, and status as ‘invisible’ refugees in 
Canada’s refugee system. It also took into account children and other family members, as 
well as abusers’ abilities to track them down. These mediating factors are significant firstly 
because making personal and political decisions and acting on them challenges the notion of 
refugees as simply ‘forced’ migrants and ‘beneficiaries’ of foreign aid. Secondly, for the 
public, asylum seekers’ decisions and actions gave human faces with strong symbolic content, 
to political and structural persecution, making a strong bid for accountability on the part of 
both sending and receiving-countries. They were both symbolically and strategically forceful.
Public pressure tactics were no doubt a last resort option for all the women 
concerned. However some put it before going underground, while others found themselves 
having to go underground in order create time and opportunity for going public. As we shall 
see below, supporters had mixed feelings about how to combine these strategies. Some 
preferred to leave public pressure as a last resort, while others hoped to avoid claimants’ 
need to go underground by keeping that as a last resort. For claimants, in either case, going 
public followed the failure of institutional options but was mediated by important decision­
making processes about self and family, structural representation and collective identity, and 
sending and receiving-country responsibility. To take these processes for granted would be to 
discredit asylum seekers* abilities to seek out options, understand their situation and identity 
in relation to the broader political context where social constructions occur, think through 
possibilities and consequences, and make informed decisions.13 Subsequently it would 
discredit their role in national policy-making processes before attaining citizen or permanent 
resident status. These processes illuminate that asylum seekers are first political actors and
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symbols in seeking membership into a host country, and only secondly refugees according to 
the outcome of their claims and/or abilities to challenge decisions.
B. NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS’ DECISIONS AND ACTIONS 
Willingness to go public is only one of several necessary elements shaping asylum seekers 
decisions and actions. Here we shall return to two other extremely important and mutually 
informing factors mentioned earlier, and their inter-relationship: primary individual needs for 
safety, and opportunities to pursue alternative means to attaining safety when institutional 
methods fail. The first factor puts constraints and pressures upon asylum seekers, and the 
second presents options and strategies which asylum seekers may choose to exercise.
B.l Immediate Individual Need
The number one motive and goal of seeking asylum from female-specific persecution is 
immediate safety. It is a driving force behind willingness to go public, mediated by important 
decision-making processes discussed. It must be understood in its structural context, arising 
from fear of persecution and lack of alternatives. The violence feared may take a range of 
forms from more to less traditionally ‘public’ in nature, but all must be structurally rooted in, 
and encouraged, condoned or ignored by, society and the state. Because of the structural 
embeddedness of the persecution, seeking asylum is -  according to standard refugee 
definitions -  a last resort option.
We have seen how asylum seekers linked personal experiences to the political 
structural context in identifying themselves with a persecuted group and claiming collective 
rights. But their expression of experiences of persecution (or fear of) and perceived lack of 
alternatives -  is itself important for several reasons. It is informative and path-breaking in 
that it reveals forms of persecution previously unrecognised as well as the undocumented 
lack of protection in certain countries. It is also a powerful tool of public persuasion, as the 
following chapter shows. Finally, their life-stories and the telling of life-stories highlights 
tremendous courageousness in the face of extreme danger and uncertainty, which itself 
merits attention. By no means is the amount of space which can be devoted to their life- 
stories sufficient. The affidavits, argumentation and court decisions on each of the 147 
claims studied in Chapter 9 tell similar experiences of persecution, and thus easily, though 
unfortunately, illuminate the shared desperation they communicated. The claimants quoted 
here regarding experiences and fears of persecution provide an idea of the extreme nature
13 The collective action literature discusses these processes in the formation of collective identity for movement 
development and mobilisation. Whether politicisation occurs before or through contact with other actors or 
potential actors, the politicisation of identity and aims must eventually occur.
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and complexity of their situations, and the tremendous fears and urgent needs they shared. 
Some, like Nada, have already been discussed in a sufficiently detailed manner that the issue 
of need has already been touched upon.
As indicated, different forms of persecution seemed to influence how these asylum 
seekers went public. Those forms least recognised institutionally and consistently, formed the 
basis of the greatest proportion of types of claims made public.14 These involved intra- 
familial or ‘domestic’ violence, which brings the personal and the political together at its 
most insidious level. Of the seven cases with the greatest individual media attention, only 
Nada’s involved ‘public’ rather than domestic violence. However, as in many other cases, the 
persecution Nada faced was condoned by her family who therefore deprived her of one 
source of protection in her home country. Nada and these women’s experiences of 
persecution exemplify opposite ends of the range of forms of female-specific violence that 
may amount to persecution, both being culturally accepted human rights violations and thus 
structurally rooted. Of the fourteen asylum seekers who went public collectively in February 
1993, eleven involved domestic violence. One involved Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 
which may fall under a broad definition of domestic violence as any violence inflicted by or 
enforced through family members. Once case involved both domestic violence and ‘guilt by 
association’ (familial relation to political dissidents).
These cases involved fear of persecution by a husband and/or in-laws. In one 
complicated case, the death of the abusive husband while in Canada incited fears of 
persecution by in-laws in Cameroon. In statements to the press Ginette explained that her 
husband called police to resolve a domestic dispute: “he thought the police would arrest me 
because that’s what would happen in our country. But when the police saw how badly I was 
beaten, they arrested him instead.” Ginette fled to women’s shelter while he was in jail. After 
his release, discovering she had left, “he mailed a letter to his family in Cameroon saying his 
wife was responsible for his death”, then “stabbed himself in the stomach, doused his body 
with gasoline and set himself on fire” (Ginette, Montreal Gazette 6-12-94). Ginette 
subsequently received death threats from her husband’s family. She explained: “his family is 
very powerful and they can do what they want [in Cameroon]. They could kill me with a 
machete and nothing would happen.” (Ibid,6-12-94). Ginette went public after her H&C 
claim was turned down, the Immigration Minister’s refused to intervene, and her request to 
remain in Canada until the Federal Court could hear her appeal was rejected.
14 As shown in Chapter 5 daims made public were not the first involving female-specific persecution that were 
accepted, contrary to the ways they were portrayed in many media reports. However they received inconsistent 
treatment, perhaps inciting public campaigning.
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Tamarati’s situation was also complicated. She fled to a women’s shelter after two 
years in Canada, applied for refugee status and saw her husband deported to Trinidad. But 
two years later, while her claim was still being held in a backlog, her ex-husband married a 
Canadian and was accepted in Canada. Tamarati’s own claim was no longer considered 
credible because her husband no longer posed a threat to her in Trinidad. Besides the 
unfairness of the situation, in which a convicted criminal was accepted into Canada and not 
his victim, Tamarati’s future in Trinidad looked grim after having left her husband. To the 
press she stated: “I’m scared to go back, because of my in-laws.” {Montreal Gazette 10-2-95).
Dulerie’s case raised similar difficulties. She fled seventeen years of domestic violence 
involving rape, beatings, use of razors and knives, having her head slammed into a car door, 
and other forms of torture. From Trinidad Dulerie’s husband continued to threaten her in 
Canada, saying he would “chop her into little pieces”. Such threats, in letters and in phone 
calls which Dulerie taped, served as evidence in her claim for refugee status based on the risk 
she currently faced and lack of protection she had formerly experienced in Trinidad. After 
her acceptance she said to the press:
If they had sent be back, I would have killed myself. If I had gone back to Trinidad my 
husband would have killed me, so one way or another I would have been dead. Now it’s 
like being dead and waking up again. I feel like I’m alive again. (Montreal Gazette 
23/9/92)
Other claimants described similar stories involving lack of protection in countries of 
origin. One claimant described: “Even if you get in touch with the police back home, it’s 
different from here in Canada. If it’s a husband beating a wife, the police don’t want to get 
involved. They just say it’s a family problem” (Basdaye, Montreal Gazette 11-02-93). Another 
claimant, whose leave to Appeal was granted by the Federal Court in the first decision of its 
kind stated:
I was terrified for my life and felt that escape from Trinidad was my only hope. My 
husband beat me on a regular basis, sometimes several times per month. He generally 
used his fists, beating me so ferociously that I often could not see through the swelling 
in my face... He had begun using weapons and I felt that is was only a matter of time 
before he killed me. (Tee’, Court statement quoted in Toronto Star, 11-11-92).
Experiences of domestic violence can not be directly contrasted with more ‘public’ 
forms persecution, as in Nada’s case, but they do seem to have continued to encounter 
greater difficulty in refugee claims both before and after the Guidelines were instated. Thus 
the likelihood of such claimants going public was higher. As indicated earlier, even several of 
the fourteen claimants who collectively went public were later ordered deported, for a second 
time, provoking another phase of campaigning.
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Public persecution involved, in Nada’s case, public flogging upon return to Saudi 
Arabia. Another claimant (Miranda), whose persecution was the result of her previous 
husband’s political actions explained: “my oldest child and I face great danger in Guatemala. 
The authorities could take me or my child in an effort to force my first husband out of 
hiding” (Montreal Gazette 11-02-93). Ines, from Peru, had already the evidence of authorities 
intent to persecute her for the actions of her relatives -  her head was scarred from being 
doused with quicklime (Piriou, interview 1996).
B.2 Opportunities and Support
Willingness and need to ‘go public’ are not in themselves sufficient to foster collective 
identity and action. Surely the structure of support also further shaped asylum seekers’ 
decisions and actions. Information and awareness, contacts, mobility, and politicization, 
along with a host of other mediating factors, may be important influences on whether, and 
how, asylum is actually sought through extra-institutional actions. Thus we would expect the 
structure of support that developed to inform or reaffirm asylum seekers’ decisions to go 
public. Support takes many forms: moral, emotional and ideological (i.e. political framing 
processes about self, rights, and collective identity) support; material and human resources 
(i.e. organisational, human labour, political and legal knowledge, access to mass media). The 
various forms of support may work toward, and present asylum seekers with, strategies for 
achieving the primary aim, safety. It involves both offering advice and support, and means 
and tools for claimants to go public.
What we find from looking at the ways and extent to which the means and strategies 
offered by supporters actually shaped asylum seekers’ decisions and actions, is also re­
affirmation of the roles of the latter as political actors. Analysis reveals not only supporters’ 
influence as providers of information, means, and moral support for going public. It shows 
that (a) they emphasised giving asylum seekers the final say and respecting asylum seekers’ 
choices, and (b) asylum seekers made rational and strategic decisions when presented with 
options or strategies. Asylum seekers’ decision to go public involved strategic considerations 
shaped by and also shaping the internal environment of supporters, as part of two-way 
structures of influence.
Unfamdiarity, lack o f mfomiadon, and desperation: impetus to seek out alternative sources o f support 
Undoubtedly, asylum seekers’ decisions and actions were strongly influenced by their 
unfamiliarity with the external environment, and by supporters who could inform and 
support them. As well recognised, transnational migrants face language barriers as well as 
legal and administrative systems and social and political customs with which they are
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unfamiliar and which constrain their abilities for action. These asylum seekers are no 
exception, although some had resided in Canada for several years. Simply making an 
independent refugee claim (before any negative decision on claims or decisions about going 
public can be made) can be difficult. This is may be enhanced for female asylum seekers, 
who face cultural barriers particular to their gender (Paul,1992). It is particularly amplified for 
those fleeing persecution not traditionally recognised. Both are less likely to receive 
spontaneous and pertinent information and advice through typical interaction with the 
immigration system, including government, nongovernment and legal counsel who 
themselves lack information or sensitivity concerning the particular group. Added to these 
constraints are the psychological traumas and fears that refugees often face, and which 
gender-related experiences of violence are particularly likely to foster (see Chapter 4).
Sponsored or dependent asylum seekers already in Canada face particular concerns. 
These asylum seekers fall into two categories: those currently in status determination 
processes, often lasting several years, and those already accepted through the claims of family 
members whose sponsorship agreement breaks down.
For those whose persecution occurred within the family, transnational migration of 
the whole family may appear as a panacea that is later proven illusory. Indeed, the pressures 
of status determination and integration may cause an escalation of violence (MacLeod and 
Shin 1990). Therese falls into the category of those engaged in status determination 
processes with a sponsor, when the need to make her own claim became apparent.
I came to Canada in September 1991 to join my husband, even though we had 
problems. I had pressure at home, and his political problems. I thought my marriage will 
work, because I left all the political and social problems back home. By coming here, 
things got worse, I realised I was wrong. (Therese, interviewl995)
Others came to Canada with violent spouses because they had no option to separate 
or divorce according to social norms in their home countries. Repercussions could include 
not only escalation of violence, but social ostracisation, losing guardianship of children, 
inability to earn a living or find support due to gendered divisions between paid and unpaid 
work, and even legal punishment.
A common misconception among battered immigrant and refugee women is that 
they will automatically be deported if sponsorship is withdrawn, for example if separation or 
divorce is sought (MacLeod and Shin,1990). They lack information and support to make 
their own claims. But the greater problem for the asylum seekers studied was the lack of 
information and advice about the nature of their particular claims. Both those battered 
women whose husband’s claims are being determined, and those already accepted as 
dependants, may be unaware that they have sufficient grounds to make their own claims, or
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that their own stories of persecution are important. Although practice is now changing, 
standard immigration procedures at the time of the study did not inform, advise, or 
encourage women to make their own claims (Paul,1992).
Lack of information and fears raised by dependency on her husband’s refugee claim 
had serious consequences for Therese and her children. Initially she did not make use of 
protection Canadian police could offer because she feared it would interfere with the status 
determination process, while she also was unaware that she could make a claim of her own:
... one day my boy called the police because [my husband] threw the telephone at me, 
and hit me. [My son] called and when he told me he called the police, I went to hide 
and I didn’t want the police to see me. I didn’t want really to get involved with the 
policemen because my mind said: You are here, immigration is a big deal for you; if you 
are starting to get involved with the police, you will not get a chance with immigration. 
This was in my mind! So I said to myself: You better keep quiet! (Therese, 
interview,1995).
Often increasing desperation forced asylum seekers to take action, regardless of lack 
of legal information about consequences or alternatives to deportation. The greatest 
providers of information were, in most cases, women’s shelters and lawyers. But like 
women’s shelters, other organisations helping asylum seekers who went public were often 
not traditional refugee organisations. They included churches, ethnic community groups, 
advocacy groups and front-line service groups. Nada sought help from NOIVMW (geared 
toward women already established in Canada) and the ICHRDD (not typically involved in 
domestic refugee claims). Therese and Tamarati contacted the CCR and ICHRDD through 
chance encounters on the street with individuals who referred them (Therese, interviewl995; 
Bronson interview,1995).
Therese is a good illustration of the variety of contacts and influences informing her 
decision, and of their outcome. Two events convinced Therese to seek help: the escalation of 
her abuse, and finding out that her husband had been sexually abusing her children. Upon 
discovering the latter she sought advice from various sources and received different opinions 
about what to do. She contacted Youth Services and talked with a psychiatrist, who helped 
her understand the abuse of her children and suggested how she might prevent her husband 
from being alone with them. These professionals were unable to advise her on immigration 
problems when she enquired. The president of the Seychelles Association, in which she was 
a member, told her:
‘Why did you have to come here? Why you didn’t stay [in Seychelles]? This was your 
chance for breakup!’ I said: ‘I don’t know, I followed my husband here, I didn’t know 
what was happening with the family.’ And [the president] told me: ‘Keep quiet until you 
have everything with immigration, then I will help you.’ (Therese, interview!995).
177
Therese did ‘keep quiet’, but her husband’s abuse intensified when she confronted 
him about abusing the children. When she requested a separation, he threatened to kill her. 
He was arrested by Canadian authorities, and when he was released and his refugee claim was 
rejected, he continued to threaten her. He was deported in handcuffs due to his criminal 
behaviour. “He wanted me to pay for the rejection of his claim, even though I had nothing 
to do with it... Even when he was back home he still threatened to kill me because he was 
jailed here in Canada and rejected, so I had to pay.”( Therese, interview 1995).
When Therese received her own deportation notice and explained her situation to 
immigration authorities, she was granted leave to re-apply on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds. Knowing that there was no protection from domestic violence in 
the Seychelles Islands, she re-applied, but was rejected. Fearful of returning to her country, 
where her husband continued to issue death threats and police protection was unavailable, 
she then sought advice from a priest.
I told the priest what I want to do, and he said it’s the wrong idea: Why don’t I take my 
money and go back to my country?’... But I said to him ‘I will do anything I have to do 
to save the lives of my children.’ (Therese, interviewl995).
Ultimately the decision was hers to make. She opted to fight her case even it if 
entailed going public, which core supporters offered her the means to do. By chance a 
woman she met while waiting for a bus advised her to contact Janet Dench from the CCR. 
Dench put her in touch with a new lawyer and others in the advocacy network.
Supporters* viem on going public advising respecting supporting
Glynis Williams, who worked closely with Therese, expressed an often repeated attitude 
among core supporters regarding influencing claimants’ decisions and actions:
I am reluctant [about claimants going public] until, first of all, you have a whole group 
that is agreed that this is the only option and that we have to go this route. I also think 
it is the person themselves who has to make that decision because I have been involved 
in some cases over the years, of people who got very dependent on you to make the 
decisions about what was the right thing to do -  and that is a killer, emotionally. People 
have to determine their own lives, and if you don’t push them to make some of their 
own decisions, because it is a hard decision, they live with it. Once they are in the 
media, that information will be sent back to their country; you can’t hide people for too 
long; and there is simply a limit to what we can do. So that is something the people 
have to think about themselves. (Williams,RAM interview 1995)
Similarly, Bronson (ICHRDD) emphasised to Nada the consequences of going 
public (as discussed earlier), and also Nada’s ultimate power of choice:
We had always said Whenever you want to back out that is fine, but you are the one 
who will have to say it, because you are the one who will have to pay, you and your 
family, if things turn out badly against you, if you lose.’ Because that was all I could say.
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Maybe we will win, this is my best bet, this is my educated guess on what will happen to 
you... And we will do whatever we can if they deport you and you are thrown in jail: we 
will write letters, we can make diplomatic representation. But we can’t save your life.’ 
(Bronson,ICHRDD, 1995)
Therese and Nada chose to go public like the others, weighing possible losses against 
the possibilities of success and the best available recourse of action. Bronson emphasised 
going public as a last resort’ strategy presented to Nada.
It was fairly obvious to me, though I was quite naive and ignorant of the immigration 
system and how it worked at that time, that if we got public attention on her case, she 
would win it. And that would be the only way she would win it. And that I knew in 
function of my background and my understanding of politics. (Ibid).
Augenfeld from the TCMR described media use in more negative terms, as a last 
resort strategy and one not suitable for most asylum seekers, despite powerful public impact:
It is not usually good to do case work through the media. You leave it to the end to use 
as a last resort because if you haven’t exhausted the other avenues [government] will say 
You haven’t given us a chance yet’. And the media is hard because you need a case that 
stands out, and the person in question and the family in question has to agree and has to 
be able to explain what is going on. And the media does not always pick up the points 
that you think are the important ones... Of course, people always respond to these 
individual stories... But you also have to think ‘how many times can you actually do this 
through the media?’ (Augenfeld,TCMR 1995).
Hesitancy to use the media indicates that NGOs are not likely to push asylum seekers 
to go public, for a variety of reasons. However, they do see the advantages and power of 
using media appropriately.
Lawyers also were firm on keeping media as a last resort strategy. Only after at least 
four separate requests/claims were rejected did Ginette’s lawyer state: “I have good contacts 
in the immigration department, but I was told (yesterday) that the Montreal department 
won’t change its mind. The only thing I can do is appeal to the public to try to help her.” 
(Belanger. Montreal Gazette 6 December,1994)
However, conflict did emerge among supporters when it came to claimants going 
into hiding. Many supported decisions to go into hiding, either to allow an opportunity to 
campaign, or upon the failure to overturn decisions through campaigning in particular cases. 
Belanger, a lawyer for several of the publicised cases, declared: “You must never give up. The 
secret: never give up. Even if it means saying to the woman, ‘go into hiding’” (Belanger 
interview,1995). However supporters were clearly aware that ‘hiding’ was no solution. 
Elisabeth Montecino from Women’s Aid, which sheltered seven of the fourteen claimants 
who went public, commented: “We didn’t say in any case that is the solution. I don’t agree 
with it because I do not think that it is really life... Maybe, when there are women who don’t
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have a choice but to go underground while some decisions are being made; but we don’t 
want again to do that in the future.” (Montecino, Women’s Aid, interview 1995).
Women’s shelters that often supported such decisions and provided residence were 
adamant that if possible it should be a last resort, behind going public. They emphasised the 
conflict in strategy among supporters, which emerged in several cases regarding whoi a 
claimant should go public. Montecino felt strongly that contrary to lawyers’ advise, claimants 
should not wait until they have already been ordered deported or they have gone into hiding 
once the deportation date has passed, to go public. They indicated less faith in government 
making acceptable decisions under only pressure from institutional channels.
Glynis Williams from RAM also emphasised that if possible, going underground 
should be avoided except in the failure of public pressure tactics or lack of opportunity to 
use public pressure tactics sooner.
I am always amazed because my experience of going underground is that you have no 
resources, no access to money, so who is paying? Is it a long-term strategy? ... As far as 
government is concerned you are not a drain on the public purse any more, and if you 
are not a danger they are probably happy if you get lost. But you have no status, you 
have no future, what do you do with health care, if you’ve got children either here -  you 
have no way to protect them or put them in school -  or if they are overseas they are 
never going to get here. It is a terrible limbo situation. Though maybe it works in the 
short term, I don’t know. (Glynis Williams, RAM, interviewl995).
As both Montecino and Williams indicate, despite its negative sides, being in hiding 
before going public had its strategic advantages that were discussed using Nada’s example. 
Williams explains, “It would work in the short term if you are working on something and yet 
they have determined to deport somebody. It seems to me you have got to have some card 
up your sleeve still... that you hope that time will help you deal with.” (Williams,RAM 1995).
Public pressure, except when used only after claimants went into hiding, was a last 
resort tactic shaped by the two-way structure of influence between asylum seekers and core 
supporters. Asylum seekers’ decisions to ‘go public’ were heavily influenced by external 
support and advice, and by the desperation of their situations. But neither need nor 
opportunities and support were in themselves sufficient to foster their action. It would be a 
gross oversimplification to say that asylum seekers take certain actions simply because they 
are forced to out of the desperation of their situations, or that supporters simply act/make 
decisions for them. Rather, asylum seekers are rational, strategic actors interacting with their 
structural environment of opportunities and constraints and exercising choices within it, 
often in an incremental or trial-and-error manner. Going public came to involve both 
personal and political factors in decision-making by asylum seekers, alongside strategic 
decision-making informed by the options supporters offered. Asylum seekers had to weigh
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the possible risks of going public, including further endangering themselves and their 
families, against needs, alternatives, opportunities and beliefs about identity and rights.
We shall now explore how supporters became involved, revealing asylum seekers’ 
roles in shaping the structure and nature of support they received, and presenting the 
outcome in terms of the internal political culture of the network that developed.
Sh a p in g  t h e  st r u c t u r e  o f  su ppo r t : m o b il isin g  su ppo r t e r s’ bel ie f  system s
INTO ACTION
How did asylum seekers influence their environment of support, and with what 
consequences? This question can be explored by looking at why and how core supporters 
became involved with the issue of sex-persecution, public pressure activities and related 
policy reforms. This is based on qualitative analysis of supporters’ explanations and 
descriptions of their involvement, in relation to the following factors: profession and 
organisational type, previous experience and pre-disposition toward the issue, core ideology, 
and how supporters linked ideology with particular asylum seekers with whom they came 
into contact.15
Several important themes emerge from analysis of the onset and development of 
core supporters’ involvement. First, a clear link exists between the translation of supporters’ 
‘deep core’ ideology into participatory actions, and supporters coming into contact with 
particular asylum seekers at a time when either perceived potential or inter-organisational 
support for successful actions was high. Deep core values are defined as “the 
highest/broadest level” in a hierarchy or value set of beliefs. They include:
... basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the perceived nature of humans or 
the relative valuation of individual freedom or social equality, which operate across 
virtually all policy domains; the familiar left/right scale operates at this level. (Sabatier 
1994:180)
Second, supporters described the initial impetus and evolving nature of their 
involvement over time in terms of a two-fold perception of individual asylum seekers’ (a) 
structural representations and (b) immediate individual needs.
All core supporters’ deep core values were predisposed toward issues raised by 
asylum seekers’ claims. But their profession, organisational type, and previous experience 
influenced the nature of their predisposition. Deep core values were reflected in two most 
commonly heard reasons for campaigning: (1) A particular case or set of cases was
15 The collective action literature describes factors such as ideological support (or predisposition), previous 
organisational support, and past participation or previous experiences (personal and work) contributing to the 
“mobilisation potential” of ‘potential’ actors. See Kriesi 1992..
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‘illustrative’ or ‘representative’ of a broader problem -  violation of women’s rights as human 
rights violations, and lack of corresponding state responsibility -  due to women’s structural 
inequality worldwide. This raises Canada’s responsibility under international human rights 
and refugee law. (2) A particular claimant’s experience was a type of persecution chronically 
ignored in the Canadian refugee system due to inherent structural inequality, placing that 
claimant in a dire situation requiring immediate outside support.
The analysis below sheds light on asylum seekers as a crucial link between core 
supporters’ deep core values, and actions finally taken based on those values. It also sheds 
light on why and how issue advocacy arose, considering that Canada had not previously been 
challenged on the matter, nor had these issues previously been the focus of Canaidan 
research or education by government or NGOs.
U mbrella a n d  advocacy  organisations
As umbrella organisations, the TCMR, CCR, ICHRDD and NAC do not typically engage in 
front-line work with individuals and communities. They typically approach social issues with 
macro level aims of policy change, education, research and inter-organisational work. 
Among these groups, the exemplary nature of cases was crucial. Participation was based 
foremost on a case or set of cases considered representative of violations of women’s human 
rights, indicating Canada’s responsibility to provide protection under international law. The 
TCMR, involved particularly in later Consultation processes, explained:
Normally we do not take on individual cases, unless those cases are illustrative of an 
issue. Some cases carry a wider issue with it, so we get involved. Everybody needs help 
but as a coalition we can’t get involved in all cases and take them all on, so we tend to 
decide when we get involved based on what issue it represents. So with Nada for 
example it was the whole wider issue of gender persecution. (Augenfeld, TCMR 
interview 1995).
Describing the down-side of this, Augenfeld remarked: “unfortunately, it is always around 
some desperate case. It is unfortunate that there has to be somebody’s life on the line...”.
A small number of the asylum seekers -  particularly Nada, Taramati, Dularie and 
Therese -  provided the initial impetus for supporters, who in espousing the cause and 
developing policy aims and strategies for one asylum seeker later got involved with others. 
Advocacy for the issue was always linked to advocacy for particular cases.
Nada also provided the political impetus for the ICHRDD’s, which generally takes 
on neither individual cases nor domestic issues. Their involvement was precipitated by a 
chance encounter between Nada and Bronson (Media Relations Officer at the time), at what 
was described as a semi-political evening. Nada (whose claim had already been rejected) was
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introduced to Bronson, who offered to look into the situation and “invest time and energy in 
it” upon approval by Broadbent, the President.
Nada came here, she told me her stoiy. I thought that it merited our attention... 
because we saw it as an international human rights issue... I thought it was a brilliant 
illustration of how women’s rights are not considered to be human rights: that her rights 
were massively violated in Saudi Arabia was not enough for the Canadian Immigration 
and Refugee Board to determine that she was a refugee. It did not matter that her rights 
as a woman were denied to her. (Bronson,ICHRDD, interview 1995).
Nada’s experience illustrated both lack of state protection (in sending and receiving- 
countries) and women’s human rights violations. It also illustrated a particular form of 
female-specific persecution contributing to the ICHRDD’s strategic decision to support her 
and not others at the time. This is apparent in Bronson’s depiction of how, again through a 
chance encounter, she met Tamarati whose situation involved domestic violence. Meeting 
Taramati prompted Bronson to consider advocating for individuals fleeing more ‘private’ 
types of female-specific persecution, including not only Tamarati but also Dulerie whose case 
had recently been publicised without ICHRDD support:
I met Taramati on the street one day, completely by accident... she asked me where to 
find [a street]. I offered to walk her to the comer... And we got to talking. It turned 
out to be Taramati. She ended up telling me her story on the street comer -  about how 
she had been threatened by her husband, how she had two children, how she was in 
hiding and she was going to a [women’s shelter]. I came into work that morning and I 
said I thought we should take on the three cases: Nada, Taramati and Dulerie. 
(Bronson,ICHRDD, interview 1995).
However, strategic considerations hinging on the different forms of persecution the women 
faced prompted the ICHRDD to pursue the cases separately. The ICHRDD became 
involved with Nada, but decided not to simultaneously advocate for Taramati and Dulerie.
I wanted us to take on Duleri from Bangladesh as well, whose case I saw as just 
appalling... and Tamarati from Trinidad, again a case of domestic violence... But Mr. 
Broadbent’s political judgement was: No, let’s go with Nada... because it’s the easiest 
thing for them to swallow. The Canadian government can not go against an argument 
of equality. They can still argue that domestic violence is a private issue, a cultural 
tradition, whatever they want... At that time [domestic violence as a human rights 
violation] wasn’t at all clear either in Mr. Broadbent’s head or in the government’s head 
or among Human Rights groups. (Bronson,ICHRDD, interview 1995).
The ICHRDD did later advocate for claimants facing domestic violence. The point 
here is that the combination of contact with asylum seekers, the Centre’s pre-established 
ideological commitment to women’s human rights, and strategic considerations prompted 
their participation. Dulerie was the earliest of the three to publicise her case (July 1992), she 
did so through women’s shelters and was the only one not in direct contact with the 
ICHRDD. For the ICHRDD, not accustomed to front-line service work and lacking
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experience with the particular asylum seekers, contact with asylum seekers appears to have 
been crucial to participation. However the Centre first pursued the case with the strongest 
legal arguments -  the public nature and non-discrimination argument of Nada’s claim.
NAC is another powerful organisation dealing generally with macro level issues, and 
lacking experience with female-specific persecution. Nevertheless NAC initially became 
involved through Tamarati. Contact occurred through overlapping membership on NACs 
Executive Board and Women’s Aid, the shelter where Tamarati was residing. Following 
Taramati’s deportation notice in February 1992 (scheduled for October of that year) NAC 
formed a special committee to address the issue of gender persecution. As head of the 
violence against women unit in the Executive Committee of NAC, Flora Fernandez 
explained that Tamarati’s deportation was delayed with the support of NAC, “and after, in 
the Executive Committee of NAC, we spoke about that [case] and we understood that big 
problems would arrive, and we started to prepare” (Fernandez, interviewl995).
NAC’s involvement grew after making statements to the media, as refugee claimants 
began arriving at its Toronto office. NAC’s inability to cope with the situation was over­
ridden by the structural nature of the problem and the deep emotional and ideological 
affinity for these women’s situation. Fernandez explained that as an umbrella group NAC 
would not typically advocate for individuals, but that these women “came in a group”:
When we go to the media... the women who understand that, who see this problem 
and who have this problem, go to the Toronto office of NAC. The people arrive and 
arrive! They cry, and it is a very emotional time for us, for NAC and for me too. We feel 
very big responsibility. But NAC is a lobby group, usually we work on very big issues. 
We don’t have the infrastructure for work on the personal problems, the individual’s 
problems; we can’t give [front-line] service too. But we saw that problem is like a group 
of problems... those women come in a group. So for that [reason] I took the decision 
to take the cases. I had about forty cases. Of those I arrived at fourteen... (Fernandez, 
interview 1995).
The fourteen cases publicised as a group in Februaiy 1993, out all those NAC considered 
representing, arrived through a combination of shelters with such cases at the time, and 
women presenting themselves directly to NAC.
From the onset, NAC was a strong supporter of women fleeing all forms of female- 
specific persecution, from more to less ‘public’, recognising the structural representative 
nature of all forms and also individual asylum seekers’ paramount need for immediate safety. 
NAC had been committed to ending violence against women since the 1970s (Vickers,1993). 
However, asked about the influence of the campaigning process upon NAC’s mandate, 
Fernandez expressed a clear sense of achievement and benefit for NAC internally as it 
expanded its scope.
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We are very proud about that. We worked so much -  it was crazy. We don’t have the 
resources, we don’t have the money, and we have too many people who wait with only 
hope, about what we can do. It was not in our ‘mission’... We didn’t have any [extra 
funding for it]. We had only the solidarity with the women. Only that. It was hard to 
go with all that pressure, all on a deadline. In another way, we learned the importance 
of the media. (Fernandez, NAC, interview 1995).
NAC’s broadened mandate became a source of pride for the significance of the task 
itself, their achievements under difficult circumstances, and the effectiveness of some of the 
strategies learned to galvanise public support. Like many core supporters NAC lacked 
sufficient financial resources for additional (new) activities, relying instead on human and 
non-material resources. NAC’s pre-existence and pre-disposition toward the issues were 
fundamental products of rising opportunities and resources (chapter 6), but taking on the 
new policy issue was not a result of new resources or particular expertise. As for other 
organisations, the expansion of organisational mandate occurred before new resources and 
expertise were available. Augenfeld from the TCMR described the importance of links 
between women's and refugee groups for the technical information the latter could provide, 
but still observed that NACs involvement developed before its expertise:
When some of the cases went public, the network of women's organisations really got 
involved. And when NAC got involved, they got a lot of exposure. NAC got involved 
with a commitment to shepherd those cases that they adopted. But they had to learn 
about the in's and out's of immigration: how things work, the nitty-gritty. They had to 
learn about that because it is not as simple as it seems at first glance. (Augenfeld,TCMR, 
interview 1995).
Expanded mandates typically occurred through heavy reliance on extra volunteer 
labour or ‘over-time’. Individuals contributed personal time and energy, alongside offering 
free services to the asylum seekers (even private lawyers, as we shall see, often offered free 
services). According to explanations provided by core supporters, emotional and ideological 
affinity for the issue alongside the urgency of individual asylum seekers’ situations were 
paramount, motivating supporters to transcend resource limitations.
Fr o n t-lin e  organisations
Whereas larger organisations tended to take hold of particular cases precisely because they
were exemplary and because supporters had not previously come into contact with cases of a
similar nature and urgency, experiences of front-line service organisations were often the
opposite. Women’s shelters, organisations working directly with immigrants and refugees,
and at times family/civil law or refugee law practitioners (discussed later) all worked with the
target population on a daily basis and saw these asylum seekers in terms of their individual
needs first and foremost. They tended to equate particular cases with the general problem
but saw each case as one of many as result of regular contact with refugees and/or battered
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women, often including previous experience with women fleeing sex persecution. Thus 
rather than a unique opportunity to pursue a newly recognised issue area, the exemplary 
nature of cases was needy considered a means of arguing for a policy solution to current and 
future individuals’ situations. Their changing approach to dealing with these cases was 
influenced by external factors including (a) changing conditions or opportunities for women 
asylum seekers within the refugee system, which increased the contact and nature of 
interactions with shelter workers (described in chapter six); and (b) new opportunities for 
front-line workers to engage in policy advocacy of the particular kind. For front-line service 
groups the latter entailed the political support, legal-know-how, and a legal-ideological 
framework which the larger organisations could provide. These factors will be discussed 
alongside actors’ conceptualisation of links between ideology and action, and consequences 
for policy advocacy.
As basis for participation some supporters emphasised the Canada’s refugee system’s 
failure to satisfy these women’s needs, rather than the existence and nature of the violence 
the women revealed. The latter was taken for granted or continuous in these supporters’ 
experience; whereas the former involved changing conditions and needs that brought more 
of these kinds of asylum seekers to them, and new ways of challenging the system.
As expected, women’s shelters became involved specifically through and because of 
women fleeing domestic violence, for whom front-line services were provided. Their 
involvement was significant particularly because some other organisations, such as the 
ICHRDD, were less strategically inclined to represent domestic violence cases, at least early 
on. As indicated earlier, refugee claims involving domestic violence continued to encounter 
the greatest difficulties attaining refugee status. Of the twelve cases involving familial 
violence, at least seven had been or were residing at women’s shelters. These shelters tended 
to be strong public supporters, and usually through them asylum seekers came into contact 
with NAC, which helped publicise claims collectively.
What was the difference between these cases and previous ones encountered by the 
shelters? With fifteen years experience at Women’s Aid, Flora Fernandez argued that the 
problem of gender persecution was recognised long before campaigns began in 1992/93. She 
explains Women’s Aid’s use of public pressure tactics at that time at as a factor of increased 
need for immigration and refugee policy change following the Conservative government’s 
increasingly restrictive stance on migration in the late 1980s. Deportation of women fleeing 
domestic violence, she contends,
...was not a problem until after the Conservative party arrived, and for sure with 
Immigration Minister Bouchard. He made very machiavellian moves against refugees... 
and very big manipulation in the media. After that the problem for women who leave
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conjugal violence was like the maximum result [of that negative climate]. (Fernandez, 
interview 1995).
Earlier, while formal rules guiding entry did not exist, relaxed criteria may have been applied 
in cases involving immigrant or refugee women whose sponsors became abusive, and for 
whom return to their country of origin posed a serious threat. As increasingly restrictive 
legislation and Conservative Immigration Ministers reduced alternatives, women residing at 
the shelter could only avoid deportation by taking public action. Supporters at other shelters 
also noted significant effects of the rising backlog of asylum seekers awaiting decisions on 
claims. During the 1980s and early 1990s backlogs contributed to an increasing proportion of 
immigrant women residing in the shelters studied and a rise in the average duration of their 
stay.16 This increased contact with women fleeing female-specific persecution.
Comparing women’s shelters’ previous and later experiences, we can see how the 
emphasis on state responsibility changed. Earlier public tactics involved different policy 
goals and substantially different inter-organisational support. At Flora Tristan, public 
sensitisation work (educating the public) and pressure activities in 1991 were argued primarily 
in terms of sponsorship abuse. New frameworks for advocacy, including both ideological 
and institutional support, emerged around the later cases; while often still involving some 
form of sponsorship abuse, domestic violence was contextualised within human rights 
discourses and discrimination toward women in the refugee system. Earlier cases also 
enjoyed little external support aside from lawyers. Cases publicised after 1992 under the 
broader issue of female-specific persecution enjoyed the interest of larger organisations and 
umbrella groups, as well as many supporters among the public at large.
But asked why they campaigned in 1992 and 1993, Montecino explained succinctly: 
“We were involved because we had such cases at that time... they were residents here” 
(interview,1995). These cases were publicised not because they were new to the shelter but 
because they had the opportunity to be presented within the broader context of claims being 
made and through the supporting network. Montecino emphasised refugee women’s acute 
need for support due to the inadequacy of Canada’s refugee system, rather than the 
exemplary nature of the domestic violence as human rights violations, or sex persecution:
... there are different factors that help these women. If the woman is alone, without 
resources, she doesn’t have a chance to be accepted by the government. If the woman is 
helped by groups, a shelter or other kinds of community groups, she has a greater 
chance to resolve the problem. (Montecino, Flora Tristan, interview 1995).
Montecino also expressed overlap between refugee claimants’ needs and structural 
representation motivating factors for participation, where system failure and needs stand out:
16 1996 Questionnaire: Nellies Hostel; Harmony House; Maison d’Amite (5% yearly increase, 1993 to 1995).
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I imagine what can happen with a woman that doesn’t have any good lawyer, doesn’t 
have the help of any organisation, and doesn’t have any other resource. She can be 
deported very easily. That is why I say it is very good initiative in Canada as the first 
country that has talked about gender persecution, because before they were thinking 
that it is only the men that are persecuted, not that women because they are women also 
suffer persecution in different countries, and also that domestic violence can be a factor. 
(Montecino, Flora Tristan, interview 1995).
In both previous and later advocacy, safety from violence and deportation, in 
particular cases, was the short-term goal while policy change the long-term goal. To address 
sponsorship abuse, women must be enabled to make independent claims, and sponsored 
women need a guarantee that they will not be deported for leaving abusive sponsors. For 
female-specific persecution, whether or not involving sponsorship abuse, the law must 
account for women’s structural experiences.
[As the problem] is going to repeat it is going to... create other social problems. We 
can’t save energy, money or anything without letting the problem get poor. So, I think 
that the immigration structure has to be revised with the times. What happened was 
that laws were made so long ago, they are “middle age” laws. But now the times don’t 
correspond, reality doesn’t correspond with the law. So these laws are going to create 
other problems, per application, with the people here. If we want to avoid social 
problems, we have to revise that. (Montecino, Flora Tristan, interview 1995).
Montecino emphasises structural elements in the Canadian refugee system and the need for 
violence against women to be addressed through immigration and refugee law reform, in 
order to get at both structural causes and outcomes of the problem.
Campaigning was also pursued because public pressure seemed the last chance for 
these women to remain in Canada. Policy advocacy was a means to argue these cases, and 
later became an end in itself. Flora Tristan’s continuing sensitisation work (informing the 
public and advocating for and with asylum seekers and immigrants) was considered 
important for both means and ends. Between April 1993 and March 1994 the shelter gave 
26 interviews with the media, participated in 21 conferences, 26 meetings and 11 meetings 
with students, and worked with other asylum seekers whose cases were publicised (Flora 
Tristan, annual report 1994/95).
RAM, a front-line organisation working with refugees in entry and settlement 
processes, also became a core supporter through cases involving domestic violence. But 
unlike women’s shelters RAM did not have previous experience with such cases. It had 
knowledge of the immigration system and an ideological pre-disposition toward work with 
women refugees. Emphasis on advocacy work increased when its board was restructured in 
1992. Contact with particular asylum seekers in 1993 precipitated its participation, first 
peripherally (in Nada’s case) and then directly (in Therese’s case). Glynis Williams (co­
ordinator) explained that the core advocacy network developed through Nada: “Some people
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knew one another [previously], but the rest of us got pulled in... the push really came more 
from the individual cases.” She also described public support arising from “people like Nada, 
coming forward from out of the blue, on her own initiative... She was articulate enough, 
though she didn’t get accepted at first, but she knew that women’s issues are at a very 
different stage in our country than they are in Saudi Arabia” (Williams,RAM interview 1995).
In this sense RAM was more like the larger umbrella groups without previous 
experience. But it was like women’s shelters in seeing advocacy arise due to increased 
opportunities, and focusing foremost on the acuteness of individual asylum seekers’ 
situations and the immediacy of their needs.
We noticed that when other issues around refugees were not being picked up or people 
were just getting in a ‘compassion fatigue’, that around Nada’s case when that finally 
broke and was quite successful... we had a broad range of groups that had an interest in 
the subject, that were not just refugee organisations. Whereas, I think it is fair to say 
that on other kinds of cases there has not been the kind of broad spectrum of 
organisations that were affected by the issue, that were involved, as there were in this 
case: women’s groups, women’s shelters, groups that are increasingly seeing immigrant 
or refugee women seeking their support. That was a whole new network of people that 
got involved and took up the refugee cause. (Williams,RAM interview 1995).
Here Williams describes increased opportunities for action, from the point of view of a 
refugee and humanitarian organisations, as arising from the interest of women’s groups, 
rather than the other way around. Umbrella groups similarly expressed the significance of 
support by women’s groups, as indicated earlier, however for achieving outcomes rather than 
precipitating their own involvement due to strategic potential for success.
Lawyers
Like RAM, lawyers occupied an interesting position between groups and asylum seekers, 
non-service and service (front-line) oriented groups. This was reflected in their combined 
emphasis on immediate needs of clients, and the exemplary nature of their cases.
One of the most vocal and active lawyers in gender-related cases at the time of the 
campaigning, Nada’s lawyer, was in a special position to describe several types of previous 
experiences within the immigration system. Cote’s previous experience was in several 
capacities: as immigration officer (border official), RHO (Refugee Hearing Officer, who 
presides as a neutral party during the oral hearing of the refugee claim), an adjudicator 
making decisions on claims, and finally a lawyer in private practice. This provides a well- 
rounded perspective on the immigration system and the particular types of claims in it. As 
an adjudicator between 1989 and 1992, she explains:
I had been expecting to see these cases, it has been my interest for a long time, so as an 
adjudicator I was just waiting for those cases to appear. One did appear one day, a very 
clear gender case. It was a woman, ‘Caroline’... and she was claiming that she was
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afraid of going back because her husband had been abusing her, and she was saying that 
her country would not protect her. This, back then although it is not long ago, seemed 
to be like: ‘how can you ever expect that this would be accepted!’ (Cote, interview 1994).
Clearly, she was on the look out for an exemplary case. However, she recognised that the 
challenges faced and posed by such claims within the immigration system were fundamental 
to the imrisibility of such cases within the system. Earlier, as an immigration officer at the 
border, her experience was common: male refugees tended to do the talking, women tended 
to be silent and not make their own claims. As a RHO and later an adjudicator, she observed:
some lawyers would dare to present the case going along a gender-based claim, but they 
would not say it like that necessarily. More often than not it would be presented... 
under the ‘social group’ category, which as one of the five grounds of the Convention is 
fine. But when a case was presented, it was received with a lot of scepticism. (Cote, 
interview 1994).
The atmosphere she describes among adjudicators was predominant apoliticism.
We were civil servants first and foremost... there was no criteria to assess your genuine 
interest in immigration-refugee problematics. So my colleagues were people who just 
did not have political ways of seeing things. None were clearly feminist, that was 
evident also. (Cote, interview 1994).
Cote finally became involved with a claimant who was clearly political and had 
sought help: “Diana [Bronson, ICHRDD] had told me about this case in the very beginning. 
I thought it was interesting but I didn’t get into it until Nada phoned me.” She offered her 
services free to Nada and became a core supporter in the network that developed. She 
represented approximately forty gender-related cases in the next three years.
Other lawyers had extensive previous experience through dual work in immigration 
and civil law specialising in domestic violence. They tended to work on cases of sponsorship 
breakdown before 1993, and later on gender-related persecution (under the Guidelines) 
which may or may not involve sponsorship complications. Among lawyers interviewed, 
women’s shelters most often referred such cases.
One major advocate in refugee law, with 13 years experience with domestic violence 
cases and extensive involvement with refugees who went public, likened the lawyer’s role to 
that of an orchestra conductor: able to direct people as to how to use the law, but not being 
the primary power behind change. As she described it, her role was in the legal battle, getting 
media attention for particular cases, and providing individuals and interested organisations 
with information on how to proceed: “on writing letters and press releases, what journalists 
to talk to, how the law works, how different procedures work... and who else can be of 
help” (Belanger, interview 1995). She emphasised solving individual women’s cases, more 
than policy goals or the exemplary nature of the cases. Belanger’s most strongly emphasised
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point was that the number of cases of this type seen by lawyers is no indicator of the 
numbers or proportion of such women in Canada, which are much greater.
Rather than looking out for exemplary cases, Belanger made increasing use of 
emerging opportunities to assist such women, in particular the increase in social resources 
and women’s increasing use of them: “Things have changed because of women’s groups, and 
because immigrants themselves started to get organised.” She particularly described advocacy 
arising from immigrant and refugee women victims of violence making greater use of 
lawyers’ services. “The greatest trend: women are leaving clandestinity.”
Women victims of violence now have more social services and phone contacts. There 
are more refugees in women’s shelters. Women’s shelters phone me. [Refugee women] 
more often leave their homes than in 1983, 1984 1985. I had one or two per year, back 
then. Over the years ten has been the most [per year]. That is because they are more 
aware of resources that exist. They go to the resources, and the resources put them in 
my path. (Belanger, interview 1995).
Co n c l u s io n : asylum  seekers a n d  t h e  in t e r n a l  po litical  c u l t u r e  o f  t h e
ADVOCACY NETWORK
We have seen some differences and many commonalties in the ways supporters became 
involved with public pressure tactics, and some of the factors involved in how asylum 
seekers made decisions about going public. Several important conclusions may be drawn 
from this.
First, asylum seekers were politically conscious actors making decisions and 
advocating for themselves and as representatives of the persecuted group. This was revealed 
particularly in how they choose to use extra-institutional strategies to challenge negative 
decisions on their refugee claims. The desperate need for asylum and the options supporters 
could provide were mediated by asylum seekers’ personal and political considerations. These 
included how they viewed themselves in relation to the world and to a collective identity, 
their rights and politicisation, and risks they were willing to take.
Being asylum seekers does not preclude abilities and desires to shape or influence
policy in order to be accepted in the receiving-country. Although these asylum seekers did
rely on opportunities and support to challenge the receiving-country refugee system, and
their need was the greatest motivating factor, they were neither simply ‘forced’ out of
desperation to make such challenges nor ‘illegitimate’ refugees abusing the system. Rather,
these asylum seekers made rational and strategic choices around a legitimate political debate
regarding identity and state responsibilities. It involved identity politics, which is both
symbolic and strategic. It involved thinking about self in relation to society, states, rights and
responsibilities. It involves taking into account the risks, options, information and means
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supporters could provide. And, although neither citizens nor permanent residents, they had 
access to a range of resources. They thus had the means to become strong symbolic and 
political identity images, or instruments of persuasion, through mass media. Asylum seekers 
were deeply embedded within what needs to be recognised as a structural, political process, 
rather than a one-way processes externally forced or imposed (as upon beneficiaries) upon 
them, or co-opted by them for personal benefit without political legitimacy.
Second, asylum seekers were not only conscious political actors in their own and 
other cases, but also mobilising and binding agents among supporters. Their willingness and 
determination to seek support and take extra-institutional actions was crucial for mobilising 
the support of permanent Canadian residents and binding them together in a common cause. 
In looking at how core supporters conceptualised the relation between belief systems and 
participatory action, asylum seekers’ symbolic and strategic roles emerged. Together 
supporters and asylum seekers may be described as an advocacy network. Unlike coalitions, 
the term network allows for relationships may exist among individuals (not members of an 
organisation) and organisations (see Hines and Gerlach 1970) rather than solely between 
organisations. It is also more fluid, or less organisationally formal. Figure 7.1 portrays the 
advocacy network schematically.
The schema also depicts some important characteristics of the advocacy network’s 
internal political culture. Its ‘clique’ structure depicts the centrality of asylum seekers, the 
density of linkages among supporters, the diversity of supporters, and their links to 
secondary actors. In all instances core supporters became involved through contact with 
asylum seekers willing to go public. Asylum seekers’ needs and structural representation 
mediated between supporters’ ideology and deep core policy values, their opportunities and 
means for strategic action, and actions actually being taken. The violence and lack of 
protection asylum seekers had experienced represented the broader problem of women’s 
structural inequality as citizens around the world, raising Canada’s responsibility under 
international human rights and refugee law. The structural inequality they experienced in 
Canada’s refugee system increased the urgency of their need for outside support as 
deportation orders were issued.
Emphasis upon one of these two stated reasons for participation tended to correlate 
with organisational type, previous and current experience and with their approaches to 
advocacy. Supporters who took up the issue because a particular cases were ‘representative’ 
tended not to have had direct experience with actual women in these situations. Some may 
have been well aware and ‘on the look out’ for these types of cases, but compared to front­
lines service organisations and to some extent to lawyers, awareness and involvement was
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7.1 Core Advocacy Network depicting links to metanetwork and external environment
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quite new among the larger umbrella and advocacy groups. Their interest was sparked 
primarily by particular claimants whose exemplary cases provided an opportunity to pursue 
an important ideological and political issue.
In contrast, women’s shelters and other front-line organisations perceived new 
opportunities to advocate for exemplary cases of which they were already aware or had 
previous experience. For front-line workers, individual life histories of the women they 
worked with may have been representative of the issue generally, but many individuals, in 
their own experience, were representative. What moved ideology or belief systems into 
action was the immediacy of particular women’s situations and their willingness to try various 
strategies to attain entry, coinciding with perceived possibilities for new kinds of advocacy 
through other groups or due to perceived potential for success in the current political 
climate. Lawyers fell into both groupings, and overlap occurred among some front-line and 
larger advocacy groups as the former increasingly took on policy advocacy roles and goals in 
their work generally and through the latter.
Asylum seekers were also important links between supporters, who were in regular 
contact with each other on the issue. Some cross-membership existed and many individuals 
worked in a variety of capacities within their organisation and served bridging roles between 
issues. Asylum seekers only occasionally worked directly with other asylum seekers, although 
most of the cases went public within the same six months, many at the same time. The 
constituency of the network was also diverse (umbrella, advocacy and service, both within 
and across issue niches, and with various specialities within issue niches) and controlled a 
wide and strategic mix of resources and capabilities across local, national and international 
levels. Details of organisation characteristics are presented in Appendix C.
The core group was associated with many of the cases at different times, and played 
a disproportionate role mobilising secondary actors and the public. Secondary actors 
comprise those who gave public support in various ways but were not involved at the 
planning and organising level around particular asylum seekers, or who worked through core 
actors rather than directly with asylum seekers who went public. They included member 
organisations of NAC (over 500 women’s groups), the CCR (over 150 international 
migration groups) and the TCMR (Montreal’s ethnic, community, international migration 
groups). Other networks of secondary supporters spun off local organisations like women’s 
shelters that could tap into the shelter network and other women’s groups. Lawyers provided 
links into formal and informal legal networks. Schools, communities, and politicians also lent 
public support through (for example) petitions, faxing and writing to the Immigration 
Minister’s office and attending press conferences. National organisations also provided links
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to international organisations such as the UNHCR and Amnesty International, as well as the 
Canadian government.
In the process of deciding to campaign and forming the advocacy network we can 
see that asylum seeking occurs within a structural context of reciprocal or mutually shaping 
relationships between asylum seekers, their structure of support, and the ideological and 
strategic frameworks where they ultimately act or become influential. The advocacy network 
itself illustrates another important dimension: changing relationships between citizens or 
permanent residents and non-citizens/non-permanent residents. These relationships can not 
be territorially defined or exclusive, nor can they be simplified as advocacy ‘for’ non-citizens. 
Through the advocacy network’s resources, capabilities and tools, we can now see how 
asylum seekers might gain significant political leverage and influence in policy-making 
processes. The campaign process and asylum seekers’ roles in it are explored in the following 
chapter.
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8 .  W o r k in g  t o g e t h e r : asylum  seek ers’ a n d  su ppo r t er s’ in f l u e n c e  o n
POLICY REFORM
Emerging rights, resources and collective interests provided important opportunities and 
building blocks for asylum seekers and supporters in the period leading up to campaigns, 
while relations between asylum seekers who Vent public’ and their supporters shaped actor 
participation and the core advocacy network’s internal political culture as a whole. We now 
need to enquire into campaigning processes to consider how the network of supporters and 
asylum seekers together influenced the external environment, and to what extent. The 
following explores the evolution and nature of the campaigns and key strategic elements of 
their success, illustrating various ways asylum seekers were integral to both.
Underlying the analysis is McAdam’s concept of ‘strategic framing processes’ or 
‘signifying acts’ (1996). Framing processes typically constitute “the conscious, strategic 
efforts of movement groups to fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at 
hand in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts’’ (McAdam,1996:39; Snow and Benford 
1988,1992; Melucd,1989; Touraine,1981). Thus it describes ideology and identity as 
movement resources. McAdam’s expanded concept of ‘signifying acts’ observes that theuays 
ideologies and demands are developed and articulated by actors constitute important actions and 
tactics in themsehxs, both in influencing and responding to the external environment. Signifying 
work reflects movement-environment relations that shape one another over time, serving at 
least four broad purposes: attracting media attention, particularly of a favourable nature; 
mobilising public support; constraining the social control options of the environment it 
wishes to influence; and influencing public policy and state action (McAdam,1996:353).
Section I lays out campaign priorities, goals and tactics, and the strategic 
combinations of these dimensions in relation to likely state responses. This typology of basic 
strategies provides a framework for analysing campaigning processes and impact.
Section II explores the evolution and implementation of activists' strategic interaction 
with the state and public between 1991 and 1996. Campaign processes are analysed using 
interviews with primary actors, institutional documents including correspondence, and 
documentary evidence from mass media. This account is descriptively important, as the 
campaigns have not previously been documented or described in detail. It is analytically 
important in that it reveals how strategies and their impact evolved both around asylum 
seekers’ participation and government responses as campaigns unfolded.
Section III concludes on asylum seekers’ participation and how, why and to what 
extent the campaigns were effective. Specifically, it suggests how asylum seekers'
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participation influenced campaign structure, aims and tactics, strategic choices that were 
made over time, and pressure that was brought to bear.
I. E le m e n t s  o f  t h e  a d v o c a c y  n e t w o r k ’s s t r a t e g i c  f r a m in g  p r o c e s s e s
A. POLICY VALUES AND GOALS: BALANCING ASYLUM SEEKERS' SAFETY, TIME AND
REPRESENTATION
As shown previously, core supporters’ involvement in the campaigns stemmed from a 
combination of factors including contact with asylum seekers, previous personal and 
professional experience, and new opportunities for action perceived to be constructive. 
Underlying these factors were deep core values which, upon contact with asylum seekers, 
resulted in two fundamental reasons why supporters’ chose to get involved: individuals' 
needs for immediate safe asylum, and individuals as representative of a structural issue and 
entire persecuted group. Asylum seekers also stressed both their needs as individuals, and 
their rights as part of a group, as reasons for going public.
Reflecting these two basic motivating factors, campaign gods were to respond bob to 
the immediate safety needs of individual asylum seekers, and to their structural 
representation or the long-term needs of future asylum seekers. But what was the priority 
assigned to each? Different policy demands could be made which satisfy either immediate 
needs or their structural representation, or both, depending on their priority and the 
perceived potential for attainment.
With immediate safety of participating asylum seekers as an over-riding priority, we 
would expect ends to be more important than means. Appropriate policy may be a means for 
securing asylum, however a number of alternatives may exist for this purpose. Using existing 
legislation, asylum may be sought on a case by case basis, using whatever means available and 
without regard for their consistent application to other cases. Or, promoting incremental 
policy change, the importance of ends and means may merge in the short-term in the ways 
particular cases are argued and become precedent-setting. While not immediately changing 
the law, jurisprudence sets frameworks for consistent status determination processes. 
Finally, particular policy goals may be ends in themselves, or important long-term goals toward 
securing safety for future asylum seekers. In the long-term, ends and means may merge in 
appropriate refugee policy because it addresses immediate needs consistently over time.
A crucial dilemma facing actors was how to resolve the conflict between shorter and 
longer term goals as interaction with the state evolved. An immediate goal was to secure 
safety for the particular asylum seekers making claims public and others who were not 
making their claims public. To this effect, actions evolved around the irrmediate inchidud needs
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of asylum seekers, on a case by case basis, and safe asylum could be sought through any 
means. Another goal was to achieve fundamental policy change in keeping with core 
ideology about why these women were persecuted and what kind of responsibility states 
hold. This expressed the structural representation of individual claimants who went public; it was 
the legal argument for state responsibility as well as an argument with moral force.
How or to what extent could structural representation be sought without 
compromising immediate individual needs if the external environment was resistant to 
radical legislative change in the short term, but willing to consider it in the long-term? Smith 
and Sabatier (1994) suggest that policy advocates are united by common “deep core” 
ideology or “basic ontological and normative beliefs... which operate across virtually all 
policy domains”, and from which a hierarchy of policy values and aims stem. Policy aims 
may shift over time as a strategy for, rather than a threat to, policy advocates’ unity or 
influence. Underlying deep core values serve to bridge “near core” and “secondary” policy 
aims and enable policy actors to shift strategically from emphasis on near core to secondary 
values. This occurs due to the emergence of ‘policy learning’: new technical information or 
beliefs regarding the substance, means or possibilities of policy change.
Table 8.1 presents the advocacy network’s policy value hierarchy and corresponding 
policy demands. This hierarchy is ideal in the sense that the highest policy aim most closely 
reflects underlying 'deep core' values. ‘Near core’ policy value describes “basic normative 
commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem... ” (Smith 
& Sabatier, 1994:180). Their 'near-core' policy value was to weigh equally asylum seekers’ 
immediate individual needs, and the aims embodied in their structural representation. 
Legislative change invoking structural roots of female-specific persecution would respond to 
the greatest range of asylum seekers, as soon as possible (Immediate Needs -X- Structural 
Representation). All core actors expressed such legislative change as the ideal outcome.
Smith and Sabatier (1994:181) describe “secondary aspects” of the belief system as 
existing within a specific policy domain comprising a large set of narrower beliefs concerning 
the seriousness of the problem or the relative importance of various causal factors in specific 
locales, policy preferences regarding desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design 
of specific institutions, and the evaluations of various actors’ performance.
Actors’ secondary aspects of the policy core aimed to secure safe asylum for the 
greatest possible range of persecuted women (versus the ideal range) within a given time 
frame, or as soon as possible. None of the activists made this their initial demand or fought 
for it exclusively at any time before the Guidelines were instated. But many supported this 
'pragmatic' option at some point, attempted to improve upon it, ensure its instatement and 
proper implementation. At this level, time demands remain constant, but policy content
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demands change. This suggests asylum seekers’ immediate safety was a priority above 
structural representation, creating a degree of openness toward policy strategies. It enabled 
advocates to shift policy values and tactics.
A third hierarchy level can also be presented: the existing legislative and 
administrative system, whereby challenges are made case by case and change may be 
incremental, but decisions on them inconsistent. None of the core actors were supportive of 
this option exclusively because change had thus far been slow and inconsistent, whereas 
current asylum seekers faced immediate life threatening situations.
Table 8.1 Hierarchy Of Ideal Policy Values And Policy Demands Of Core Advocacy 
Network
Ideal policy values Corresponding policy demands
NEAR CORE:
safe asylum for all persecuted females, as 
soon as possible 
SECONDARY CORE:
safe asylum for as many persecuted females 
as possible as soon as possible 
EXISTING POLICY (no change): 
safe asylum on a case by case basis 
existing interpretation of the law
Legislative change: add "sex" or "gender" to the 
definition of persecution
Interpretative/Administrative change: read gender 
into existing law
No change: Judicial or Ministerial discretion
We know that the outcome of the campaigns was the secondary core, entailing 
interpretative change of existing legislation through the instatement of new administrative 
Guidelines. It brought an immediate though more incremental solution to a structural 
problem, providing current asylum seekers with institutional options. We shall now lay out 
how near core and secondary core policy goals were communicated and the kinds of tactics 
used to influence the public and the state. In this we shall see possible state responses, the 
roles asylum seekers played in different types of actions, and an overarching picture of the 
strategic possibilities of the campaigns.
B. TYPES OF GOALS AND TACTICS
As indicated above, a number of goals were emphasised in the campaigns, and through 
various policy demands. Both goals and strategic demands, or tactics, were intended to 
appeal to the sympathies of various publics and thus mobilise support for particular aspects 
of the campaigns, and the campaigns as a whole. Policy values and demands may be 
described in terms of the challenge they pose to existing systems and subsequently the degree 
of resistance they encounter. Policy values were ‘framed’ both by radical (legislative) and 
reform (interpretative) policy goals, and through extra-institutional and institutional tactics.
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Demands for legislative change corresponding to near-core policy values recognising 
structural causes of female-specific persecution were radical in nature (chapter 4 discussed 
why such change is considered ‘radical’ to traditional interpretations of state responsibility). 
The desired change was the addition of ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ as a grounds of persecution in the 
UN Convention refugee definition as applied in Canadian refugee policy. This was the 
highest policy aim in the hierarchy presented earlier. Reform goals, described second in the 
hierarchy, aimed to introduce administrative guidelines that re-interpret existing legislation.
It should be bome in mind that the ideological basis and intended effect of ‘reform’ 
goals still presented a radical challenge to institutionalised ways of thinking about 
persecution, violence against women, and state responsibility. They are ‘reform’ in the sense 
that by not changing the actual law, they are not binding in the same way, their application is 
less consistent and more incremental. Reform goals in these campaigns thus describe 
strategies for institutionalising, to a certain degree, government commitment to a 
fundamentally radical way of perceiving state responsibility under international law. As such, 
reform goals and any strategic shift away from radical goals may be regarded as part of a 
negotiated achievement, even if not ‘the end of the road’ in many actors minds.
The campaigns also involved both institutional and noninstitutional tactics. 
Institutional tactics consisted of several dimensions. (1) Throughout the campaigns and after, 
institutional actions in refugee status determination processes were used to make 
untraditional refugee claims and challenge the application of refugee policy. These have been 
described in previous chapters. Figure 6.1 (chapter 6) depicted multiple pathways in refugee 
determination processes, and at multiple levels of government. All claimants using public 
pressure tactics went through typical claims processes and received negative institutional 
decisions. Most were issued deportation orders. At least one of those given leave to Appeal 
had IRB decisions overturned by the Federal Court. Institutional processes were essential 
before and after instatement of the Guidelines, both by claimants who went public and those 
who did not, and often involved core supporters in important ways (having a lawyer, getting 
referrals to other helpful organisations and individuals, getting moral and practical support). 
Making claims also contributed to a growing awareness within the IRB and inspired activities 
by its internal Working Group on Refugee Women. (2) Institutional tactics also involved 
participation in public Consultations between government, NGOs and accepted refugees. 
These were held after the Guidelines were instated to help shape their implementation and 
future revision. Two sets of consultations were called, the first arranged by NGOs and 
second by government.
Nm-institutional, or extra-institutional tactics involved using public pressure tactics to 
challenge IRB and court decisions on claims, to defy deportation orders, to demand positive
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decisions on individual claims, and to demand policy change reflecting and supporting those 
decisions. Actions included calling press conferences and using mass media (radio, television, 
journalism) extensively; threatening to hold public demonstrations; petitioning and lobbying 
politicians for support. Claimants going public and those “in hiding” from immigration 
authorities to avoid deportation were clearly acting outside normative institutional channels 
for influencing refugee status determination processes (in particular cases) and policy change 
processes (for collective claims). The idea was that publicising the challenge would generate 
political leverage not available for claims processes in closed hearings, casting the legitimacy 
or aptness of court decisions into question, heightening the debate and generating mass 
public support.
C. STRATEGY: GOALS AND TACTICS IN RELATION TO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES 
Campaigns evolve in relation to the responses of the external environment. McAdam 
explains that a movement’s stated goals and the tactics chosen to convey both goals and 
ability to disrupt the public order in order to achieve them, are instrument and effect of 
various publics’ reactions. He describes signifying work and its influence according to the 
types and possible ajmbimdons of goals and tactics that actors pursue. Figure 8.1 presents a 
matrix of expected institutional responses to non-institutional and institutional tactics and 
radical and reform goals, specifically within a democratic context (McAdam,1996).17
Tactics: 
institutional non-institutional
Radical
Goals
Repression Indifference/ 
surveillance and 
harassment
Reform Heightened public Indifference/minimal
Goals attention/ opposition and/or
polarised support
conflict
Figure 8.1 Expected environmental responses to various combinations of movement 
goals and tactics (McAdam 1996:342).
17 McAdam observes that “the emphasis... on a democratic context, cannot be understated. Give the 
very different legitimating philosophy that underlies nondemocratic systems, the interaction between 
movements and other sets of actors is expected to conform to very different dynamics than those 
evident within ostensibly democratic systems” (1996:341).
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Each combination has different effects with various advantages and drawbacks for 
the attainment of goals. Radical goals pursued through non-institutional tactics tend to 
provoke repression. This may have various effects, such as increasing public sympathy, and 
reducing movement ability to operate in some ways. On the other hand, if pursued through 
institutional tactics, radical goals tend to provoke only institutional indifference or 
surveillance and harassment. This may provide, for example, greater room to manoeuvre 
without opposition but also without mobilising support.
Reform goals pursued through non-institutional tactics tend to produce heightened 
public attention and polarised conflict. This may generate both support and opposition. But 
pursued through institutional tactics, reform goals tend to evoke indifference, minimal 
opposition and/or support. Yet it may proceed incrementally, unhindered.
This matrix demonstrates how a movement or policy advocacy coalition’s aims may 
be strategically chosen within a given environment, and pursued with various tactics. It adds 
to Smith and Sabatier’s (1994) concept of policy hierarchies which while explaining why 
shifting policy aims are possible in relation to changes in the external environment (such as 
the emergence of new technical information or the prognosis for success), lacks insight into 
why and how coalitions strategically chose and combine aims with various tactics for 
achieving them at a particular time, and thus why they may or may not be successful.
However, McAdam’s depiction of movement-environment relations lacks insight 
into whether a movement can have various combinations of goals and tactics, or change its 
combination over time. McAdam assumes that a particular blend of goals and tactics 
comprises the overarching strategy pursued by a homogeneous body of actors at all times. 
He does not consider that different types of tactics may occur simultaneously, as may 
different policy aims. In other words, a number of strategic framing processes may coexist 
either at different times in the same campaign or by dfferent movement actors simultaneously. In fact, the 
campaigns studied used each combination of goals and tactics described, sometimes 
simultaneously. Government responses conformed closely to the above matrix with the 
exception that ‘repression’ was minimal and non-violent. At the lowest degree on a scale of 
possible forms of repression, it entailed efforts to silence dissidence by taking a radical 
position of opposition, rejecting claimants and policy demands. This response was repetitive 
but always short-lived.
Diversity of goals and tactics may be instrument or effect of different dimensions of 
the same movement or network of actors. It may be explained partly by the fact that 
concurrent to all goals is a desired time frame for achieving them. The time-factor may shift
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actors’ focus from one to another goal and/or tactic, depending upon responses elicited and 
the priority actors assign to the time-factor. Thus it helps describe why different policy aims 
and different blends of goals and tactics may develop or change. Shifting or simultaneous 
blends may also be explained by different access to information, perceptions about the 
possibilities for success or risks that may be involved in pursuing particular strategies, and 
degrees of political access that actors may enjoy from the start or over time. The strategic 
influence of changing or simultaneous combinations may be to reduce or increase strategic 
diversity and influence.
Having considered the advocacy network’s policy value hierarchy and described its 
basic goals and tactics in relation to possible state responses, we can now observe the 
strategic evolution of the campaigning processes itself, the roles of asylum seekers in 
campaigns and their evolution, and outcomes as a whole. How did tactics and goals evolve in 
relation to the government and publics they wanted to influence over time? How did they 
attract media attention, mobilise public support, constrain the state's options and get a 
favourable response?
II. In f l u e n c in g  in t e r -state  r espo n sib il it y
Campaigns were organised around a series of individual claimants and groups of claimants 
‘going public’ between 1991 and 1996. Within this time, policy advocacy and public pressure 
tactics occurred in roughly two phases, each of which may be broken down into periods of 
generation, peak activism, and decline of extra-institutional activities. The second phase was 
significantly more limited in extra-institutional actions and support. Institutional actions 
continued throughout both phases, and expanded in the period of decline to regeneration 
between them due to the institutionalisation of the Guidelines and a series of national 
Consultations on Gender and Refugee Issues. As we shall see, the nature and intensity of 
activism in each period both provoked and responded strategically to government statements 
and reactions, and to the changing political climate of the country.
A. GENERATION: OPENING THE DIALOGUE, ATTRACTING INTEREST, DEVELOPING THE
DEBATE
In the generative period, aims for policy reform using institutional tactics were gradually 
supplemented by increasingly radical demands and extrainstitutional tactics. Institutional 
tactics remained important throughout campaigning even at the height of radical- 
extrainstitutional demands and actions. By using institutional tactics as far as possible, actors
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not only made use of every possible resource but also protected their legitimacy in the eyes 
of government and the public. In the reform-institutional blend, refugee claims were made 
through institutional status determination processes, in particular using the 1985 UN 
Recommendation that the ‘social group’ category may describe some forms of female- 
specific persecution. Acceptances could set precedents for future claimants without changing 
the law, but slowly reforming its interpretation and application. The evolution of case law has 
been discussed in previous chapters, and its outcomes after instatement of the Guidelines 
will be analysed in Chapter 9. For the generative period, what remains to be considered is the 
emergence of alternative tactics when institutional methods fail, and how they complement 
one another.
Rejected refugee claims have value both inside and outside status determination 
processes. Inside, they may heighten awareness among IRB members, whether of a positive 
or negative nature. Outside, they may heighten public awareness (again both positive and 
negative). In the cases examined this first occurred with policy reform goals in mind. 
Between approximately May 1991 when the first press conferences were held with claimants 
facing deportation, and August 1992 just before a series of claimants began going public, the 
media was used occasionally and without generating great public support. What was 
generated during that period was: (1) the interest of many “core” supporters who began 
working together through particular claimants (2) a dialogue with government (3) the 
strategic evolution of actors’ framing tactics, that is, the radicalisation of their demands, 
discourses and tactics. These dimensions will be discussed as they developed around five 
claimants during that time.
Core supporters’ participation was explained in the previous chapter in relation to 
previous experience, ideology and contact with asylum seekers. Looking now at the external 
environment, we see that interest emerged as free trade and constitutional debates (NAFTA 
and Charlottown Accord) were drawing toward conclusion. Many core organisations, such as 
NAC and the CCR, were pre-occupied with these issues, thus their activity in the newly 
emerging refugee issues was more limited in the generative period. Nevertheless the first 
steps were taken to get supporters’ attention, which entailed bridging women’s groups and 
immigrant and refugee advocates. At the same time dialogue with government was initiated 
and demands were developed. Both were sparked in May 1991 when press conferences were 
called by Flora Tristan Shelter for Immigrant Women, shelter residents Ana and Sandy from 
Germany and Mexico (facing imminent deportation) and their lawyers {Journal de Montreal 
2/5/91). They argued government was insensitive to the problem of ‘sponsorship abuse’ 
because the immigration and refugee status determination system was gender-biased. They 
declared that deporting women for breaking a sponsorship contract with an abusive sponsor
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is discriminatory and unjust. Invited to the conference panel was the Quebec Minister of 
Immigration and Culture and a representative of a federal sub-commission on violence 
against women within Health and Welfare Canada (see Maison Flora Tristan, May, 1991). 
This well-rounded and strategically chosen panel of claimants, NGOs, lawyers and 
government representatives sympathetic to the issue, solicited positive media attention.
Participants made recommendations based on the experiences of women residing at 
Flora Tristan and on reports by the National Organisation of Immigrant and Visible 
Minority Women of Canada and by the Social Planning Council Co-ordinating Committee 
on Wife Assault. NOIVMW had previously approached the federal sub-commission on 
violence against women, recommending that immigrant women’s dependency be broken by 
lessening work restrictions, using Minister’s Permits in cases of sponsorship breakdown, and 
broadening the refugee definition to include sex persecution (Ibid, 18). These 
recommendations were upheld at the conference.
While the question of changing the refugee definition was peripheral to the main 
issue of sponsorship abuse that conference raised, it got reactions from other NGOs and the 
government. Appeals to the public were simple. These asylum seekers were fleeing domestic 
violence -  something Canadian women could understand in their own country. Randy 
Gordon, the Assistant to the Immigration Minister, responded in a statement to the press by 
saying that EIC does not consider gender within the refugee definition and that accepting 
women such as those being publicised Vould be opening a whole can of worms’ (NOW, 
December 1992). Dench from the CCR explained: “What he was saying had to do with 
violence against women and ‘floodgates’: that there is just far too much violence against 
women and therefore we can not accept everybody who comes [on that basis]... ” 
(Dench,1995). His statement provoked women’s groups, was criticised in NOW magazine 
and prompted the CCR to adopt an internal Resolution supporting gender inclusive refugee 
policy and to write a letter to Gordon.
Gordon was impelled to clarify the government’s policy position and moral position 
in a letter responding to President Matas of the CCR. Gordon emphasised that Canadian 
refugee policy is based on the refugee definition provided by the UNHCR, in which ‘gender’ 
does not appear as a grounds of persecution. Second, he disassociated the powers and duties 
of the EIC and Immigration Minister from those of the IRB:
... decisions on refugee claims are made by independent, quasi-judicial, decision-makers. 
Neither the Minister, nor any member of his staff, can determine whether a claimant is a 
Convention refugee. Nor... can the Minister fetter the discretion of officers of 
Employment and Immigration Canada who exercise delegated authority with respect to 
humanitarian and compassionate review. (8 July 1992, Randy Gordan, letter to CCR 
President David Matas)
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Divorcing executive and administrative from judicial branches of government, 
Gordan ignored their shared responsibility in refugee policy development. He also ignored 
the Immigration Minister’s special powers to issue Permits on Humanitarian and 
Compassionate grounds in individual cases, although the individual cases provoking the 
dialogue to begin with had appealed for such Permits. This power enables the Minister to 
override both IRB and EIC decisions and grant acceptance under a special status. While not 
granting Convention Refugee status, making such exceptions piMvdy could place the refugee 
determination system and the law in question. The Immigration Minister avoided this 
possibility.
Third, after claiming the irrelevance of the position of the Immigration Minister and 
administrative branch of government, Gordon stated the Immigration Minister’s moral 
opinion:
... the position of the government with respect to the persecution of women is 
irrelevant to the refugee status determination process. Nonetheless, let me assure you 
that the Minister does not condone discrimination against, or persecution of, women.
Despite efforts to avoid responsibility, when confronted with a politically charged 
question in a country with a strong humanitarian and women’s rights reputation Gordan was 
impelled to assert the government’s moral conviction against the persecution of women. At 
the same time he appeared unaware of recent government research on the problems of 
sponsorship.18 Thus he was unable to steer the debate toward an administrative solution 
either specifically for sponsorship or generally for the application of refugee policy. Rather, 
he gave further reason for refugee policy itself to be fundamentally questioned.
These correspondences and press statements elevated the issue from a question of 
administrative ineptness and gender insensitivity to one of structural persecution and 
subsequent state responsibilities. This marked an important evolution in framing tactics. 
Sponsorship was no longer the trigger issue. Subsequent cases were publicised with an 
emphasis on state responsibility for upholding gender inclusive human rights principles by 
amending refugee policy. A wider range of types of female-specific violence was publicised 
as persecution. In the next three cases, both traditionally ‘public’ and ‘private’ forms of 
violence against women were publicised as persecutory. Those forms previously considered 
an outcome of administrative problems concerning either sponsorship (typically domestic 
violence cases) or inconsistent application of the ‘social group’ category (as recommended by 
the UN) both turned to question the basis of policy itself.
13. Particularly the IRB Working Group on Refugee Women. The CACSW and the QGCI (Provincial 
immigration) had also been producing reports on the problems of sponsorship since the late 1980s.
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Between December and August 1992 campaigns began with Taramati, Dulerie and 
Nada. Each made claims based specifically on female forms of persecution and each faced 
deportation. Their cases raised a range of issues: whether female-specific forms of violence 
may ever amount to persecution or whether they are culturally relative; whether the Canadian 
government considered women’s rights as understood in Canada to be human rights; 
whether some forms of violence against women may be considered persecution, and not 
others; whether the validity of a refugee claim is dependent upon the location of the primaiy 
perpetrator in the country of origin; and whether secondary perpetrators such as in-laws and 
the communityshould be taken into account for persecution ocurring in the ‘private’ sphere.
Taramati, Dulerie and Nada’s claims differed from the those of Ana and Sandy by 
introducing the risk they faced in their country of origin if deported, due to the lack of 
resources or willingness of their own states to protect them. Both Nada and Dulerie had 
independently fled their countries of origin due to the violence they faced there. Taramati 
and her husband came to Canada together, she as his dependent. After two years in Canada 
she applied for refugee status on her own grounds, and her husband was deported.
Dulerie and Taramati’s cases involved domestic violence, a powerful image of human 
rights violations and persecution against women with which Canadians could more perhaps 
readily identify than other more culturally-specific forms. Statistics Canada reported in 1993 
that one-quarter of women in Canada experience violence by current or past marital or 
common-law partners. Government had made clear commitments in its 1988 Initiative on 
Family Violence, 1990 Declaration on Family Violence, and 1993 National Action Plan on 
Family Violence. Taramati and Dulerie, whose situations were described in the previous 
chapter, had resided in Canada with children since 1988, and both had fled to women’s 
shelters. Both were in the final stages of the refugee status determination process between 
December and October 1992 after two years awaiting and appealing decisions.
Dulerie’s claim was processed through all the standard refugee status determination 
reviews, and in July 1992 she was ordered deported “because she fled to Canada to escape 
domestic violence instead of political oppression.” Immigration department official Roger 
White defended his decision by citing a new family violence act passed in Trinidad in 1991 
allowing abused women to lay charges and obtain protection orders. Dulerie’s lawyers argued 
that the recent law was not being implemented: “You can have a written law, but the effect 
of it is a different thing altogether. If someone refuses to enforce the law, then what is one 
supposed to do? And that in effect is what the police [in Trinidad] are doing” (Toycnto Star 
17 Sept 1992). Dulerie was ordered deported in July, at which time she appealed to the 
immigration minister and was refused. In Taramati’s case, the IRB had found that domestic 
abuse was not a basis for a refugee claim although her husband had been deported back to
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their home country and was issuing death threats. Taramati applied for leave to remain in 
Canada on H&C grounds after her refugee claim was rejected in January 1992 and a 
deportation order was issued. In August she was still awaiting a decision.
Nada’s case involved ‘public’ forms of violence against women. She made a refugee 
claim in 1991 based her experience of female-specific forms persecution due to political 
opinion, namely refusing to comply with discriminatory laws against women, with severe 
punishment for infractions. Considering that precedents had already been set in similarly 
based cases, the rejection of her claim highlighted the IRB’s general unreceptivity to female 
claimants, the inconsistency of its use of the 1985 UN Recommendation on women as a 
social group, and gender biases in applications of the other four categories of persecution. 
After failing to win an Appeal by the Federal court, she was issued a deportation order. 
Defying it, she went into hiding and sought NGO support. In August 1992 she appealed to 
the Immigration Minister and was refused.
Between December and August 1992 these three claimants exhausted almost all 
institutional avenues. Their remaining option was to appeal piMidy to the Immigration 
Minister. They did not begin making use of mass media until September 1992, but until then 
attracted the support of women’s shelters and traditional refugee and humanitarian groups. 
Bronson (ICHRDD) describes some of the strengths of the core advocacy network that 
started meeting on a by-weekly basis:
Each of us was basically powerless as individuals, but each of us had organisations that 
could carry a lot of weight. The CCR is a coalition of 150 refugee groups across the 
country, NAC is some 500 women’s groups, I am from an institution created by 
Parliament with a president who has a powerful public voice, and [Nada’s lawyer] could 
connect with all the lawyers. (Bronson, ICHRDD interview 1995).
She described their strategies as two-fold: “one, we would try to draw media 
attention to this problem, and two we would have a Consultation that would bring together 
NGOs, government and women’s groups and so on, to talk about it” (Bronson interview 
1995).
Publicity was limited throughout the summer while groups concentrated on writing 
letters to the Immigration Minister and potential supporters, and introducing more radical 
demands by developing a human rights approach to arguing the cases. On August 19 the 
ICHRDD urged the immigration minister to intervene, concluding:
If [Nada] is forced to return to her country, Canada will be sending out a signal that it 
will not act to oppose the systematic violation of women’s human rights, nor will it 
accord asylum to those who are victims of such violations. This would be most 
unfortunate, given the important initiatives that Canada has taken on behalf of gender 
equality and human rights in the Francophonie, the Commonwealth and the 
Organisation of American States. A failure to act decisively on the side of justice in this
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case would be most damaging, both domestically and internationally. (Broadbent, letter 
to the Immigration Minister 10-08-92)
As demonstrated above, the ICHRDD’s involvement with Nada raised human rights 
issues and Canadian responsibilities both at home and abroad. This was particularly 
important for the campaign as a whole, which began making human rights principles the 
turn-stone of its arguments. It also demonstrated the weight of domestic concern for the 
issue, and domestic repercussions. Bronson explains: “The ICHRDD was able to situate the 
debate in the context of women’s rights and human rights, which sadly get a good deal more 
respect than do refugee rights.” Adopting the slogan “women’s rights are human rights’, the 
ICHRDD made clear the connection between Canadian women’s rights and human rights of 
persecuted peoples of other nationalities:
The challenge for women is to use the language and mechanisms of international human 
rights law in a way that makes it relevant to their experiences. The challenge for the human 
rigfots moimient is to start taking the violations o f women's rights as seriously as the violations o f men's 
rights. Women must use the paradigm that exists already and begin to forge a new one 
for the realities that the old language of human rights still cannot address. (Bronson, 
ICHRDD presentation for the CCR 12 May 1993)
In August the IRB Working Group on Refugee Women responded by circulating a 
draft version of the Guidelines among the UNHCR (Canadian Division), CCR, ICHRDD 
and other NGOs, and lawyers. Although the Guidelines received positive responses, they 
were reform in nature, initially excluded domestic violence as a possible form of persecution 
women may face, and had no timeline for instatement. This combined with government’s 
split sympathies on the issue, the immanent deportation current claimants faced and their 
accumulation of support, ushered in the peak period of activism between September 1992 
and March 1993.
B. PEAK ACTIVISM: POLARISING THE DEBATE AND MOBILISING PUBLIC SUPPORT 
The shift into the peak period was expressed through a dramatic increase in use of the mass 
media, conferences, petitioning, and correspondence to the Immigration Minister. Reflecting 
the human rights framework, publicised, policy demands in this period were considerably 
different. Radical legislative demands dominated and the debate took on rhetorical tones 
with newspaper headlines such as “Are women’s rights human rights?”. A dialogue between 
government and nongovernment actors took place in which government responses 
continually provoked and further mobilised the immigration and refugee community, 
women’s groups, and public support.
Thus the period began with a combination of extraintitutional tactics (namely public 
pressure tactics), and demands for court decisions to be reversed for those claimants going
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public, and for radical legislative change for future claimants. Demands for legislative change 
increased both through the public examples being made and by emphasising Canada’s 
international role. Not only Canadian legislation was at stake. The question was raised as to 
whether the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees should be reopened to 
consider adding sex as a grounds of persecution. Broadbent, (President ICHRDD) stated: 
“We want a recognition by Canada, to lead internationally, that women are persecuted as 
women and that they should be recognised as part of the refugee process.” (Montreal Gazette 
30/1/93). Supporters wanted the government to make recommendations to the UN.
The three concurrent cases discussed above were sequentially joined by others, both 
as individuals and in groups. Media use was at its highest, including newspapers, journals and 
in-depth radio and television broadcasts. Between September 1992 and March 1993 at least 
17 claimants told their stories to the press, and many others made private appeals to the 
immigration minister. Public appeals were made primarily through press conferences 
attended by claimants and called by lawyers, national and local women’s, immigrant and 
refugee organisations working with participating asylum seekers. One asylum seeker wrote a 
newspaper editorial and several spoke at conferences, including one organised by the IRB on 
International Women’s Day. Influential heads of organisations wrote editorials.
With this activism the women’s human rights issue exploded on the Canadian scene 
around particular claimants making their claims public, all facing deportation and many 
defying deportation orders. Many had gathered core supporters during the previous year, as 
described. They and others also gained increasing attention due to their timeliness. In the 
autumn of 1992 Canada was rocked by international reports of mass rape (an estimated 
50,000 Bosnian women) as a strategy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. 
Domestically, Canada was shifting its focus considerably. It is perhaps no surprise that peak 
activism was ushered in not even a month after NAFTA was signed and as Canadians saw 
the Charlottetown Accord rejected (26 October 1992). Canadians were ‘fed up’ with long- 
lasting debates on national unity and were free from years of international trade debates.
This not only provided a public space for other important issues, but coincided with 
the onset of Federal elections. As the issue gained public sympathy, politicians found 
themselves having to state policy positions, and women refugees were on the agenda for the 
first time. Liberal MP’s lent their support for a number of individual refugee claimants who 
went public, and in January 1993 the liberal government began making promises. Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Liberal party, Sheila Copps, promised that if the liberals were elected a 
moratorium would be held on deportations of women claiming gender-persecution so that 
their cases could be reviewed under a fair determination system.
210
Meanwhile the Conservative government began making moves to change party 
political leaders in an attempt to win back Canadian trust. During this period other 
immigration issues and problems were mounting. The last Backlog clearance program came 
to an end and the unpopular new immigration Bill C-86 was poised to come into effect by 
February 1993, making Conservatives particularly vulnerable to public dissent on 
immigration matters. The campaign for gender-sensitive refugee policy hit its peak at this 
time, with overwhelming public and Liberal government support. Between September and 
December 1992 Dulerie, Taramati and Nada went public. At the same time the favourable 
result of another claimant’s appeal to the Federal Court was publicised.
Dulerie went public after Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt’s refusal to 
intervene in her deportation. On 17 September, the Toronto Star published an article about 
Ottawa’s refusal to protect Dulerie. The article, “Trinidad can protect woman, Ottawa 
insists”, raised the first wave of protest by human rights, refugee and women’s groups across 
the country. Bronson (ICFIRDD) observed that the Immigration Minister’s office was 
‘flooded with faxes and calls’ criticising his non-intervention. Less than one week later 
Valcourt reversed his decision. Headlines ran: “Abused woman allowed to stay here” (Townto 
Star, 23 September).
However, Valcourt’s decision did not give Dulerie the right to stay based on H&C 
grounds, the status usually bestowed by Ministers. It skirted any question of human rights 
violations or persecution that might suggest a chronic structural problem within Canada’s 
refugee system, and whether claims like Dulerie’s should in future be awarded H&C status or 
even refugee status. But it was a direct response to public pressure. Dulerie’s case was to be 
handled through a legal loop-hole: she would be “shuffled”. That is, she would be deported, 
admitting no fault by the IRB, but instead of being returned to her country she would be sent 
to the United States where after a two-week period she would be allowed to apply for 
immigrant status, with guaranteed acceptance in Canada.
While recognising a fundamental short-coming of the refugee determination system 
this solution offered no structural corrective. Dulerie’s lawyer Bhardwaj explained: “it doesn’t 
show any insight on the government’s part as far as compassionate or humanitarian grounds” 
(Toronto Star 23Septl992), referring to its application to claims involving female-specific 
persecution. However the decision did demonstrate the government’s vulnerability to the 
weight of moral responsibility brought to bear by public support.
In early September Nada also went public, giving her first interview. Bronson 
(ICHRDD) commented on forms of publicity which were sought and the significance of 
sympathetic and committed journalists, as well as the networking which began with lawyers 
handling similar cases.
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The first article Nada did was for the Ottawa Citizen, a detailed article by Jack Miller, a 
very good journalist, very committed to this issue. Then we helped Carol Offe from 
CBC radio do a series of radio reports on it, for five nights in a row on The World At 
Six: different cases of women who had been refused refugee status. We had begun to 
get information from lawyers in Toronto who were facing similar problems... [such as] 
Dulerie’s case. (Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
Nada’s case specifically demanded that Convention refugee status should apply to 
women facing female-specific forms of persecution. Still in hiding, Nada did not receive a 
direct response from the Immigration Minister until December.
As public pressure mounted, Taramati’s H&C application was rejected and in 
October she and her three children were ordered deported for a second time. After press 
conferences were held, the Immigration Minister agreed to delay deportation in order to 
review the case and determine whether H&C grounds could be determined. This would not 
grant her Convention refugee status, but would mark a step in that direction by recognising 
the abuse she suffered as amounting to persecution, although falling outside the Convention 
definition. The decision on her case remained pending.
A further gain was made after another Trinidadian woman won an appeal to the 
Federal Court in November. The claimant fled to Canada with her five children in 1986 after 
fifteen years of abuse by her husband in Trinidad. She reported that Trinidadian police 
typically took several hours to respond to her calls and sided with her husband. In 1988 she 
applied for refugee status. In January 1991 an IRB Appeals Tribunal found a ‘credible basis’ 
to her refugee claim, “based on years of violent assaults, rapes and kidnappings at the hands 
of her estranged husband.” However the Justice Department had then appealed the 
tribunal’s decision, arguing the claimant was not fleeing state persecution but domestic 
violence, and that fear of assault by husband is not fear of persecution. Such women are not 
a ‘social group’. On 11 November 1992 the Federal Court of Appeal overturned the Justice 
Department’s decision, saying the tribunal that heard her case was responsible for 
determining not those issues but only whether a ‘credible basis’ to her claim exists, giving her 
the right to apply for Convention refugee status.
This ruling did not automatically give the claimant refugee status nor did it determine 
whether women fleeing domestic violence meet the legal criteria for becoming refugees. 
Tenenhouse, her lawyer, explained: “They did not decide the broader issue of whether she is 
a member of a social group fearing persecution” (Montreal Gazette 11-11-92). However, the 
decision paved the way for her acceptance on H&C grounds and bolstered the legitimacy of 
the campaign as a whole. The Montreal Gazette’s headlines ran: “Victim of spousal abuse 
can stay: Trinidadian woman’s refugee claim ‘credible’” (11-11-92). The Toronto Star also 
emphasised that that an ‘abused woman’ has grounds to apply for refugee status.
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Following these examples, other claimants began appealing to the Immigration 
Minister, typically with the support of women’s shelters where they were residing. After 
becoming involved through Nada and Taramati, NAC propelled the national debate with the 
slogan: “Make Canada a haven for abused women” {Montreal Gazette 30-11-92). The image of 
Canada as a safe haven for abused women drew upon inroads already made toward 
understanding domestic violence and the fundamental role of women’s shelters in Canada. 
NAC called upon the government to declare commitment toward abused women in refugee 
policy by December 6, the third anniversary of the death of 14 women in an anti-feminist 
attack known as The Montreal Massacre.
By December Nada’s story was receiving sympathetic national coverage and support. 
Advocates were calling explicitly for refugee policy to include sex persecution. Nada’s 
rejection by the IRB, the Appeals court and the Immigration Minister, appeared more 
outrageous after exceptions had just been made for abused women. In particular the less 
radical ‘public’ nature of the persecution Nada claimed she faced, and the well documented 
treatment of women in Saudi Arabia, made her rejection appear increasingly unacceptable to 
the public.
Nada was getting prime time news, she was doing radio stations, the Toronto Star and 
other papers [were picking it up], there were various editorials about it, Michelle 
Lansburg got on it, the human rights people from the editorialists across the country, all 
kinds of people, were just outraged that Nada had be refused [refugee status]. 
(Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
Nada’s advocacy network included individuals with organisational backing of 
extensive influence and a variety of skills described in previous chapters. They negotiated 
their tasks effectively:
This was something I always found myself explaining at our meetings... “let us do what 
we are good at. We are not good at some things, and we are very good at other things. 
You are good at mobilising women’s groups; you do that. We are good at writing letters 
to the Minister; we’ll do that. And each compliments the other. I think that is what was 
so interesting about the way the group of us approached the problem. Everybody did 
what they were good at and we were all very clear about what it was we were good at. 
(Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
Lawyers played important mobilising and organising roles. Nada’s lawyer explained:
To win a case like that you have to pull strings, to push; anyone who knows anyone calls 
the person and so you need a network. You hopefully know someone who knows a 
reporter. You really need all those contacts and as an individual lawyer you can’t do that, 
you just can’t, and you have to work in a team. You have to work with human rights 
groups, women’s groups, grassroots organisations. You have to do it that way. Which is 
something I suspected but in that case it revealed itself very clearly. (Cote, interview 
1995).
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In late December President Broadbent if the ICHRDD wrote an editorial for the 
Globe and Mail and La Press. Its impact, as Bronson explains, was profound: “It 
embarrassed the hell out of the government, they did not know what to respond to it. It was 
very good.” In a statement to the press Immigration Minister Valcourt responded by 
justifying the government’s decision in Nada’s case on the grounds of cultural relativism: “I 
don’t think Canada should unilaterally try to impose its values on the rest of the world. 
Canada cannot go it alone, we just cannot” (London Free Press, 16 January 1993). Accepting 
Nada would imply condemnation of the laws of Saudi Arabia regarding culturally accepted 
roles and behaviours of women. Valourt declared:
The laws of general application in countries of the world are not necessarily laws that we 
in this country would want to promote because of our values but will Canada act as an 
imperialist country and impose its values on other countries around the world? (The 
House, CBC Radio, 16 January 1993)
Apparently the rhetorical swing which the debate had taken caught the state 
unprepared. It’s responses were described as repressive, ignorant, and lazy, and ultimately 
helped mobilise mass public support. Dench from the CCR felt that the radicalisation of 
policy demands to include sex as a grounds of persecution in the refugee definition may have 
served "a useful rhetorical purpose":
Calls for including sex as one of the grounds on which refugee status could be claimed 
have undoubtedly served a useful rhetorical purpose. It is an easily communicated hook 
on which to hang demands for reform, demands which if fully spelt out would certainly 
not fit a newspaper headline or excite an uninitiated public. (Dench, Speech to BC Law 
School 1994)
As a national umbrella group for immigrant and refugee organisations, the CCR has 
privileged insight into the activities and political culture of the advocacy community. Dench 
attributed the surge of interest to individuals within the community having a particular 
interest in the issue, claimants whose cases were of particular interest to the public, and the 
widespread perception that government was particularly vulnerable on this issue.
I think certainly in the beginning of 1993 it was clear that this was an issue on which we 
were winning, under the old Conservative regime of Valcourt. This is something where 
we were getting a lot of favourable media attention. So if you were in the refugee 
advocacy community, this was a good vehicle to jump on. And the community that we 
have is said to be very open... The scope of interest is quite broad. (Dench,CCR 
interview 1995)
The view that Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt contributed directly, though 
“unwittingly” to support for women’s human rights, was widely held among activists. They 
pointed out over and over again particular instances that were crucial to the movement’s 
ability to attract favourable media coverage, generate anti-government support, and by
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embarrassing the government, constrain its social control options. Public Relations Officer 
of the ICHRDD, Bronson, explained:
Bernard Valcourt, the Immigration Minister at the time, at one point made a real 
mistake. He told the Globe and Mail and a group of reporters that it would be culturally 
imperialist for Canada to accept Nada. He said something about Canada not being able 
to pass judgement on “other countries’ cultures”. And saying also that Canada would be 
“flooded” with women refugees. (Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
That the Conservative government was threatened by increasing Canadian malaise, 
scepticism and cynicism, while national identity was fragile, made the Immigration Minister’s 
potentially racist and sexist responses to questions regarding women’s human rights indeed 
dire. Not only did his comments mobilise women’s and immigrant and refugee groups, but 
also provoked overwhelming public response. Would he stain a great source of Canadian 
identity and pride, its progressive humanitarian reputation? Would he ignore the rights and 
recognition won by Canada’s feminist movement? Describing the significance of the latter 
and the profound impact of Valourt’s comments, Dench explained:
It is widely understood [in Canada] that women have rights that are traditionally 
trampled upon, that violence against women is a problem we have never taken seriously 
enough, that attitudes need to change. In this context, it is more difficult to get away 
with patent insensitivity toward the oppression of women... Into this trap fell the 
Minister of the day, Bernard Valcourt... He contributed immeasurably and no doubt 
entirely against his will, to the cause of women refugees, by some ill-conceived public 
remarks... The Minister was taken to task for suggesting that the rights of women are 
no more than a matter of cultural choice and that we should keep the door open for 
men, but slam it shut for women, lest too many come. (Dench, Speech to BC Law 
School 23 March 1994).
Groups responded immediately to Valcourt’s statements, several more claimants 
were in the public eye, and the debate between universal and culturally relative human rights 
of women was increasingly polarised.
We put out a press release two days later saying that it was “bizarre” that [the 
government] would say such a thing... And two weeks later Nada was accepted. The 
heat was just too much... I was told that Bernard Valcourt’s fax machine was just 
running off the hook, women really got angiy across the country and started faxing him. 
(Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
Press releases were also issued by the CCR Media attention was clearly favourable; 
the Globe and Mail reported: “No plan to accept victims of sex bias” (16 January 1993), and 
the Montreal Gazette wrote: “Consider gender: persecuted women should have refugee 
status” (25 January 1993). Conceding to public pressure, Valcourt retracted his statements, 
granted Nada a stay of deportation on H&C grounds, promised to develop policy guidelines 
to deal with similar cases, to consider whether changing Canada’s Immigration Act to include
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gender or sex persecution would be an appropriate course of action, and to hold national 
consultations on women refugee issues for this purpose.
In his press statement Valcourt underscored the influence of Broadbent’s editorial 
advice: “In reaching my decision I took into consideration the comments made by the 
Honourable Edward Broadbent, President of the International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development”. Dench (CCR) interpreted public support and the government’s 
reversal in part as one based on the strength of individual cases presented as exceptions to 
the rule rather than structural representatives: “I guess no one needs to feel that the world as 
we know it is too seriously threatened when two powerful guys agree to let one faceless, 
nameless woman remain in Canada” (Speech to BC Law School, 23 March 1994):
In a sense, then, the issue was an uncontroversial one. It piqued the public’s interest; it 
provided a new angle on the popular theme of the incompetence and heartlessness of 
the reigning government. There was little to threaten the fabric of [Canadian’s lives]: it 
seemed like big government against a small number of largely defenceless harmless 
women who simply wanted to be allowed to live in Canada...
However, the pattern of provocation, government response, heightened activity and 
media attention continued even after government reversed its position and promised certain 
concessions. Activists wanted government not only to make concessions on particular 
claimants’ cases, but to follow through with statements of longer-term intent, namely 
structural and administrative changes that would affect whole groups of claimants. The 
media continued to push provocative headlines such as “Is sexual equality a universal value?” 
(Montreal Gazette 15-02-93). Both radical legislative change and the immediate interpretative 
reform promised by the government, were demanded. NAC president Judy Rebik explained 
to the press: “When they know it’s going to go public and the heat goes on, they stay the 
deportation, but what about the cases that don’t go public?” (Montreal Gazette 15-02-93). 
President Matas of the CCR commented on the inadequacy of the proposed policy 
guidelines, saying: “All the guidelines in the world won’t mean a thing if they are left in the 
hands of ignorant, sexist, politicised board members who can still do what they like... Sexual 
equality isn’t a Canadian value, it is a universal value. The Minister is dragging his heels over 
something over which there is no need to drag his heels” (Montreal Gazette 15-02-93). Several 
claimants went public in February and were accepted by the Immigration Minister. And in 
early March a group of 14 claimants collectively publicised their claims at press conferences 
in Toronto and Montreal. NAC demanded a moratorium on all pending deportations of 
gender-persecution claimants until an appropriate determination system could be instated.
In response, government announced a moratorium on deportation of the 14 women, 
its continued commitment to national Consultations on the issue of including sex
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persecution in refugee policy, and the instatement, that month, of policy Guidelines on 
Women Refugees Fleeing Gender-Related Persecution.
As indicated by the instatement of the Guidelines, it appears that the shift to reform 
goals combined with extrainsitutional tactics and backed up by radical demands as a 
bargaining point, described above, was quite effective. Other research has found non- 
institutional tactics combined with reform goals to be particularly powerful. McAdam’s 
research on the American civil rights movement suggested that this powerful combination 
hinges on the ability of groups “to master the art of simultaneously playing to a variety of 
publics, threatening opponents, and pressuring the state, all the while appearing non­
threatening and sympathetic to the media and other publics” (1996:344). These were strong 
characteristics that the network studied indeed portrayed. While pushing radical demands 
until the final moment, they concurrently pressured the state into immediately implementing 
the Guidelines and took a strong hand in their subsequent application and revision during 
the National Consultations that followed.
C DECLINE AND REGENERATION: MEDIATING BETWEEN IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND
LONG-TERM GOALS
What were the considerations behind this shift toward co-operation with government 
regarding reform rather than radical policy, and to what degree were the Guidelines accepted 
by supporters as a policy solution? Here we must look at the nature of the Guidelines, to 
whom it appealed and to what degree.
The Guidelines cut a compromise between radical liberal and conservative 
perspectives. They were developed in lieu of reopening the 1951 Convention or Canadian 
Immigration Act to include "gender” or "sex" persecution. Instead, gender as a type of 
persecution may be "related" to any of the five traditional grounds (rather than just ‘social 
group’) through Guidelines that educate and aid decision-makers to provide "gender- 
inclusive" hearings and evaluations of claims, rather than subsuming refugee experiences 
under the traditional male model (Turley,1994).
Immigration and Refugee Board "guidelines" were given statutory basis in Canada 
when amendments to the Immigration Act came into force on 1 February 1993. IRB 
Chairperson Mawani’s immediate use board guidelines as a way of addressing female-specific 
persecution and problems in the hearing room was considered a brilliant strategy by many. It 
negotiated between competing perspectives on need for, and shape of, policy change. It also 
made gender-related refugees legitimate in the face of continuing controversy over a 
relatively brief period of time. The Guidelines’ form and principles provided a way of 
avoiding, to some extent, philosophical issues of cultural relativism and "the condemnation
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of wayward states" in determining which women's rights (in which country) are "human 
rights". They strategically avoid criticism by cultural relativists by not directly condemning 
sending-countries. Instead, they (a) use the human rights approach in refugee law and 
determination processes, which is readily extendible to female-specific persecution due to the 
gender neutral language of the Declaration of Human Rights, and (b) recognise that some 
states may not have sufficient resources to provide internal protection. The non-obligatory 
and non-binding nature of the Guidelines also protects Canada’s sovereignty. However, 
adjudicators are obliged to take the Guidelines into account and give well-founded reasons 
for their decisions, and the Guidelines may be expanded and refined over time.
Agreeing that floodgate theory and cultural relativism are irrelevant, this pragmatic 
perspective maintains by accepting gender-related refugees Canada acknowledges and 
exposes the maltreatment of women in many countries, and makes an international statement 
that women's rights are human rights rather than sexually, culturally, or racially determined.
The Guidelines enjoyed the support of core network constituents, although to 
differing degrees and with different ideas about their long-term usefulness. In all cases, the 
fact that supporters worked with individual asylum seekers facing deportation weighed 
heavily upon strategy choice. Weighing the potential for success corresponding to responses 
of the external environment (public support, elite sympathy, government position) over time, 
in conjunction with these policy values, forces a shift in priorities and produces the hierarchy 
of policy demands represented in Table 8.2. Secondary aspects of the policy core become 
primary danands. ‘Near core’ aims take on a different time frame and subsequently become 
second priority. This hierarchy of ‘pragmatic’ policy values represents values and aims in order 
of doe emphasis actors gave them during a particular period of negotiation with government.
Table 8.2 Hierarchy of Pragmatic Policy Values and Policy Demands Of Core 
Advocacy Network
Pragmatic policy values (shifted emphasis with time Corresponding policy aims
factor)___________________________________________________________________________________
NEAR CORE with time factor: Interpretative/Administrative change: reading gender
safe asylum for as many persecuted females into existing law
as possible as soon as possible 
SECONDARY CORE with time factor Legislative change: "sex" or "gender" added to the
safe asylum for all persecuted females, in the definition of persecution
medium to long-term
EXISTING POLICY (no change): No change: Judicial or Ministerial discretion
safe asylum on a case by case basis
existing interpretation of the law___________________________________________________________
What has changed here are essentially expectations about institutional responses 
within specified time periods, although some activists expressed some scepticism as to 
whether legislative change would really ever be attainable, or even desirable given a workable
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alternative. In all cases, supporters were not willing to sacrifice the priority of asylum 
seekers’ immediate needs for safety under strict time pressure. Actual contact between 
asylum seekers and supporters helped create a willingness to strategically shift policy goals in 
relation to the conditions and responses of the external environment. The suggested solution 
offered immediate implementation for waiting claimants. Shifting from long-term goals 
(legislative change) to short-term needs (entailing interpretative change), produced policy 
aims geared toward guaranteeing asylum to the greatest possible range of asylum seekers 
(types or forms of female-specific persecution) in the shortest possible time.
There were different degrees of support for the Guidelines among advocates. Some 
accepted the compromise as a short-term solution, and others later abandoned long-term 
policy aims. In both cases the shift was defended as both strategic and realistic given various 
goals and constraints. Constraints included time as well as technical and political limitations. 
The second most important reason for supporting the Guidelines was related to political 
access and information relating to refugee law. This was indicated by the fact that the 
strongest support evolved particularly among individuals and groups in a position of 
knowledge about and access to refugee law, excluding in particular smaller feminist 
organisations with more service than advocacy orientation.
Main adherents of the Guidelines as a long-term solution included the CCR, 
ICHRDD, and RAM. They sought to formally harness the law to the needs of women 
refugees without reopening the 1951 Convention to introduce ‘sex persecution’, yet 
transcending the social group category and ‘public’ forms of persecution. They explained that 
long-term policy change (re-opening the 1951 Convention) looked highly unlikely, in part 
because it may endanger other aspects of the refugee definition which would also be open to 
re-interpretation, with the possibility that established protection mechanisms might be 
destabilised.19 Moreover, legally acknowledging sex persecution would challenge receiving- 
countries to unilaterally accept that violence against women which is 'domestic1 in nature is a 
structural condition and a public issue that is neither culturally relevant nor a question of 
moral interpretation. These issues could not be resolved in a short period of time. Instead, 
attention was turned to questions concerning states’ basic roles and rights in cases involving 
recognised characteristics of human rights violations (see Chapter 4). They accepted the 
Guidelines as sufficient if implemented quickly and appropriately. Williams (RAM) explained:
From a pragmatic point of view, the fact is that the numbers of women and children 
who are refugees keep increasing every single day, that what would be most helpful 
would have to be that we will have to find other avenues. And in the meanwhile, one of
19 Interview with Bronson, ICHRDD; speeches by IRB Chairperson, Mawani,, 1993 and 1994.
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them is to use the existing definition as it is, and use it in an enlightened way. (Williams, 
RAM interview 1995).
Similarly Bronson from the ICHRDD explained:
I think we have been pursuaded by everybody, from [the CCR] to [IRB Chairperson] 
Mawani to the UNHCR that politically it is not a viable option because if you open up 
the Convention then you will never get another one signed, because of a very general 
climate of closing down borders and so on. I would certainly be for it but I... can live 
with "women as a social group" as long as we can have adequate implementation. 
(Bronson,ICHRDD interview 1995).
Also stressing appropriate implementation, Nada’s lawyer observed that the instated 
Guidelines might make the existing refugee definition work by changing attitudes and 
understanding: “This reinforces the statement that you did not need to change the law 
because you could have accepted women before; it was just a way of perceiving reality.» 
(Cote,interview 1995). Supporters particularly emphasised getting the Guidelines 
implemented at overseas refugee offices, as for inland status determination.
Advocates who did not adopt the same long-term shift in emphasis described the 
same combination of goals with only one major constraint: time. Women’s shelters, which 
typically enjoy less political access and also had less previous knowledge of refugee law, 
tended to agree on this point. Fernandez, from Women's Aid and NAC commented:
We think the directives of Madame Mawani are very nice, good progress in the world. 
But to have the real solution we must put another point in the definition of refugee. 
Within the five points we must add 'gender persecution'... to give power, or rights. To 
have a law to protect women from gender persecution, so they can [name the] problem 
and get help. (Femadez, Women’s Aid, NAC, interview 1995).
Groups of this opinion did not believe progressive interpretation and application of 
the Guidelines would be enough. Interestingly, they tended also to be organisations doing 
front-line work rather than primarily advocacy work, and which dealt with the particular 
kinds of refugee women on a day to day basis. They might witness whether the Guidelines 
were really applied consistently or in a progressive manner by the women with whom they 
work on a daily basis. Yet women’s shelters, and also NAC, also stopped pressuring for 
radical policy change, as did other secondary supporters, for reasons described in the section 
below on the second phase of campaigning.
The range of degrees of support for the Guidelines was underlined by a primary 
commitment to implementing the Guidelines as far as possible, whether in the short or long 
term. The instatement of the Guidelines was followed by a decline of public actions and an 
increase in govemment-nongovemment co-operation. National Gender Consultations also 
took place, in which each sector was represented. These were arranged between June 1993 
and December 1995, first by nongovernment actors and later by government, and involved
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asylum seekers, non-governmental advocates and government. They aimed to promote 
greater "gender inclusivity" (Hathaway,1993) in the refugee determination system.
Co-operation was a goal of the first Consultation organisers, consisting primarily of 
advocacy network members and represented by the TCMR. Williams from RAM described:
The Consultations were incredible. It was bilingual... [and] set it up in a way that 
wasn’t meant to be confrontational. It was meant to be exploratory. We had people who 
had lived the experience already, we had advocates, and then we had government 
people. We all knew what everybody's position was, we didn’t want to get in that 
position where everybody is just defending what they were doing. It was really hoped 
that people would, through exposure to other views, become more conscience of the 
issues. (Williams,RAM interview 1995).
The participation of refugees was frequently commented upon as both novel and powerful. 
Their testimonies were also identified as one of the only real sources of controversy:
Liliana was quite emotional about her experiences at the Board and how bad it had 
been. Her testimony] was quite long. It was good, it was important, and she needed to 
do that. But the response was... a sort of rather defensive outburst; it was too bad. But 
it doesn’t surprise me; it is the setting... where it is the NGO community putting 
[government] on the defensive, criticising the system that is in place, and [where some 
individuals are] part of that system. And I’m sure [they feel] at times caught because... 
I’m sure they cared about the issue but these are things that people [in their institution] 
up until the Guidelines happily didn’t think about... (WilliamsJRAM, interview 1995.)
This controversy describes IRB members “caught” between personal interest and support 
for the particular claimants, and constraints imposed by the institutions they represent. It 
also perhaps indicates the importance of ‘elite supporters* within these institutions, who 
worked against institutional constraints and were instrumental in developing and getting 
support for instatement of the Guidelines. Core supporters repeatedly remarked upon the air 
of co-operation coming from government sector people. Dench from the CCR described:
... as it turned out a lot of the individuals who were sitting at that table were quite radical 
in their way, not necessarily taking the defence of government line. So you've got things 
like the representative of Quebec government putting forth all sorts of ideas and 
confident that she would not be attributed because what she was saying was not 
necessarily representing the Quebec government point of view.
Among issues discussed was need for more comprehensive and consistent decision­
making through the Guidelines; gender-awareness training of immigration and refugee 
officers and adjudicators; administrative changes in the refugee hearing room to enable 
women claimants to be heard (i.e. not letting the husband represent both parties) and 
encouraging new interpretations of gender-related persecution by developing a body of case 
law from which lawyers can draw. But by the end of the Consultations no consensus had 
been reached as to whether the Convention refugee definition should be expanded to include
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"gender" or "sex", although the view that "guidelines" were inadequate was prevalent 
(Turley,1995). Use of Guidelines would need to be monitored.
d . Peak a n d  D ecline of  the  second  phase: implementing  a n d  e x p a n d in g  the  
Guidelines
Nearly a year after peak activity in 1993, extrainstitutional actions were sparked by the 
rejection of what advocates’ considered strong refugee claims, and in several cases the 
repeated rejection of claimants from the first phase who had gone public, were given stays 
of deportations and promised reviews. The three most publicised cases involved Tamarati, 
Therese (both among the 14 women who had collectively received stay of deportation a year 
earlier) and Ginette.
These cases brought into question the initial hesitation the proposed polity change 
had raised: do the Guidelines go far enough? During Consultations between June 1993 and 
March 1995, neither in depth follow-up or monitoring of cases and court decisions occurred. 
It was not apparent whether the Guidelines were being applied consistently, whether they 
could ever be applied to the kind of range of cases that advocates had hoped for, and 
whether they were sufficient in the depth of their analysis of the structural basis of ‘gender- 
related’ claims. After the Final Report from the Consultations (1994) was issued, government 
stopped calling Steering Group meetings on Gender and Refugee Issues generally.
The peak period in the second phase of activism was markedly different from the 
first. It corresponded with the perceived breakdown or inadequacy of the Guidelines for its 
target population or for segments of the population it failed to target. But while returning to 
non-institutional tactics, campaigns did not return to radical policy demands. The most 
powerful framing tactics emerged in Taramati’s case.
Tamarati’s claim was rejected because while awaiting a decision, her previous 
husband returned to Canada by marrying a Canadian. The woman’s shelter where Tamarati 
resided appealed to Quebec Immigration Minister Ludenne Robillard, saying: “The delay of 
7 years [in processing her refugee claim] has been long enough for the ex-husband to apply 
for refugee status, have a seventh child, be deported back to Trinidad, remarry a Canadian 
citizen, reapply to Canada and finally be accepted as a permanent resident in our country” 
(Secours aux Femmes, letter to the Immigration Minister). They compared the rights of 
persecutors and the persecuted:
To maintain this deportation order would raise the indignation of the Canadian people 
as they learn that our government gives exile to wife abusers and deports the victims. 
We are unable to give any credibility to the report from the Immigration services and 
the population will not be able to give him any credibility. The only message that 
Canada would hear from coast to coast is that Canada colludes with violent spouses at 
the detriment of the victims... (Letter to the Immigration Minister, February 1995)
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Canada’s international responsibility was also questioned: “It would be very 
embarrassing for our representatives at [the Beijing] conference to be criticized about an 
unfavorable decision. How will they be able to explain that Canada favors wife abusers? We 
are convinced that this is not in the best interests of Canada.” (Ibid).
However, no demand for radical policy change was made, simply demand for 
appropriate implementation of the Guidelines. Similarly, Therese and Ginette’s cases relied 
primarily on arguing that domestic violence may amount to persecution, in other words 
attempting to secure consistent application of the Guidelines and expand them across 
complicated case scenarios.
The absence of radical demands for legislative change may be explained by several 
factors, most importantly the co-operative stance that government had adopted and which it 
insisted it still maintained. This helped reduce conflict and controversy. It was accompanied 
by a new government strategy of conflict avoidance in particular cases, both those that went 
public during this period and those that made private appeals. By the second phase, the new 
Liberal government had learned to make neither private responses to particular claimants nor 
public statements to public demands in the cases studied, until the latest possible moment 
before deportation. This strategy, seen under the new Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi’, 
reduced conflict by avoiding the media and reducing activists’ opportunities to make use of 
it. Therese’s lawyer explained:
We went to the press, and the Minister promised to look into the case again, personally. 
So that looked good. But he waited until the day before her planned departure to tell us 
«No». So we had remained kind of silent because we (reasoned) we have to collaborate, 
we have to give him a chance. And he fooled us. He waited until the very last minute so 
that we would not make too much noise. (Cote, interview 1994).
Therese’s case ultimately won through public pressure when she re-entered Canada 
after being detained and rejected at a third country option she had chosen to avoid her 
country of origin. However the example her case provides of changed government tactics 
explains some of the heightened disagreement among supporters concerning the use of 
extrainstitutional tactics, particularly between lawyers and women’s shelter workers when 
cases were lost. Several shelter workers charged that lawyers had waited too long to go 
public, having too much faith in the state and institutional approaches, and thus lost cases 
due to lack of public pressure. One lawyer who handled many of the cases, explained: “It 
was often a process of explaining what you have done, then getting the impression that they 
don’t understand what the work involves, that they doubt me, my competence, thinking that 
I don’t do good work” (Belanger,interview 1995). Nada’s lawyer similarly observed:
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Nada had a lawyer before [me], a good lawyer who does good work. But sometimes 
when you lose a case, the client can say it was the lawyer’s fault and will want to change. 
Nada wanted to change lawyers, and she did. (Cote, interview 1995)
It also became apparent by those cases that did go public during this period, that the 
effectiveness of the media strategy was declining, a second change. Only one out of three 
claimants receiving major publicity during that time had court decisions on their cases 
overturned by the Immigration Minister. This had been a major concern among many 
activists: that either media interest would wane, or the public responses and influence upon 
government would degenerate. Williams from RAM commented she was “concerned that as 
a strategy for the future it is already suffering from overwork”. Media interest did not 
decrease, as the spate of coverage of Therese, Taramati and Ginette’s cases indicated, but the 
nature of its interest and impact changed. This was perhaps an off-shoot of government’s 
new stance and the existence of the Guidelines. Provocative headlines that grabbed public 
attention in 1993 could no longer be used because further refugee policy change was not 
being demanded. There was a return to the kinds of headlines seen early on in Dulerie’s case, 
and a refocusing of emphasis on implementation of existing policy rather than a call for 
policy change.
Other factors may also have been involved in declining influence. In particular, 
several of the largest and most influential supporting organisations, the ICHRDD, CCR and 
NAC, were decreasing their involvement. The assistance they continued to offer was 
primarily information and advice to potential or current activists on how to campaign, 
although the CCR continued to work more directly in Therese’s case. Thus, despite 
significant media attention and the involvement of a large number of previous and new 
supporting organisations, Ginette ultimately went into hiding to avoid deportation and 
Tamarati was deported. Only Therese was accepted. Perhaps not surprisingly, Therese’s 
acceptance occurred just after a major scandal within the ranks of Canada’s peace keeping 
force in Somalia. Canada’s humanitarian policies and actions were under intense scrutiny.
Although these cases did not effect further policy change they exert pressure on the 
IRB to implement, broaden, and revise the Guidelines. But perhaps the greatest pressure for 
continuing policy reform stemmed from the growth of jurisprudence under the Guidelines, 
which the following chapter examines.
III. Co n c l u sio n : t h e  c e n t r a lity  o f  asylum  seekers
We have explored the evolution and implementation of strategies and the context in which 
they operated, the dynamics between them, and changing relations to the external
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environment over the course of the campaigns. In this the integral role of asylum seekers 
has also emerged. Core to asylum seekers’ participation and influence was their presence as 
both actors in institutional and extra-institutional events, and signifiers of campaign ideals. 
The latter, most fundamentally entailed aligning human rights with the citizenship rights of 
women in Canada regarding safety from female-specific violence. Interestingly, both 
substantive human rights and citizenship rights (despite non-citizen status) asylum seekers 
already enjoyed in Canada supported their capacity to take actions and push out the 
boundaries of both ideal and substantive rights they widxd to enjoy. In this the basic 
messages and tactics of persuasion conveyed through asylum seekers’ participation, as actors 
and signifiers, were crucial to campaign success. Citizenship and human rights of both 
theoretical and substantive kinds were played off one another to become mutually enhancing.
The aims of campaigners were expressed and achieved both through policy demands 
and the policy change process itself. They prioritised both asylum seekers’ immediate need 
for safety and their structural representation. When near-core policy aims seemed unlikely to 
be attained, secondaiy-core policy aims prioritised immediate need for safety. The shifting 
strategies advocates used responded to and provoked the external environment. Framing 
processes combined'm. the campaigns were each provocative and timely in their own way. They 
responded to and elicited government responses, fuelled anti-government public support, 
and encouraged speedy instatement of the Guidelines as a short term solution. Near-core 
demands were an important bargaining tool, but campaigns evolved around a series of 
individual asylum seekers whose immediate needs were paramount. When government 
dismissed or repressed demands, advocates polarised the debate further and thus heightened 
public attention and mobilised anti-government supporters, urging government to take 
moderate demands more seriously. The co-existence and changing combinations of goals 
and tactics were both proactive and reactive; they were important strategies in themselves, as 
the evolving dialogue of conflict and negotiation between the advocacy network and the 
environment indicates.
Structure a n d  Signifiers
Activists’ goals were presented through two simultaneous discursive and ideological frames. 
The primary vehicles for their expression were a series of at least nineteen claimants ‘going 
public’ between 1991 and 1996. This brought many opportunities and needs for public 
pressure, creating a staggered effect of numerous concentrated actions over a period of time. 
Each case was fought individually and also referred to a group. Asylum seekers were 
advocates in their own cases and representatives of the persecuted group. As cases were 
publicised one after another, pressure mounted.
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Asylum seekers appeared both as 'symbols' and 'exceptions', mobilising broad public 
support. As symbols, these asylum seekers represented a structurally persecuted group, thus 
calling upon Canada's international human rights obligations, drawing attention to structural 
failures of Canada’s refugee regime, and polarising the debate. Arriving from Latin America 
and South America, the Caribbean, Russia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa and 
South-East Asia, they represented a range of forms of structural violence experienced by 
women around the world. These asylum seekers had exhausted all appropriate institutional 
channels. They raised the question of whether human rights are universal or culturally 
relative and put into question Canada’s responsibility for upholding human rights dear to 
Canadians (and subsequently upholding its humanitarian reputation), as well as their 
corresponding citizenship rights.
On the other hand the public was also mobilised through the reverse tactic. As 
exceptions, these asylum seekers were individuals who against all odds sought asylum in 
Canada. Thus the acceptance of one or a few was non-threatening (it will not provoke a 
‘flood’ of claimants). This strategy emphasises their individual humanity, drawing upon 
Canadians’ sympathy and upon Canada's beneficent humanitarian reputation and privileged 
position as an advanced democratic country with ample resources. It is not Canada’s 
obligation to accept them, but its moral conscience.
The campaign kept the issue extremely local and visible by constantly referring to 
individuals, and to Canada’s failure rather than sending-countiy or sending-culture failures. 
Making appeals for individual needs sometimes entailed framing individual cases as somewhat 
isolated occurrences in Canada. It played down long-term implications for refugee policy and 
for future asylum seekers, making humanitarian acceptance of individual cases as non­
threatening to Canadians as possible. As Dench (1994) describes: “it seemed like big 
government against a small number of largely defenceless harmless women who simply 
wanted to be allowed to live in Canada.” Crucial to this approach was the argument that 
women around the women tend not to have the means or opportunities to seek asylum: no 
‘floodgates’ would be opened either by making exceptions for a few cases, or altering refugee 
policy or its administration to accommodate their needs. By contrasting the powerful state 
against the harmlessness of a few women, the campaigns played on Canadians’ concurrent 
anti-government sentiments, “provid[ing] a new angle on the popular theme of the 
incompetence and heartlessness of the reigning government” (Dench, 1994).
Focusing on individuals gave names, faces and individual stories to the abstract 
concepts, legal issues and moral dilemmas they represented. It elicited public sympathy bolh 
on structural grounds and as exceptions to the rule. It appealed to Canadian’s who took as 
basic (a) Canada’s humanitarian identity (b) the right of women resident in Canada to be
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protected from violence, public or private, with whom these asylum seekers could be 
equated. Canadian women were invited to compare their own positions, privileges, 
expectations and fears of violence and their rights to protection, with that of a few stateless 
women from other cultures who were being denied the same help in Canada. One of the 
most powerful sources of anti-state sentiment arose as implications for Canadian women 
were emphasised: Canadian women may have rights in Canada, but even they did not have 
privilege to human rights in the abstract sense. If the right to safety from the kinds of torture 
and degradation which (for example) battered women experience is not a human right, it is a 
right at risk in a global society. The sympathy elicited was overwhelming, including not only 
refugee advocates but women’s organisations, politicians, and residents.
These moral and legal arguments represent a fusion of feminism, citizenship and 
human rights. The combined threats and pressures they evoked were two-fold: domestic 
public pressure outweighing perceived foreign risks of imperialism as well as Canada’s 
national security (opening floodgates).
Sig nify in g  A cts: tactics a n d  their  expression
Having already made claims and been rejected, asylum seekers who went public clearly were 
worked outside the institutional system, pressuring for inclusion into a system that would 
need to be radically changed to accommodate them.
Asylum seekers’ institutionalised rights to status determination processes and oral 
hearing were upheld through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and their 
human rights upheld in refugee policy guidelines status determinations. Institutional tactics 
supported in different ways by the substantive citizenship and human rights asylum seekers 
could access, provided building blocks for extra-institutional tactics and demands for policy 
change involving an inherent equation of ideal citizenship with ideal human rights. This 
developed the legitimacy of demands and mobilised a wide range of public interest and 
positive media coverage, creating sufficient domestic pressure to outweigh the risks of policy 
reform perceived by the state.
Asylum seekers’ extra-institutional actions affected by-stander publics. By ‘going 
public’ they gave human faces as well as the evidence of their testimonies and strength of 
their convictions, to the body of claimants they represented. This was crucial for attracting 
media attention, primarily of a positive kind, polarising the debate, gaining public support 
and embarrassing government, and constraining social control options of the latter.
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OUTCOMES: EXTENT AND CONTEXT
While radical policy change did not result, the policy reform that occurred through 
institutionalised policy guidelines achieved many of the basic policy aims and ‘policy values’ 
campaigners began with. Furthermore the ideological change they achieved in the underlying 
interpretation and application of human rights law in refugee policy was fundamentally 
radical. It dramatically expanded state responsibilities for human rights protections by 
blurring traditional notions of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres where persecution occurs. 
Strategically, demands for radical policy change when supported by the public made 
acceptance of more moderate policy reform easier for the state to swallow. As one core 
supporter observed, it was a useful “rhetorical hook” upon which to hang demands for 
reform. Mediation between radical and reform goals, institutional and extra-institutional 
actions, played an important role in the nature and extent of influence that asylum seekers 
and advocates were able to achieve. Not all supporters were equally satisfied with results, but 
undoubtedly achieved progressive policy change.
The Guidelines cut a compromise between the two key values in the belief system 
hierarchy: immediate safety for asylum seekers, and policy change reflecting deep core values. 
The advocacy network tolerated political compromise in accepting shorter-term solutions 
proposed through the Guidelines, while continuing to challenge and expand the Guidelines.
The Guidelines may thus be better understood through the conflicting forces and 
grassroots actions shaping them, including the important roles of asylum seekers and the 
weighting of value priorities when compromises had to be made. In light of these 
compromises, we may question the extent to which the Guidelines either adequately 
represent or pave the way for institutional recognition of the particular refugees. Broader 
implications for processes of policy development are suggested in the concluding chapter. The 
following chapter looks at how the Guidelines have been used by examining gender-related 
claims and court decisions between 1993 and 1997.
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9 . S e e in g  ‘s e x  p e r s e c u t i o n ’ t h r o u g h  a s y lu m  s e e k e r s  c la im s : 
u s e  o f  t h e  G u id e l in e s ,  1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 7
The first battle was over words and it has almost been won.... But if we make the mistake of 
being satisfied with words that are ultimately not respected, or phantom programs that are 
not really functional, we will really be no closer to our objective. We must not be satisfied 
with declarations, we must look at implementation. We must not be satisfied with the 
Guidelines, we must monitor their impact and be prepared to adjust if need be.
(Bronson, ICHRDD 1994)
With the Guidelines in place, important new channels opened for asylum seekers to shape 
interpretations of the kinds of persecution females experience. The dual aim of this chapter 
is to illuminate who is using the Guidelines and to what effect. It assesses how the 
Guidelines have fared in addressing a range of types of ‘gender-related’ persecution and 
complications characteristic of these types of claims; where claims have continued to push 
out their boundaries; and whether further policy change is warranted. It demonstrates both 
the use and possible policy implications of institutional claim-making by ‘gender-related’ 
asylum seekers, neither of these which have been previously addressed in the literature.
In section I the approach taken in the Guidelines is reviewed and its advantages and 
drawbacks are considered. A framework is offered through which actual claims and use of 
the Guidelines may be explored. This framework aims to disclose and elaborate a 
comprehensive range of case scenarios looking at significant common dimensions of these 
claims. Section II analyses and uncovers a range of forms and causes of female-specific 
persecution and factors complicating such cases, drawing upon the case synopses and court 
decisions on 147 notable “gender-related” refugee claims across Canada between 1993 and 
1997.20 This reveals both a typology of actual claims being made, trends in the interpretation 
and application of the Guidelines, continuing challenges and possible implications. 
Elaboration of the typology concentrates particularly on the more problematic and 
complicated aspects of gender-related claims.
Section III concludes with a qualitative assessment of what has been considered one 
of the main advantages of the Guidelines, its flexible, non-binding nature, against a two-fold 
criticism of this very characteristic: that it precludes ensuring full and proper implementation, 
and that it skirts the question of universality - the structural basis of female-specific 
persecution. The debate comes down to the question of whether it is possible or even 
sufficient to enumerate over time and through the growth of case law, the multitudinous 
forms and conditions of female-specific persecution occurring on the basis of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion and social group, without the sex-specific categoiy demanded by
20 RefLex (legal database) searched for gender-related claims; See Chapter 2.
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campaigners. The use of the social group category as a catch-all for female-specific claims 
that do not fit the other categories is in question. The effect of claimants’ use of the 
Guidelines in continually challenging ways, as illustrated by the range of types of claims 
elaborated in Section II, is indicated alongside possible directions for future policy change 
which claim-making continues to suggest -  namely along the same lines campaigners were 
suggesting before the Guidelines were instated.
I. C a n a d a ’s G u id e l in e s  f o r  w o m e n  r efu g e es  f e a r in g  g e n d e r -r e l a t e d
PERSECUTION:
A. T he NATURE OF board  guidelines
Young (Library of Parliament, research branch) observes that IRB “polity guidelines” are 
intended to “foster consistency in what is a very decentralised system.” (1994:10, supra27). 
However, they are by nature non-binding and flexible, and as such, both enabling and 
disillusioning.
As outlined in the IRB Chairpersons memorandum, "Procedures for the Guideline- 
Making Process -s .65(3) and (4) of the Immigration A ct'\ guidelines are enforceable to the 
extent that: (1) Refugee, Immigration Appeal and Adjudication Divisions Members are 
expected to "follow the Guidelines unless there are compelling or exceptional reasons for 
adopting a different analysis"; and (2) "individuals have a right to expect that the Guidelines 
will be followed unless compelling or exceptional reasons exist for departure from them"; but
(3) guidelines are not binding, "in the sense that Members and Adjudicators may use their 
discretion in individual cases to follow a different approach where warranted, as long as the 
reasons for the departure are set out in their reasons for decision.”
The Guidelines for Women Refuges Fearing Gender Related Persecution adopted under 
section 65(3) and (4) of the Immigration Act thus provide a forum and framework for 
suggested interpretations of female-specific persecution, and from which adjudicators may 
depart only for “compelling reasons”. They may also act as vehicle through which 
interpretations and procedural processes regarding gender-related claims are expanded over 
time. They encourage the accumulation of case law and documentation, and by their flexible 
nature are easier to amend than legislation, which must pass the approval of Parliament. 
Thus they remain open to future revisions and may expand in scope and application beyond 
their original purpose. At the same time, their non-binding nature makes application by 
refugee hearing officers less predictable and possibly inconsistent. They require the
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interpretation of adjudicators who use them, many of whom may not be "gender sensitive", 
and they require monitoring.
B. Co n t en t  of  the  G e n d er  G uidelines
Consistent applications of board guidelines is also related to their content, which adjudicators 
may be more or less partial to. Arguments for and against the Gvnddines for Women Refugees 
Fearing Gender Related Persecution were presented in chapters 1 and 8. The following elaborates 
where the Guidelines transcend traditional refugee law as well as relevant proposals for 
change described in chapter 5.
Under the Guidelines adjudicators are advised to view claims and the Convention 
refugee definition through a gender-lens. Through them, females whose persecution is tied 
to the gender-culture of the society in which they live may be recognised as Convention 
refugees for reasons "related" to their gender. That is, persecution occurring on Convention 
grounds occurs for reasons related to, or through forms related to, a persons gender. It does 
not occur because a person is female or male, but because of their status and expected gerder- 
roles in society, either as related to their race, nationality, political opinion, religion or social 
group. The question is, how is this ‘relatedness’ determined?
To answer this question the Guidelines identify broad four categories of persecution 
women may experience, any of which may be ‘related’ to the grounds of persecution 
recognised in the 1951 Convention (race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social 
group). The four categories below build upon DeNeef’s (1984) work and reflect elements of 
various international level recommendations (presented in Chapter 5). But the Guidelines 
also take pains to qualify and elaborate the application of these categories in order to 
encompass ‘private’ forms of violence. Specifically, they identify nonstate actors as 
perpetrators, and acts of omission by the state (failing to protect) alongside more traditionally 
recognised ‘acts of commission’ (persecution by the state or state actors). Attention is also 
drawn to ‘evidentiary issues’ and ‘problems in the hearing room’, which make evidence and 
clear information on both the objective and subjective elements of claims problematic for 
adjudicators to evaluate. Strong emphasis is placed on the need to recognise the general lack 
of appropriate available documentation on violence against women (rather than using it 
against claimants) and to make use of historical evidence about trends in both 
implementation and non-implementation of relevant laws, policies and customs in countries 
of origin. The four categories of female persecution are:
(1) Women who fear persecution on the same Contention grounds, and in similar circumstances. as 
men,: in such cases, “the risk factor is not their sexual status, per se... although the nature of 
the harm feared and procedural issues at the hearing may vaiy as a function of the claimant’s
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gender”. Persecution may take forms related specifically to woman's roles in society, it may 
take the form of sexual violence, and it may raise difficulties in the hearing room which male 
refugees do not commonly face. (2) Women who fear persecution for reasons solely pertaining to 
kinship: in such cases “persecution of kin” may occur to pressure women for information 
about the activities of family members, or because political opinions of their family members 
have been imputed to them (3) Women who fear persecution resulting from certain circumstances o f 
severe discrimination on grounds o f gender* or acts o f violence either by public authorities or at the hands of 
private citizens from whose actions the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned persons. 
In such cases discrimination must be of a “substantially prejudicial nature” and must be 
imposed “on account of any one, or combination, of the statutory grounds for persecution” 
(i.e. race, religion, nationality, political opinion, social group). Females may be the target of 
discriminatory and sometimes persecutory policies and social customs; such policies and 
customs themselves may amount to persecution to which women are expected to conform.
(4) Women who fear persecution as the consequence for failing to conform to, or for transgressing certain 
griderdiscriminating religious or customary laws and practices in their am  country or origin. Such laws and 
practices, by singling out women and placing them in a more vulnerable position than men, may create 
conditions precedent to a gender defined social group. Here policies and customs may not be 
persecutory in themselves, only discriminatory, but failure to conform to them brings 
punishment disproportionate to the crime and amounting to persecution (i.e., decapitation of 
women accused of adultery in systems where women are not given the means to dispute the 
accusation, and moreover the punishment for male adulterers is not death).
The 1996 Update to the Guidelines emphasises several important elements. First, the aim of 
the Guidelines is made explicit: to provide a framework for recognising forms of gender- 
related persecution corresponding with Convention categories of persecution, rather than for 
identifying gender itself as structural cause of persecution. Second, greater explanation of the 
legitimacy of domestic violence and other forms of ‘private’ violence amounting to 
persecution is provided, relying particularly on the social group category. More broadly, the 
Update addresses change of circumstances in sending-countries, and how cultural, economic 
and religious factors may affect claimants’ internal flight alternatives (see Mawani,1997). And 
significantly, it strengthens the use of the social group category as well as positions on state 
protection for gender-related claims, by drawing on non-gender-related jurisprudence 
(namely the case of Canada vs. Ward 1993; see).
We will examine some of this jurisprudence in order to consider how far the 
Guidelines’ categorisation of types and causes of female-specific persecution go, in practice,
(a) to cover a range of forms of violence against women that may amount to persecution, and
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(b) to identify structural causes of persecution in a consistent manner, particularly the social 
group. To do this we will need a basic framework for examining cases.
C. The  social STRUCTURE OF FEMALE-SPECIFIC PERSECUTION: framework for  
ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
Strangely enough, claims and use of the Guidelines have not been monitored in a detailed 
manner. We shall now turn to a framework for examining claims in order to determine the 
nature and range of use of the Guidelines. This framework is informed by the Guidelines and 
checked against basic criteria of the Convention refugee definition described in Chapter 4: 
(1) Convention grounds/universality of persecution (2) well-founded fear indicating the 
individual basis of the persecution (3) absence of internal flight alternatives. The framework 
was also influenced by details of case scenarios emerging in interviews with specialists and 
the histories of asylum seekers who engaged in collective actions. These sources helped 
illuminate why refugees of female-specific persecution may remain ‘invisible’, and thus 
enabled the creation of a more realistic framework. Specifically, four inter-related factors 
may be explored to draw out the range of kinds of claims being made. These are:
(1) The locale in which the persecution occurs and its manifestation or form, Contrary to most of 
the relevant human rights and refugee literature, I do not focus on the distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ locales and forms of violence against women in order to oveoome the 
divide. Rather, I draw from Schuler’s helpful categorisation of violence against women which 
operates by linking three types of locus and manifestations’ of violence (1992:10). I slightly 
revise the typology to demonstrate not only the forms of violence against women according 
to the locales in which they occur, but also the inter-relatedness of these locales. This actually 
links ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres and forms of violence, as well as linking the state with 
non-state actors, across all the locales. It presents a broader picture of the social structure of 
power in which the violence occurs. Figure 9.1 depicts the revised categories schematically.
Schuler explains that “at each point [or locus] key social institutions fulfil critical and 
interactive functions in defining, legitimating and maintaining the violence.” These categories 
are: The Family, which socialises its members to accept hierarchical relations expressed in 
unequal division of labour between the sexes and power over the allocation of resources. The 
Community (social, economic, religious and cultural institutions), which provides the 
mechanisms for perpetuating male control over women’s sexuality, mobility and labour. The 
State, which legitimises the proprietary rights of men over women and provides a legal basis 
to the family and the community to perpetuate these relations; the state may enact 
discriminatory laws and policies or apply laws and policies discriminatorily (Ibid, 10).
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These general categories are useful because, like the refugee definition, we can not 
possibly enumerate all forms of persecution. Instead they describe a range of kinds of violence 
against women. However two amendments to Schuler’s categories appear in the Figure 
below. Within the category of “state”, the absence of laws and policies designed to protect or 
uphold women’s equality to men within society, is included. Regarding the overall 
framework, the categories are represented in overlapping spheres, rather than lists, with the 
family and community within the overarching state context, to show their interrelation. 
Relations between the state, the social sphere in which violence occurs, and the gendered 
nature of the violence are essential for purposes of locating accountability in refugee status 
determinations. Of course, as for all refugee claims, for violence of any kind to amount to 
persecution the fear of it actually occurring must still be well-founded, involving one of the 
five Convention categories of persecution, and absence of internal flight alternatives.
Figure 9.1 Interrelatedness of Locus and Agent in manifestations of Violence 
Against Women (Revised from Margaret Schuler, 1992)
FAMILY:
physical aggression: murder 
(dowiy/other), battering, genital 
mutilation, foeticide, infanticide, 
deprivation of food, deprivation 
of medial care, reproductive 
coercion/ control 
sexual abuse: rape, incest 
emotional abuse: confinemen 
forced marriage, threats of 
reprisals
STATE:
political violence (policies, laws...): 
illegitimate detention, forced 
sterilisation, forced pregnancies, 
tolerating gender violence by 
nonstate agents 
custodial violence (militaiy/police...): rape, torture 
absence of laws to prevent and punish gender-related violence and 
discrimination
COMMUNITY/social reference 
group:
• physical abuse: battery, physical 
chastisement, reproductive 
coercion/control, sati
• sexual assault: rape 
workplace: sexual aggression, 
harassment, intimidation, 
commercialised violence 
(trafficking, forced prostitution) 
media: pornography, 
commercialisation of women’s 
bodies
(2) The relation between persecutor and persecuted: This is most easily depicted using the 
above locales where violence occurs to indicate relations between persecuted and persecutors
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according to their status within and across the locales. For example, a husband may also be a 
public official with considerable authority to violate the law or prevent his wife from 
receiving protection, or he may use the laws of his country to justify his behaviour or prevent 
his wife from leaving (i.e. threatening to use paternal right to custody of their children). Thus 
various types of family, community, and state relations to the claimant bring with them 
status, and come to bear both upon manifestation and protection issues, both in the home 
country and in the receiving-country.
(3) The claimant's role in the persecution against her: I concentrate neither on the duality of 
active versus passive claimants, suggested by Heiss (1994) and others, nor that of 
‘transgression’ versus ‘conformity’ which the Guidelines and previous international policies 
indicate. Rather, claimant roles in the onset of persecution are described on a scale from 
adherence to defiance of the mores of her society (formal/legal or informal). The middle ground 
on this scale is defying custom or law solely by seeking asylum and thus evading persecution 
arising either from adherence or defiance. This scale emphasises first that even adherence is 
an action; it supports the political norm. Second, it agrees, like other scales, that some social 
customs and laws targeting women are inherently discriminatory such that adhering to them 
may amount to persecution, while defying them evokes severe punishment amounting to 
persecution. Third, the scale highlights women’s actions in a more neutral way. 
Transgression’ and ‘deviance’ used in earlier proposals and the Guidelines emphasise the 
criminality of their actions, rather than the potential criminality of laws or customs being 
transgressed in a political manner or with political implications.
(4) The role o f the state in the persecution of doe particular claimant: Here I follow the 
approach taken in the Guidelines but make explicit a scale of relevant state actions, from 
commission to prevention of female-specific persecution, the middle being protection. This 
emphasises both direct and indirect state roles: in committing, condoning, turning a blind 
eye, or lacking the means to prevent or protect women from human rights violations.
(5) The structural causes o f the persecution: Assessing causes of persecution, Schuler’s 
categories are again useful because they depict the social structure of power relations within 
which violence occurs. Using the widely accepted definition of “gender violence” put 
forward by the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APFWLD), we must 
consider whether forms of violence in each of the categories can be defined as “any act 
involving use of force or coercion mth an intent o f perpetuating/promcting hierarchical gender 
relations”. If so, we must then ask if the norm of formal non-discrimination and the principle 
of gender-inclusivity, as applied by the Guidelines, are sufficient. Non-discrimination 
provides that females be treated the same as males in being given equal opportunities to 
make claims, present evidence, and be fairly evaluated in claims of persecution occumngfor the
235
same reasons as men. Gender-inclusivity implies that both opportunities and instruments to 
make and evaluate claims of persecution must be applied to include female-specific 
experiences rather than using the general male model. Gender-inclusivity as used in the 
Guidelines does not include female-specific structural causes of persecution, only female- 
specific forms hinging on causes men also experience as outlined in the Convention (race, 
religion, etc.). In question is the Guidelines’ use of the social group category in cases where 
persecution of men and women does not have an equivalent structural cause, or whether a 
sex-specific interpretation of persecution is warranted. The latter can only be founded upon 
recognition of the social power structure in which women are subordinated in emotional, 
physical, economic and sexual ways.
The above categories and their inter-relations will now frame an examination of 
gender-related claims and court decisions. A range of possible scenarios is elaborated 
regarding dynamic relations and actions linking claimants, perpetrators and states, indicating 
how and to what extent the Guidelines have actually been used and who is using them. 
Because determinations also rely on the perceived credibility of objective and subjective 
evidence, which as we know raises particular difficulties in gender-related cases, evidentiaiy 
and documentation matters are also kept in mind, as the Guidelines suggest.
II. Lin k in g  h o m e  a n d  state: analysis o f  claims m a d e  u n d e r  t h e  G u id e l in e s
The following illuminates the range of case scenarios accepted under the Guidelines, according 
to the framework outlined above. Part A on Claimants and their Families situates the 
claimants between the claim-making context and the important relationships in their lives, 
showing how each informs the other in ways particular to refugees of female-specific 
persecution. Part B on Actions and Reactions looks at the range of case scenarios on a scale 
of claimant and state actions and reactions, which link occurrence of persecution to 
responsibility for its occurrence.
A. Claimants a n d  their  families: relations a n d  claim-m aking
Analysis of cases and court decisions under the Guidelines in terms of the unique situations 
and issues arising from claimant-family relations in cases of female-specific persecution does 
two things. By drawing from accepted claims it reveals variables unique to female-specific 
persecution claims and the extent to which the Guidelines have in practice been applied to 
account for these unique variables; and it also provides a base for understanding the unique 
nature of female-specific persecution generally (whether involving family violence or other
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forms of female-specific persecution), within the claim-making process, by setting claimants 
in the context of gendered social relations.
A.1. Claimants and families in types of claims applications: location and 
applicant status
Most broadly speaking, refugee claims may be made in two ways: from Overseas 
immigration posts, and from within Canada at Inland immigration posts. Within these two 
types a refugee must make a claim either as a “principal applicant” (who may or may not 
sponsor dependants) or as a spouse or “dependent”. The primary difference between PA’s in 
one category, and spouses and dependants in another, is that refugee claimants of the former 
kind tell their own story of persecution, and the latter do not. While Canadian practice in
9.1 Percentage distribution of refugees entering Canada as permanent residents, by sex, 
refugee status and principal versus sponsored applications, 1981 -  1991
All Principal Applicant Sponsored Applicants:
UN Convention refugees Spouse Depend&a
Women 27% 46% 43% 11%
Men 48% 91% 2% 7%
Designated groups (H&Q
Women 30% 40% 50% 9%
Men 47% 91% 2% 8%
Source: Boyd 1994
refugee hearings has been shifting in the past few years toward encouraging all asylum 
seekers to make independent claims if possible (a change which is particularly important for 
women)21, more men than women still tend to be PA’s and to be accepted as Convention 
refugees generally. Table 9.1 shows that between 1981 and 1991 only 46% of women who 
were recognised as Convention refugees in Canada were principal applicants, compared with 
91% of men. Similarly, in the category of Designated Groups (refugees outside the 
Convention definition), only 40% of women were accepted as principal applicants compared 
to 91% of men. And of all refugees accepted into Canada, women formed only 27% of 
Convention refugees and 30% of designated groups, while their male counterparts comprised 
48% and 47% respectively. This may be in large part due to traditional male bias in refugee 
hearings and interpretations of refugee law, discussed in Chapter four.
Consequently the first question with bearing upon the claimant’s applicancy type, 
whether inland or overseas, is her marital and family status (Box A.I.). Three scenarios may 
occur. As a single woman or only with children, she must make her own independent claim.
21 As discussed in Chapter 4, on problems in the hearing room. See for example Paul, 1989 and 
Leibich,1989.
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As a married woman or relative of other adult 
claimants (particularly males), she may either make 
her own claim or apply as a spouse or dependent 
(the latter if she is under 18 years). A third scenario 
arises when the woman undergoes “change of 
status” from spouse/dependent to principal 
applicant after a period of residence in Canada.
At present Canada’s Guidelines are applied 
only to Inland refugee claimants, who are thus the 
focus here in terms of the nexus between family 
status and applicancy types. This nexus is important 
in cases of female-specific persecution, whose claim 
types and family relations are closely connected in 
ways not traditionally considered 
relevant to refugee eligibility, thus 
raising particular types of issues 
and situations. Table 9.2 shows 
that female-specific persecution 
claims turn the usual relation 
between family status and 
applicancy type on its head. 
Claimants were Principal Applicants upon arrival in Canada with or without family in 96.6% 
of cases, while only 4.1% arrived as spouse, dependant, temporary visitor, or illegal entrant 
and became PA’s in change of status after a period of residency in Canada. PA’s upon arrival 
without adult male family members comprised 89.8%, and PA’s who arrived with a spouse 
comprised 6.8%. Claimants may sponsor children and sometimes husbands, or may make 
joint claims with their husbands. In the latter case the strength of the woman’s female- 
specific claim may provide the basis for the male’s claim through his relation to her, either in 
his own independent claim or as a dependent. In all cases the significance of family relations 
is invoked, either by way of constituting a source of the persecution itself, a supporting 
structure for the persecution (by community or state), or a failed or unavailable source of 
traditional protection from the persecution.
Case scenarios may be further elaborated by looking closely at unique aspects of 
relations between those claiming gender-related persecution, their families, and their PA or 
sponsored status arising from the three situations described (single, with family, change of 
status). Such unique aspects include: status and protection issues related to children of
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9.2 Percentage distribution of gender- related refugee 
claims as Principal Applicants, by time of claim and relation 
to family members, 1993-1997
PA upon arrival:
ALL (with or without family) -------------------  96.6%
Without adult male family members: -----------------  89.8%
With spouse:   6.8%
PA in change of status:
ALL (arrival as spouse, dependant, visitor or illegal) — 4.1%
Source: Analysis of gender-related claims in RefLex
A l. Nexus of family status and 
applicancy types
1. IN Canada
a) claimant arrives alone, as PA
b) claimant arrives with family
i) as Spouse or Dependent
ii) as Principal Applicant
c) claimant undergoes change of 
status after a period of residency
i) temporary or illegal, to 
Spouse or PA
ii) Spouse /  Dependent to PA
2. OUT of Canada
a) independent claim, (PA)
b) with family
i) as Spouse or Dependent
ii) as Principal Applicant
claimants; and status and location of perpetrator/s of the human rights violation against the 
claimant. The latter is quite unique to female-specific persecution claimants and directly 
affects the situation of the claimant as well as children, the types of claims they make, and 
some of the issues and conflicts arising in different case scenarios and the claim-making 
process, thus it will be addressed first.
A.2. Perpetrators and Claimants: relation, location, status
The relation of the perpetrator/s to the claimant, the location of the perpetrator at the time 
the claimant applies for refugee status, and the perpetrator’s status in relation to public 
authorities and to non-state sources of protection in the claimant’s country of origin, are all 
important variables raising particular problems in gender-related claims (Box A.2., items 1-3). 
This is because, first of all, in such cases human rights violators may be members of the 
claimant’s family. Secondly, the status of women in many countries is such that their family 
and immediate community are their Vorld’; their gender-specific roles within the family, 
community and culture precludes them from participation in many aspects of ‘public’ life 
(including paid labour and political participation) whilst removing themselves from family 
and/or immediate community could result in ostracism or further persecution. Such 
claimants are often highly dependent upon family and community for survival; if they are 
abused by the members of their immediate social world, or if they are ‘cast out’ or not 
supported for their attempts to remove themselves from proximity to those who abuse them, 
they may face grave difficulties establishing a new, safer, life.
Thus we must first divide perpetrators into two categories: members of the claimant’s 
immediate ‘social world’ -  family and community -  who are thought to share common 
identity or membership traits; and perpetrators who are ‘outside’ that immediate world. The 
latter categoiy includes the perpetrators common in traditional refugee claims, such as 
opposing ethnic or religious groups. But it also includes agents of the state who enforce 
legislation that is severely discriminatory against women. However it should be bome in 
mind that in cases of female-specific persecution by perpetrators from the ‘outside’ category, 
often protection traditionally depends upon male family members. Thus the social world of 
claimants is important in cases involving perpetrators ‘outside’ the family and community, 
and is also important in itself, as the location and source of the perpetrators and persecution. 
For present purposes, I shall focus on the first of the two categories of perpetrators, those 
‘within’ the immediate social world of the claimant, which raises the most unusual 
difficulties. In all cases, what is at stake is the perceived relation (in evaluations of refugee 
claims) between perpetrators and state responsibility, which traditionally hinges on the 
distinction between ‘nonstate’ and ‘state’ actors as discussed chapter four. But here the
239
relation between perpetrators and state responsibility will be discussed in terms of the location 
and, status of perpetrators ‘within’ the immediate social world of the claimant, focusing in all 
cases on how perpetrators are linked to the state, whether directly or indirectly.
Distinctions must be 
made within both location and 
status categories which are 
complicated in cases involving 
family or community members 
as perpetrators. Regarding 
perpetrators’ location’, personal 
relationships with the claimant 
may actually create situations in 
which perpetrators are in the 
receiving-country. This raises 
unique questions and posing 
special difficulties in status determinations. Regarding status of perpetrators, both ‘official’ 
and ‘unofficial’ status type, and their inter-relations, need to be considered. They may have 
status and potential influence in the ‘public’ realm of state, government and law enforcement 
authorities either (a) through their own position or (b) connections with others in such 
positions. Such status can be used to prevent the claimant from receiving state protection in 
the country of origin. Or they may enjoy a certain status as a men generally, in a context 
which (c) officially condones or sanctions certain actions by men toward women, or (d) 
unofficially condones it. In both instances women lack certain rights and are prevented from 
receiving protection from family or community members (who may indeed ostracise, punish 
or further persecute her).
The inter-relations between these different aspects of location and status of the 
perpetrator, and relation to the claimant, are elaborated below taking into account whether 
the claimant is initially sponsored or is the Principal applicant.
The perpetrator and the female claimant may arrive in Canada together, making refugee 
claims on grounds unrelated to gender persecution, and where the female claimant is 
sponsored. Domestic violence may have started in the country of origin, where the female 
claimant had no internal flight alternatives or sources of protection from it, or it may start in 
the receiving-countiy, where the female is dependent upon her husband’s status to remain in 
the country. If an independent claim is later made due to change of status (from sponsored 
to independent) which occurs if the marriage is dissolved, or because the husband withdraws 
sponsorship to ‘punish’ the wife he abuses, the female claimant must establish that were she
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A.2. Perpetrator/s: relation, location, status
1. Relation to claimant
a) member of immediate ‘social world’ of claimant
b) ‘outside’ or further removed from immediate social 
world of claimant
2. Location at time of claim
a) IN Canada (including change of status)
b) OUT of Canada
3. Status
a) public official (government, military, law or 
enforcement...)
b) kinship or close connection with public officials
c) state or religious sanctioned status and behaviour of 
males toward females generally
d) status and behaviour of males toward females 
generally is unofficially condoned in customary, state, 
or religious practice
to return to the country of origin vMe the husband remains in Canada, she would be farther 
persecuted by family, community and/or state. As indicated earlier, only 4.1% of the RefLex 
cases involved change of status applications. They are however possible and acceptable.
In similar cases in which the perpetrator is ultimately deported or returns to the 
country of origin, the claimant facing change of status must establish well-founded fear of 
persecution and lack of protection should she return with him. A good example of this type 
of situation was demonstrated in the case of a Bulgarian woman and her children, who 
arrived in Canada together with the her husband, but were prevented by the latter from 
presenting evidence in their own cases. The female claimant was subsequently determined 
not to be a Convention refugee. When the male later returned to Bulgaria, the hearing was 
reopened based on the argument that “the claimants had been denied natural justice by being 
hampered from presenting their evidence by the male claimant.” The new evidence revealed 
a long history of battering, rapes and death threats by the husband, without recourse to 
protection “because of the Bulgarian societal attitude that the wife belonged at her husband’s 
side, no matter what.” 22
In another scenario, a female claimant may arrive with her spouse/family member, 
but immediately make an independent gender-related claim. In cases of domestic violence, 
relocation to another country may be used as an opportunity to separate when separating 
would be impossible or dangerous in the country of origin due for example to cultural 
expectations. This scenario is not common in the RefLex cases, perhaps because of the 
claimant’s hopes that the relationship will change and improve once she and her spouse start 
a ‘new life’ in the receiving-country, and because of the stronghold of cultural pressures upon 
the claimant to remain with her husband. It may also stem from lack of understanding that a 
separation could be made in this manner, that women’s rights and protection in the 
receiving-country are different from those in the home country, and assumptions by 
immigration officers that women will not make independent claims.
Finally, a female claimant may arrive in the receiving-country without her spouse or 
abusive family member, based on the intent to flee the abusive situation. In the RefLex cases 
this category was by far the largest. But in some cases the perpetrator actually followed the 
claimant to the receiving-country, making his own refugee claim or applying as an immigrant. 
As in any case, the female claimant must establish that persecution would continue in the 
country of origin through the perpetrator’s connections or because the claimant broke with 
custom in leaving her husband, and because protection is unavailable. However, in most 
cases if the claimant arrives alone, the perpetrator/s remain in the country of origin. There
22 T91-01497 and-01498
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are abundant examples of this type of situation, with diverse variables in form of persecution 
and reasons protection is unavailable in the country of origin. Such cases raise questions 
about the violence being linked to state responsibility and about the availability and 
accessibility of internal protection or flight alternatives.
For example, one case involved a 60 year old woman who was beaten and harassed 
by her ex-son in law after he lost custody of his children and his wife left the country. Police 
in Moldova where the claimant lived failed to intervene, and the claimant was hospitalised as 
result of attacks. It was determined that protection and internal flight alternatives were not 
available, and the claimant was granted refugee status.23 In another case, the claimant argued 
that she faced forced religious conversion, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage, all 
arranged by her father, with severe physical repercussions and social ostracisation if she did 
not comply. Adjudicators found that state and nonstate protection was hot available to the 
claimant in Ghana24
A.3. Children and Mothers: custody, rights, evidence
Claimants with children may face three issues which complicate claims for both parties, and 
raise serious questions about rights and protection: 1. child status and protection issues in
custody battles; 2. right to family verses right to nationality issues (both mother and child); 
and 3. conflict or support of evidence regarding persecution of the mother. The first two are 
particularly inter-related, and are discussed together.
Children of claimants may have been bom either in the mothers’ country of origin, 
or in the receiving-country, particularly as female-specific persecution cases sometimes 
involve delayed claims when domestic violence is involved, as indicated above in change of 
status situations. In both situations custody issues may arise which could endanger the safety 
of the children. Right to nationality verses family must be weighed in both situations.
Children bom in the country of origin may face customary and religious laws concerning 
the right of paternal custody which may endanger them. This may prevent the mother from 
seeking internal flight alternatives, and also raise the question of the right of the child to have 
a mother, and the mother to have a family. For example, an Iranian claimant and her 
children, being sponsored in Canada by her husband, sought refugee status when he abused 
them and threatened to have them returned to Iran, where under law child custody would be 
awarded to his brother. He further threatened to tell Iranian authorities that she was an 
adulteress so that she would be stoned and flogged, according to the law. The female
23 A95-00442, February 19,1996.
24 CRDD V95-00374 21 November 1996. "33
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claimant divorced her husband in Canada and was awarded custody of her children based on 
his abusive behaviour. Were she not to be allowed to remain in Canada without his 
sponsorship, “she would have no right to retain custody of her children nor would she have 
a right to dispute her former husband’s claim that she was an adulteress”. The children were 
considered to be refugees due to the ability of the father to “enforce his threats and violate 
their right to be with their mother” 25
Custody may be an issue even if not a matter of religious or customary law in the 
country of origin. Rejection of either the child’s or the mother’s claim may raise the custody 
issues upon the child’s return to the country of origin (with or without the mother). This was 
demonstrated in a case where the children’s claims were accepted on the basis of their 
relationship to their mother, as “the wife of an influential man in the powerful status security 
apparatus” of Argentina, who had used his position to overturn a custody order, prevented 
his wife from receiving police protection from death threats, and sent his own armed agents 
to sexually attack her when the she sought a separation from him26
In cases where children are bom in the receiving-country, the same custody issues may
A.3. Children and mothers
1. Status and protection issues
a) Children bom in country of origin
i) custody issues in country of origin under religious or customary law
ii) custody issues due to father’s position of authority in country of origin
b) Children bom in receiving-country
i) custody issues in country of origin (as above) which endanger children if 
deported with mother
ii) custody issues in receiving-country which may endanger children if mother is 
deported
2. Rights issues
a) child’s right to nationality verses right to have a mother
b) claimant’s right to motherhood and family
3. Evidence in children’s case affecting mother’s claim
a) evidence of child abuse
b) having children is an infraction of the law or social code
c) responsibility for protection of children adds weight to the Principal Applicant’s claim
arise if the mother’s claim is rejected and she is deported. On one hand, an abusive husband 
remaining in the receiving-country could endanger the remaining child. If the husband is in 
the country of origin, no parent would remain in the receiving-country. If the child 
accompanies the mother back to the country of origin, parental custody practices may 
prevail.
25 CRDD T94-00001 to 00004.
26 CRDD T93-12736 to 12738.
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Regarding the third situation -  conflict or support of evidence between children and 
mothers’ claims -  several scenarios emerge, (a) The child may be traumatised and also 
abused, supporting the credibility of the mother’s claim of domestic violence (for example). 
Psychiatric evaluations done in refugee cases involving domestic violence may reinforce the 
credibility of the mother’s claim. However, in some cases adjudicators have decided that a 
child has not been sufficiently affected by the abuse of the mother by the father, therefore 
rejecting the child’s refugee claim. For example, one mother’s refugee claim was accepted 
on the basis that she had suffered severe abuse throughout her marriage and because her 
husband was an officer in the Jamaica Defence forces, thus preventing her from receiving 
police protection. But adjudicators decided that “the fact that the adult claimant had custody 
of the minor claimants was not a proper basis for determining the latter to be refugees”; a 
“lack of persecution” was determined in the minors’ cases. Furthermore, it was argued that 
“evidence did not establish a reasonable chance that, if the minor claimants were to live with 
the husband, they would be deprived of the adult claimant's companionship, or suffer 
psychological harm. The fact that a Canadian custody order gave the husband only 
supervised access was not considered evidence that the husband would abuse the minor 
claimants or abscond with them.” 27
But interestingly, some case decisions involving claimants with children fleeing 
domestic violence do not invoke or emphasise custody arguments or the potential danger 
which the father poses to the children. Rather, some decisions appear to make the 
assumption that children of battered mothers will be negatively affected and endangered, 
without psychiatric evaluations or other forms of ‘objective evidence’.28 Such decisions 
represent an inherently feminist analysis of domestic violence, which not all adjudicators 
apply. Until such analysis is more well-established in Canada, cases will often invoke child 
custody and safety issues as argument, or counter-argument, to refugee eligibility. *
(b) In some cases, the existence of children may be part of the cause of persecution. 
Women having children out of wedlock are in some cultures ostracised, persecuted, or 
refused protection when persecuted for other reasons. In a case that combined all of these 
elements, an Indian woman was turned out by her family when she became pregnant in a 
extramarital relationship. She later married a police inspector from Nepal, and acquired 
Nepalese citizenship. When her husband began to abuse her, she was refused protection 
through his influence on the police force, as well as because of her status as a woman in 
Nepal with few rights, and because “women with out-of-wedlock children are regarded as
27 CRDD T95-01010 to 01012.
28 for example, CRDD M 92-09034 to 09036.
244
immoral and thus are particularly subject to harassment and abuse amounting to 
persecution.” Support by her own family had already been withdrawn, thus she lacked 
protection from any source.29
Family planning policies have also been recognised as, potentially, a cause of severe 
discrimination resulting in persecution, taking the form of forced sterilisation, forced 
abortion, or severe penalties by both state and society for infractions of the policy. The 
ground-breaking case of Cheung vs M.E.I. in 1994 overturned the Refugee Division’s 
previous decision that China’s one-child policy was a law of general application which could 
not therefore constitute persecution in individual cases. The Federal court’s ruling 
concerned the case of a woman who after having one child, became pregnant three times and 
each time was forced to abort. On her fourth pregnancy, she went into hiding and gave 
birth. Subsequently, the Family Planning Bureau took the claimant away to be sterilised. She 
fled to her in-laws, became pregnant again, and underwent another abortion before coming 
to Canada, where it was determined that were she to return to China she would most 
certainly face forced sterilisation.30
(c) The presence of a child may bring added weight to the principal applicant’s claim 
through the added responsibility of protecting a child. For example a Somali woman was 
found to be a Convention refugee “as a national of Somalia, a member of the Ogaden tribe 
and a single female responsible for the welfare of three young children”. She was subject to 
clan-directed violence in the context of a civil war, she was a woman without traditional male 
protection, at risk of rape by opposing clans as “an attack on the manhood of all the men in 
her clan”. 31 In another case, a male applicant from Afghanistan was found to be a 
Convention refugee because “the potential suffering of the [claimant’s] wife and daughter, 
the very real threat of rape, is still very relevant to the separate issue of whether the 
[claimant] would undergo undue hardship in making his way north and availing himself of 
[an internal flight alternative]” 32
B. A ctions an d  Reactions:
B.l. Claimant Activism: from defiance to adherence
The roles claimants themselves play in the occurrence of the persecution is circumscribed by 
manifestations of the sexual hierarchy in which she lives and the social expectations it
29 CRDD M93-09655.
30 Cheung, Ting Ting and M.E.I. (F.CA, no. A-785-91).
31 CRDD V94-00024 to 00027.
32 FCTD, no. IMM-2331-96.
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imposes upon her as a woman. This links persecution to different social spheres 
(private/family to public/state) through the claimants perceived degree of activism. In any 
of these spheres, a woman may defy or adhere to expected legal or social customs. The middle 
ground between defiance and adherence applies to women whose attempts or wishes to defy 
social political custom are thwarted by the threat of persecution -  which may lead directly to 
asylum seeking. Another situation occurs when the actions or political opinions of political 
dissidents are imputed to the claimant because of familial relation, rather than opinions or 
actions of her own, or when a woman is targeted for persecution by nonstate actors simply 
for being female (i.e. rape as an act of ethnic cleansing). In all cases, seeking asylum is a 
further political act. Thus even in cases of ‘adherence’ the refugee makes a bold political 
statement, which indeed may provoke further persecution if her claim is rejected and she is 
returned to the country of origin.
Cases involving defiance are more clearly political according to traditional applications 
of refugee law (see chapter 4). Dress code infraction resulting in persecution was among the 
first type of political act particular to women to be recognised as such in Canada (Indrriyan, 
Zeyiyev. M .E.I. 1987). In the RefLex database, for example, were two Pakistani claimants of 
different faiths were determined to be refugees based on threat of persecution in response to
B.l. Claimant activism
1. Defiance of cultural, religious, and/or state sanctioned norms regarding social roles and 
behaviours
>  persecuted by family, community, and / or state
2. Adherence to cultural, religious and/or state sanctioned norms that are inherently 
discriminatory and persecutory. In some cases, claimants have been prevented, by threat of 
persecution, from defying cultural, religious and/or state sanctioned norms, or from receiving 
protection from inherently persecutory norms
> persecuted by family, community, and / or state
3. Familial relation to political activist, resulting in political opinions being imputed to the claimant
>  persecuted by family, community, and / or state
their marriage; a fatwah had been pronounced against them, which could only be retracted if 
the male claimant, a Catholic, converted to Islam within three months.33 And in a more 
traditionally political case, a Bangladeshi woman was accepted as a refugee based on her 
career as an educator, an activist for women’s rights, and an opponent of fundamentalism. 
Because of her political views and actions, she was abused by her husband, refused 
protection by police, and denounced by the state by way of fatwa.34
Some claimants see adherence to cultural, religious and/or state sanctioned norms as 
persecution; for example this may include forced marriages and customary forcible female
33 U95-04967, U95-04968, U95-04967. June 11,1997.
34 M94-04037, February 28,1995.
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genital mutilation. One case involving both of these forms of persecution occurred when a 
woman from Ghana opposed an arranged marriage as well as the religious conversion and 
female circumcision which were to be undertaken before the wedding. Her father, who 
made the arrangements, beat her for refusing, while the police and government refused to 
intervene for her protection. The claimant fled to Canada, was married to another, and was 
granted refugee status under evidence that were she to return to Ghana her father would 
force her to proceed with the arrangements, “or injure or kill her if the intended groom 
called off the wedding”.35
In cases of imputed political opinion, familial relations, whether the claimant is male 
or female, may incite persecution. In cases of females, however, persecution often assumes 
forms of sexual torture. One case involved a Chinese woman who, although not in breach 
of China’s one-child policy, was threatened with forced sterilisation as an indirect method of 
punishing her husband, who had gone into hiding when the Public Security Bureau began 
searching for him due to his involvement with the pro-democracy movement.36
B.2. State role in persecution, from commission to prevention
State responsibility for persecution ranging from proactive commission, to failure to provide 
protection, to failure to prevent persecution, is well represented in cases studied. Both 
‘public’ and ‘private’ (not traditionally linked to state responsibility) forms of persecution 
appear in the cases. In all cases the crux of the issue and weight of the claim lay less in who 
the perpetrator is or where persecution occurs but whether protection is available.
(1) Active government enforcement of legislation that severely discriminates against 
females and imposes severe sanctions for infringements of the law obviously precludes 
government protection. In such cases, evidence may be sought as to regional variations in 
enforcement of the law or conditions under which infractions of the law are permitted, for 
example under the permission of male family members._____________________________
B.2. State role in persecution: commission to prevention
1. active enforcement of government legislation which severely discriminates against females 
and imposes severe sanctions for transgressions of these laws
2. government legislation (as above) which is not actively or regularly enforced, or no legislation 
In either case, however, unofficial cultural codes and enforcement of such codes by family 
and community may exist, alongside lack of state protection
3. state unwillingness or inability to enforce legislation banning social practices which severely 
discriminate against females, or prevent or protect females from such practices as upheld in 
society
4. palliative and pro-active or preventative government policy, to different extents, which are 
enforced or implemented to different extents.
35 V95-00374. November 21,1996 .
36 U92-06664. August 9,1994.
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In the latter situation, judgement is deferred from state to male heads of households. 
However community members may still so disagree with behavioural transgression allowed 
by male relatives that normal life is made impossible for the female claimant, and potentially 
for her family as well. Claims in which violence is clearly sanctioned by the state have 
encountered the least resistance being recognised as ‘political’ and qualifying for refugee 
eligibility. For example, a claimant who had been sentenced to “20 lashes for not fully 
complying with the Iranian dress code”, and again for meeting secretly with her boyfriend, 
finally fled her country when her father (a member of the Komiteh) ordered that her chastity 
be confirmed by a government examiner. The severe penalties imposed by the state for non- 
compliance with the Shariah law was determined to be “cruel and unusual punishment” 
amounting to persecution.37
(2) Discriminatory government legislation may not be actively enforced or may not 
exist, but nevertheless discriminatory practices are upheld in society, and even condoned by 
the state. Cases of ‘dowry abuse’ fall into this category, where in India the dowry practices 
have been banned by the government but thrive in society. Cases where state involvement is 
more questionable, are more difficult to prove. For example, a claimant from Yeman who 
claimed persecution for infraction of the Islamic dress code was rejected because the court 
determined that “as the dress code was not imposed by law in Yemen, the female claimant 
would not have faced any legal sanctions for failing to observe it, and any harassment which 
she might have faced would not have amounted to persecution”. If the claimant had shown 
that “harassment” by community and/or family would amount to persecution, against which 
the state would not provide protection, then positive decision may have been rendered.
(3) and (4). The existence of pro-active or preventative government policy against 
violence or discrimination against women must be weighed against its actual implementation, 
which may change over time, or evidence of which may change over time. For example, in 
October 1996 a negative decision was rendered in a case involving domestic violence against 
a woman from Ecuador who, it was determined, could make use of a recently instated “Law 
Concerning Violence Against Women and Families”. The court stated that “while not 
perfect, the law was being implemented, and changed the position of abused women in 
Ecuador.” 38 Before this law was instated, only a year earlier, Ecuadorians making similar 
claims were being accepted. In contrast, cases from Ghana established that a government 
ban on Female Genital Mutilation was not being enforced at the time claims were made.39
37 V94-01847, June 21,1996.
38 U95-04292, October 2,1996.
39 V95-00374, November 21,1996.
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III. Fr o m  Form s t o  c a u se s: r an g e  a n d  str u c tu r a l  r e p r e s e n t a t io n
We may now consider whether decision-makers use consistent reasoning in determining the 
structural basis of persecution. This concludes the chapter by considering the range of case 
scenarios already illuminated as an indicator of the Guidelines’ flexibility and of possible types 
of claims that can be (and are being) made. We take a broader look at trends in claims 
regarding the underlying social structure of persecution in particularly problematic and 
numerous forms of persecution in the ‘notable’ cases analysed. This leads to an analysis of 
both positive and negative decisions on claims within the particularly controversial ‘social 
group’ category of structural causes used to explain particular forms of persecution. We are 
then able to indicate advantages and difficulties of the ‘gender-related’ approach, and suggest 
that other policy alternatives might still be warranted.
The range of case scenarios drawing on the Guidelines and receiving positive 
decisions, illuminated above, clearly crosses family, community, and state dimensions 
regarding locus, agent, and manifestation of forms of violence against women that may 
amount to persecution. In all instances, lack of protection by, and linkages between, the 
three locus dimensions are crucial to proving well-founded fear of persecution, individuality 
and universality of the persecution, and lack of internal flight alternatives (the broad 
requirements of refugee eligibility). The range of cases examined thus indicate that in the first 
four years since instatement, the Guidelines have proven flexible and have been broadly 
implemented to significantly and adequately encompass a range of forms of violence against 
women. The cases analysed were particularly useful for exposing such a range because they 
are drawn from a legal database of notable cases from different Provincial IRB branches 
across Canada. The RefLex cases analysed are not only notable cases generally, but also 
contained 20 claims made at Federal Trials and Federal Appeals levels. The RefLex cases are 
a particularly significant body of case-law, moreover comprising approximately 7% of all 
gender-related claims made in Canada during between 1993 and 1997. On this basis we can 
conclude that claims made have expanded the interpretation and application of the 
Guidelines along a number of dimensions not explicitly excluded from the Guidelines, but 
left to elaboration in practice.
On the other hand the above analysis can not indicate whether or not the Guidelines 
are being applied consistently across the kinds of case scenarios discussed above. Those 
described were based on positive decisions, indicating the range of possible types of claims 
that are being accepted in Canada. However each claim must be judged on its own merits, 
not according to fitting a particular ‘type’; i.e., a claimant may still have low credibility, her 
information may not be adequately substantiated, or internal flight alternatives may actually 
be found. Although case precedents are important, lawyers will not always be aware of them
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or be sufficiently able to draw upon them to argue a particular case. Thus in practice the case 
scenarios described may result in negative decisions. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible 
to assess whether negative decisions are made on justified or unjustified grounds, in part 
because adjudicators always attempt to justify their reasons for decisions. We can however 
now look at both positive and negative decisions on cases involving particular causes of 
persecution into which particular forms tend to fall. This provides qualitative analysis of 
overarching trends in complications and difficulties that tend to arise and which may 
negatively affect consistent decision-making.
Based on the average numbers of positive and negative decisions made on gender- 
related claims in Canada yearly, there is not sufficient reason to strongly suspect that the 
Guidelines are not being implemented at least to a basic level, nor that they are being abused 
by claimants making bogus claims. The total number of gender-related claims finalised by the 
IRB in an average year altogether comprise less than 2% of all refugee claims in Canada 
(Mawani,1997), clearly not a ‘flood’ of claims as initially feared but also constituting a sizeable 
number of individuals seeking protection. Since the Guidelines’ instatement approximately 
1200 gender-related claims have been identified by the IRB up to 1997 (Mawani,1997). The 
acceptance rate for all gender-related claims in Canada has remained on par with average 
acceptances of refugees generally in Canada, that is, about 60% (Mawani,1997).
This however does not tell us whether the majority of claims being accepted are of 
particular kinds, while others tend to be rejected. Having looked at the range of forms that 
may be accepted among claims that are regarded as ‘notable’, one of the most striking trends 
is the enumeration of ‘particular social group’ categories to explain the causes of forms of 
persecution not traditionally recognised. This was reflected in the RefLex cases where 99 of 
the 147 cases, or about 67%, invoked the social group category as a cause of persecution. Of 
these, again approximately 60% were accepted. But additionally, through the use of the 
social group category we have seen perhaps the greatest area of expansion in interpretation 
and application of the Guidelines, namely recognition of cases involving forms of family 
violence. Indeed, the 1996 Update explicitly identified domestic violence as a type of 
persecution by ‘private’ or nonstate actors {Update, section 1.3). Previously violence “at the 
hands of private citizens” was left open to interpretation.
IRB Chairperson Mawani explains that “the Update was necessitated by the volume of 
jurisprudence that has emerged in the field of gender-related claims and also by the 
experience we have gained with such claims since the issuance of the original Guidelines” 
(Mawani,1997). This appears to have been true in the case of family violence related claims, 
which in themselves constituted at least 33% of the RefLex cases and 54% of all RefLex 
cases invoking Social Group before the Update was enacted. The fact that these are ‘notable’
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cases suggests these types of claims and/or the decisions on them were considered to 
contain new elements (see Table 2.2, Chapter 2). Of these notable cases, approximately 56% 
were accepted, all invoking the social group category.
Complicating this analysis is the fact that, unlike the definition of family or ‘domestic’ 
violence typically accepted by Western cultures indicating spousal or partner abuse, the 
RefLex refugee claims involve violence by family members other than spouses (i.e. parents, 
in-laws and even brothers). Therefore violence is often linked to specific causes of 
persecution not always associated with domestic violence as commonly understood in 
Western cultures, for example family violence resulting from dowry customs associated with 
religious practices. Such a case therefore invokes both social group and religious persecution 
categories. Almost all family violence cases in the RefLex database commonly describe 
women o f a particular race, religion, or ethnicity as comprising a ‘particular social group’. Without 
these added dimensions, the social group category fails. This, in addition to elaborating the 
range of possible sending-countries (through evidence of persecution on a country-by- 
country basis) and further forging a link between gender-related persecution and nationality, 
race, ethnicity, religion or political opinion in particular countries (where politicised ideas 
about cultural relativism come into play for many adjudicators), is not only tedious but 
creates an incredibly diverse and complex range of possible types of ‘social groups’. It also 
means that the percentage rate of domestic violence cases invoking social group (above) 
necessarily overlaps with the percentage rates of the other structural causes of persecution 
(race, religion, etc.).
The most common grounds for persecution associated with social group and family 
violence in the cases examined were nationality and race/ethnicity. Each case of family 
violence set a precedent according to the country or culture from which claimants arrive. While a 
similar method of setting precedents and applying them (i.e. by country) occurs in other 
(non-gender-related) types of claims as human rights violations are first discovered and 
documented, it may be more the case that some claims occur across a narrower range of 
sending-countries -  for example Kurdish refugees, or even (in the case of gender-related 
claims) those involving defiance of the dress code limited to Islamic countries. In contrast, 
domestic violence is endemic to the majority of countries and cultures while the majority of 
states have not developed or adequately implemented programs or policies to curb it. This 
results in a huge range of possible scenarios for family violence amounting to persecution 
which need to set precedents on a country-by-country basis, and even then must be 
monitored to reflect changing conditions for women in different countries over time.
A few examples of the tremendous range and ambiguity of the social group category 
(including cases of family violence as well as those involving other forms) illustrate this point.
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Looking only at social group cases receiving positive decisions (60 positive, 28 negative, 
excluding Federal court decisions), ‘social group’ has been described variously as: “unwed 
mothers in China who have two children” (in the case of a woman facing forced sterilisation 
for transgressing the one-child policy; CRDD V94-01287); “Westernized Tajik women in a 
society moving towards Islamic orthodoxy, with no male protection” (CRDD V T93-04176); 
“Ecuadorian women subject to wife abuse” (CRDD U92-08714); “Ghanian women subject 
to forced marriage” (CRDD V95-00374); and “Sikh women fearing police harassment who 
cannot obtain state protection” (CRDD U95-02138). Although rare, several cases do emerge 
in which the named social group is simply “women” (i.e. CRDD T91-01497; T94-00416). 
Most commonly, women form a social group based on a particularly nationality (i.e. “Syrian 
women”, CRDD T-93-11934).
An additional indicator of complexities arising from the social group category, and 
also through cases of domestic violence invoking the social group category, is the 
disproportionate number of these types of claims that reached Federal Trial and Federal 
Appeal levels, out of all possible types. Nine out of twenty involved domestic violence, and 
twelve out of twenty invoked the social group category.
The overarching implication of the social group system for classifying causes of 
persecution in female-specific forms is that women are wet typically treated as a ‘social group’ 
in themselves -  only relative to their particular location and structural identity other than 
gender or sex. Public and private persecution, where the state fails to protect, must occur on 
the grounds of one’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group. In these categories persecution may take female-specific forms 
reflecting the condition of women in society, often defined by their “gender-roles”, which 
states may condone, ignore or uphold. Sex persecution is therefore considered culturally 
relative as any occurrence of persecution is. But it is unlike, for example, the ahistorical vision 
which we understand of the other categories because it does not recognise causes of 
persecution resulting from the structural basis of women’s inequality as rooted in their sex 
and the gender-role conceptions framed around sex, in the same way that (for example) the 
structural basis of racial inequality and corresponding persecution is rooted in racial 
stereotypes framed around race.40
This points toward the need for a different structural framework as basis for 
decision-making. An argument can be made for a more explicit category of persecution
40 Another way of stating the obvious is that society does not impose feminine gender roles upon 
males or masculine gender role upon females; gender roles are assigned according to sex.
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specific to sex, which will not skirt the question of universality, while maintaining the rigour 
of individuality in status determination processes. While undeniably useful, the social group 
category is remains problematic not only because of its ambiguity but because it perpetuates 
misconceptions about some types of female-specific persecution. It is the only one of the five 
Convention categories of persecution which applies to gender-specific structural causes of 
persecution, rather than forms. Its success stems from the fact that emphasis tends to be put 
on the question of protection mechanisms in the country of origin, rather than the nature of 
the persecution itself.
The social group category actually skirts the question of universality, and is in danger 
of becoming a catch-all category for all sorts of forms of female-specific persecution whose 
causes can not be adequately explained on other Convention grounds. It has served as a 
safety net for many forms of persecution to be recognised, particularly domestic violence, 
while obscuring the primary cause of the persecution in some of those cases. In this sense 
the Guidelines’ ‘gender-inclusive’ approach is insufficient, because it operates within the 
confines of pre-established grounds (or causes) of persecution and thus is most helpful for 
recognising the forms rather than the causes of persecution particular to females.
The "gender related" guidelines reflect the conflict between culture and universality 
by failing to distinguish adequately between enumerated categories of persecution specific to 
females but occurring for the same reasons as male persecution (race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, social group), and a sex-specific category of universal persecution unrelated 
to the other grounds of persecution men experience and can not be squeezed into the pre­
existing "social group" category. This suggests that a two-tier framework may be in order.
Such a framework would recognise ‘gender-related’ forms of persecution linked to 
the five stated causes of persecution in the Convention definition, making the gender aspect 
a secondary aspect of the claim (it exacerbates vulnerability, danger or lack of protection, or 
is manifested in specific forms of persecution) as the Guidelines do presently. It would also 
be sex-specific, creating a sixth category of persecution to absorb those claims based primarily 
on sexual status in society. This second tier is based on structural inequalities imposed by 
society because o f sex, whereas the first is more an expanded field of vision of state 
responsibility for ‘private’ forms of persecution and for failing to protect in many types of 
cases not neoessarily involving gender defined social groups, but certainly encompassing them.
Like campaigners in this study, a number of international law specialists have 
advocated that ‘sex’ be included in the 1951 Convention definition of refugee (for example 
Shenke,1996). The sex specific approach suggested here differs from previous proposals in 
not trying to include all forms of female-specific persecution under one universal ground of 
persecution. Rather, its strength is in distinguishing between those forms which can be
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adequately covered on the other Convention grounds, as the Guidelines suggest, and those 
which can not.
Such a distinction can clearly be made by examining the challenging new twists that 
have been emerging in claims made through the Guidelines, as this chapter has done. These 
have not been evaluated quantitatively but qualitatively, as it is not the numbers of 
persecuted individuals that should determine whether asylum is granted or on what basis, but 
more simply the existence of persecution and lack of protection in sending-countries. The 
institutionalised process of claim-making in refugee status determination systems offers a 
channel through which foreign-nationals and stateless persons can incrementally challenge 
and change how we think about natural rights and corresponding state and interstate 
responsibilities. This is one possible implication of national refugee systems and asylum 
seeking processes which has been long overlooked, despite the recognised significance of 
refugee case-law for generating and altering refugee membership criteria. Jurisprudence can 
be a driving force behind refugee policy development, as Chapter 4 indicated and the 
evidence in this chapter suggests, although to different extents in countries with different 
legal traditions. In Canada, as IRB Chairperson Mawani herself observed; gender-related 
refugee jurisprudence was key to the evolution of refugee policy and administration. 
Subsequently, not only can ideas and values corresponding to individual/group rights and 
state responsibilities be challenged through asylum seeking processes; as well, despite asylum 
seekers’ noncitizen status, they can challenge refugee policy and its application.
We shall now consider, in the Concluding chapter, the overarching implications of 
the institutional and extra-institutional means, and the dual foundations of citizenship and 
human rights ideals and institutions, through which asylum seekers managed to challenge 
refugee policy and policy-making in Canada.
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10.
Asylum  seek er s’ c h a l l e n g e  t o  po l ic y  a n d  po l ic y -m a k in g : 
H u m a n  r ig h t s , c it iz e n s h ip  a n d  so cia l  po l ic y
Asylum seekers’ challenge to refugee policy and policy development in Canada reflects 
changing relationships between groups and states in a global system -  where the parameters 
of citizenship and state sovereignty can no longer prevent or adequately control noncitizens 
making successful claims upon states for the benefits of membership. Instead, various forms 
of identity driven politics are increasingly finding opportunities and means to push out the 
boundaries of state responsibility, with implications for policy and policy-making.
The previous chapters unravelled the relationships between theory, opportunity and 
practice shaping interpretations of persecution and refugee status eligibility, and subsequently 
shaping state responsibilities for fonale-spedfic persecution. Dynamics of these relationships 
set structural barriers against female claimants, and also opportunities for overcoming them. 
The study illuminated the international and Canadian structural contexts and how asylum 
seekers in the study actually navigated and influenced the developing dynamic between them.
These asylum seekers had access to a range of rights, resources and political 
opportunities at national and international levels, enabling them to challenge Canadian policy 
through both institutional and extra-institutional means. The rights they drew upon included 
citizenship and human rights of formal and substantive kinds in an interesting dialectic 
between institutionalised norms, codes and practices that were at times conflictual and at 
times mutually supportive. These rights constituted the basis of policy advocates’ strategic 
framing tactics, providing legal and moral legitimacy to their claims. They also provided 
claimants authorised and informal access to a variety of resources or mdxlising structures 
necessary to push their claims forward. Among crucial resources they could access were 
those institutionalised in status determination processes, and those stemming from the extra- 
institutional interest and capacity of a range of influential individuals and organisations in 
Canada who formed a necessary structure of support. Rights and resources could be best put 
to use given favourable political opportunities. These included a refugee system with a strong 
humanitarian reputation that was nevertheless unable to efficiently manage claims, and a 
domestic political environment vulnerable to public dissent, particularly regarding the 
women’s rights issues represented in these asylum seekers’ claims. Canada was facing its own 
identity crisis, involving multicultural and global dimensions. These asylum seekers’ claims 
cast Canada’s humanitarian and women’s rights reputation into conflict and threatened to 
undermine both if female-specific persecution was not recognised as a state responsibility.
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We saw how women facing deportation exhausted institutional avenues and how 
they used extra-institutional tactics -  going public -  to mobilise public support for radical 
policy demands, namely to change Canada’s use of the internationally standard setting 1951 
UN Convention definition of refugees. As negative decisions on their claims were 
institutionally overturned in what were first portrayed as exceptional cases, examples were set 
which raised expectations about decisions on similar cases, even before the law was changed 
to provide a framework for such decisions. When the Gvaddines for Women Refugees Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution came into effect, claim-making further tested their flexibility and 
application, sometimes resulting in further extra-institutional actions being taken and 
ultimately encouraging revision of the Guidelines in 1996. Examination of a legal database of 
gender-related claims and court decisions suggested further policy change explicitly 
recognising ‘sex persecution’ might be warranted.
The asylum seekers studied acted not solely upon need (as ‘forced migrants’) but as 
actors seeking alternatives, weighing the risks associated with political action in the receiving- 
countiy, and making decisions. They not only made use of political opportunities, but also 
helped shape them. They influenced the internal political culture of the core advocacy 
network by mobilising participants and affecting policy aims. They were integral to the 
success of public pressure tactics to influence government. Many engaged directly with the 
media; they acted as both ‘symbols’ of structural persecution and ‘exceptions’ to asylum 
seeking trends. They helped bridge the gap between the public understanding of women's 
citizenship rights in Canada and human rights globally. They also shaped policy strategies, 
which shifted over time. The Guidelines were in fact a compromise, targeting the greatest 
range of asylum seekers possible within the shortest time possible, rather than ensuring coverage 
for all possible types of female-specific persecution. By helping to shape policy these asylum 
seekers helped shape the structural context of asylum seeking.
All these aspects illustrate that asylum seekers can play explicitly political roles in the 
policy change process. These asylum seekers helped shape their own eligibility criteria for 
membership in Canada and international rights to protection, demonstrating that noncitizens 
can help influence national policy. Moreover, the ways these noncitizens shaped access to 
rights invoked ‘rights to membership’ through residence and human rights, ultimately altering 
the nature and justification of state responsibilities for the welfare of citizens and non­
citizens alike. At the time of the campaigns, significant expansions in state responsibilities 
for human rights were widely recognised in international law. But asylum seekers’ roles in 
policy-making processes and the ways they invoked not only human rights but also 
citizenship have been illuminated and explained for the first time in this study. This 
successful case challenges existing theory that excludes asylum seeking noncitizens from
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policy processes, and farther illuminates why and how these particular noncitizens were able 
to participate and influence policy.
It is apparent that these asylum seekers could not have ‘done it alone’. Their 
participation and influence was enabled by previous international developments in relevant 
policies and human rights discourses, alongside the salience of women’s rights ideologies and 
increasing opportunities to migrate and reside in host countries while seeking refugee status. 
It was also enabled by the unique Canadian context for asylum seeking and political dissent, 
and by Canadian residents explicit support. Globalisation affected all of these dimensions, 
increasing the interaction between national and international levels, culturally-specific and 
universal rights, and changing the dynamic between them regarding inter-state protection. It 
is also clear that the asylum seeking process and the unusually explicit challenge asylum 
seekers faced and posed was a grave matter. Asylum seekers were indeed ‘desperate’ and 
often traumatised by their experiences of persecution. But they were also politically active 
individuals who formed a structural group ultimately able to bring identity and rights 
together in a significant way. Some were highly articulate about their political consciousness. 
All were integral to the policy process.
Migration theory must increasingly come to terms with the nature of ‘refugee* 
eligibility for national membership as a political and social construct. It is shaped not only by 
national interests and inter-state relations, but also by increasingly deterritorialised relations 
between groups and states in a global system, within which are asylum seekers themselves. 
Consequently, refugee policy-making is a fertile area for contests between culturally specific 
and more universally defined rights -  both as ideals and as institutions circumscribing 
national membership. It is a fruitful terrain for citizenship and human rights to be negotiated 
and transformed within specific national contexts, in processes involving noncitizens. This 
being the case, social policy too must come to terms with global pressures to extend the 
scope and application of social citizenship rights it encourages and upholds.
Asylum seekers’ engagement in the policy process and the particular ways they 
influenced policy point to some important implications for refugee policy and policy-making 
which Section I addresses explicitly. Three aspects of the relationship between asylum 
seeking and policy development are generalised from the case study, with significant 
consequences for the theoretical basis of social policy, which Section II considers. The 
traditional idea of citizenship as the underlying justification of social policy is reconsidered 
and possible alternatives are discussed in light of the case studied.
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I. THREE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASYLUM SEEKING AND POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT
A. Asylum seeking and refugee policy development are bound together in an evolving international and
national structural context in which claimants are both agents o f policy development and emotions or
objects o f policy.
What we think of as ‘legitimate refugees’ is a product of our times despite the ahistorical 
structural nature of the persecution by which policy attempts to identify them (racial, 
religious, political, nationality and social group defined persecution). Policy that defines 
‘refugees’ reflects historically specific biases that affect refugee selection processes and 
exclude many refugees who may have legitimate claims in modem terms. By the same token, 
the modem structural context also offers opportunities and constraints of various kinds that 
affect asylum seekers’ abilities to make successful claims and alter the terms of their inclusion 
in host countries.
Refugee policy develops in both a radical and an incremental fashion. It reflects 
historically specific socio-political processes and the changing needs of refugees or their 
changing opportunities to make claims. An example of radical refugee policy change 
occurred when the Organisation of African Unity changed its refugee definition, like most 
was states based on the 1951 UN Convention definition, to include refugees of civil war. 
More commonly, refugee policy tends to develop incrementally through new interpretations 
and applications of the law. This is evidenced in the resilience of the 1951 Convention 
refugee definition in most national refugee policy. Where the Convention definition has been 
unable to accommodate new kinds of refugees, legislation has been added both by the UN 
and member states to recognise ‘extra-Convention’ refugees. The majority of refugees 
accepted in advanced industrialised countries now enter under extra-Convention categories. 
Slightly more radical (and less common) incremental change occurs through the 
reinterpretation of the Convention definition itself. Canada’s 1993 Guidelines reflect such 
policy change; they reinterpret the Convention definition to include gender-related 
persecution.
Nationally, one powerful tool for shaping the interpretation and application of the 
Convention definition is the growth of case-law arising from individual asylum seekers 
claiming refugee status and challenging standard eligibility criteria. This challenge may occur 
both in institutional and extra-institutional settings. While the significance of refugee 
jurisprudence (to different extents in different countries) is generally recognised, somewhat 
surprisingly asylum seekers’ roles as policy actors are not. Policy actions by asylum seekers in 
extra-institutional circumstances, although even more striking, are a rarer occurrence and 
perhaps as consequence have received even less academic attention. Yet this study showed
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how asylum seekers’ participation in public pressure tactics alongside their full use of 
institutional means and processes influenced Canadian refugee policy.
As described in the case studied, whether through institutional or extra-institutional 
means, asylum seekers’ agency in refugee policy development is in no small part a factor of 
strategic opportunities available to refugee claimants in receiving-countries. They may access 
an array of rights, resources and avenues for participation in host societies to challenge 
refugee policy through inland claims. These strategic opportunities are the product of factors 
such as the nature of international and national refugee regimes; the subsequent structure of 
status determination processes; and the strength or mobilisation potential of nationally 
located supporters. The nature and infrastructure of Canada’s refugee regime, its common 
law tradition and pluralistic inclination toward policy-making were all important for asylum 
seekers’ success in the case studied. Canada has a progressive humanitarian reputation with a 
relatively high rate of refugee acceptance. It is a country rich in resources and has an 
increasingly multicultural identity. It values jurisprudence and in politics tends to avoid 
conflicts, resulting in more consensual style policy-making. Asylum seekers’ abilities to use 
these opportunities in the case studied is a significant demonstration that asylum seekers, 
rather than being simply pawns of history, are political actors who may shape policy and in 
so doing influence the structural context.
Strategic opportunities are also linked to the salience of particular ideas regarding 
responsibilities and rights of states, individuals, and groups of people or collective identities. 
Today these are increasingly transnational or global in nature. They are heavily influenced by 
national politics and citizenship rights, increasingly by international politics and supranational 
rights, principles and standards, and by the interaction between the two. While they may 
provide new legitimacy to individuals, thus enabling their claim-making, they also raise 
conflicts. At this interface collective identities -  in this case individuals sharing similar 
structural status related to experiences of persecution forming the basis of their refugee 
claims -  grapple with the task of juggling culturally relative and universal rights. The 
questions is, which rights will be accepted and safeguarded as ‘universal’ rights on specific 
issues? When should citizenship rights be considered universal? Which country’s citizenship 
rights? And which citizenship rights in particular? This leads us to the second aspect of the 
relation between asylum seeking and policy development.
B. A sybm seekers make use o f and encourage the increasing complexity and overlap between citizenship
and human rigfrts, which may be applied to arguefor the rights o f particular collective identities
Inland asylum seekers may extrapolate culturally relative rights of citizens in host countries to 
thicken the use of human rights principles in their cases. In practice, cultural relativism
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underpins interpretations of the universal standards upon which refugee policy is based. 
Asylum seeking raises moral and political debates in receiving-countries regarding whih 
culture, which country and which rights will ultimately be used as touchstones for 
interpretations and applications of human rights. And asylum seekers can help determine the 
outcome of such debates. One useful way of looking at the conflict between universalism 
and cultural relativism in moral debates over whether or not to grant asylum, is the right of 
individuals to chose which ‘universal cultural morality* they believe in regarding specific 
issues. The right of a sovereign state to commit, condone or ignore what an individual 
member of that state considers to be human rights violations, can never be considered a 
culturally relative right in the international domain if that individual rejects it. Asylum seekers 
make an expressly political choice by seeking membership in a foreign country for particular 
reasons. One way of justifying rights to asylum is by appealing to internationally accepted 
human rights standards. Another way is by appealing to the ‘universal’ moral underpinnings 
of citizenship rights in receiving-countries.
In the case studied, fundamental rights enjoyed by women in Canada were 
considered citizenship rights in practice and theory, but not human rights. The Canadian 
government’s judgement on the women’s human rights in other countries corresponded with 
women’s citizenship rights in other countries and cultures. The question raised was why such 
judgement should not be made according to Canada’s own values. Why should some 
citizenship rights be considered human rights while others are not? The legal and moral force 
of asylum seekers’ argument lay in their claim to Canadian citizenship rights pertaining to 
women’s equality and elaborated regarding rights to safety from violence in particular, and 
their compatibility with abstract human rights principles. Standard Canadian and 
international applications of universal human rights could be merged with Canadian 
citizenship rights to challenge exclusive entry eligibility criteria, influence decisions on 
refugee claims and admit asylum seekers as formal members of Canada. Asylum seekers’ 
claims thus drew upon a combination of citizenship and human rights -  discourses, legal 
instruments, substantive resources and rights -  whose traditional interpretations excluded 
them as a particular group, one on grounds of noncitizen status, the other for the gender 
basis of claims.
The rights extrapolated from Canadian experience protect women from violence 
such as domestic violence, rape, sexual assault and harassment. In Canada violence against 
women is considered not only physically and psychologically harmful to females, but also an 
obstacle to their full participation in society (both their rights and contributions) and thus a 
detriment to society as a whole and the equality of its members. Canada’s commitment to 
ending violence against women is explicitly legitimated through citizenship discourses and
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rights. In a report on violence against women the Federal government of Canada states: 
“These assaults on the person, dignity and rights of women as equal citizens undermine the 
values Canadians revere and upon which they are trying to build a tolerant, just and strong 
nation. It is the responsibility of every individual, institution and level of government to 
acknowledge the gravity of this problem and to work in partnership to prevent it and to 
improve society’s response to the problem, when it occurs” (Status of Women 
Canada, 1991:1). Canada has evolved an elaborate network of social programs and legislation 
to prevent and eradicate violence against women, drawing on social, civil and political rights.
Inland asylum seekers requested the same protections from female-specific violence 
Canadian women are entitled to receive through the combined efforts of the voluntary sector 
and at least eight government departments. Rights to make claims were protected and 
facilitated by international human rights principles and Canadian refugee policy, as well as 
aliens’ constitutional rights in Canada. Asylum seekers were also able to draw on both 
individual rights and structural rights as women, in different legal contexts.
By drawing upon citizenship rights in the host country asylum seekers expanded 
traditional interpretations and applications of human rights, which form a fundamental basis 
of international refugee law. The expanded human rights interpretation reshaped the 
administration of national refugee policy, providing asylum seekers authorised entry into 
Canada and the benefits of membership. From this example we can see how asylum seekers’ 
use of citizenship and human rights discourses is a two-way relationship: they claimed 
citizenship rights by appealing to human rights, and they claimed human rights by drawing 
upon rights developed in a particular country’s citizenship tradition.
This circular process indicates not only that notions of citizenship may expand 
beyond nation-states (being extended or replaced) as increasingly recognised today, but that 
interpretations and applications of human rights may expand through nation-states. Although 
in the past human rights instruments were at times criticised as being a creation of Western 
countries and thus not truly universal, they have been increasingly accepted. Thus the idea 
that human rights (what constitutes human rights, and to whom they apply) may still have 
room to expand through culturally specific rights tends to be overlooked as we cling to a 
false idea that human rights principles are ‘universal’, as if they exist a priori to our thinking 
and conceptualising them, or interpreting and applying them.
The rootedness of human rights in citizenship (“the right to have rights”, as Arendt 
explained in 1973), before citizenship in human rights, emerges but need not be negative 
here. It allows new conceptions and practices of ‘rights’, rights issues and beneficiaries to 
develop by example in different countries. This national experimentation of course means 
they can also move in a more exclusive direction. But as citizenship rights are simultaneously
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decoupled from national rights and subject to international standards, they may expand in 
application (to beneficiaries) and in substance, taking on more universal aspects.
The fact that asylum seekers, as noncitizens, were a driving force behind dynamics 
between citizenship and human rights observed in this study further emphasises the 
contestability of assignations made or upheld by states regarding who should enjoy what kind 
of human rights and in what places, justified by reference to different cultural and citizenship 
traditions. In an increasingly global society, it is unsurprising that some individuals and 
groups will question the inevitability of their social-political structural environment, even as 
others move more toward preserving it. It is also unsurprising that in an increasingly inter­
connected world, residents with nationally upheld citizenship rights would want to safegaurd 
their rights as particular structural groups (i.e. women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, 
children) on a world scale. When citizen and noncitizen constituencies join forces a strong 
case can be made for internationalising state responsibilities.
Canada’s progressive record on human rights, citizenship rights, and women’s rights 
was no doubt crucial for this process. The process itself and asylum seekers’ roles in it are a 
significant illustration increasing noncitizen capacities as an outcome of institutionalised 
cultural rules and structures of society taking on both international and national frameworks. 
Asylum seekers’ roles in the case studied illustrate one way the human rights-citizenship 
dialectic may be used to shape state responsibilities toward more ‘ideal’ rights, a broader 
membership base, and wider justification for ‘rights to rights’.
The study suggests that globalisation invites us to consider different 
conceptualisations of both citizenship and human rights, and may be providing new tools for 
them to be played off one another in a symbiotic rather than hierarchical relationship. The 
case studied has particular implications for women's expanding rights, a strong example of 
how cultural relativism underpins both citizenship and human rights in highly contestable 
ways but also how it enables some rights to develop further in increasingly transnational 
community formations. It also shows noncitizens can play a significant role in this 
developing relationship -  leading us to a third significant implication of the relationship 
between asylum seeking and refugee policy development.
C. National refugee policy development is prone to international influences that have previously been 
overlooked and which alter the ways we think about how national policy is made and what states ’ 
responsibilities are.
As nondtizens making claims to rights offered through citizenship based on their rights to 
make human rights claims, asylum seekers’ participation and ultimately significant leverage 
within the policy process is particularly important. It signals significant pressures arising from 
new noncitizen-state relationships. Canada’s vulnerability to their claims suggests noncitizens
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can no longer be assumed to be outside policy processes, and state responsibilities can not be 
assumed to be limited to ‘citizens’.
This addresses a significant gap in the international migration literature, which leaves 
unexplored the relationship between the asylum seeking process and policy development. 
Increasingly recognised are global pressures undermining state sovereignty and control over 
international migration policy -  particularly the world economy, international trade and 
labour agreements, and the international human rights regime which sets standards and 
legitimates the rights of noncitizens (see Sassen, 1988, 1996, 1998). In particular, theories of 
receiving-countiy responses tend to focus more on international politics such as sending and 
receiving country relations and foreign policy aims underlying policy outcomes, than actual 
policy struggles between domestic constituencies (see Baubock,1998), while considerations of 
the latter are limited to citizens and established residents. Moreover, asylum seekers are still 
viewed primarily as ‘forced’ migrants, or at most as individuals claiming rights divorced from 
broader policy processes; they are not considered international actors.
This study revealed a case in which the weight of domestic politics was the 
determining factor for policy change and moreover involved asylum seekers themselves. 
While domestic pressure necessarily drew upon and was legitimated by international level 
rights of personhood, international rights also needed ‘bottom up’ mobilisation to change 
policy. Asylum seekers were not only well positioned within the international human rights 
regime and Canada in order to make claims and access resources, they were also wiling 
(rather than ‘forced’) to use these opportunities and ultimately took strategic actions explicitly 
linked to policy advocacy and policy change. Significantly, asylum seekers drew on social 
rights associated with citizenship to argue their claims.
It is worthwhile therefore to give greater attention to domestic politics in refugee 
policy development; in light of the case studied, the study of international migration and 
social policy can be mutually expanding. Policy-making models used in academic social policy 
are better equipped to study domestic processes. However, the particular policy process 
studied highlights a fault in the study of social policy, where policy-making models typically 
focus on national influences (and self-interests) to the exclusion of noncitizens. It thus 
behoves domestic policy-making models to expand in some significant respects.
The expansion of policy-making models to include international influences is now 
occurring to account for some international trends (i.e. the global political economy, see 
Esping-Anderson,1996) and to a lesser extent regarding international orgmisations (see 
Deacon,1997; Mishra,1999) as discussed in Chapter 1, but still stops short of individuals 
detached from citizenship (that of sending and receiving countries). However, it is not 
difficult to further this expansion. Many models only imply national limits; the exclusion of
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international influences (trends, organisations and individuals) occurs in their application or 
interpretation. However, many models do explicitly refer to citizens and various levels of 
governmental policy-making apparatus limited to the national arena and do not consider 
international trends among what are commonly described as external or system variables; 
thus their inclusion needs to be made explicit.
In light of the case studied which we now understand in the context of migration 
systems, we can account for the possibility of international influences including international 
actors (noncitizens), taking one exemplary model. Smith and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition 
Approach (1994) is a useful here. It is described as an attempt “to synthesize the best 
features of both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches”. A number of its features 
corresponded well to the policy process in the case studied, and moreover, the ACF is 
amenable to international influences as it does not explicitly exclude them and provides 
parameters flexible enough to include them. International variables do not seem to conflict 
with the model. This is apparent in each of its four underlying principles (Ibid, 178), drawing 
examples from international migration as a driving international force:
(1) “Understanding policy change processes requires a time perspective of a decade 
or more”: This longer-term approach enables the influence of factors such as policy analysis 
and the cumulative effect of findings from studies and every day knowledge to be taken into 
account, and for at least one policy ‘cycle’ to be completed and its outcomes evaluated. 
Considering international migration trends, historical trends are significant, reflecting 
changing relationships between countries, the development of international law and the 
emergence of new social-political crisis in sending-countries. These international structural 
variables create pressures for national policy change over the long-term, including pressures 
of increasing migration by certain groups and the effects of past policies upon the formation 
of ethnic communities. As we saw in the case studied, international trends such as migration 
by women, the development of relevant policy discourses, and the salience of human rights 
discourses were developing throughout the 1980s if not earlier. These long-term trends were 
as important for policy campaigns in the 1990s as were developments in the Canadian 
domestic political climate throughout the 1980s, such as the failure of Canada’s refugee 
regime to deal with mounting claims in an equitable way during a period of Canadian identity 
crisis, resulting in years of policy debates, controversy and alternative avenues for claimants.
(2) “The most useful way to think about policy change over such a time span is 
through a focus on policy subsystems, the interaction of actors from different institutions 
who follow, and seek to influence, governmental decisions in a policy area”: This second 
principle underscores that “policy change in modem industrial societies is not a specific 
governmental institution”, nor do policy subsystems conform to “traditional notions of iron
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triangles limited to administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interests groups at a 
single level of government” (Ibid, 179). Rather, it includes various government levels, as well 
as journalists, researchers and policy analysts, as studies of policy networks and policy 
communities have observed. In the case studied we saw that international migration involves 
international institutions and regulations, status-seeking migrants themselves, their 
nongovernment supporters in host countries, government supporters and opponents, and the 
administration where policy is confronted, including the judicial setting of refugee claims.
(3) “Subsystems must include an intergovernmental dimension, at least for domestic 
policy”: Policy actors and policy innovations are found at all levels of government. For 
example, “innovations may occur first at a subnational level and then expand into nationwide 
programs.” And officials at the sub-national level have been shown to demonstrate wide 
discretion in how policy gets translated and implemented in local situations (see Smith and 
Sabatier 1994:179). This third principle can be clarified by noting that subsystems may 
include supranational, international and regional governmental levels. This is important in the 
case of international migration, which is a matter of both domestic and foreign policy. It 
draws on international and regional Conventions, Declarations and Treaties to support 
migrant rights in host countries, as well as national legislation and its development and 
implementation at subnational levels (i.e. through judicial and administrative bodies). It is 
precisely the intersection between international and national/sub-national levels which 
enables refugee claimants. It is important to also specify that ‘interest groups’ (both voluntary 
and private organisations) in the policy subsystem may also organise and interact (among 
themselves and with government) at different governmental levels, including global.
(4) “Public policies or programs can be conceptualised in the same manner as belief 
systems”: This principle is based on the premise “that public policies/programs incorporate 
implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives (Pressman and Wildavsy,1973; 
Majone,1980)” (Ibid,179). Like belief systems these theories involve value priorities, 
perceptions of important causal relationships and of the state of the world, and perceptions 
of the efficacy of policy instruments. It is evident that international migration evokes values 
and beliefs and often intense controversy about issues such as multiculturalism, human rights 
and state responsibilities, and particular issue areas. (i.e. the causes of political conflict in 
particular countries; the nature of particular kinds of structural persecution, and the identity 
and rights of structural groups defined at a transnational level). Belief systems legitimated in 
institutional norms nationally and internationally facilitate policy actors. Policy actors’ belief 
systems inform how they collectively frame policy aims and strategies, as we saw in the case 
studied. Asylum seekers’ participation further influenced policy aims and strategies in this 
respect, and by going public they signified the principles and values in question.
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Figure 10.1 depicts the Advocacy Coalition Framework. It consists of relatively stable 
system parameters and more dynamic system events, both affecting subsystem actors’ 
constraints and opportunities. These actors operate within a policy subsystem that may be 
“aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various 
governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and 
who often act in concert” (Ibid, 180).
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‘Belief systems’, which are transformed into policy aims, are organised hierarchically, 
those at the ‘bottom’ being most readily adjustable to new data, experience, or changing 
strategic considerations (Ibid, 182). Strategies adopted by different advocacy coalitions to 
influence policy decisions may be mediated by ‘policy brokers’, “whose principal concern is 
to find some reasonable compromise which will reduce intense conflict” (Ibid,1994:182). 
Resulting policy programs produce ‘outputs’ with various impacts and side effects on 
targeted problems (and populations), such as revised policy or political aims. (1994:192).41
This model is suitable for understanding the type of policy change that occurred in 
the case studied. It involved international trends and instruments within both stable (i.e. 
Canada’s refugee regime type) and changing system parameters and events (i.e. global 
migration trends, sending-receiving-country relations, changing supranational standards and 
agreements and opportunities for women), and included international actors (noncitizens)
41 The ACF further develops hypotheses concerning ‘policy-oriented learning’.
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confronting the constraints and resources of supranational and national refugee regimes. 
They worked in advocacy coalitions or networks as they advanced claims and made policy 
demands. Policy ‘outputs’ shaped their membership eligibility and rights in Canada.
Reconciling policy-making models and international influences of the type described 
above may not be difficult, however addressing the theoretical implications for social policy 
more generally may be. Can noncitizenship-based state welfare responsibilities be reconciled 
with traditional citizenship rooted justifications underlying social policy? In light of the case 
studied and the implications described above, let us return to Marshall’s idea of citizenship in 
order to consider whether it is compatible with some of the changes brought on by 
globalisation and recent debates outside social policy concerning modem transformations of 
citizenship.
II. R e v isit in g  T .H .M arshall: c it iz e n sh ip  a n d  “h u m a n  e q u a l it y  o f
MEMBERSHIP” IN LIGHT OF GLOBAL MIGRATION
Marshall was right in regarding citizenship as a developing institution. The boundaries and 
nature of inclusion and exclusion in societal structures -  such as those based on race, gender, 
ethnicity, age, mental and physical ability -  are being rethought, and the substantive rights of 
excluded groups broadened. We also know that international migration has created a 
situation in which individuals without formal citizenship status can access many substantive 
citizenship rights. Yet Marshall’s underlying assumption that the idea of citizenship provides 
the fundamental justification for rights to state protection and benefits (civil, political and 
social rights), or ‘rights to rights’, has remained largely taken for granted in social policy, as 
Chapter 1 showed.
It is the “ideal” of citizenship with its corresponding sets of rights which provides the 
inspiration for their institutionalisation in relations between individuals, society and the state, 
toward the aim of social integration. Yet what discussions of Marshall’s idea of citizenship 
have perhaps most failed to question is the logic and basis for individual’s rights to the ideal 
of citizenship. Thus we must return to the idea of citizenship itself, not only broadening its 
parameters of inclusion as many social policy academics have advocated, but to find whether 
its own central justification fits expanding institutions, or is being replaced. What is the basis 
for citizen membership, according to Marshall?
Marshall invoked the ideal of citizenship society creates in order to explain what gives 
rise to social, political and civil rights and duties, and to justify those rights and duties: “If 
citizenship is invoked in the defence of rights, the corresponding duties of citizenship cannot
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be ignored” (1950:41). But the right to equality of citizenship was explained by Marshall 
simply as the correlate of “ The basic human equality o f manbership”
Marshall stated: “The basic human equality of membership... has been enriched with 
new substance and invested with a formidable array of rights... It has been clearly identified 
with the status of citizenship” (1950:7). Marshall began with the postulate that “there is a 
kind of basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of a 
community”. Full membership can be attained only when the conditions necessary to enjoy 
“life as a whole in terms of the essential elements in civilisation or culture” (1950:6) are met, 
regardless of inequalities in a social class system.42 Marshall then not only interpreted human 
equality of membership within a modem conception of “citizenship” but made these two 
concepts synonymous, thereby making the principle of equality of membership dependent 
on the nation-state. That is, Marshall not only interprets the right to be admitted to a share 
in the social heritage to be within the context of the nation-state, but equates it w ih the 
nation-state: “It [human equality of social heritage] means a claim to be accepted as full 
members of society, that is, as citizens” (Ibid,7).
How Marshall made this leap in logic is not explained, in fact no attempt is made to 
justify it. Nevertheless it constitutes the starting point for Ckilisatim and Social Class. We are 
left merely to assume that the most natural locus for rights to be developed institutionally is 
the nation-state. For the most part this is a reasonable assumption, as the state system was 
then and is today the dominant political structure and Marshall wrote in post-war years in 
which welfare state idealism was high. In other ways it is simply too dismissive of dramatic 
shifts taking place in the interstate system even as Marshall wrote, which have since only 
increased. The exclusive role of states as the only “actors” in the inter-state-system was being 
encroached upon by individuals as international institutions sprang up. Considering the broad 
impact of Marshall’s thesis, it is worthwhile reconsidering it in light of such developments.
Questions raised by international rights and migration trends: retrospective and 
prospective
As Marshall wrote individuals’ rights were coming up in regional and supranational 
structures, driven by supranational trends and an inter-state system changing under global 
pressures. These also come to bear upon both formal citizenship status and substantive 
citizenship rights. Humanitarian protection had been developing at the supranational level 
despite the strongly held principle of self-determination of nation-states (and subsequently, of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention). It moved from group rights, for instance in the
42 A qualitative assessment of life which he found latent in the earlier work of Alfred Marshall in 
1873.
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abolition of slavery in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1814 between Britain and France, to 
individual rights. Of the latter, among the earliest were treaties on the protection of 
minorities after WWI, providing “right of petition under international law by a group of 
private individuals”, through the League of Nations [later the UN] (see Davidson 1993:11).
The growth of individuals’ human rights, international human rights law, and 
supranational institutions and organisations to uphold those rights, have changed the nature 
and course of the international system. These developments were driven in large part by the 
atrocities of WWII. Previously, as one human rights expert explains:
States were the sole subjects of the international legal system; other entities, including 
individuals, were merely objects of the system. States might adopt rules for the benfit of 
individuals, but such rules conferred neither substantive rights on those individuals nor 
were they enforceable by any procedural mechanisms. Individuals, as citizens of the 
state, were subject to the complete authority of their government, and other states, in 
general, had no legal right to intervene to protect them should they be maltreated. 
(Davidson,1993:7)
The shift in roles and rights of “other entities” besides states in the inter-state system 
was perhaps most dramatically embodied in the 1948 International Declaration of Human 
Rights, and international instruments that followed. These instruments make explicit 
individuals1 rights (civil, political, economic and social) vis-a-vis states in an inter-state system. 
Individual rights are also specified above social categories that commonly lead to exclusion 
and marginalisation by ‘deep structures’ such as race and ethnicity, sex, religion and political 
opinion, notably including nationality. Thus individual rights are based not on nationality or 
citizenship status derived from membership in a nation-state, but upon membership in 
humanity. In this schema, state responsibilities vis-a-vis individuals are implicit, albeit without 
international monitoring and enforcing mechanisms; states are subject to international 
standards and human rights codes.
Two points of interest regarding the coinciding emergence of apparatus for human 
rights protections embodied in international instruments and for social citizenship rights 
embodied in the welfare state are worth noting. First, the Human Rights Declaration did 
what Marshall extolled citizenship rights for doing in the 20th century through the welfare 
state: bringing together civil, political and social rights.43 Second, like citizenship rights, the 
nation-state was to be the primary implementing and enforcing institution for human rights. 
A primary difference is that apparatus to check state accountability for upholding or violating 
human rights have been slow in developing compared to checks on the state regarding
43 In a rather sweeping historical assessment, Marshall claimed that “in early times... rights were 
blended because the institutions were amalgamated”, but eventually separated, ran their separate 
courses, only to re-converge again “in the present century, in fact I might say only within the last few 
months... ” (1950:8,9).
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citizenship rights from within. While the rate of development and democratisation has been 
rapid, between 1947 and 1967 the UN Commission on Human Rights remained a “standard- 
setting” body without competence to deal with human rights violations complaints. The 
unevenness of human rights enforcement is a reflection of the unevenness of the effects of 
globalisation (Held et al,1999). However, more recently international bodies have been 
attaining greater powers of monitoring, intervention and enforcement. And it is incontestable 
that since the 1940s state humanitarian responsibilities have been broadening, both within 
and outside national territories. But even earlier examples can be found.
A significant and noteworthy aspect of such expansion can be found in international 
migration. Even in the older tradition where “states were the sole subjects of the 
international legal system” to the exclusion of other entities, Davidson (1993:7) observes that 
“the position of aliens in a foreign state was slightly different. The state of which an alien 
was a national might, under certain conditions, be entided to bring a claim under 
international law against a delinquent host state.”44 Another important exception well before 
WWII was the obligation of states to reodve designated groups of refugees identified by 
nationality in treaties between particular states (see Zolberg et al,1989:5-21). Later, WWII 
became a decisive turning point for refugee rights as it was for social citizenship rights under 
emerging welfare states. The identification of refugees in treaties was moved from a 
nationality-basis to more universal human rights codes applicable to all signatory states 
(Ibid,21 -27). The rights of individuals to emigrate, seek asylum and return to their country 
encompass a range of rights: nationality, protection from human rights violations (underlying 
refugee movement), social and economic rights (underlying immigration). They protect both 
citizens and the stateless. They were formalised for the first time through the 1948 Human 
Rights Declaration and reinforced three years later in the UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. Moreover, international human rights instruments have increasingly 
become vehicles for individual agency, providing the legitimacy and legal framework for claims 
that undermine state sovereignty (see Sassen, 1996).
It is evident that Marshall’s conception of citizenship not only neglected the question 
of which individuals can make claims of what kind on the state, but upon which state. It 
ignores the changeableness of nationality and the long tradition of thought shaping ideas of
44 Davidson notes such claims were not driven so much “to seek redress for the injured citizen; 
rather, it was to vindicate the rights of the state which had been indirectly injured through the 
mistreatment of its own national” (1993:8). Nevertheless the arrangement departed from established 
state to state relations which normative^ excluded individuals* claims -  as opposed to states acting as 
representative of all or certain segments of their citizenry.
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nationality and nationality law that shape citizen membership.45 It neglected globalisation’s 
increasing and various forms of influence upon citizenship and national identity, and 
individuals’ rights to both. Following Marshall, academic social policy has similarly taken 
these questions for granted both in its initial assumptions and more recently in critiques of 
how citizenship is used to exclude certain groups from rights to social policy.
International migration and the international laws supporting it challenge these 
assumptions historically, and modem international migration trends only increase the 
challenge. Mass immigration and refugee movements have been and continue to be nation- 
building forces. They have developed and changed interstate relations as well as the 
landscape of states from whence immigrants and refugees originate. They call into question 
the exclusiveness of human equality of membership based on formal citizenship status linked 
to a particular nation-state.
In the last few decades the primary reaction of governments and citizens to rising 
and increasingly uncontrollable international migration flows has been panic, posing 
immigrants and refugees (particularly illegal immigrants and ‘illegitimate’ refugees) as a threat 
to national identity and citizenship rights, particularly social rights, as competition for 
resources increases. In this the ideal of citizenship has been invoked to try to prevent too 
many competing claims on the state. It overlooks rights to citizenship and residency, as well as 
non-nationally defined identity-based damts on the state (including claims for citizenship status 
and for citizenship rights in themselves) that cross-cut formal citizenship status. However, 
given its basis in the ‘human equality of membership’, Marshall’s conception of citizenship is 
not necessarily incompatible with transformations currently occurring under globalisation, as 
the following considers with the example of refugee movement.
Directions and dilemmas suggested by international migration trends: the dialectic 
between human rights and citizenship
Immigration and refugee policies set out the parameters of inclusion or exclusion from 
membership in a particular nation-state, where membership eligibility is defined in part by 
identity sub-categories (family, business, student, political refugee, etc.) and related rights, and 
membership is not necessarily defined in terms of citizenship status but in terms of 
temporary or permanent resident status. Claims upon the state for entry by refugees needing 
human rights protection rely upon a framework of civil, political and social rights of 
individuals as humans, in relation to sending and receiving states in an international system.
45 These traditionally range from jus soli (right of birth) to jus cogens (right of residence) and the role 
of allegiance, from the time of Ancient Greece and Rome; see Plender, 1988 for a comprehensive 
historical overview of relevant international law. More recently, and more controversially, it is 
considered to include elements of consent and human rights (see Baubock, 1994).
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In this context citizenship status or residency in a particular nation-state is a vehicle for the 
institutional protection and provision of human rights. But in receiving-countries, established 
citizenship rights that are of an equivalent order to human rights refugees need protected, are 
fundamental. As shown in the case studied, citizenship rights may even be a vehicle for 
expanding institutionalised norms or readings of what constitutes human rights violations.
Thus, both status and rights from international and national levels transfer protection 
responsibilities from one state to another. Refugees move to countries where they can find 
better human rights protection through the substantive citizenship rights offered in host 
countries, conferred through authorisation for residency. Subsequently, states are vehicles for 
both citizenship and human rights protections and their development as ideals and 
institutions. In this sense, both citizenship and human rights imply membership eligibility in 
territorially defined states (i.e. not all refugees are protected by particular states, and in 
practice not all human rights are promoted either within or across states).
Because of the dynamic interaction between national and international levels it seems 
that citizenship and human rights have some basic compatibility -  in both their ideds of 
membership rights and some of the basic institutions of enforcement. But are they compatible 
regarding ‘rights to rights’, and subsequently membership status? Citizenship may be an 
ideal, a legal status, and an institution all at the same time. But it needs a larger organising 
principle which gives individuals rights to access citizenship or membership in a nation-state 
in the first place. So we return to the question, what is human equality o f m&nbership, inherent in 
Marshall’s theory of citizenship, as an organising principlef1
Human equality of membership might be expressed as the equal right among human 
beings to be “admitted to a share in the social heritage”, in Marshall’s words. This is a right 
individuals may possess first as beings with rights to full membership in the human 
community, and second as persons institutionally circumscribed by a state or other governing 
structure. The aim of citizenship is to achieve human equality of membership -  this can be 
interpreted in a global world. Indeed, in later works Marshall (1963) stated that nationality is 
too large a binding concept; he subsequently held more of a minimal conception of 
citizenship in this regard, describing persons related through common rules and jurisdictions 
regulating their conduct and opportunities (rather than through homogeneity of cultural and 
historical background) and therefore not excluding jurisdictions larger than the state (see 
Parry,1991). Citizenship achieves human equality of membership by institutionalising it 
through the vehicle of the state, and we are increasingly seeing, it does so by drawing on both 
international and national rights of personhood and the interaction between the two. Thus, 
universal human rights principles should in theory be compatible with those of national 
citizenship regarding ‘rights to rights’, based on human equality of membership. Human
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rights and citizenship principles need not be entirely synonymous to interact in constructive 
ways. Social policy could draw on the human equality of membership interpretation of 
citizenship as a theoretical justification for extending its horizons beyond formal-status 
citizens and across nation-states.
However, in practice there are still major obstacles to the deployment of citizenship 
and human rights together. We do not yet accept all of Marshall’s citizenship rights on a 
world basis. We do not have world government, nor are all states democracies. The majority 
of the world’s people can not claim equal resources or equal access to fundamentals such as 
food and shelter, not to mention education and services targeting social problems such as 
violence against women. But we are increasingly seeing the growth of means to enforce some 
basic rights on a world basis through international treaties and conventions, regional and 
international bodies (the EU and the UN). Through them states ideally negotiate and share 
responsibilities and rewards of governance, both inward and outward looking, toward 
residents and nonresidents alike. Overseas humanitarian and development aid are of the 
‘outward’ type, alongside pressures for states to conform with international standards in the 
treatment of their residents and potential residents.
A more current obstacle is the continuing existence of geographically defined 
territories, which will continue to raise questions about individuals’ rights to membership. 
Until states are equalised in some basic respects (if at all possible), individuals will migrate to 
preferred states or seek asylum from persecution. The problem of membership criteria and 
legal status will still apply. As this study showed, in practice not all individuals enjoy equal 
human rights or opportunities to claim membership in a particular state or to contest their 
exclusion.
At the moment right to claim benefits of citizenship through human rights principles 
-  a case of human equality of membership in all major aspects of ‘rights to rights’ -  is still 
reserved for refugees. They are thus an interesting but unique example that points toward 
future possibilities. Indeed, refugee policies and application have been expanding in some 
important ways since the 1960s. First, they increasingly draw upon human rights principles, to 
the extent that the common interpretation of ‘persecution’ is now considered ‘human rights 
violations’ (Hathaway, 199lb: 104-5). Second, new types of refugee claims are being made 
which either enlarge the pool of human rights from which refugees can draw, enlarge the 
interpretation of what constitutes human rights violations, or increasingly blur human rights 
and citizenship categories together and transform them. This study revealed that asylum 
seekers drew as much upon citizenship rights as upon human rights to make claims, 
participate in policy-advocacy and influence policy outcomes (their membership eligibility, 
and Canada’s transnational responsibilities). It helped explain why refugee policy actually
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expanded in a significant way despite the current context of government restraint and 
cutbacks in refugee admissions and social policy provisions generally.
Asylum seeking may be just one of many examples of the changing dynamic between 
human rights and citizenship rights, changing access to citizenship rights and changing 
processes and pressures on national policy-making in an increasingly global community. If 
the idea of citizenship in social policy is compatible with changing access to ‘rights to rights’ 
beyond national borders, as suggested, asylum seeking presents a significant example of 
human equality of membership. To grapple with issues of this kind and the problems it 
brings more generally, as indicated above, social policy would benefit by engaging with 
current citizenship debates in other fields. The following reconsiders theories of 
transformations of citizenship46 in light of the dynamics between citizenship and human 
rights illuminated in this study, to further suggest directions social policy might want to 
consider if it is to become more globally aware.
Revisiting possible theoretical implications: Expanding or replacing citizenship
Two general propositions regarding transformations of citizenship under globalisation have 
received substantial attention in political science, sociology, international relations, and to a 
much lesser extent in social policy. The first sees citizenship expanding progressively to 
include transnational rights of the kind supported in human rights principles, but remaining 
very much nationally based. The second sees the traditional citizenship model losing its value 
or being replaced by one based on universal human rights. Both views raise citizenship issues 
concerning the range of substantive rights, beneficiaries, and state responsibilities to be encompassed.
The expansion of citizenship:
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, social policy has only begun to recognise the of globalisation. 
So far the few accounts offered of a more ‘global social policy’ describe or more often 
prescribe an expansion of the idea and institution of citizenship. Lister (1997) provides an in- 
depth discussion and prescription of the expansion of citizenship under feminist influences 
and more generally under global influences. Deacon (1997), by way of describing the 
internationalisation of social policy generally, also prescribes a global concept of citizenship. 
Several others have more indirectly described the changing nature and role of citizenship for 
social policy, for instance in work concerned with social policy in the European Union, or
46 This is necessarily only a brief sketch of the literature and various perspectives. The literature on 
citizenship is now quite extensive and indeed goes back to ideas of democracy in Ancient Greece. 
The work covered here is limited to those relevant to social rights and social policy, and also excludes 
in-depth coverage of broader related topics in political theory, such as global democracy.
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social policy reforms in recent EU member states (for example Kleinman and Piachaud, 
1993). Deacon’s (1997) approach was presented in Chapter 1 as advocating transnational 
social issues and welfare state responsibilities, in part through global citizenship for rights to 
transnational social policy, and international policy actors whom he identifies as international 
organisations. He does not explain just what global citizenship might entail, but implies 
access to transnational welfare states in one’s own country rather than by moving abroad. 
Lister’s (1997) account, which is perhaps the most extensive attempt to engage fully and 
directly with issues of citizenship and social policy, focuses squarely on the theoretical and 
practical details concerning the use and transformation of citizenship, in particular to suit a 
‘feminist conception of citizenship’, and thus shall be elaborated here.
Lister’s (1997) feminist conception of citizenship suggests we can aspire to an ideal 
that accounts for the duality of public and private experiences of citizenship. It says further 
that to simultaneously account for women’s diversity and differences in increasingly 
multicultural nation-states requires a “global notion of citizenship” that bridges citizenship 
and human rights. This would enable women to claim universal citizenship rights with 
respect for cultural differences. The new ‘differentiated universalism’ of citizenship rights 
would fulfil substantive rights to the level of an ‘ideal’ citizenship.
Arising out of social policy, Lister’s model is highly relevant to the questions at hand. 
For as we saw in the case studied, established citizenship rights -  women’s rights to 
protection from female-specific violence, and citizens’ rights to resources and avenues for 
participation -  were drawn upon and expanded toward noncitizens from culturally diverse 
backgrounds and different citizenship traditions. However three dimensions of Lister’s 
model remain unclear and somewhat problematic. These inter-linked problems are endemic 
to considerations of the relationship between citizenship and human rights.
First, Lister’s conception of citizenship does not clearly delineate between 
substantive and formal expansion, somewhat neglecting the latter. It neglects the question of 
exactly what kind of formal or informal status the proposed ideal set of rights would be based 
on, or what defines membership (rights to access rights). In this Lister’s idea of citizenship 
follows the general trend in social policy, which concentrates on substantive rights but 
neglects the question of how these rights are to be framed in law governing who is eligible 
for membership in a particular place. Migrants are discussed primarily in terms of resulting 
multicultural societies with diverse membership needs, not their formal status legitimating 
access to rights. The possible liberalisation of naturalisation and mulitple-citizenship laws, or 
the extension of full political rights to noncitizen residents, which Lister mentions in a 
cursory look at this problem (1997:49) furthermore applies to established migrants and does 
not address rights to social policies by residence-seeking migrants. The question of status
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eligibility is not likely to disappear, as states are unlikely to stop attempting to regulate 
international migration and the various status types that subsequently arise are not likely to 
disappear. Unless we do away with all border controls (including regional, in the case of the 
EU), distinctions will remain between authorised and non-authorised residents as well as 
controversy about priority to rights and competition for resources among them. As we saw in 
the case studied, even asylum seekers, the one migrant type whose claim to membership lay 
in universal human rights principles, face status determination processes and formal entry 
constraints that in most countries have been tightening in the past few decades -  not 
loosening. Negotiating membership status types is a complicated endeavour that would need 
some thinking through if states were to take on the responsibility of noncitizens to ensure 
their human rights, as part of a global citizenship project. It is further complicated by the 
following two problematic dimensions, which are more explicitly inter-linked.
Second, Lister’s conception of citizenship does not sufficiently address how human 
rights conflict with cultural relativism. It takes human rights automatically as being of a 
higher order than citizenship rights, and does not look at the hard questions about where 
values fundamentally conflict. It simply takes the citizenship as the legal form in which 
human rights are manifested at the level of the nation-state and suggests the two should 
merge. The third problem is that the question of whether states’ roles would subsequently be 
enlarged or diminished through the new respect for ‘differentiated universalism’ is not fully 
explained. For instance, her idea of citizenship relies on institutions of the state but also 
“loosens its bonds with the nation-state’’ and involves international institutions and 
discourses; at the same time it is suggested that invoking human rights might alter states’ 
responsibilities toward citizens of other countries “that lack the resources to translate human 
rights... into effective citizenship rights” (1997:196). This relates back to the first problem, 
that of not addressing how members -  those with rights to citizenship rights -  are to be 
identified in an inter-state system that still requires border controls, and how they could draw 
on rights and resources developed in particular nation-states. It relates to the second question 
in neglecting the conflict that could arise regarding the choke of various applications of human 
rights and various traditions of citizenship rights that currently exist. This would entail 
negotiating conflicts among governing states and international bodies, and social groups 
within them both. As the currently diverse application of human rights and citizenship across 
countries indicates, this is no easy feat. In assuming the universality of human rights is of a 
higher order than citizenship rights, it is subsequently assumed that citizenship rights should 
ultimately take on the same form in different countries, without at the same time questioning 
the culturally relative ways universal human rights principles evolved and will continue to be 
interpreted and contested. It also takes an inherently Western approach toward the choice of
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citizenship rights that will remain in an elaborated application of human rights; for example, 
in many non-western cultures collective rights are valued over and above the individual. This 
sometimes gives rise to structural justifications of controversial social practices that 
individuals can not decline, for example the widespread practice of female circumcision in 
many African countries is known in the West as ‘female genital mutilation’.
In the case studied, protection from female-specific violence was initially more well 
elaborated and upheld through Canadian women’s citizenship rights than through standard 
human rights interpretations and applications. Yet for these noncitizen claimants, human 
rights -  not citizenship rights -  ultimately provided the legal basis for membership and state 
protection from female-specific violence. As asylum seekers their eligibility for membership 
would always be assessed through refugee law based on international human rights principles 
and state’s enforcement responsibilities, but before this could occur, they had to engage in 
protracted moral and legal debates about cultural relativism, imperialism, citizen versus 
human rights, and transnational identity rights of women.
It is undeniable that citizenship was expanded and formed a crucial building block for 
these asylum seekers claims. Yet the processes this study uncovered are not adequately 
explained by Lister’s model which in many respects reflects the way human rights work, in 
theory. No territories or memberships are needed to claim ‘rights to’ human rights; cultural 
relativism is forecast to yield to its higher neighbour, universalism; and while deriving its 
legitimacy from international institutions and discourses, universal human rights need to be 
enforced by states (both in their own citizenship rights and in polices toward foreign 
nationals). Thus overarching the three problematic dimensions is the possibility that if 
citizenship and human rights could really merge, we may as well simply refer to eilher human 
rights or citizenship as mutually encompassing terms and adjust them accordingly. One could 
ultimately drop off because they would become synonymous. The issue initially would no 
doubt concern different ideas in different places regarding which citizenship and human 
rights should be merged, and which left off. But if citizenship is supposedly of a lower order 
than ‘universal’ human rights as usually assumed, it seems natural that it would be the 
dimension to drop off.
Lister’s model corresponds closely to the literature in sociology, political science and 
international relations which explores new forms of expanded citizenship arising with 
globalisation. These include cultural citizenship (Turner,1994), ecological citizenship (Van 
Steenbergen,1994), European citizenship (Habermas,1994, Meehan,1991) and global 
citizenship (Falks,1994) to name but a few. Many reinforce the substantive rights of different 
segments of national populations, based on shared cross-national collective identities (such as 
women), and many discuss the growth of international institutions suitable for this purpose.
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What is on one hand a fruitful and abundant area of scholarship also illustrates even 
more clearly the danger of extending the idea of citizenship so much that its analytical and 
practical usefulness becomes questionable, or becomes subsumed under human rights 
principles. This was an often repeated concern at the Conference on Rethinking citizenship: 
critical perspectives for the 21st century (Leeds, June 1999) which explored citizenship and 
difference, children’s citizenship, sexual citizenship, science and technology and citizenship, 
corporate citizenship, cultural citizenship, gendered citizenship, indigenous citizenship, 
migrant citizenship, and many other forms.
These accounts also tend to suffer from the same three problems discussed in 
Lister’s work In particular is the continuing question of governing institutions and rights to 
rights within territorially defined ones. Citizenship issues and the nature of citizenship can 
increasingly be discussed from detenitorialised or inter-territorial standpoints, but if the 
concept of citizenship is to be expanded there must be institutions and laws able to enforce 
those rights. If enlarged citizenship rights remain governed by nation-states, will there be 
rules for inclusion or exclusion from residency in particular territories? If attempts to regulate 
international migration are not about to disappear (even in the EU), there needs to be a 
continuing distinction between global and state level rights, if only to regulate entry.
In the case studied, by using both global level and state level rights ncndtizens were 
able to shape their entry eligibility criteria and thus their ‘rights to rights’ in a particular tenitury. 
It is not only the nature of citizenship that is changing, but also individual’s means of 
changing it. This suggests the citizenship model needs to change in some respects to 
accommodate noncitizen rights and participation, as part of the process of negotiating 
extended forms of citizenship. However, extended citizenship models do not explain or 
discuss the implications of noncitizens with ‘rights to rights’ being part of the transformation 
process. Rather they primarily consider individuals assumed to have formal citizenship status 
(even in a futuristic global democracy; for example Held,1995), or they neglect the question 
of formal status altogether.
Theories of the transformation of citizenship that describe new transnational and 
postnational forms of membership arising, suggest an alternative by keeping a firmer eye on 
the duality of formal status and substantive rights, under overarching ‘rights to rights’ that 
transcend nation-state borders.
The replacement o f citizenship:
The literature on the replacement of the citizenship model suggests human rights are 
becoming the basis or legitimacy of membership and ‘rights to rights’. It is argued that rather 
than ever progressing and expanding the value of citizenship is contracting or being replaced,
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and that with it the concept of nationality and national membership must be recast under 
more universal notions of human rights or universal personhood. Studies of international 
migration in particular have made fundamental contributions to discourses and debates on 
citizenship by demonstrating that citizenship rights often accrue to residency rather than 
formal citizenship status. These studies tend to concentrate on changing processes of 
noncitizen integration or incorporation into host countries and the benefits of membership.
In Rights Across Borders (1996) Jacobson contends that changing relations between 
individuals’ rights and states in the global system are causing citizenship to undergo 
devaluation. Taking the case of illegal immigration, he argues that “Transnational migration is 
steadily eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship”, and 
“contribut[ing] to the increasing importance of international human rights codes” (1996:9). 
Jacobson suggests that the ‘devaluation’ of citizenship is not decreasing the role of states in 
proportion to “a supranational polity”. Rather it is increasing the role of the state as a 
“mechanism essential for the institutionalisation of international human rights.” (1996:11). 
While citizenship and nationality may be in a process of being recast, the rights of individuals 
in relation to states and benefits of membership are growing through the institutionalisation 
of human rights codes.
Jacobson’s analysis agrees in many respects with Soysal (1994), who in The Limits o f 
Citizenship argues that a new form of post-national membership is arising. Building on the 
example of guestworkers’ incorporation into European nation-states, she elaborates a 
postnational model as a replacement for the citizenship model. Guestworkers have been 
incorporated into host countries in various ways corresponding to different national 
incorporation regimes, and drawing upon human rights discourses to legitimate and facilitate 
making claims upon states. Soysal explains:
...membership and the rights it entails are not necessarily based on the criterion of 
nationality. In the postnational model, universal personhood replaces nationhood; and 
universal human rights replace national rights. The justification for the state’s 
obligations to foreign populations goes beyond the nation-state itself. The rights and 
claims of individuals are legitimated by ideologies grounded in a transnational 
community, through international codes, conventions, and laws on human rights, 
independent of their citizenship in a nation-state. Hence, the individual transcends the 
citizen. This is the most elemental way that the postnational model differs from the 
national model. (Ibid, 142)
Soysal’s model suggests that a dialectic between citizenship and universal personhood is 
maintained, and that together with international instruments the state maintains or 
strengthens its importance as a vehicle for institutionalising human rights in new forms. But 
the justification for rights and claims is becoming increasingly postnational.
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Not all residents are ‘citizens’, thus their experience does not correspond to 
traditional citizenship models. Different legal status types, different rules of entry and 
degrees of access to rights persist corresponding to different immigration regimes and 
patterns of incorporation. Yet the experience of international migrants today demonstrates 
that an expansion of state responsibilities toward noncitizens and citizens is occurring 
through recognition of their international human rights. This gives noncitizens new 
legitimacy and agency; they can evoke institutionalised discourses and norms of universal 
personhood to advance claims and undermine traditional state sovereignty.
Other studies on the incorporation or integration of international migrants into host 
societies observe or prescribe similar trends, with the aim of moving toward increasingly 
tolerant and fair multicultural societies, although some give greater emphasis to the 
importance of established citizenship traditions for progress -  or regress -  in rights (for 
example Baubock,1997,1998). Baubock refers to the new forms of membership as 
transnational in nature, maintaining more of an emphasis on host-country and sending-country 
citizenship rights while explicitly drawing on human rights and transnational state 
responsibilities.
These models of postnational and transnational membership are concerned with the 
duality of membership status and rights, drawing on studies of established migrants to 
demonstrate that nationally-bound citizenship no longer adequately describes or explains 
national membership and the rights it confers. They directly confront the problem of formal 
membership (having ‘citizenship status’) which theories of expanding citizenship tend to 
neglect. In the case of illegal migrants, states’ abilities to select potential residents (with access 
to substantive citizenship rights) is questioned altogether. While illegal migrants do not attain 
authorised entry or formal membership status, the processes by which they evade or 
undermine state regulations may be understood as part of broader global trends. As Sassen 
(1996) describes, global pressures on nation-states -  arising from the global political 
economy and the international human rights regime, for example -  both contribute to and 
arise from international migration which further undermines state sovereignty.
These explanations further address the transformation of citizenship as a process of 
conflict and negotiation between noncitizenship-status and citizenship-status groups, 
describing how the struggle between cultural relativism and universalism is actually played 
out in ethnically mixed populations. In the postnational model minority group claims 
formerly described as culturally relativist are drawing on universal human rights frameworks 
for legitimacy in multicultural societies, while the ability of majority cultures in host countries 
to maintain their own culturally relativist rules for inclusion or exclusion from rights is cast 
into question. In the transnational model, citizenship is a well established ‘moral resource’
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(see Linklatter,1998) for universalising rights. In both, driving the capacity for the 
internationalisation of rights is the continuing -  and expanding -  role of sovereign states able 
to enforce rights, drawing on international principles and instruments. But driving the 
enforcement or expansion of state responsibility are also individuals’ abilities to draw on 
national and international norms and legal codes in an increasingly transnational community.
These migration studies also benefit from being more descriptive than prescriptive. 
They portray on-going processes through which membership models and rights are being 
transformed, rather than advocating forms of global governance (for example) which do not 
yet exist, or advocating group-related transnational rights without reference to formal 
membership for rights-protection. They do so without discarding the persistence of formal 
residence status which among many established migrants is not based on formal citizenship 
status; rather, the strength of these studies is in describing the paradox of substantive rights 
without formal status. New forms of membership and rights can not be explained simply as 
an expansion of citizenship without addressing how global citizenship (with, consequently, 
globally-based rights) may be governed and also still maintain territorial borders of sovereign 
nation-states. States are still concerned with preserving and strengthening their economic, 
demographic, and cultural integrity and therefore will continue to regulate immigration, 
resulting in different legal status types that in the past and foreseeable future include those 
without formal citizenship status.
But by the same token, neither can new forms of membership and ‘rights to rights’ 
which established migrants may enjoy be explained without accounting for the processes by 
which international migrants gain entrance into geographically bounded areas in the first 
place, thus gaining ‘rights to rights’ within a specified territory. The studies considered above 
drew on examples provided by established migrants who already enjoyed many formalised 
substantive citizenship rights (institutionalised rights to citizenship rights, without formal 
citizenship status). These rights provided a basis for migrants to build upon. After attaining 
certain substantive citizenship rights through residency, layers of internationalised rights 
found in human rights frameworks and instruments could be added. In contrast, the study 
of asylum seeking in this thesis considered the processes and implications of status-seeking 
migrants making claims upon host countries. In their case, the very process of gaining entry 
and membership status involved invoking both citizenship and human rights in a more 
symbiotic than hierarchical relationship.
This can be explained in part because these asylum seekers had different access to 
and justifications for drawing upon human rights compared to other migrants, namely to 
justify making claims for authorised membership. But like established migrants, they had 
access to various formal and informal citizenship rights despite their lack of formalised
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membership, as inland asylum seekers awaiting decisions on their claims. They further 
combined both citizenship and human rights in ways somewhat different from those 
described above, and they had different aims. Asylum seekers clearly wanted Canadian 
citizenship rights, and moreover, established citizenship rights were fundamental to their 
claims. They aimed to formalise their entry eligibility, and did so through human rights to 
make claims upon the Canadian state, the expansion of human rights applications through 
existing Canadian citizenship frameworks, and consequently the expansion of state 
responsibilities toward female noncitizens and citizens (whose rights became ‘human rights’) 
alike. They participated in political processes in the host country before attaining citizenship 
or permanent resident status, and in some cases even after they were issued deportation 
notices and declared illegal. They helped enumerate new eligibility frameworks in refugee 
policy, actually shaping their own rights to entry in ideal and institutional terms through 
expanded interpretations of human rights.
Thus while the above citizenship debates offer invaluable foundations, neither the 
extending nor the replacing models in themselves seemed to fully correspond to either the 
dynamics between citizenship and human rights in the case studied, or its outcomes. This 
indicates social policy would do well to consider different dimensions of the various 
citizenship debates that are still being developed and contested: expanding citizenship rights 
within countries, altogether new forms of membership arising within countries, and 
expanding applications of human rights. It can do this by bettering its understanding of the 
dynamics between citizenship and human rights, exploring and theorising why and how 
transformations are currently occurring rather than searching for an overarching solution or 
final conclusion which can not yet be clearly seen and, so far, does not adequately account 
for the way ‘rights to rights’ developed in the case studied.
Earlier this chapter demonstrated why social policy should and could incorporate 
transnational actors -  namely noncitizens -  into explanations of policy-making processes 
influenced by globalisation, taking the example of asylum seekers’ participation in refugee 
policy development. We further saw that the basis of asylum seekers’ rights to membership 
and participation were compatible with Marshall’s conception of ‘the human equality of 
membership’ underlying citizenship and social policy. And in the case studied, asylum 
seekers’ rights and means to challenge refugee policy and national membership eligibility 
were framed by the institutional structure of society, or institutionalised cultural rules and 
norms (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991), in particular the developing dynamic between national 
and ‘world level’ institutionalised cultural rules and norms (Meyer, Boli and Thomas,1994). 
This developing dynamic provides legitimacy and mobilising vehicles for individual political 
action within an increasingly transnational community. It makes the political actions of
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noncitizens viable and subsequently exerts new pressures for states to expand their social 
responsibilities, and for international human rights norms to be further developed.
Further research is needed which for the time being avoids polarising or completely 
merging citizenship and human rights, keeping an eye on the problem of distinguishing 
between formal status and substantive rights. One possible line of research is to further 
consider cases in which citizenship rights may feed into and further develop human rights 
applications, in addition to human rights extending or replacing conceptual foundations and 
substantive forms of citizenship rights (possibly to eventually replace it), exploring how 
individuals and groups actually drive such developments through the new opportunities for 
political agency which the dual international/national context affords. Like the dynamics 
illuminated in this study, such an approach concentrates on citizenship and human rights as 
mutually reinforcing ideals in a symbiotic rather than necessarily hierarchical relationship, 
with distinct though interdependent institutionalising vehicles.
The challenges posed by status-seeking migrants offer several avenues for research 
along these lines. Interesting studies might include considering the rights and processes of 
nonresident asylum seekers -  overseas refugees -  making claims for membership in potential 
host countries like Canada. They too can lay claim to a range of human rights as well as 
substantive receiving-countiy citizenship rights which frame status determination processes. 
A fruitful exploration could also be made by comparing the asylum seeking and policy 
process studied in Canada with inland asylum seekers’ rights and claim-making processes in 
countries with different types of refugee regimes and policy-making traditions, including for 
example countries without a strong common-law tradition. A third avenue for research might 
be comparing the Canadian experience with that of countries with less advanced welfare 
states -  those with intermediate development. How might citizenship rights in such countries 
be played off human rights to argue cases involving human rights violations for which the 
receiving-country does not have well established and integrated policies for its own citizens, 
such as domestic violence? Perhaps noncitizens could influence citizenship rights and social 
programmes in countries developing welfare states. Such studies are bound to reveal a 
number of ways citizenship and human rights are being used in interesting and significant 
new ways. They might also show the persistence of exclusive citizenship frameworks, and 
deleterious effects upon the interpretation and application of human rights.
Refugee movement is far from an ideal way of increasingly universalising either 
citizenship or human rights, since refugee movement is always a product of structural root 
causes which in themselves need to be addressed to stop persecution from occurring in the 
first place. Asylum seekers can not easily influence policy, nor should policy respond 
immediately to reflect all claims. Indeed, rising panic about the unmanageability of
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international migration, and refugee flows in particular, has brought world-wide tightening of 
border controls and increased controversies about "illegitimate'' and "illegal" international 
migrants. Rather, this thesis has simply explored some long overlooked dimensions and 
implications of asylum seeking for policy and policy-making, under the recognition that there 
are now and will likely always be, refugees fleeing injustice and persecution. It revealed 
asylum seekers’ use of changing dynamics between citizenship and human rights as 
justifications and basis for membership, and their subsequent influence upon policy and state 
responsibilities.
Co n c lu ding  remarks
Marshall’s idea of citizenship may be inherently compatible with a notion of human rights or 
universal personhood upon which claims by non-citizens for access to host countries and the 
benefits of membership (rights and participation) may be supported. However, selecting 
which rights, which beneficiaries, which governing institutions and hew much state (or 
international) responsibilities, is no easy feat. This study provided one example of how 
universal human rights and citizenship rights can be negotiated, in this case by noncitizens 
seeking residence.
Blurring across traditional boundaries between citizenship rights and human rights 
was remarkably demonstrated by asylum seekers requesting the same protection that 
Canadian women are entitled to receive through the combined efforts of the nongovernment 
sector and eight government departments in the social services which address violence 
against women. Traditionally perceived as among the most powerless of the powerless, 
women refugees became a political force in Canada, helping to redefine the basic parameters 
of refugee policy and state responsibility for the protection of female foreign nationals and 
stateless persons, or non-citizens.
In this claim-making and policy development process, we have explored more fully 
and gained a better understanding of changing relationships between nemtizens and states in a 
global system, and the complexity of the unfolding dialectic between citizenship and human 
rights. Social policy will need to increasingly engage with consequences of globalisation such 
as those described in this study. It illustrated a symbiotic relationship between citizenship and 
human rights. It illuminated the structural context for seeking asylum, challenging refugee 
policy to seek social citizenship rights, and participating in policy processes. It explored why 
status-seeking international migrants had access to and actually drew upon citizenship rights 
in Canada to expand the interpretation and application of human rights. And it described 
how, using an expanded human rights interpretation, they gain authorised entry into Canada
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and received the benefits of substantive citizenship rights -  namely protection. In so doing, 
despite their noncitizen status they helped expand the substance and applications of both 
citizenship and human rights and subsequently of state responsibilities toward citizens and 
noncitizens alike. They played political roles, participating in the development of refugee 
policy and their own eligibility criteria for membership and the rights it confers. They were 
supported by and furthered the developing dynamic between institutionalised norms and 
values at national and international levels.
The study also suggests that listening to asylum seekers can create a fairer refugee 
system without compromising the rigour of selection systems. Ideally, eligibility criteria can 
be negotiated to reflect more accurately the range of social injustice that exists in the world, 
while narrowing in on those most in need within each category. Listening to asylum seekers 
can also open up new vistas for academics trying to understand the current transformations 
and future potential of a more global responsibility for social welfare.
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APPENDICES
Ap p e n d ix  A. Asylum  seek er s , In t e r v ie w e e s  a n d  Q u e st io n n a ir e
RESPONDENTS
A. 1 A sylum seekers in  the  study  w ho  w e n t  public
Major case histories
Name* Country of origin
Dulerie Trinidad & Tobago
Taramati Trinidad & Tobago
Ferdousi Bangladesh
Nada Saudi Arabia
Lee Trinidad & Tobago
Azadeh Iran
Fatima Lebanon
FEndra Trinidad & Tobago
Ines Peru
Olga Russia
Liza St. Vincent
Nadia Bulgaria
Maria/Miranda Guatemala
Kapinga Zaire
Therese Seychelles
Anna Bulgaria
Angela Dominica
Phagawdeye Trinidad & Tobago
Ginette Camaroon
Minor case histories:
Ana Mexico
Sandy Germany
Kissoon Trinidad & Tobago
Amina Somalia
Zahra Iran
Fatima Turkey
* Names are sometimes Alias; see section on Confidentiality in Chapter 2
A.2 Expert  Interviews
Refugee Lawyers:
Marie-Louise Cote, Montreal, 13 January 1995
Barbara Jackman, (Ontario Lawyer Association, President), Toronto, 22 November 1994
Diane Belanger, Montreal, 11 July 1995
Suhk Ramkisson, Toronto, 18 October 1996
SylviePiriou, Montreal, 30 October 1996
Sonia Heyeur, Montreal, 2 February 1995
Pierre Duquette, Montreal, 20 July 1995
Women’s Groups:
A . N ational W omen's Groups
National Action Committee on the Status o f Women (NAC),
Executive Committee, Violence Against Women Unit: Flora Fernandez 24 August 1995
National Organisation ofImmigrant and Visible Minority Women o f Canada, member, Flora 
Fernandez 24 August 1995
B. W omen's shelters
Flora Tristan (Montreal shelter for immigrant women), Director Elizabeth Montecino 31 
January 1995
Women's A id  (Montreal shelter for immigrant women), Director Flora Fernandez 24 August 
1995
Auberge Transition (Montreal women’s shelter), Staff Member Martha, 17 January 1995 
(phone interview and survey)
Multi-Femmes (Montreal shelter for ethnically diverse women), Staff Member Julie 
Asimaliopulos, February 1995
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Refugee and Human Rights Groups:
A. International
International Centre for Homan Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD): Information 
Officer Diana Bronson, 25 January 1995
International Centrejur Human Rigjots and Democratic Devdopment (ICHRDD): Arienne Brunet, 21 
December 1994
B. National
Canadian Comal for Refugees (CCR): Executive Director Janet Dench 20 December 1994
C. Community & local
Table de Concertation des Organismes de Montreal au service des Refugies (TCMR), 
President Rivca Augenfeld, 22 August 1995
Refugee Action Montreal (RAM), Coordinator, Glynis Williams 28 July 1995
Refugee Action Montreal (RAM), Board Member And Refugee Claimant, Therese 19 July 
1995
Coalition Aux Refugees, Montreal (CAR), member, Marie LaCroix, 27 August 1995 (phone 
interview)
Institutional -  Government organisations:
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB): Working Group On Refugee Women, Adjudicator Nancy 
Doray, 30 January 1995
Library O f Parliament Research Division, Law and Government, Margaret Young, 23 August 
1995 (phone interview)
Asylum seekers:
Therese, 19 July 1995
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A.3 Q uestionnaire respondents: W om en ’s shelters
M ontreal 
Auberge Transition 
Maison d’Amitie 
Maison Marguerite
Toronto and O ttawa 
Robertson House 
YWCA Women’s Shelter 
Nellies Hostel 
Harmony House
A ppe n d ix  B. Sem i-structured  In terv iew  a n d  Q uestio nnaire
schedule
As described in Chapter 2, interviews were loosely structured. Interviewees provided their 
own chronology of events, but questions were at times interjected to ensure that all the basic 
themes were covered. Interviews were also tailored to the professional background or 
experiences of interviewees for the purpose of obtaining more detailed information about 
participation (i.e. legal experience, NGO experience of different kinds, governmental 
experience, and asylum seeking experience). However guidelines used for interviews 
followed the same main themes. The Questionnaire sent to women’s shelters similarly 
followed the same themes but emphasised case-experience more than campaign experience, 
and was more detailed with specific questions elaborated under each question and prompts 
for various dimensions of the question to be answered. The interview schedule for asylum 
seekers was different in not departing from professional experience, and allowing for an 
even looser, unstructured (narrative) account of asylum seekers’ experience. A sample 
describing themes in both supporter-oriented interviews and questionaires, and asylum 
seeker interviews is provided below.
Sample interview schedule and Questionnaire themes: core and secondary supporters
Themes and subthemes:
• What was your previous experience with these types of cases?
• Can you describe trends in the types of cases you saw, in your experience, previous to the 
campaigns?
during the campaigns? (particular case scenarios, pre- and post- Guidelines) 
after the campaigns?
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• Why did you get involved with the campaigns?
- do you/the organisation usually get involved in campaigns for particular 
cases/asylum seekers?
• How did you get involved with the campaigns?
• Can you describe your involvement in the campaigns?
- Working with other core supporters
- working with particular asylum seekers who went public 
relationship with government; strategies for influencing government 
relationship with media; strategies for using the media
• Can you describe how the Consultations came about, and what they were like (if 
participated)?
organising sectors to be represented 
relationships with other participants (by sectors)
- participation of refugee women
• Were you satisfied with the Guidelines?
• If you didn’t engage in advocacy in later cases (post-Guidelines), why not?
Sample interview schedule for asylum seekers who went public
(Interuiewswere eum more Iwsdy stmctumi in these cases. Wefirst began talking about the interview process. 
I  then asked ^ nerd questions aboat how the campai^ isbe^m and prooeedecb and how the particular 
claimant's case was resohed Descriptions o f the asylum seeking and carrfdgping experience unfolded in the 
asylum seeker's cum way).
Themes and sub-themes
• When and how did the claimant first seek asylum
made an independent refugee claim
how did the claimant arrive at these decisions? (advice from others, lack of 
options, etc)
• When and how did the claimant decide to go public
• How did the claimant go public
what enabled her to go public 
in what manner did she go public
• Who did the claimant work with
• Interaction with the media
• Description of the asylum seeking process, and campaigns
• Outcome of endeavours (application outcome)
• Did the claimant believe refugee policy and/or its administration should be changed,
why and in what way
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A p p e n d ix  C .
C h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  c o r e  o r g a n is a t io n s  in  t h e  a d v o c a c y  n e t w o r k
Core organisations in the policy advocacy network (expert interviews) had the following 
characteristics, described generally in chapter 6 as an outgrowth of trends and developments 
in the 1980s (formalisation, funding, interests), and chapter 8 regarding organisational type, 
mandate/interests and political access.
C.l Refugee and humanitarian organisations
TCMR
Refugee entry, settlement 
and integration, some 
policy advocacy.
Early 1980s
Member of CCR 
Working Group on 
Women Refugees, 1988.
Montreal umbrella group 
co-ordinating refugee 
organisations
1.Research/education on 
refugee rights
2. develop and 
coordinate settlement 
service among NGOs
3. foster understanding 
btw. society and 
migrants.
4. Policy advocacy 
particularly through the 
OCR
>1'Rarely advocates for 
individual cases, unless 
representative of a 
structural or group 
problem
Government funding, 
from various 
departments for specific 
activities on short-term 
basis (unstable).
Moderate political 
access, particularly on a 
regional level, and with 
IRB in Montreal
FOCUS
YEAR of 
formalisation
WOMEN’S 
ISSUES an 
interst (Year)
LOCALE & 
MANDATE
FUNDING
POLITICAL
ACCESS
OCR
Refugee issues (inland and overseas, 
policy and administration).
1977 /  1978, volunteer effort. 
Formalised in 1988.
Working Group on Refugee Women 
1985; became a Core Group in 1988, 
Refugee Women’s 
Issues
National umbrella organisation for 
refugee groups
1. education & networking forum 
for nonprofits
2. policy advocacy through meetings, 
correspondence & telephone contact 
with Gvt., and through media
’’’Rarely advocates for individual 
cases, unless representative of a 
structural or group problem
Government funding for specific 
activities on short-term basis 
(unstable).
High political and media access. 
Serve on several government 
Working Group committee(IRB 
Advisory Committee; UNHCR 
consultative status), regularly advise 
government on policy and practice, 
attends and organises Consultations 
with government_______________
ICHRDD
Human rights and
democratic
development.
1988
Women’s Human 
Rights part of mandate 
from the start, targeted 
as a domestic issue in 
1992
Canadian International 
organisation.
1. Primarily 
international advocacy 
work, mediating 
between government 
and NGOs/citizens
2. occasionally takes up 
domestic issues
’’■Rarely advocates for 
individual cases, unless 
representative of a 
structural or group 
problem
‘Arms-length’ or 
‘independent’ 
nongovernment group 
created and funded by 
government.
High political and 
media access, including 
representation by 
former party political 
leader
RAM
Refugee issues, 
primarily entry and 
settlement
1985, first paid staff
Member of CCR 
Working Group on 
Women Refugees,
1988. Focus on 
refugee women, 
networking, policy 
advocacy in 1993
Front-line community 
service for refugees
1. Intervention in entry 
processes
2. networking, 
education
3.Policy advocacy 
through national 
umbrella groups 
(ICCR, CCR, TCMR)
’’’Advocacy in 
individual cases (front­
line services)
Ecumenical group 
funded by Protestant 
church but operating 
independently since 
1992
Moderate/Low direct 
political access; 
operates primarily on 
local level, advocacy 
through umbrella 
groups
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C.2 Characteristics of W om en’s organisations
NAC NOIVMW Women’s Aid Flora Tristan Multi-Femmes Auberge
Transition
FOCUS
YEAR of 
formalisation
Women’s issues, 
general
1972.
Years of
institutionalisation:
1980-1988
Immigrant and 
visible minority 
women’s issues
Formalised in 1986
Women’s shelter 
Late 1970s
Immigrant 
women’s shelter
1986
Women’s shelter 
for women of 
different race 
and ethnicities
Early 1980s
Women’s 
shelter, Montrea
Late 1970s
Increased attention Always -  but more Sensitisation Always; Always Increasingly
Refugee to visible minority, attention to toward the needs Sponsorship catering to
women’s ethnic and immigrant women of immigrant abuse a women of
issues an immigrant and settlement women, late particular focus different ethnic
interst (Year) women’s issues 
since 1988.
issues than entry 
issues
1980s in late 1980s and racial 
origins, mid 
1980s
LOCALE & National umbrella National umbrella Front-line Front-line Front-line Front-line
TARGET organisation for organisation for community community community community
women’s groups immigrant and 
visible minority 
women’s groups
service for 
immigrant 
women fleeing 
domestic
service for 
immigrant 
women fleeing 
domestic
service for 
immigrant 
women fleeing 
domestic
service for 
women fleeing 
domestic 
violence
MANDATE
&
Primarily lobbying 
federal
Education,
research
violence violence violence
ACnVTTTES government on 
legislation and
Policy advocacy Provide
residence,
Provide
residence,
Provide
residence,
Provide
residence,
policy', education ’''Occasionally counselling and counselling and counselling and counselling and
and research advocates for 
individual or
support; 
policy advocacy
support; 
Research and
support;
Policy advocacy
support;
Policy advocacy
*Rarely advocates representative through education; through through
for individual 
cases, unless 
representative of a 
structural or group 
problem
cases Provincial and
national
networks
’''Advocacy in 
individual cases
policy advocacy 
through 
Provincial and 
national 
networks 
’''Advocacy in 
individual cases
Provincial and
national
networks
’''Advocacy in 
individual cases
Provincial and
national
networks
’''Advocacy in 
individual cases
FUNDING Government Government Government Government Government Government
grants from the 
Women’s Program 
and Secretary of 
State. Non­
government 
funding sources: 
membership fees 
and donations.
funding funding 
Low access to
funding 
Low access to
funding 
Low access to
funding 
Low access to
Hight political and Moderate access to government, government, government, government,
POLITICAL media access. government, Moderate to Moderate to Moderate to Moderate to
ACCESS Moderate to media media media media media
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App e n d ix  D . Chronolo gy  o f  press coverage a n d  campaign
CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSED, 1991-1997
May 2, 1991. Le Toumal de Montreal. “Retoumer dans leur pays ou continuer d’etre 
maltraitees.”
December 20, 1991. CCR president David Matas letter to Immigration Minister Bernard 
Valcourt.
July 8,1992. Randy Gordan, Assistant to Immigration Minister, letter to David Matas.
August 13,1992. ICHRDD letter to potential supporters.
August 19, 1992. ICHRDD president Ed Broadbent, letter to Immigration Minister Bernard 
Valcourt.
September 17, 1992. The Toronto Star. Canadian Press. “Trinidad can protect woman, 
Ottawa insists.”
September 23,1992. The Toronto Star. Willkes. Jim. “Abused woman allowed to stay here.”
November 11, 1992. Montreal Gazette. Bindman. Stephan. “Victim of spousal abuse can 
stay: Trinidadian woman’s refugee claim ‘credible’.
November 11, 1992. The Toronto Star. Special. “Court allows refugee bid by abused 
woman.”
November 23,1992. Secours aux Femmes, letter to immigration officials and supporters.
November 30, 1992. Montreal Gazette. LaSalle. LuAnne. “Make Canada a haven for abused 
women: NAC.”
January 1993. The Globe and Mail. Oziewicz, Estanislao. “Canada not planning to widen 
refugee rules to cover sex bias: women fleeing abuse would strain system, Valcourt 
says.”
January 16, 1993. The Globe and Mail. Oziewicz, Estanislao. “No plan to accept victims of 
sex bias.”
January 18,1993. Press release issued by the ICHRDD.
January 20,1993. Press release issued by the CCR
January 20, 1993. CCR letter to Laura Chapman, Director General of Policy and Program 
Development, EIC.
January 25, 1993. Montreal Gazette. Scanlan, David. “Consider gender: persecuted women 
should have refugees status”.
January 25,1993. Montreal Gazette. Bennett. “Rape and war: They go together, experts say.”
January 29,1993. Press release issued by the Immigration Minister’s office.
January 29,1993. Immigration Minister, letter to Ed Broadbent, ICHRDD.
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January 29,1993. Press release issued by the ICHRDD.
January 30, 1993. Montreal Gazette. Canadian Press. “Persecuted woman gets refugee 
haven.”
February 2, 1993. Press release issued by the CCR. February 3, 1993. Montreal Gazette. 
Scanlan, David. “Women’s groups say abuse is ground for refugee status.”
February 6,1993. Montreal Gazette. Canadian Press. “Valcourt stays deportation of Trinidad 
woman.”
February 10, 1993. Montreal Gazette. Miller. “Battered Montreal mother fears for life if 
deported to Bangladesh.”
February 11,1993. The Toronto Star. Thompson. Allan. “Women fleeing abuse to qualify as 
refugees.
February 11, 1993. The Toronto Star. Canadian Press. “Valcourt to review case of 
Bangladeshi woman.”
February 11, 1993. ICHRDD president Ed Broadbent, letter to Immigration Minister 
Bernard Valcourt.
February 15,1993. Montreal Gazette. Curran, Peggy. “Is sexual equality a universal value?”
February 26,1993. NAC letter to Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt.
March 1993. Montreal Gazette. Curran, Peggy. “Ottawa eases way for women seeking 
refugee status”.
March 1993. Montreal Gazette. Fitterman, Lisa. “Woman gets 18-day delay on deportation: 
Seychelles native fears estranged husband will kill her if she’s sent home”.
March 1993. NAC press package on fourteen women seeking stay of deportation.
March 1, 1993. Press release issued by Legal Counsel for Fard, & Firoozeh Radjai, and 
Iranian Immigrant and Refugee of B.C. “Hunger strike day”.
March 3,1993. Press release issued by legal counsel and the IIRBC. “Hunger Strike Day 9.”
March 5, 1993. Montreal Gazette. Bagnall, Janet. “Stop deporting female refugee claimants: 
NAC”.
March 8,1993. Montreal Gazette. Bagnall, Janet. “Battered Bangladeshi woman can stay.”
March 11, 1993. Montreal Gazette. Broadbent, Edward. “Indivisible: Until women’s rights 
are human rights, we have far to go.”
March 11, 1993. The Ottawa Citizen. Nada. “A serious step toward accepting female 
refugees.”
March 19,1993. Letter to Madeleine Bamabe at the Centre Immigration Canada.
March 25,1993. ICHRDD letter to Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt, and MPs.
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June 6,1993. The Toronto Star. Thompson. Allan. “Woman given refugee status after fleeing 
spouse’s beatings.”
November 1993. Women’s Aid, letter to Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt, and MPs.
December 21, 1993. The Globe and Mail. Broadbent. Edward. “Prisoners in their own 
homes.” Editorial.
November 16,1994. Press release issued by NAC.
November 17,1994. Montreal Gazette. “Woman fears death if deported tomorrow”.
November 17,1994. Montreal Gazette. Chemey, Elena. “Can’t shelter all battered refugees”.
November 17, 1994. Montreal Gazette. Semenak, Susan. “Marchi stops deportation of 
abused woman and two children”
November 1994. The Westmount Experience. Halting. Clare. “Un sursis de 18 jours ne 
rassure en rien la famille Sabadin: Une mere et ses deux enfants vivent dans la peur.”
November 23, 1994. The Westmount Experience. “Westmounters backing Seychelles 
refugee: Petition to prevent deportation of threatened woman available for signing at 
Church of the Advent.”
December 1994. The Westmount Experience.Williams. Glynis. “Success for Refugee Action 
Montreal”.
December 6,1994. Montreal Gazette. Wilton, Katherine. “Pleading to stay.”
December 7, 1994. Montreal Gazette. Norris, Alexander. “Woman hides from deportation: 
says in-laws will kill her in Cameroon.”
December 12, 1994. Multi-Femmes (Coalition Quebecoise et Canadienne d’appui a Ginette 
Ngueyo et a sa fille Belinda), letter to Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi, request 
for ministerial intervention.
December 12,1994. Mulit-Femmes (CQCGNB) letter to potential supporters.
December 20,1994. La Ouartier Libre. Calmels. Didier. “Entre la mort et la clandestinite.”
January 1995. Dossier prepared for Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi.
January 5-11, 1995. Hour Magazine. Feinberg, Jennifer. “Cameroonian woman threatened 
from the grave.”
January 5, 1995. Mirror. “Hiding out, waiting, hoping.” Ginette; Coalition contacted over 50 
Montreal groups and local MPs to lobby Federal immigration department.
January 11, 1995. Montreal Gazette. Binder, Sarah. “Cameroon woman in hiding tests new 
immigration guidelines.”
February 2,1995. Montreal Gazette. Norris, Alexander. “Battered woman kicked out.”
February 8, 1995. Montreal Gazette. Norris, Alexander. “Ottawa ruling angers women’s 
groups.”
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February 8, 1995. La Presse. Montreal. Berger. Francois. “Ottawa deporte une immigrant 
battue... mais accept l’ex-mari agresseur.”
February 8, 1995. Le Toumal de Montreal. “Immigration Canada accusee de deporter une 
femme battue.”
February 8,1995. The Globe and Mail. Canadian Press. “Deportation order fought.”
February 10, 1995. Montreal Gazette. Norris, Alexander. “Battered woman to be deported 
today: immigration rejects last-ditch plea to allow Trinidadian to stay.”
February 10, 1995. La Presse. Montreal. Berger. Francois. “Les groups de femmes 
demandent a Quebec de bloquer la deportation dune famille de Trinidad.”
February 11, 1995. La Presse. Montreal. Bergen Francois. “Enfants apprehendes en vue de 
l’expulsion de leur mere.”
February 1995. The Westmount Experience.Regina. “Irregularites dans la deportation d’une 
mere et de ses deux enfants.”
March 8, 1995. Sabadin, Therese. Speech delivered at the IRB Conference for International 
Women’s Day, Montreal.
March 9-15, 1995. The Canibbean Camera “Guyanese granted refugee status.”
July 12, 1995. Montreal Gazette. Wilton, Katherine. “Woman had reason to flee Ghana: 
threat of genital mutilation justifies her appeal to stay, court rules.”
June 21,1996. The Canibbean Camera “Lesbian gets walking papers.”
August 26, 1996. The Toronto Sun. Godfrey. Tom. “Battered wife can stay here.”
December 28,1998. Montreal Gazette. Jelowicki, Amanda. “Deportee fears for her life.”
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